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Community justice in Scotland – the system of agencies that deliver community 
punishments and related services – is being restructured for the second time in a 
decade. The current system of administration by regional Community Justice 
Authorities (CJAs) will be replaced by a two-tier model, with local planning passing 
to Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) and a new national body providing 
leadership for the sector. This thesis, the only empirical study of the restructuring, 
draws on interviews with politicians and practitioners to analyse the policy, its 
historical background and the ways in which – without directly affecting practice – 
it connects to major questions about Scottish politics and penal policy. 
Using the theoretical concept of the ‘penal field’, the thesis discusses the effects on 
community justice of struggle and compromise between Scottish local and national 
government. The birth of CJAs from this compromise caused them to be structurally 
flawed, but they were nonetheless not without certain achievements. Community 
justice is also considered in relation to historical narratives of a distinctive Scottish 
penal identity, and efforts to reaffirm it by reorienting the justice system towards 
community penalties rather than prison. 
Recent scholarship which highlights the role of local democratic structures in penal 
policy informs an analysis of CPPs (whose limited success has produced concern 
about their ability to fulfil justice responsibilities) and the relationship between their 
development (including the recent Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act) and 
the community justice redesign; the thesis argues that the community justice and 
community empowerment agendas are being allowed to converge but not meet. 
The new system, it is argued, is another structurally flawed compromise. The 
proliferation of agencies will likely hinder partnership working, while the new 
national body will have little power to fulfil some difficult and complex 
responsibilities around legitimacy and accountability. The policy will disrupt lines 
of communication despite efforts to smooth the transition, and the length of its 
development has already caused disruption. The restructuring, it is further argued, 
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This thesis concerns Scotland’s system of community justice, which is responsible 
for working with convicted offenders in the community to help them desist from 
offending. Specifically, it concerns the organisations that administer community 
justice in Scotland, the framework of which is currently being reorganised for the 
second time in about a decade. The thesis is an investigation into the historical roots 
and likely effects of this policy, and is believed currently to be the only such study. 
In the context of efforts to reduce Scotland’s prison population, the Scottish 
Government is aiming to use community justice as an alternative to imprisonment, 
with lower financial costs and reoffending rates. In many jurisdictions, community 
justice work is known as ‘probation’ and carried out by national justice agencies, but 
in Scotland, it is the responsibility of Criminal Justice Social Work (CJSW) units 
within local authorities. This distinctive structure is closely connected to narratives 
which emphasise the distinctively welfare-oriented character of Scottish policy, but 
– as this thesis also argues – has meant the structure of community justice is shaped 
by power struggles and compromises between Scotland’s local and national 
government.  
These compromises produced serious structural flaws in the previous system of 
regional Community Justice Authorities (CJAs), which ended up with major 
responsibilities for reducing reoffending and holding organisations to account, and 
little power over CJSW units or other bodies. After a long consultation, it has been 
decided that CJAs will be abolished in 2017 and replaced by a two-tier system in 
which a new national body, Community Justice Scotland, will be set up but most of 
the CJAs’ responsibilities will pass to the local Community Planning Partnership 
(CPP) framework, a system which is also being altered by policy to form a 
prominent part of the Scottish Government’s new ‘prevention’ agenda. As this 
thesis argues, CJAs and CPPs are similar in suffering from a number of problems to 
do with partnerships and democratic engagement with local communities. 
xii 
 
The thesis draws on interviews with practitioners in the system, policymakers and 
politicians to argue that the policy will be limited in its ability to resolve the 
previous system’s structural problems and is also likely to create its own. The power 
of local authorities in the development of the policy has meant the new national 
body has – like the CJAs – been left with complex and difficult responsibilities yet 
minimal power. Further, it is unlikely to have major effects on CJSW practice, and in 
fact falls far short of the kind of major social and cultural shift needed to move 
Scotland away from its over-reliance on imprisonment. Nonetheless, this thesis 
argues that the restructuring of the community justice system sheds light on 
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“Any topic of interest in the social sciences has a peculiarly amorphous quality. It 
looks distinct, tangible, separate – empirically or conceptually – but the closer you 
examine it, the more it merges into its surrounding space.” 







“You wake up in the morning 
And the sun’s coming up 
It’s been up for hours and hours” 
- Neil Young, ‘Last Dance’ 
  
                                                     







Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Background: Interesting Times 
This thesis concerns the current restructuring of the community justice system in 
Scotland, still ongoing at the time of writing and due to take full effect in 2017. The 
second such major reform in only a decade, it comes shortly after the establishment 
in 2005 of Scotland’s eight regional Community Justice Authorities (CJAs). These 
were found to be deeply constitutionally flawed in a number of ways,2 and the 
current reforms will abolish the CJAs and replace them with a two-tier arrangement 
in which new local partnerships – originally to be Community Planning 
Partnerships (CPPs) – will administer community justice locally, while a new 
national body, Community Justice Scotland (CJS), will be established with a mission 
to provide guidance, share best practice and promote community justice in 
Scotland.3 The roles and functions of each of these bodies are explained more fully 
below. 
Like many (perhaps all) theses, this one has narrowed in focus over the period of its 
development, in a way that has not always been straightforward or easy. But the 
scope of the project has also widened, engaging with a broader range of literature 
and theory than expected. The thesis is also in many ways the ‘child’ of a 
particularly interesting and unusual time for politics in Scotland. Its conclusions are 
necessarily tentative, as the developments under discussion are still in motion at the 
time of writing, and it is in this sense a contemporaneous report on a restructuring 
process whose full dimensions and effects remain to be seen. 
The project was originally conceived largely as a response to the part-privatisation 
of probation in England and Wales, an unprecedented and controversial policy 
whose effects on the practice of probation in England and Wales have been 
described by many practitioners and observers as enormous and highly destructive, 
                                                     
2 Audit Scotland, 2012; Angiolini, 2012 
3 Scottish Government, 2014c 
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and which I had hoped to investigate as they were occurring.4 I noted also that 
Scotland was also embarking on a restructuring of its own community justice 
system, although the detail of this was not yet clear, and thought a comparison 
between the two would provide valuable insights into processes of community 
justice reform and the ways in which two somewhat similar and neighbouring 
jurisdictions were taking such different paths. As detailed in Chapter 4, it eventually 
became clear that this comparative approach would not be possible – and that the 
project would have more to do with the administration and management of 
community justice than its actual practice. 
As Scotland’s new community justice policy started to take shape, it became clear 
that there was more than enough material for a PhD in the developing Scottish 
policy, and it was decided to refocus the project on the Scottish reforms. As the 
policy had developed, significantly more detail had come to light on the new 
Scottish system and on the process of its development. This also produced a wider 
scope for the thesis, in which it was possible to put the detail of the policy into the 
context of penal and political developments in Scotland and further afield. This 
policy is a somewhat unusual locus for conflicts and tensions to do with these 
various developments, allowing the thesis to rise above anodyne and administrative 
concerns and deal with key issues at the heart of criminal justice policy in Scotland. 
England and Wales, in fact, remained in the picture. Even though Scotland has 
always had separate legal and criminal justice systems from its neighbour 
jurisdiction, Scottish criminal justice policy (including community justice) has been 
affected by developments and policies in England and Wales, and by its changing 
political relationship to that jurisdiction. Scotland is often described as having a 
different penal philosophy to England and Wales, one marked by a more welfarist 
and less punitive approach to criminal justice and often referred to as the 
‘Kilbrandon philosophy’,5 after a 1964 report which produced vital and distinctly 
                                                     
4 Robinson, 2016b; Burke, 2016 and others in Probation Journal, Vol. 63(2) 




Scottish system changes in youth justice and in community justice.6 The 
development of Scottish criminal justice has been shaped by narratives of 
distinctiveness and difference from England and Wales, although close study of the 
available historical evidence shows a picture which resists simplification, and 
includes similarities and convergences as well.7 
In the years following the 2007-08 financial crisis and particularly since the election 
of the 2010-2015 Conservative-led coalition government, the UK has embarked on 
extensive ‘austerity’ cuts to public spending. At the same time, the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) has gained a surprising degree of power and influence, winning an 
overall majority in the Scottish Parliament in 2011.8 The SNP government has 
embarked on various policies aimed at restructuring public services in Scotland to 
mitigate the impact of the cuts by improving efficiency while maintaining, as far as 
possible, the level of service.9 Scotland’s criminal justice institutions have always 
been separate from those of England and Wales, and these have also undergone 
major reforms. As well as community justice, the Scottish government has been 
involved in restructuring Scotland’s courts system, integrating the provision of 
health and social care within local authorities and (perhaps most controversially) 
uniting Scotland’s eight territorial police forces into a single national service, Police 
Scotland, in April 2013. The SNP majority in the 2011 election also produced 
probably the biggest single political event since devolution – the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014, which produced an enormous rise in support for 
the SNP (doubling its membership to about 115,000 people, or 2% of the population 
of Scotland)10 while falling short of the result the party had intended.11 Although 
Scottish criminal justice had always been separate from its counterpart south of the 
border, the referendum and its galvanising effect on the SNP independence agenda 
                                                     
6 Kilbrandon, 1995 [1964] 
7 McAra, 2008; Croall, 2006 
8 Curtice, 2011 
9 Matthews, 2012 
10 Keen and Audickas, 2016: 12 
11 Paterson, 2015: 24 
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(before and after the vote) have helped to shape a criminal justice policy agenda 
which aims to pursue both distinctiveness from England and Wales and 
demonstrate Scotland’s competence to govern itself independently (while not 
always conforming as closely to penal welfarist ideals as this might suggest).12 
At around the same time, the Scottish Government has also sought to reduce the 
country’s fairly high prison population, which rose from around 5,000 (a rate of 
about 100 prisoners per 100,000 population) in the early 1990s to nearly 8,000 (a rate 
of 145 per 100,000 – fairly high for Europe) in 2014.13 Recent years have seen political 
and governmental recognition that imprisonment (particularly the very short tariffs 
that make up the majority of Scottish prison sentences)14 has little success in 
reducing reoffending while producing many destructive effects for individuals and 
communities.15 The high reoffending rate and enormous economic and social cost of 
imprisonment make it an unacceptably inefficient punishment, especially at a time 
of financial austerity, as well as an often disproportionate one. Like other 
jurisdictions, Scotland has pursued the expanded use of community sentences as a 
way of reducing imprisonment and its associated costs – but despite its intuitive 
appeal to many policymakers, this policy has sometimes produced the opposite of 
its intended outcome when attempted in other jurisdictions.16 
One particularly important feature of Scotland’s ‘distinctive’ criminal justice 
identity is that community justice has been primarily the responsibility of local 
authority social work departments, rather than a national criminal justice 
organisation like the Probation Service which until recently had responsibility for 
probation in England and Wales.17 This may be a factor in aligning Scottish 
community justice more closely with social work ideas and values, and in insulating 
it somewhat from changes that have affected other community justice systems, 
                                                     
12 MacLennan, 2016 
13 Scottish Government, 2015f: 10 
14 Ibid.: 10 
15 Scottish Prisons Commission, 2008 
16 Phelps, 2013 




particularly that of England and Wales. It also has major political consequences, 
placing the relationship between local and national government at the centre of the 
current restructuring policy and producing an interesting, and perhaps distinctively 
‘Scottish’ answer to the question of the meaning of ‘community’ in community 
justice. Partly as a result of the comparative novelty of Scotland’s parliament, local 
authorities in Scotland exercise an unusual amount of power,18 and the 
development of the new system has been marked by conflict and compromise 
between local and national government – which, as several of the participants in this 
project have observed, is similar to the process that produced the flawed CJA 
system. A further problem is to do with the tension between responding to local 
needs and producing outcomes that are consistent nationally. 
As such, the restructuring of community justice in Scotland must be seen not merely 
as a mundane managerial reform but also as a development in Scotland’s complex 
political relationship with England and Wales, and in the sometimes equally 
difficult relations between local and central government. It must also be considered 
as an indirect consequence of austerity policies enacted by the UK government, as 
this prompted a programme of public service reform in Scotland intended to 
mitigate the impact of these policies while still maintaining a commitment to levels 
of social service.19 Finally, the restructuring also forms part of Scotland’s attempts to 
reorient its approach to punishment, and is thus connected to a number of other 
criminal justice reform policies – although many interviewees in this project argued 
the restructuring did not go far enough in this (Chapter 6). It is a policy which has 
gained widespread but generally cautious and qualified support from a range of 
politicians and practitioners. 
                                                     
18 Jeffery, 2006; Mooney, Croall, Munro and Scott, 2015: 214; Morrison, 2012: 251-3 
19 Christie, 2011 
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2. Defining Community Justice in the Penal Field: A Note on 
Terminology 
Community justice is a complex term freighted with political connotations and not 
as easily defined, either administratively or spatially, as imprisonment.20 This is part 
of the reason why this thesis focuses on ‘community justice’ as opposed to 
‘community penalties’, ‘sanctions’ or ‘measures’ (which suggest more of a focus on 
the penalties themselves, rather than the system as a whole); ‘criminal justice social 
work’ or ‘social work with offenders’ (which implicitly excludes third-sector and 
other relevant organisations); or ‘probation’ (which refers only to the supervisory 
aspect and, unlike in other jurisdictions, is not used in Scotland to refer to the 
system of provision). 
Statutory supervision of offenders is still at the core of community justice. In 
Scotland this is carried out by criminal justice social work (CJSW) departments, 
either as part of a community sentence or as statutory ‘throughcare’ provided to 
prisoners leaving the prison system after sentences of four years or more, in order to 
aid their reintegration into the community. (Shorter-sentenced prisoners may 
request voluntary throughcare on their release).21 The work of CJSW departments 
also includes various services to Scottish criminal courts – in particular, CJSW staff 
investigate the backgrounds of convicted offenders to produce reports for 
sentencers to take into account in making sentencing decisions.22 As well as 
supervision and pre-sentence reports, community justice involves running 
Community Payback schemes (unpaid work) in cooperation with other parts of 
local authorities, and some aspects of the administration of electronic monitoring of 
offenders (EM or ‘tagging’), which is provided in Scotland by the private security 
firm G4S.23 However, the focus of this project is on supervision- and social work-
oriented services and mainly on state-run institutions (although the degree of 
                                                     
20 Robinson, 2016a 
21 McNeill and Whyte, 2007: 115-39 
22 Ibid.: 68-82; Halliday, Burns, Hutton, McNeill and Tata, 2008 




separation between these institutions is in itself an interesting potential research 
problem). In addition, there are many small and large third sector organisations 
(TSOs) providing specialist services to the community justice system in Scotland, 
such as Sacro, Victim Support Scotland and Turning Point Scotland, which runs the 
218 service highlighted by Angiolini as a model for an alternative to prison for 
women offenders.24 Because of the complexity of many offenders’ needs and the 
wide range of social problems involved, various non-justice organisations from the 
public sector, such as the National Health Service (NHS), may also be enlisted in 
community justice work – but the focus of this project is on institutions for whom 
community justice represents a major or primary function. 
Thus, the community justice ‘system’ in Scotland, although dominated by certain 
principal actors with primary responsibility for provision and administration (the 
CJSW departments, the CJAs and the larger, nationwide specialist third-sector 
organisations), is somewhat diffuse and has the potential to involve almost any 
public service organisation, as the Scottish Government’s own broad definition 
suggests: 
“The collection of agencies and services in Scotland that individually and in 
partnership work to manage offenders, prevent offending and reduce 
reoffending and the harm that it causes, to promote social inclusion, 
citizenship and desistance.”25 
Although this is far from the only definition of community justice, and has been 
criticised for being too narrow (see Chapter 2, Section 5),26 it is what I use for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
Much of this project concerns the position of community justice services within the 
‘penal field’, described by Page as “the social space in which agents struggle to 
accumulate and employ penal capital—that is, the legitimate authority to determine 
penal policies and priorities – … [which] intersects the bureaucratic, political, and 
                                                     
24 Angiolini, 2012: 26-28 
25 Scottish Government, 2014b: 1 
26 SP OR 19 November 2015, col. 41-44 
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legal fields, and neighbors the economic, academic, and journalistic fields.”27 The  
Scottish Prison Service (SPS) exercises a degree of influence on Scotland’s penal field 
that is disproportionate to the relatively small proportion of sentenced offenders 
who are imprisoned; much of the discussion of community justice as a set of 
institutions and as a penal approach also entails discussing its position in relation to 
prison, and as Robinson has noted this has been a feature of much of the scholarship 
on community penalties.28 Given this, and the interest in using community penalties 
as a mechanism for reducing imprisonment, this thesis necessarily gives some 
consideration to the relationship between the two. 
The matter is complicated further by various types of institutional ‘blurring’ of 
boundaries between the systems of community justice and imprisonment;29 as 
Cohen notes, efforts in the last few decades to shift from incarceration to community 
punishment have been characterised not by the replacement of one by another but 
by “gradual expansion and intensification of the system; a dispersal of its 
mechanisms from more closed to more open sites and a consequent increase in the 
invisibility of social control and the degree of its penetration into the social body”.30 
The first type of blurring has to do with responsibilities – the system of community 
supervision is required to deal not just with offenders punished in the community 
but also with the ‘throughcare’ or ‘aftercare’ of offenders leaving prison. Personnel 
from the community justice system may also work in prison with imprisoned 
offenders, producing a spatial blurring of the boundaries. Community penalties can 
also turn into prison sentences if offenders fail to comply with the requirements of 
community supervision (Chapter 2, Section 3). This complicated relationship 
between community punishment and imprisonment gives the lie to a 
straightforward narrative which posits using these punishments as ‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’. It is also often far from clear what is meant by ‘community’ in this 
                                                     
27 Page, 2011: 10 
28 Robinson, 2016a 
29 Cohen, 1985: 58 




context, as efforts to engage local communities in this and other areas of criminal 
justice have made clear (Chapter 3).31  
3. Explaining the Research Questions: Overview of the 
Thesis 
The research questions of this project are: 
1. What historical processes have structured the Scottish community justice 
field? 
2. What are the likely effects of the reforms on the structures of this field? 
3. How will the habitus of people working in different parts of community 
justice adapt to these structural changes? 
These questions are structured around Bourdieu’s social theory, particularly the 
concepts of ‘field’ (a social space in which various agents take positions in relation 
to each other and may come into conflict) and ‘habitus’ (a set of “structured, 
structuring dispositions” both shaping and shaped by everyday practice),32 which 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The first question is intended to site the 
current restructuring policy within a historical context, dealt with mainly in 
Chapters 2 and 3 which are based on historical and academic parts of the research. 
The second and third questions deal more closely with the restructuring policy 
itself, and are answered partly by the literature research (particularly the ‘closer 
range’ research of recent policy documents and legislative developments) and partly 
by the empirical part of the project, which comprises 21 interviews with various 
practitioners and politicians involved in various ways with the community justice 
redesign.  
The focus of the longer-term historical research is on the period between the 1968 
Social Work (Scotland) Act, which made community justice supervision the 
responsibility of generic social work departments in local authorities, and the 
                                                     
31 Crawford, 1997; Hughes, 2007; Hope, 1995 
32 Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]: 52 
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present day. Chapter 2 takes theoretical cues from the ‘penal field’ described by 
Page and others to set the history of community justice in Scotland in the context of 
wider movements in community justice history, the complex and intertwined 
problems to do with the position of community penalties as ‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’ in the context of the ‘penal turn’ described in the work of David 
Garland,33 and the ways in which Scotland’s ‘distinctive’ approach to community 
justice has developed, including the effects of Scotland’s changing relationship with 
England and Wales. Chapter 2 also sketches the development of the community 
justice redesign policy through its long consultation period up to the passage of the 
primary legislation underpinning the new system, the 2016 Community Justice 
(Scotland) Act. 
Chapter 3 is more political in focus, taking as its starting point work by Barker, 
Savelsberg and Dzur which emphasises the role played by democratic structures in 
accounting for criminal justice policy variation between and especially within 
countries, complicating significantly the picture of the ‘penal turn’.34 In the context 
of longstanding problems with the public and political legitimacy of community 
justice, evidence suggesting that more deliberative forms of democracy produce 
more support for welfarist and rehabilitation-oriented policies connects this strand 
of political theory directly to current concerns about community justice.35 This 
chapter also sets the policy in geographical context: Scotland’s small size and 
geographic diversity have created particular challenges for balancing local 
responsivity and national consistency; its local government is unusually influential 
and its national Parliament unusually new. The chapter then turns to the concept of 
community in criminal justice, taking a critical perspective influenced by Stanley 
Cohen’s Visions of Social Control.36 It also draws on the ‘crime reduction partnership’ 
literature, particularly the works of Crawford, Hughes and Hope,37 to consider how 
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community partnership approaches to crime reduction have developed, particularly 
through the 1990s, in parallel with other ‘community’-oriented policies including 
community planning. Chapter 3 then gives a brief account of the somewhat fraught 
development of Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) in Scotland, the 
particular democratic concerns about these partnerships and the implications of the 
community justice redesign which will connect community justice to CPPs, just as 
the Scottish Government also seeks to strengthen these flawed institutions of local 
democracy. The chapter concludes by arguing that despite the contemporaneity and 
seeming convergence of these two policy developments, the community justice and 
local democracy agendas have been kept separate, representing a lost opportunity 
to create a radically democratic and community-oriented approach to justice. 
The fourth chapter explains the development of the project, before returning to 
Bourdieu’s social theory to explain this more fully as a theoretical grounding for my 
methods, and more specifically considering the applicability of the ‘penal field’ to 
the Scottish case. The chapter orients some parts of the project more towards ‘field’ 
and other parts more towards ‘habitus’, before considering some of the literature on 
interviewing and the ways in which I prepared for the project fieldwork. Chapter 4 
then turns to the issue of how the qualitative data from the interviews would be 
processed; I chose to use the very popular but not always well-understood ‘thematic 
analysis’ method. Rather than simply approaching this as a ‘default’ method of 
qualitative data analysis, the chapter explains the process and positions the analysis 
in relation to the vexatious ontological and epistemological tensions identified in the 
qualitative analysis methodology literature, including in particular the question of 
inductive as opposed to deductive coding, discussed by Boyatzis and Charmaz 
among others.38 The chapter then explains how the themes drawn from the data 
were connected and related to each other by a somewhat hierarchical and structural 
system which aimed to organize the findings around a manageable number of 
interrelated key points, and how I used software to achieve this. 
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There follow two Findings chapters which discuss the results of the analysis, 
illustrated by extensive direct quotes from interviews. The first of these, Chapter 5, 
concerns aspects of community justice practice and is primarily (but not exclusively) 
based on interviews with management-level practitioners in CJAs, social work and 
the third sector. The key findings from this chapter concern the importance 
accorded by these practitioners to research and evidence-based practice, their 
general agreement that the CJA system was in need of replacement but was not 
wholly unsuccessful, and their concerns about the complex and sometimes difficult 
dynamics of community justice partnerships (and the effects of restructuring 
policies on these partnerships). Chapter 5 also considers the pervasive impact of 
austerity cuts, the search for long-term and flexible funding models in an area of 
public service which often seems to resist easy quantification, practitioners’ own 
experiences of the redesign consultation, the ways in which they sought to smooth 
the transition to the new system, and their hopes and concerns for that new model.  
Chapter 6 is based primarily (but, again, not exclusively) on my interviews with 
local and national politicians involved in community justice and particularly the 
redesign policy. The chapter considers a number of matters to do with politics and 
purposes, beginning with the ways in which CJAs have operated as institutions of 
local democracy and deliberation, and related issues to do with accountability in the 
current and the new system. It then turns to the complex dynamics of local and 
national control in community justice, its connection to political questions and the 
idea that the new system is intended to combine the best aspects of local and 
national approaches. The chapter also considers discussion of the purposes of 
community justice, highlighting the continued relevance of the Kilbrandon 
philosophy in the modern day as well as the view, expressed by many interviewees, 
that a major cultural change in Scottish criminal justice and wider society (well 
beyond the current redesign) was needed, before considering a key obstacle to such 
a development – the widespread lack of public and political interest in community 
justice. Chapter 6 concludes by arguing that the compromise between local and 




with some very difficult responsibilities – developing good working relationships 
with local bodies and raising the public profile of community justice – but very little 
power. 
Chapter 7 draws together and briefly summarises the key themes from the findings 
chapters and sites them within the theoretical literature discussed in the first half of 
the thesis, to make several theoretically-grounded arguments about the Scottish 
community justice redesign. By way of a denouement, the chapter sets the current 
system and the redesign in the context of the development of Scotland’s penal field, 
taking a critical view of efforts to produce a smooth and straightforward transition 
and arguing further that the redesign, as well as being only the latest in a series of 
compromises between local and national government over community justice, 
represents a continuation of a ‘dirigiste’ approach to local governance. It builds on 
this to argue that community justice will remain a politically and culturally invisible 
part of Scotland’s justice system, despite the intention in the redesign to raise its 
public profile, and then considers the redesign in terms of the development of 
Scotland’s distinctive penal identity, and the wider public service reforms that 
followed the Christie Report.39 Despite claims that have been made about desistance 
and reintegration, the redesign is fundamentally a managerial reform which will not 
necessarily reorient Scotland’s penal field in the way hoped for by many 
interviewees, and is unlikely to have any significant direct effect on the everyday 
practice of community justice. It could not be considered a new paradigm in the 
same way that the advent of generic social work was.40 However, the restructuring 
is already having some indirect effects – the transition process is increasing 
difficulties for some provider organisations and disrupting existing partnership 
arrangements, despite adaptations of community justice practices that aim to 
minimise this disruption.  
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Chapter 7 then concludes the thesis by returning to the research questions above, 
answering them by summarising some of the main findings and arguments of the 
thesis. This thesis is believed to be the first empirical study of the Scottish 
community justice policy, and the only one to involve fieldwork carried out while 
the policy was still in development. In understanding the historical origins of the 
policy, its connection to questions about community and democracy in Scotland, the 
development of the new model and practitioner and political views on it, I hope to 
explain its relevance to community justice in Scotland and the wider world, the 






Chapter 2: Community Justice in Scotland’s Penal Field  
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the historical background of the redesign of the Scottish 
community justice system. In doing so, it aims to answer the first of the project’s 
research questions: “What historical processes have structured the Scottish 
community justice field?” It begins by considering some issues and concerns which 
have persisted throughout the history of community justice in the UK – a breadth of 
geographic scope intended to overcome the dearth of historical material on early 
community justice history in Scotland. The chapter then considers a major and 
complex problem for community justice: a Gordian knot in which are entangled a 
lack of public knowledge, a deficit of public and political interest, a perceived lack 
of judicial legitimacy (manifested in complaints of underuse by sentencers), what I 
have termed ‘discourses of optionality’ which position community sentences as 
‘alternatives to imprisonment’ and the ways in which policies intended to address 
this deficit may actually diminish the value of community sentences as diversionary 
measures. The chapter then takes a somewhat more narrative approach to consider 
the ways in which Scottish justice policy and community justice have followed a 
path distinct from but sometimes affected by developments in England and Wales, 
and marked by complex and ongoing power struggles. The chapter then explains in 
detail the conception and development of the current restructuring of the system, of 
which this project is believed to be the first empirical study.  
The historical scope of this chapter is wide, but its focus is on the ‘late modern’ 
period, defined approximately as lasting from the late 1960s to the present day. As 
such, its theoretical approach to historical developments is informed by sociological 
accounts of the development of more punitive justice policies in the late modern 
period, and in particular by Garland’s book The Culture of Control.41 This now-classic 
account of penal developments in Britain and America investigates the ‘penal turn’ 
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which took place in both countries around the 1970s, a sudden and surprising shift 
from ‘penal modernism’ or ‘penal welfarism’ to ‘penal populism’. The first of these 
tendencies is described as being dominant in the early to mid-20th century, and 
characterised by the dominance of rehabilitation in penal discourses (including 
through the development of community justice practice)42 and reductions in the use 
of severe punishments including imprisonment and the death penalty (abolished in 
the UK from 1965, suspended in the US in the 1970s). However, a ‘crisis in penal 
modernism’ developed in which crime and punishment became more politicised 
and ‘law and order’ increasingly staked out by right-wing political parties.43 Other 
aspects of this late-modern period of ‘penal populism’ included more emotional and 
punitive political discourse around crime and punishment, the growth of private 
crime control, a dramatic increase in the use of imprisonment and – pertinently for 
community justice – a loss of criminological belief, and political interest, in 
rehabilitation and the welfare of convicted offenders.44 This coincided with and was 
partly the result of wider economic and social factors, particularly social upheaval 
in the 1960s, recession in the 1970s, the growth of neoliberal capitalism in the 1980s 
and rising crime from the 1960s until about the 1990s. In general, the penal turn was 
less dramatic in the UK (and other English-speaking countries) than in the almost 
uniquely punitive USA.45 Recent commentary within Scottish criminology has 
argued that Scotland (a separate jurisdiction within the UK) has avoided the most 
dramatic aspects of this penal turn.46 
Garland’s account has been criticised for its inadequate explanation of causes, of 
variation (between places) and of consistency of some practices over time. Garland 
himself has argued for a conception of penality which “attend[s] more closely to the 
structure and operation of the penal state”.47 (Chapter 3 considers variation between 
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places within Scotland, and the role of democratic structures and local government 
in community justice, in more detail). 
Bourdieu’s theory of the ‘field’ – a social space of any size in which actors vie for 
positions using various types of ‘capital’48 – has proved valuable in examining the 
development of penality at a ‘meso’ level – one which can ‘bridge the gap’ between 
macro-level scholarship of the type exemplified by The Culture of Control and micro-
level studies which emphasise the complexity of what ‘really’ happens ‘on the 
ground’.49 Page makes particularly valuable use of the concept of the ‘penal field’ in 
The Toughest Beat, his account of the role of the California Correctional Peace 
Officers Association (CCPOA) in shaping and influencing the ways in which that 
state experienced its penal turn.50 The ‘penal field’ goes beyond the ‘penal state’ to 
consider the involvement of non-state institutions, and this is part of its utility in 
analysing a part of criminal justice in which charities have traditionally been 
prominent.51 
Goodman, Page and Phelps developed the ‘penal field’ concept further in arguing 
for an ‘agonistic’ perspective on penal development, a theoretical framework based 
on three axioms: that penal change results from struggle between actors in 
asymmetric power relationships with each other (i.e. with differing capital 
resources), that this struggle is constant and consensus over penal matters largely 
illusory, and that struggles within the penal field are affected but not determined by 
wider trends in society.52 One effect of these structural characteristics is that reforms 
oriented towards a particular rationale, although often announced with some 
fanfare, are almost never carried out entirely as intended.53 However, as will be 
argued in Chapter 4 (Section 3), the agonistic approach does not translate neatly to 
Scotland. 
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This chapter will show that conceiving of Scottish community justice using the 
penal field helps explain the extent and patterns of recent restructuring, and the 
power struggles that have shaped its recent history. In this case, the situation is 
complicated further by the position of Scottish community justice specifically within 
not just the penal field but also social work and local government fields. 
2. The Standard History of Probation 
Since its beginning in the late Victorian era, the practice and administration of 
community justice has been affected by certain longstanding issues. There is 
remarkably little historical material on the early history of Scottish community 
justice, so any discussion of these concerns must also draw on material about the 
history of the field in the wider UK. Particularly influential in this regard is the 
‘McWilliams quartet’ of articles on the evolution of probation in England and 
Wales.54 These articles divided British probation history into three broad ‘eras’, 
characterised by different approaches to probation practice and the ontology of 
offenders. 
McWilliams describes the origin of probation in the late 19th century as a response to 
social concerns, as well as a convenient judicial third way. This period was marked 
by concern over urban poverty, crime and the ‘dangerous classes’;55 among the 
many philanthropic organisations established around this time was the Church of 
England Temperance Society (CETS), founded in 1862 as the Church of England 
Total Abstinence Society.56 CETS was founded to promote abstinence from (or at 
least moderation in) drinking, by evangelising to the public – and thereby to save 
the souls of alcoholics and reduce alcohol-related crime.  CETS began appointing 
missionaries to police courts in 1876, initially “exhorting offenders to give up drink, 
distributing uplifting tracts, and taking pledges of abstinence”.57 These missionaries 
quickly became useful to magistrates in other ways, the most important and lasting 
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of which would be the supervision of offenders released on ‘recognizances’ (a 
power then recently granted to magistrates) and assisting the court in determining 
which offenders should be so released. The work in the courts,58 which quickly 
became the main business of CETS missionaries, established the practices of 
supervision and presentence reporting which still form the core of modern 
community justice practice.59 
The second ‘era’ in the history of probation was ‘diagnostic’ and associated with the 
burgeoning disciplines of psychiatry and sociology.60 The 1907 Probation of 
Offenders Act, which applied across the UK, formalised probation orders and made 
probation personnel (most of them still missionaries at the time) court employees. 
This was the beginning of a professionalising tendency within community justice 
whose principal features were the development of more formal structures, the end 
of church involvement in the 1930s and the institution of formal staff training.61 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, community justice in the UK gained more 
responsibilities and more community sentencing options became available.62 In 
Scotland this period also saw the Kilbrandon Report and the development of what 
is widely seen as a distinctively Scottish approach to criminal justice, including 
community justice.63 
The third era begins approximately at the same time as the ‘crisis of penal 
modernism’ identified by Garland,64 marked by more and longer imprisonment, 
more punitive discourse around punishment and more public and political concern 
about crime. This final era is typically characterised as being both punitive and 
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highly managerial.65 Community justice tended also to become both actually and 
rhetorically more punitive, particularly in England and Wales.66 
One feature of this period was a loss of faith in the idea that community 
punishments could rehabilitate offenders, encapsulated in Martinson’s infamous 
claim that ‘nothing works’.67 However this pessimism ultimately gave way to the 
idea that some rehabilitative measures were effective, and that these could and 
should be tested empirically – the ‘what works’ school of thought.68 In these altered 
terms, rehabilitation (properly evaluated) remained popular but tended increasingly 
to be framed in terms of protecting the public from future crimes, particularly from 
higher-risk offenders.69 A risk management ethos became prominent in probation, 
social work and mental health, including the introduction of Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) for supervising high-risk offenders in England 
and Scotland, and an emphasis on actuarial risk assessment tools such as OASys 
(Offender Assessment System).70  In general, community justice practice became 
more managerial and (in many jurisdictions) more market-oriented.71  Governments 
began to exert more central control over community justice services through 
national standards, performance targets and successive reorganisations.  
This periodised history provides some sense of the main currents in the 
development of community justice in the UK. There are parallels with Scotland, 
particularly in the diagnostic and managerial phases, but there are also important 
differences which are discussed further below. Scotland is notable for its earlier 
adoption of a service run by the state rather than religious charities,72 and the move 
towards more risk assessment in the 1990s and 2000s, while also present in Scotland, 
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was not accompanied by punitive rhetoric as it was in England and Wales.73 
Perhaps most importantly, the ‘diagnostic’ period in Scotland brought not only 
changes in practice but highly significant structural developments. 
3. Legitimacy, Optionality and Toughness 
Throughout its history, the system of community penalties has suffered from 
problems with legitimacy.74 In the wider public sphere this has mostly manifested as 
a belief that community penalties are too lenient and/or applied to the ‘wrong’ 
offenders, where the public is aware of these penalties at all. There is a lack of public 
or political awareness of what community penalties are and how they work, which 
may partly be attributed to their low visibility in popular culture.75 
This has taken place in the wider context of the ‘penal turn’, a development 
characterised by rising crime and increasingly emotive and politicised responses to 
crime and punishment since the 1970s.76 The most visible aspect of this was the 
enormous rise in imprisonment across much of the Western world – the prison 
population of England and Wales more than doubled from 1993 to 2008; Scotland’s 
prison population experienced a similar pattern but grew more slowly.77 As of 2015, 
Scotland’s imprisonment rate is 143/100,000 population while that of England and 
Wales is only marginally higher, at 148/100,000 population. Although far lower than 
those anywhere in the US (which has tended to symbolise the very worst of the 
‘penal turn’), these imprisonment rates are high by comparison with most Western 
and Northern European countries.78 
However, it is less widely acknowledged that the rise in imprisonment in the UK 
and the US was accompanied by a rise in the use of community penalties. Because 
of their intended use as diversionary sentences, discussion of community penalties 
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also entails discussion of imprisonment and sentencing. Within the penal field, 
community penalties have long existed in the ‘shadow’ of the prison, despite their 
demonstrably greater penal and social value. This is partly because of the blurred 
institutional boundaries between community supervision and imprisonment, and is 
evidenced in longstanding concern in Scotland and elsewhere about the underuse of 
community punishments by sentencers.79 This section argues that this judicial 
legitimacy and underuse problem is largely a result of what I term ‘discourses of 
optionality’, which have positioned community penalties as ‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’ throughout their history. It also considers ways in which the British 
and Scottish Governments have attempted to deal with legitimacy problems by 
making community penalties more explicitly punitive, in rhetoric and in reality.  
Public Legitimacy and Awareness 
In general, there is little evidence of public legitimacy for, or public confidence in 
community sentences. As Maruna and King remark, “probation has developed a 
distinct public relations problem in the USA and the UK”,80 although they 
acknowledge that this may be less serious in Scotland. Public attitudes research on 
crime and punishment suggests this is not a straightforward question of the public 
believing offenders deserve harsh punishments, and that community sentences and 
sentencers are too lenient, and thus of the increase in imprisonment arising from the 
popular will. In practice, as Korn has remarked, “the public has become one of 
criminal justice’s ‘sacred cows’, often deferred to but never consulted”.81 
There is not much evidence that public opinion is against the use of community 
penalties per se,82 or that public beliefs about appropriate sentences (tested in mock 
sentencing exercises) are more punitive than those of actual sentencers (although 
they may believe that they are).83 Additionally, opinion polls (which involve ‘snap 
judgments’ and little discussion, and are often phrased to suit a particular agenda) 
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may produce a misleadingly punitive and potentially self-fulfilling picture of public 
opinion;84 conversely, more deliberative approaches to gauging public opinion show 
a more complex and largely more lenient picture.85 
The public legitimacy issue appears to stem largely from a lack of awareness of 
community penalties. In their recent major study of occupational cultures in 
probation in England and Wales, Mawby and Worrall described a sense of 
frustration among probation staff arising from this lack of public knowledge, which 
manifested not only in the media and political climate but also in their interactions 
with personal acquaintances.86 The findings from this project suggest that public 
and political ignorance about community justice is also a source of concern to 
practitioners and policymakers in Scotland (Chapter 6, Section 6), and that this has 
been considered in the redesign of the Scottish system, but the redesign is unlikely 
to address it. The low level of public awareness is not entirely surprising in light of 
the media profile of community punishments. Compared to other areas of criminal 
justice or of public service, community justice and social work receive little media 
coverage. Even the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms in England and Wales (see 
Chapter 4, Section 1), arguably an internationally unique criminal justice reform, 
received little news media coverage, most of it confined to the Guardian and the 
Independent.87 Further, as Robinson notes, 
“[u]nlike prisons, community sanctions have no obvious physical 
architecture or structural locus (beyond probation and parole offices and 
supervisees’ homes) and those who administer them tend not to wear 
uniforms, such that both the sanctions and those who enact them fail to 
generate ready images or occupy any significant space in the public 
imagination.”88 
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Successful community justice practice is oriented towards prevention or 
minimisation of future offending, and thus defined by what does not happen as a 
result of it (reoffending or reconviction at the individual and statistical levels). What 
media coverage there is of community justice and social work tends to focus instead 
on high-profile failures of supervision or protection – high-risk offenders left 
unsupervised and thus free to carry out violent crimes.89 Fitzgibbon argues that 
although incidents of this type have long drawn news media attention, the tone of 
the coverage has become – in line with trends towards emotionalised crime and 
punishment discourse, an eroded sense of community and heightened insecurity – 
noticeably more emotive and inclined to attack individuals (a recent example being 
Sharon Shoesmith, head of children’s services in Haringey at the time of the Baby P 
case).90  
Community penalties also have a low profile in popular fiction of various types.91 
Compared to the countless films and TV shows in which courts, prison and 
(especially) the police have featured prominently, there are only a handful of 
offerings which consider the work of the community justice system, and few are 
well-known. This underrepresentation in popular fiction might not seem 
particularly important, but in light of research suggesting that public opinion on 
community justice is far more readily affected by emotive appeals to moral values 
around “making good” and “paying back” than by “cognitive strategies” based on 
dry statistical information,92 the dearth of high-profile, popular and compelling 
community justice fiction may be a contributing factor to its public legitimacy 
problem. 
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Judicial Legitimacy – Optionality, Net-Widening and the ‘Paradox of 
Probation’ 
The public legitimacy deficit has been accompanied by a similar concern, mainly 
within community justice institutions, that penalties lack legitimacy among 
members of the judiciary, and that sentencers make insufficient use of them. In the 
late-modern context of the high and rising prison populations, this concern has 
taken on a new urgency, with governments pursuing community penalties as a way 
of reducing the prison population, often with only limited success. Investigating the 
relevance of judicial legitimacy for community justice in the penal field involves 
some consideration of studies of sentencing statistics and practice, and of theoretical 
models which aim to account for the complex and contradictory position of 
community justice in relation to the ‘penal turn’ of the last forty years, in Scotland, 
England and elsewhere – specifically the extent to which community justice serves 
as either a ‘diversionary’ or a ‘net-widening’ system.93 
Community punishments of various types are sometimes referred to as 
‘alternatives’ to imprisonment.94 This term has different meanings depending on 
who is choosing between imprisonment and the ‘alternatives’ – sentencers in 
individual criminal cases at the micro level, or policymakers seeking to alter 
criminal justice systems at the macro level. Sentencers in the UK are independent 
from politicians and enjoy considerable discretion in the sentencing options 
available to them, especially in Scotland.95  Meanwhile, policymakers, including 
politicians and civil servants, have the power to introduce certain types of 
sentences, to alter the set of available sentencing options and/or to restrict the range 
of judicial discretion in sentencing, including through the use of mandatory 
sentences. In either case, the language of ‘alternatives to imprisonment’ reifies the 
dominance of prison in the penal field and the scholarship around it.96 
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Community justice has been defined in relation to imprisonment since it began in its 
modern form, in the late Victorian era. As McWilliams writes in his classic history of 
the early development of probation in England,97 it developed during a period in 
which England’s justice system was becoming more systematised, crime was rising, 
and the jurisdiction of magistrates (similar to Sheriffs in Scotland) had been 
extended to deal with a wider range of criminal matters. All of this resulted in more 
business for magistrates and a major rise in the prison population. Magistrates also 
found themselves caught between two sides in a debate over the right way to 
sentence, between consistency and leniency, particularly for minor offenders – 
unable simply to let them off but unwilling to punish too harshly (or to contribute 
further to the severe prison overcrowding of the period). The police court 
missionaries provided a way out of this by allowing the offender to be supervised 
but not imprisoned.98 About a century later, it was crisis in Scottish prisons – rather 
than within the community justice system – that forced the Scottish Office to 
attempt to use community penalties as a way of reducing the prison population,99 
while the introduction of the Community Payback Order in 2010 was similarly 
justified in terms of dealing with overcrowding in prison, following a 
recommendation by the Scottish Prisons Commission: 
“To move beyond our reliance on imprisonment as a means of punishing 
offenders, the Commission recommends that paying back in the community 
should become the default position in dealing with less serious offenders.”100 
Scholars and practitioners in community justice describe a persistent problem with 
underuse of community penalties by the judiciary;101 this has long been a concern, 
even during the diagnostic ‘golden age’ of probation; the 1962 Morison Report on 
probation in the UK found that during this period, in both England and Wales and 
Scotland, the ‘market share’ of probation actually declined even though the absolute 
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numbers of people on probation rose markedly during this period.102 The 1955 
history of probation in Glasgow also emphasised that despite a recent increase in its 
use “it is felt that probation can play a much more prominent role in the Adult 
Courts.”103 The concern may have been even more serious in Scotland before the 
Kilbrandon reforms. The Scottish Office expressed concern about a lack of 
understanding in a 1947 report, and 15 years later the Morison Report was raising 
similar issues:  
“Probation is used considerably less in Scotland than in England and Wales 
especially for adult offenders. The use of probation by the higher courts is 
also much greater in England and Wales than in Scotland, where there is still 
a tendency to regard probation primarily as a treatment for juveniles and 
young offenders.”104 
By 2010 Scotland had “one of the widest ranges of ‘alternative’ community-based 
sentences anywhere in the world,”105 including the Probation Order, the 
Community Service Order (CSO), the Supervised Attendance Order (SAO), the 
Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO) and the Restriction of Liberty Order 
(RLO). After the crisis in Scottish prisons during the 1980s, the CSO (introduced in 
1979) was developed as a specific alternative to imprisonment, with a requirement 
imposed in 1991 that Scottish courts could only impose a CSO where they would 
otherwise impose a custodial sentence.106 Similarly, the SAO was developed as an 
alternative to imprisonment for fine default, which would require the offender to 
carry out a certain number of hours of ‘constructive activity’, constituting a “fine on 
the offender’s free time” in lieu of payment.107 Thus this set of options appears to 
have developed partly as the result of the highly selective application of the logic of 
‘alternatives to imprisonment’, producing measures that were highly specialised in 
their diversionary intent although not necessarily very different in practice. This 
complex system of community sentences was described as part of the reason for the 
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low public profile of community justice in Scotland,108 and was mostly replaced by 
the Community Payback Order (CPO) in 2010 (see below). 
However, much of the research on sentencing suggests that decisions to imprison 
rather than impose a community punishment do not result from a paucity of viable 
community options.109 In addition, there is strong recent evidence that increasing 
the use of community penalties can actually increase the prison population.110 This is 
to some extent supported by the fact that rises in imprisonment have tended to be 
accompanied by rises in the use of community penalties.111 As Cohen has argued, 
“the claim to be doing more good (or less harm) is somewhat less valid if the 
alternatives are not real alternatives at all, but supplements”.112 Attempts to reduce 
imprisonment by providing ‘alternatives’ to incarceration can widen rather than 
narrow the net of social control, as a complex apparatus of classification must be 
developed to determine who gets ‘diverted’ and sentencers give more of these 
apparently less harmful sentences to minor offenders who might not otherwise have 
been sentenced at all. Austin and Krisberg describe this aspect as key to the “unmet 
promise of alternatives to incarceration”.113 In addition, Millie et al.’s research shows 
that British sentencers in ‘borderline’ cases (those that could receive either a 
custodial or a community sentence) are more inclined to impose prison sentences 
where the offender has reoffended after a community sentence, taking the view that 
community justice has ‘failed’ in that offender’s case, but using prison as a ‘last 
resort’ rather than because it is expected to ‘succeed’.114 
Where community penalties are imposed, imprisonment remains available as an 
option, as it also does in related practices of post-imprisonment supervision such as 
parole. An offender who breaches the terms of a community penalty or post-prison 
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supervision, such as by failing to attend an appointment, can be recalled to court 
and potentially (if the breach is especially grave, or has happened many times) be 
imprisoned, even for an administrative as opposed to a criminal offence. This 
becomes particularly likely when community justice systems are encouraged to 
punish breaches severely (see below). Some community penalties, such as the 
Suspended Sentence Order in England and Wales, make the threat of a custodial 
sentence even more direct a consequence of ‘failure’. This can result in what Caplow 
and Simon describe as a form of ‘reflexivity’ in which community sanctions create 
“feedback loops” that bring people into prison (and then back out on supervision, 
etc.).115 Connected to this is the phenomenon of “back-end sentencing” – returning 
parole violators to prison for breaches – which has been a major and understudied 
factor contributing to the growth of imprisonment in the US.116 
Phelps, writing about the US system in recent years, describes a ‘paradox of 
probation’ in which community sentences can function either to divert people away 
from prison or to feed people into it – or both at the same time.117 The key factors 
Phelps identifies in determining which it is are: the extent to which supervision is 
supportive and rehabilitative or punitive and compliance-focused, how breaches are 
dealt with by systems, and the extent to which the sentencing process is net-
widening or diversionary. 
So, is the Scottish community justice system in 2016 net-widening, diverting or 
both? Weaver et al. point to an increase in the rates of recall to prison from post-
release supervision or licences as a “back-end sentencing” factor that has frustrated 
efforts to reduce the prison population, but one that “should be understood as a 
consequence of the political failure to address rising levels of ‘front door’ entry into 
prison.”118 However, recalls from post-release supervision have rarely accounted for 
more than 1% of receptions into prison through recent years (although they 
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constitute around 9% of Scotland’s prison population, up from about 5% in 2006, 
suggesting that a sizeable proportion of recalled prisoners return to long 
sentences).119 Similarly, although about a third of CPO breaches in 2013-14 resulted 
in a custodial sentence, this only accounts for about 800 prison receptions from an 
annual total of nearly 34,000.120 Prison receptions continue to be almost entirely 
accounted for by remand and direct sentencing, suggesting that “back-end 
sentencing” is not currently a major factor in Scottish imprisonment.121 Front-end 
aspects of the ‘paradox of probation’ tend to be less easily determined and 
understood.122 
The ‘share’ of community sentences has increased from 12% to 17% of convictions in 
Scotland over the last ten years. In general, crime and reconvictions have also 
decreased significantly over this time.123 This has not however been accompanied by 
a fall in the share of custodial sentences, which has remained fairly stable while the 
‘share’ of financial penalties has fallen significantly.124 The replacement of the more 
specifically diversionary CSO and SAO with the CPO has clouded the picture of the 
extent to which CPOs are diverting cases away from prison, but is also likely to be 
part of the explanation for the rise in the share of community penalties. Considering 
the different shares of custodial sentences for the same crimes over time shows that 
despite this rise, the percentage share of custodial sentences for most offence types 
has risen over the last decade – that is, a higher percentage of convictions for similar 
crimes result in custodial sentences.125 This counterintuitive finding is probably 
largely accounted for by the large fall in the share of financial penalties and the 
contemporaneous large increase in the use of fiscal fines and other out-of-court 
disposals. It suggests that overall, at the “front door” of sentencing, community 
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penalties have not been successful enough at diverting people away from prison to 
offset the rise in imprisonment. 
Millie et al.’s finding that custodial sentences are often imposed in ‘borderline’ cases 
where the offender has already served community sentences – out of a sense that 
these previous sentences have ‘failed’ and sentencers have ‘no other option’ but to 
imprison126 – could also help to explain the apparent failure of community penalties 
significantly to reduce the prison population. Statistics on reconviction and 
sentencing in Scotland support this, with people who have served more than one or 
two previous community sentences being significantly more likely to receive a 
custodial sentence. However, much of the rise in custody’s ‘share’ that is observed 
as the number of previous community sentences increases appears to be at the 
expense of the ‘share’ of financial penalties, rather than community sentences.127 In 
general, the ‘share’ of convictions that result in financial penalties decreases 
significantly with previous convictions or sentences of any type.128 
It may be that a process similar to the one described by Millie et al., but operating in 
a different part of sentencing, is occurring in relation to financial penalties; 
previously imposed financial penalties are seen to have ‘failed’, leading sentencers 
to impose CPOs or other supervisory sentences. This is far from certain, though, 
given that the data do not include information on previous financial penalties. They 
are also only minimally disaggregated by crime type, and are only aggregate- rather 
than individual-level data.129 
Despite these limitations, it seems likely that the process described by Millie et al., in 
which the perceived ‘failure’ of previous community sentences leads to decisions to 
imprison, is continuing to take place in Scotland. Despite some success in increasing 
the ‘share’ of community penalties, there is no clear evidence that they have been 
successful as genuine ‘alternatives’ which divert people away from imprisonment in 
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significant numbers. However, community penalties in Scotland have so far also 
largely avoided developing the problematic “back-end sentencing” observed in 
other jurisdictions. 
Legitimacy Through ‘Toughness’ in the Late-Modern Era 
One way in which both the UK and Scottish governments have attempted to 
improve the public and judicial legitimacy of community penalties is by 
emphasising that these penalties are not lenient or ‘soft’ punishments. This was 
widely seen as a way of regaining legitimacy after the 1970s’ ‘crisis of faith’ in 
rehabilitation and the general turn towards popular punitiveness. Robinson and 
Ugwudike have explained the ways in which the probation service of England and 
Wales reconfigured itself to suit a new ‘toughness’ agenda.130 This was not just an 
externally imposed agenda but was seen as a route to regaining public, judicial and 
political legitimacy even within the service.131 The language of community penalties 
was altered to seem ‘tougher’, with the development of punitive rhetoric about a 
‘punishment service’. Plans to rebrand the entire agency as the Community 
Punishment and Rehabilitation Service came close to fruition in 2000.132 
Perhaps more important in practice for probation in England and Wales was the 
stricter enforcement of penalties (i.e. reporting breaches and acting on them), for 
which the first national guidance was issued in 1992 – also the year in which 
probation became an official criminal sentence rather than an alternative to one.133 
This appears to have had some effect on the perceived legitimacy of community 
penalties among sentencers, but also had significant counter-diversionary 
implications – the number of offenders imprisoned for breaches rose by an alarming 
470% between 1995 and 2009.134 However in practice it appears likely that probation 
staff in England and Wales still largely under-enforce breaches, while using 
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‘creative compliance’ to achieve enforcement targets.135 This suggests that although 
this initiative towards toughness was never enacted completely (as Goodman et al.’s 
“agonistic perspective” would suggest),136 it exemplifies efforts towards legitimacy 
which undermine the diversionary intent of non-custodial measures. Similarly, the 
Community Service Order in England and Wales became more punitive and was 
renamed the Community Punishment Order in 2000;137 it was subsequently 
renamed ‘unpaid work’. Following the publication of Louise Casey’s report 
Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime,138 it was again rebranded (as ‘community 
payback’) and ‘toughened’ by the addition of high-visibility vests which would 
identify and shame offenders thus sentenced.139 
In Scotland, similar attempts have been made to gain legitimacy through 
‘toughness’ but have tended not to have such deeply felt effects. The Community 
Payback Order (CPO), instituted in Scotland by the 2010 Criminal Justice and 
Licencing (Scotland) Act, although highly oriented towards rehabilitative practice 
and the reduction of imprisonment (being accompanied by the introduction of a 
presumption against the shortest sentences), was still framed in the language of 
toughness. However, the Scottish Government’s approach aimed not merely to 
stress that the new sentences could command public legitimacy through their 
toughness, but also to challenge preconceptions of the meaning ‘toughness’: 
“The Government will challenge the perception that short prison sentences 
are “tough” whereas community penalties are “soft”. Community penalties 
can be more demanding than prison. They can require offenders to 
undertake work, paying back for the wrong they have done. They can 
involve offenders confronting the victim of their crime and facing up to the 
consequences of their actions. They can require offenders to develop skills 
that will enable them to find work and help them move on in life. And at a 
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very basic level they can develop discipline by forcing the offender to adhere 
to a routine.”140 
Community penalties will likely always lose out to prison in ‘toughness’, at least in 
the more punitive sense of the term employed in England and Wales. In general, 
though, the rhetoric of toughness has been employed far less in the recent Scottish 
context. Certain aspects of Scottish criminal justice history suggest that this is 
indicative of a distinctively Scottish approach to criminal justice policy, and it is to 
this idea that the chapter now turns.  
4. Kilbrandon and on and on… 
Scotland’s legal and criminal justice systems have always been separate from those 
of England and Wales, and many Scottish penologists have described a distinctive 
Scottish penal philosophy. The jurisdiction is sometimes described as having 
diverged from the ‘punitive turn’ experienced by England and Wales, adopting 
more welfarist and rehabilitative criminal justice policies and experiencing less 
febrile political debate about crime.141 The 1964 Kilbrandon Report into youth justice 
in Scotland tends to be seen as a watershed moment in the divergence from England 
and Wales, and as totemic of Scottish penal exceptionalism, encapsulated in 
references to Scotland’s ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’.142 The report’s best-known 
recommendation centred on the principle that children who offend should be 
treated not as offenders but as ‘children in trouble’, in the same way as children at 
risk of poverty, neglect or abuse.143 This led to the abolition of juvenile courts and 
the establishment of Scotland’s unique Children’s Hearings System, an organisation 
of lay ‘panels’ to which children are referred on various welfare grounds (offending 
accounts for only a small proportion of referrals).144 Hearings panels meet to discuss 
                                                     
140 Scottish Government, 2007: 29 
141 McAra, 2008; Croall, 2006; Croall et al., 2010: 8-10 
142 McAra, 2008: 489 
143 Kilbrandon, 1995 [1964] 




issues affecting the child’s welfare and to decide whether supervision is 
necessary.145 
Developments closely connected to Kilbrandon also established peculiarly Scottish 
structural features of community justice which persist even today. However, the 
narrative of Scottish penal exceptionalism is not straightforward, and the period 
since Kilbrandon has been marked by convergent as well as divergent tendencies in 
the penal policies of England and Wales and Scotland, including within community 
justice. This can be partly explained through an ‘agonistic’ approach which 
emphasises the importance of (sometimes hidden) struggles between policy 
actors.146 This approach has some value in explaining the structural development of 
community justice, which has been marked by compromise and sometimes conflict 
between Scotland’s central government (the Scottish Office until 1999, thereafter the 
Scottish Executive/Scottish Government) and its local government. However, as 
noted below (Chapter 4, Section 3), caution is necessary when applying the agonistic 
approach to Scotland. A further important theme is the emphasis on ‘social work’ 
values in Scottish community justice and the pursuit of a ‘generic’ social work ideal 
which sites community justice within a wider welfarist and egalitarian agenda.  This 
chapter now turns to the historical development of Scottish community justice, 
beginning with the scant historical evidence on developments before the Kilbrandon 
Report, before recounting the key structural developments which have shaped 
Scottish community justice.  
Early Probation in Scotland 
Although there is little literature on the history of Scottish community justice before 
Kilbrandon, a short history produced by the City of Glasgow Probation Committee 
provides a valuable (though brief) account of the genesis of that service (the first in 
Scotland) and its development over fifty years,147 while the 1962 Morison Report to 
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Parliament on probation in the UK gives some sense of the situation in Scotland 
immediately before Kilbrandon, and its differences from England and Wales.148 
Notably, the two probation services did not share a common origin – the Glasgow 
history describes it being imported from the USA by Bailie (councillor) John Bruce 
Murray and established by the Corporation of Glasgow.149 Nor did Glasgow’s 
service share the missionary roots of the English system – instead, probation officers 
in Glasgow were drawn mostly from the police, until the 1931 Probation of 
Offenders (Scotland) Act which required probation officers to be appointed in all 
areas of Scotland, and prevented police officers or ex-officers from working in 
Scottish probation.150 However, the Glasgow history also describes developments in 
Scottish probation similar to those in England and Wales – professionalisation 
through more rigorous training, closer links with academic social science and the 
development of a Scottish branch of the National Association of Probation Officers 
(Napo).151 The extent to which these developments in Glasgow were mirrored 
elsewhere in Scotland is unclear, but it appears likely that probation in rural areas 
was much less developed, and sometimes entirely reliant on volunteers.152 The 
Glasgow history shows two distinctive features actually predating Kilbrandon – a 
strong association between community justice and local government structures, and 
justified concern about inconsistency between local areas.153  
By the time of the Morison Report, probation was administered by local probation 
committees, serving 34 probation areas. These were mostly coterminous with the 
counties and ‘large burghs’ into which Scotland’s local government was then 
divided. Apart from sheriffs and stipendiary magistrates (who served as ex officiis 
members), the membership of these committees was decided by local authorities, 
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which were criticised in the Report for taking too little interest.154 Although Morison 
focused mostly on England and Wales, the Report also raised concerns about the 
failure of Scotland’s services to develop a professional identity and a consistent 
system of administration and delivery.155  
Scotland’s diverse geography (see Chapter 3) meant provision tended to be 
inconsistent and, in rural areas, often organised somewhat informally. At the time of 
the Morison Report, there were no full-time probation officers north of Aberdeen;156 
in many rural areas officers were also “registrars of births, deaths and marriages or 
inspectors of weights and measures”,157 and until 1960, probation training was 
limited to a three-week course.158 Professionalisation was a keenly felt need, and 
Morison advocated replacing part-time with full-time officers where possible, and 
improving probation recruitment and training in Scotland.159 Bolstered further by 
the Kilbrandon recommendations, professionalisation of community justice in 
Scotland continued through the 1960s, although some of Morison’s 
recommendations about this were not implemented until after the 1968 Act.160 As 
McWilliams and others have noted, this trend was in accord with, rather than 
exceptional to, professionalisation in England and Wales.161   
The Morison Report was less clearly on the right side of history in its 
recommendations about geographic subdivision. Fundamentally it took the view 
that “probation is a social service of the courts”,162 and attributed the success of the 
service in England and Wales to its close links with the court system.163 Morison 
criticised the dominance of local authorities in the geographic subdivision of 
Scottish probation areas and in the probation committees themselves. The report 
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argued the ideal system would be divided along Sheriffdom rather than local 
authority lines, and lamented that probation “has been regarded not as a court 
service but as a local authority service”.164 It would largely remain so.  
As in England and Wales, Morison advocated enlarging the probation areas to 
improve the consistency of service provision and ensure a good level of service for 
rural areas. Recommendations for altering the appointment system for probation 
committees reflected an interest in rebalancing power towards courts and away 
from local authorities, but Morison avoided recommending that Scotland replace 
the system entirely with either a centralised or a Sheriffdom-based structure.165  
Local Authority Social Work: the 1968 Act 
The Kilbrandon Report, published two years later,166 emphasised its proposed 
structural reform of youth justice would affect Scottish probation as well, 
particularly since (as Morison also found) probation in Scotland tended to be seen as 
primarily a youth rather than an adult sanction;167 thus, many probation officers 
specialising in youth justice would be expected to transfer.168 This section draws on 
Brodie et al.’s history of Scottish social work between 1966 and 2006 to give a brief 
account of how Scottish social work responded to Kilbrandon.169 
The 1966 White Paper Social Work and the Community, described as “the foundation 
stone of the modern profession”,170 broadened the scope of reform to a ‘generic’ 
social work which would serve all social care needs among all social groups. The 
White Paper was produced by a small group of experts who believed in the 
importance of establishing a unified generic profession for reasons of efficiency and 
professionalism, but also to promote social equality – “an unwritten, but 
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fundamental, objective of the main players.”171 There was a particular interest in the 
development of strategic planning of services within local communities, prefiguring 
the subsequent development of first informal and then formal community planning 
structures in Scotland (see Chapter 3, Section 3).172 Professionalisation and 
politicisation of social work were served further by the establishment of two 
professional bodies. The Social Work Services Group (SWSG) was established in 
1967 to assist with preparing the legislation, but became the main link between 
profession and the Scottish Office, while the Association of Directors of Social Work 
(ADSW – now Social Work Scotland) was formed to become a more directly 
political voice for the profession.173  
The 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act abolished Scotland’s probation service and 
amalgamated probation functions and other social work into ‘generic’ social work 
departments within local authorities. Although initially reluctant, Scotland’s 
probation officers quickly adapted to the new arrangements.174 The Act solidified 
two key structural features which have shaped the development of Scottish 
community justice ever since: its status as a social work rather than a criminal justice 
operation, and its position within local authorities. The extent to which this could be 
said to be distinctive to Scotland at the time is unclear: the idea was in fact 
considered in England and Wales as well, but rejected. This arose not out of 
resistance from probation practitioners (which was also present in Scotland) but 
from legislative exigency. The Labour government of the UK intended, with the 
draft Local Authority Social Services Bill, to merge probation into new generic social 
work departments in English and Welsh local authorities, but the calling of the 1970 
general election put the government under pressure to pass the Bill quickly, forcing 
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it to drop the most controversial elements.175 This legislative necessity was in itself a 
function of the two jurisdictions’ different political structures. 
Kilbrandon has been described as establishing a welfarist consensus in Scotland that 
lasted for decades,176 as well as a “revolutionary change” in social work.177 The 
power and politicisation of social work departments in local authorities was 
consolidated by the 1973 reorganisation of Scottish local government into nine 
regions (including the Strathclyde region, which contained half the population of 
Scotland) and three island areas, and the increasing politicisation of local authorities 
in Scotland, particularly from 1979 onwards.178 
As McAra and Croall have both argued,179 some of the explanation for Scotland’s 
distinctive approach may be found in the structure of Scottish policymaking before 
devolution. The government of Scotland was administered by Westminster’s 
Scottish Office, but Scotland was (and had always been) a separate legal jurisdiction 
with a separate criminal justice system. The result of this in practice was that 
Scottish justice policy was mostly in the hands of a governmental layer of unelected 
civil servants and experts, nominally under Scottish Office control, but in practice 
largely free to pursue their own policy aims, which tended to be more welfarist and 
arguably more criminologically well-supported than in England and Wales – where 
elected officials had a role in criminal justice policy but often engaged in ‘populist 
punitiveness’, making policy for electoral advantage.180 A further factor is that 
Scotland is a small country compared to England and Wales, meaning that policy 
elites tend to know each other, so that in producing Social Work in the Community 
“easy communication between the key stakeholders was critical… The ‘parochial’ 
nature of professional, government and academic relations made for personal 
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interaction on a level and at a pace impossible south of the border.”181 A number of 
interviewees in this project made similar observations. 
Decline and Rebirth 
Community justice was largely left out of the development of Scottish social work in 
the 1970s.182 Generic social work departments had considerable discretion in how 
their budgets were used, creating “a classic opportunity for the operation of the 
doctrine of less eligibility”.183 Because offenders were seen as less deserving than 
other client groups such as children and the elderly, there was little funding and a 
low level of service for work with offenders. This was likely both a cause and a 
result of a continuing perception of underuse by sentencers at this time. 
The 1980s notably saw an “unprecedented number of major incidents” of prison 
unrest all over Scotland, culminating in the 1987 hostage-taking at Peterhead 
prison,184 and this brought about another decisive moment for Scottish community 
justice. In a 1988 lecture to the Scottish branch of the Howard League for Penal 
Reform, the then Scottish Secretary Malcolm Rifkind articulated ‘The Way Ahead’ 
for Scottish penal policy. This included reforms to imprisonment but also an effort 
to make greater use of community sentences to reduce the prison population.185 
Several reforms were made to community sentences with a view to improving their 
efficacy and their judicial legitimacy as viable ‘alternatives to imprisonment’, (see 
above), and reversing the decline of the 1970s.  
The problem of ‘less eligibility’ in social work budgeting was resolved by ‘ring-
fencing’ funding for work with offenders, which would now be provided entirely 
by central government.186 This began in 1991, and in the same year, the first set of 
National Objectives and Standards for social work with offenders was published by 
SWSG, setting objectives and requirements for the service (including reducing the 
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use of imprisonment).187 Social work with offenders was reconstituted as a specialist 
sub-discipline in itself – criminal justice social work (CJSW) – which “led in larger 
regions to the creation of specialist teams and in smaller authorities to the 
identification of designated specialist staff with caseloads devoted solely or 
primarily to 100 per cent funded work.”188 This might seem to run counter to the 
ethos of generic social work, but in practice was largely a question of financial 
management of the new ring-fenced funding, which had to be kept separate from 
the rest of the social work budget.  
One difficult consequence of this development was that CJSW staff experienced a 
degree of marginalisation within social work departments, while also, as Halliday et 
al. note, feeling “marginalized and undervalued in the legal domain” in their court-
service and criminal justice role,189 and being subject to the general stresses and poor 
public image of British social work (particularly shaken in Scotland by the Orkney 
child abuse scandal in the 1990s).190 The organisational structure of Scottish social 
work, with upper and middle management tiers having responsibilities beyond a 
single specialisation, also means that “hardly anyone can be promoted more than 
two or three times and stay a criminal justice specialist.”191 Furthermore, central 
funding brought with it central control. The Scottish Office required local 
authorities to carry out cost-finding exercises and to submit strategic spending 
plans.192 The CJSW system was given more responsibilities, including throughcare 
of offenders released from long (over 4 years) prison sentences.  
This period also produced another restructuring, itself largely the result of the 
restructuring of Scotland’s local government from nine regions and three island 
areas into 32 unitary local authorities.193 The fragmentation of some quite large 
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administrative units (especially Strathclyde, once the biggest local government 
region in Europe) produced concerns about efficiency and cooperation between 
local areas, particularly because CJSW was now almost entirely centrally funded. 
The consultation on ‘Community Sentencing: The Tough Option’ included several 
possible options for the structure of community justice in Scotland: retaining the 
current system, developing more joint working and partnership between local 
authorities, setting up a network of six areas based on Sheriffdoms, and a national 
service.194 In what would become a rather familiar refrain, the local authority body 
COSLA (the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) emphasised that: 
“Community based criminal justice social work services are a vital bridge 
between the national criminal justice system and local communities and their 
concerns, and should therefore be retained within local government…”195 
COSLA instead proposed a hybrid system which retained local authority delivery 
while also aggregating neighbouring authorities into twelve regional groupings for 
partnership working, strategic planning and the joint management of some 
specialist elements. This structure was adopted in 2000; its acceptance may have 
been a result of the then Justice Minister, Jim Wallace, being a member of the Liberal 
Democrat minority faction in the governing coalition of the new Scottish Parliament. 
The issue was settled for now, but this hybrid central arrangement was far from 
perfect: as Morrison notes, there was no way of enforcing cooperation or even 
membership, and with little power to redistribute resources the Tough Option 
groupings tended to reproduce rather than mitigate funding inequities between 
areas.196 Despite nearly twenty years of development, these problems would remain 
current through this reform and the current one. 
Devolution and ‘Detartanisation’? 
The 1998 Scotland Act established the Scottish Parliament and a new central 
government for Scotland – the Scottish Executive (rebranded in 2007 as the Scottish 
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Government). Although Scotland’s criminal justice system had always been 
separate from that of England and Wales, devolution nonetheless had major and 
sometimes surprising effects on Scotland’s penal policies in general and on the 
administration of its community justice system in particular. 
In the field of broad penal policy, Scottish criminologists have described a 
counterintuitive result of devolution – after decades of the ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ 
and welfarist consensus, Scottish penal policy began to converge with that of 
England and Wales, in a process sometimes termed ‘detartanisation’.197 The 
establishment of the Parliament created a new set of policy actors – Members of the 
Scottish Parliament (MSPs), who had power to make legislation and (if in 
government) set policy for Scotland, but who were also elected officials who had to 
bear in mind electoral concerns when taking political positions.198 For the 
Parliament’s first two terms (1999-2007), the Labour party was in control of Scottish 
government as it was in England and Wales, and this is likely also to have been a 
factor in the convergence. Crime and justice became more politicised in Scotland 
during this period; MSPs were inclined to ‘talk up’ crime as an issue even as 
recorded crime was decreasing in Scotland from its peak in the 1990s.199 The 2004 
Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act brought New Labour’s antisocial behaviour 
agenda to Scotland, extending the use of ASBOs and electronic monitoring to 12-16 
year-olds, implementing parenting orders and giving the police wide powers to 
disperse groups of young people – over and above the objections of critics who were 
described as “out of touch” with social concerns about youth crime.200  
Convergence with England and Wales was neither straightforward nor complete; as 
Mooney et al. have noted, this: 
“…was also a period of continuing therapeutic and rehabilitative practices in 
prisons and social work, more locally led community actions, more attempts 
to recognize communities affected by crime, greater focus on the needs of 
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victims, substantial court reforms, innovation in violence reduction and 
moves to address the crisis in the physical prison estate that was ‘in some 
instances, bursting at the seams or falling down around people’”.201 
In community justice, the relationship between local and central government 
complicates the picture further. There were signs of limited pre-devolution 
convergence with England and Wales in CJSW practice, which became somewhat 
more managerial and concerned with risk and public protection.202 Concern with 
public protection was also reflected in the 2005 establishment of the Risk 
Management Authority (RMA), a specialist body with a remit to oversee the 
management of high-risk offenders.203 The writing of court reports also became 
more concerned with risk during this period.204 However, McNeill has argued that 
although Scottish community justice did experience convergence with England and 
Wales with respect to public protection, this did not extend to the development of 
punitiveness in rhetoric or practice; no attempt was made to rebrand as a 
“punishment service”.205  
The administrative structure of Scottish community justice was the site of a 
particularly notable near-convergence, and of conflict between Scotland’s long-
established and powerful local government and its national government. This began 
with the Scottish Labour manifesto for the 2003 Holyrood election, which the party 
won but (as in 1999) had to form a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats. The opening paragraph of the manifesto, entitled On Your Side, made 
clear its adherence to the New Labour position on crime – the party would be “On 
the side of those suffering at the hands of thugs or drug dealers.”206 Unsurprisingly, 
there is little mention of CJSW among the more headline-grabbing and classic 
‘detartanising’ policies, but the manifesto did make the following brief proposal:  
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“We will set up a single agency – the Correctional Service for Scotland 
[‘CSS’] - staffed by professionals and covering prison and community based 
sentences to maximise the impact of punishment, rehabilitation and 
protection offered by our justice system.”207 
The CSS proposal had not been discussed within the party, the civil service or senior 
CJSW personnel before its inclusion in the manifesto;208 neither had local 
government been consulted, despite promises to the contrary.209 Although it was 
significantly moderated, on the Liberal Democrats’ insistence, after the election – to 
propose a consultation on a single agency, rather than the imposition of one210 – it 
remained controversial, and “immediately ran up against entrenched defensive 
opposition from the agencies concerned”.211 Had the CSS proposal been 
implemented, it would have removed community justice responsibilities from local 
authorities. In addition, as Morrison notes, “[t]he proposals would see the new 
service staffed by personnel who no longer required social work training”,212 and 
whose role would centre on ensuring compliance rather than rehabilitative social 
work.  
At around the same time, following the publication of the Carter Report,213 the 
National Probation Service and HM Prison Service of England and Wales were 
merged into a single agency, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS). 
Although the CSS proposal actually predated the Carter Report by some months, 
and appears not to have been intended as a convergence with England and Wales, 
comparison between the two was inevitable. The political fortunes of CSS were 
damaged by the perception of NOMS as an ‘imposition’ on English and Welsh 
probation officers, a general sense of concern over the ‘detartanising’ direction of 
penal politics in Scotland and potentially also suspicion of the party political adviser 
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who proposed CSS, who “was seen to have close connections with London.”214 
McNeill, writing in 2004, raised concerns that set this development in the context of 
‘detartanisation’: 
“Perhaps the most pressing question to be addressed in the current debate is 
not whether social work or probation can or should survive in Scotland, but 
rather whether the objectives that probation was established in Scotland to 
pursue – improving justice and helping offenders to change – can survive 
the rapid politicization of criminal justice post-devolution.”215 
In this way, narratives of Scottish distinctiveness could raise concern over the idea 
of integration being ‘imposed’ by the UK Government. Because of the distinctive 
structural elements – the inclusion of CJSW within a powerful social work 
profession (represented by ADSW), with delivery sited win local authorities 
(represented by COSLA) that were themselves unusually powerful (and an 
important source of support for Scottish Labour), particularly in relation to the new 
national government – an organised and powerful opposition to the proposed single 
service model could develop in Scotland as it did not in England and Wales. 
However, the status quo was not tenable, and ministers in Scotland emphasised five 
key points in favour of change:  
“(i) coordinated and consistent supervision and support to offenders;  
(ii) streamlined management and greater economies of scale;  
(iii) achieving performance standards and effective practice through direct 
management rather than through financial grant leverage;  
(iv) the benefit of a close relationship between probation and prison services; 
and  
(v) the capability to drive forward a focused political agenda without the 
dilution or distraction arising from competing local priorities.”216 
As Morrison explains,217 the result was a series of compromises between local and 
central government, and between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The tension 
between local government and the new Executive was also to some degree a tension 
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between old Labour and New Labour.218 CJSW would still be provided by local 
authorities, but oversight and funding control would come from a new type of body 
– eight regional Community Justice Authorities (CJAs), with responsibility for 
allocating CJSW funding to their constituent local authorities, for holding local 
authorities to account where they failed to meet reoffending targets, and for 
reducing reoffending in general.219 The CJA groupings were to some degree 
coterminous with the pre-existing CJSW groupings – four of the new CJAs were 
exactly coterminous, while the other half were formed by mergers (but not splits).220 
The CJAs were established by the 2005 Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act, 
and started operating in late 2006 to early 2007 – and will barely have lasted a 
decade until their abolition.  
Community Justice Authorities 
The official membership of a CJA is made up of councillors from the constituent 
local authorities (between one and seven local authorities, sometimes more than one 
councillor from each), who vote on annual and triennial plans for allocating ring-
fenced funding to CJSW departments. Responsibility for developing these plans and 
(in practice) for most of the CJA’s work falls on the Chief Officer and their small 
team of staff, but officially they work for the CJA without being members. These 
staff fulfil roles similar to civil servants, although the 2005 Act emphasises that they 
should not be regarded as such.221  
For the ‘elected members’ of the CJA, though, the role is one among the many 
committees on which councillors sit; they are sometimes (but not always) 
knowledgeable about social work or criminal justice, spend only a small fraction of 
their time on CJA business and are reliant on information provided to them by CJA 
staff. Fears that the elected member system would introduce an unwelcome degree 
of politicisation into the governance of community justice appear not to have been 
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realised,222 perhaps because of a lack of public knowledge of, and interest in, 
community justice in general and CJAs in particular. However, it is difficult to see 
how elected members have brought much accountability to the system either – 
particularly since CJA area plans are generally worked out informally before 
meetings and voting is effectively a formality (Chapter 6, Section 2). As in the Tough 
Option groupings, this system has made it difficult to alter the distribution of 
resources between local authorities, as elected members are expected to resist plans 
that divert resources from their areas. 223  
CJAs were intended to work in partnership with organisations including police, 
courts, local NHS boards, the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and a range of third-
sector organisations involved in providing services to offenders. However, CJAs 
only have any financial control over local authority CJSW funding; with no funding 
control over the other bodies, the CJAs’ engagement with them, particularly the 
already somewhat marginalised third-sector partners, has been limited.224 Similarly, 
without any power over SPS (an organisation larger and better resourced than the 
whole community justice system), CJAs have been unable to compel close 
engagement from SPS. Cooperation between CJA partners depends in practice on 
persuasion by the Chief Officer, and their ability to align the priorities of different 
organisations to the CJA’s goals – an unenviable position of “responsibility without 
power.”225  
CJAs were meant to hold local authorities to account if they failed to meet targets 
for reducing reoffending in their areas, by reporting them to Scottish Ministers, but 
this function was also a casualty of their deeply flawed constitution – CJAs are 
dependent on the willing cooperation of their constituent local authorities, and 
using the reporting power would compromise the working relationship. This 
relationship was for many years a fragile one, with the limited powers and 
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responsibilities of the CJAs set against resentment from CJSW departments who 
sometimes continued to work in their old groupings.226 Despite these structural 
flaws, CJAs have been credited with producing better partnership working and 
more efficient use of resources, particularly as they began to ‘bed in’ during the 
tenure of the first SNP government.227 The flaws and the successes of CJAs are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 5, Section 2. 
Reclaiming Distinctiveness? Restructuring in the SNP Era 
Shortly after the CJAs started operating, the pro-independence Scottish National 
Party (SNP) won the 2007 Holyrood election, and criminal justice policy in Scotland 
appeared to enter a new period. The party formed a minority government and 
appointed Kenny MacAskill MSP, a former lawyer from the left of the party,228 as 
Cabinet Secretary for Justice, a position he would hold until November 2014. The 
party consolidated its power significantly in the 2011 election, winning an overall 
majority in Parliament despite the Holyrood system having been designed to avoid 
such majorities. Curtice argues this aspect was intended to prevent nationalists 
gaining sufficient power to call an independence referendum, which the SNP 
succeeded in doing in September 2014.229 Although voters rejected independence, 
the SNP-led ‘Yes’ campaign was described as both more effective than its opposition 
and as valuable in winning support for the SNP,230 a claim supported by the party’s 
extraordinary performance in the following year’s UK General Election, in which it 
won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster. The 2016 Holyrood election returned 
a further SNP government, although the party narrowly lost its overall majority.231 
Although crime and justice was hardly an issue during the referendum 
campaigning,232 the ‘Yes’ campaign did emphasise values of welfare and social 
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democracy as distinctively Scottish tendencies which would be best served by 
independence, in a similar way to the party’s rhetoric about criminal justice while in 
power. MacLennan describes a broad justice policy agenda with two primary 
intentions which connect to each other and to the SNP’s main goal, independence 
for Scotland: “a desire to portray themselves as competent managers; and a desire to 
highlight Scotland’s distinctiveness, in particular from the rest of the UK.”233 The 
SNP period has been described as one of ‘retartanisation’, a reversal of the 
convergence that had occurred during 1999-2007.234 As discussed in Chapter 3, SNP 
governments have also had to deal with significant public spending cuts for most of 
their life, and as a result, this period has also seen significant restructuring of much 
of Scotland’s criminal justice system, most famously the merging of Scotland’s eight 
regional police forces into a single service, Police Scotland.  
In reality, as with the ‘detartanisation’ of the Labour years, the reality is significantly 
more complex and marked by contradictions and compromises. MacLennan argues 
that the SNP’s rhetoric of distinctively Scottish welfarism masks some illiberal 
tendencies, including deference to the ‘operational independence’ of Police Scotland 
– even in politically controversial matters such as stop and search, with potentially 
authoritarian implications for policing practice and for the government’s attitude 
towards young working-class males.235 As McAra notes, this period has also seen 
legislation to end automatic early release for long-term prisoners, a populist 
development carried out “in the face of robust research evidence highlighting its 
likely damaging consequences.”236 Despite these concerning developments, the 
prevailing tendency has seemed to be more towards social welfare and inclusion, 
albeit perhaps in a different form, influenced by the post-Christie approach to 
mitigating public sector austerity. 
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Community Sentencing and ‘Paying Back’ 
The SNP administration in Scotland has been marked by a particular emphasis on 
reducing the use of imprisonment, especially the number of short prison sentences 
imposed in Scotland. These accounted for most receptions into prison, but were also 
widely recognised as being of little penal value.237 The new government responded 
to the growth in imprisonment in Scotland by setting up a review of community 
penalties in Scotland, and by establishing the Scottish Prisons Commission whose 
2008 report Scotland’s Choice recommended confining the use of imprisonment to the 
most serious cases and instituting a population target of 5,000 (an imprisonment 
rate of around 100 per 100,000 population, closer to France or Belgium than England 
and Wales).238 The SNP government stopped short of endorsing this, but there was a 
growing recognition that Scottish criminal justice had to be reoriented away from 
imprisonment and towards community punishment. The new focus on the value of 
community penalties might be said to signal a return of rehabilitation to the Scottish 
justice policy conversation, although the language tended to frame it more in terms 
of reparation and ‘payback’. As discussed above (Section 3), this is somewhat 
consonant with but also different from the rhetoric of ‘toughness’ developed as a 
legitimating mechanism in England and Wales around this time.  
Scotland’s Choice also recommended the creation of a new community sentence 
which would simplify the system by merging the pre-existing range of community 
penalties.239  The Scottish Government’s response took legislative and other forms, 
beginning with the establishment of the multi-stranded Reducing Reoffending 
Programme (RRP) in 2009, now in its second stage (RRP2). The legislative response 
was the 2010 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act, which as McNeill notes, 
implemented the Commission’s recommendations on sentencing only in part.240 The 
legislation was intended to establish a presumption against prison sentences of six 
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months or less,241 and the Act made provision to establish a Scottish Sentencing 
Council which would produce sentencing guidelines and presumably seek to 
embed that presumption into the system. However, there was political and judicial 
resistance to the provisions. The short sentence provision was attenuated to a 
presumption against sentences of three months or less, and the Act as passed 
requires courts only to ‘have regard to’ the Sentencing Council’s guidelines rather 
than (as originally drafted) ‘adhere’ to them; Committee discussion also ensured a 
larger presence for the judiciary on the Council than originally envisioned.242 The 
Council was only established in 2015, its membership mostly comprised of lawyers 
and sentencers.243 
The Act was more successful in its restructuring of community sentencing. It 
established the Community Payback Order (CPO), a new community sentence 
which replaced the existing complex range of Probation Orders, SAOs, CSOs and 
Community Reparation Orders (community orders for young people that had been 
piloted, with little success, from 2005 to 2007).244 The DTTO and RLO remain 
separate sentences. The CPO, which now accounts for around 90% of community 
sentences in Scotland,245 can include any of nine different types of requirement, 
which include compensation, social work supervision, unpaid work and other 
mostly treatment-oriented requirements.246 In this, the CPO not only simplified the 
community supervision framework but did so in a way that acknowledges 
structurally the ontological claim which influenced generic social work as well as 
more recent developments of partnership approaches, and which was often invoked 
by the participants in this project (see Chapter 5, Section 2) – that offenders often 
experience a range of social problems at once, that these complex needs are causally 
implicated in crime and that they are best dealt with by specialist agencies.  
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Although Scotland’s prison population continued to rise until 2011-12, it has fallen 
in the last couple of years,247 but this fall has been fairly slight, and current 
projections suggest the prison population will remain approximately the same over 
the next decade.248 It is notable that the drop-off in sentences of three months or less 
was followed almost immediately by a rise in sentences of six months to two 
years.249 However, the restructuring of community sentences would soon be seen as 
insufficient for penal reorientation, and there would follow a restructuring of the 
system charged with their delivery. 
5. Redesigning the Community Justice System 
Two Reports 
The current restructuring of community justice has its origins in 2012, with the 
publication of two reports, that of the Commission on Women Offenders, led by 
Dame Elish Angiolini (the ‘Angiolini Report’),250 and the Audit Scotland report 
Reducing Reoffending in Scotland.251 Although these documents were critical of 
aspects of the community justice system, their end result – the replacement of the 
CJAs by a two-tier local/national system of administration – was far from a foregone 
conclusion. The length of time taken to design the new structure makes this topic 
particularly suited to examining the ways in which penal change in Scotland has 
been shaped by contests between penal actors and by external conditions. This 
section considers the specific recommendations of the 2012 reports before examining 
the development of the new structure, and how it will be implemented. 
The Commission on Women Offenders was established following a long-held 
concern with the number of women prisoners in Scotland (which was rising as a flat 
figure and as a proportion of all prisoners) and in particular with overcrowding and 
mental ill-health in Scotland’s only dedicated women’s prison, Cornton Vale; it 
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dealt only briefly with the community justice system. In relation to prison it tended 
to follow a similar penal-reductionist line to Scotland’s Choice, re-emphasising the 
minimal penal value and the economic, social and human costs of short prison 
sentences.252 The report also argued that women offenders are in general lower-risk 
and more likely to have various types of psychological and social problems (and 
dependent children) which make imprisonment especially harsh and 
inappropriate.253  
The report recommended the establishment of ‘Community Justice Centres’, along 
the lines of the 218 Service in Glasgow and the Willow Project in Edinburgh, and the 
replacement of Cornton Vale with a smaller specialist prison for high-risk women 
prisoners only.254 The initial rejection and eventual acceptance of the Angiolini 
proposals on prison is a different story of penal change, but the report also advised 
that in order to achieve these outcomes, the entire adult community justice system 
should be restructured. Angiolini described a “cluttered landscape” populated with 
a confusing range of public and third-sector agencies, of different sizes and 
(especially among the larger public sector organisations) tending to operate a range 
of different (i.e. non-coterminous) systems of geographic subdivision.255 The report 
argued, in line with the Christie Commission’s recommendations on public services 
in general, that the system needed to be streamlined. It also claimed the system was 
inconsistent and unaccountable, and that funding for CJSW was too short-term and 
inconsistently allocated. Angiolini recommended abolishing the CJAs (then only 
five years old) and replacing them with a national Community Justice Service, 
whose “objective would be to protect the public, reduce reoffending and promote 
rehabilitation”.256   
The interviewees in this doctoral research project mentioned both the Angiolini and 
Audit Scotland reports often in their accounts of the restructuring; notably, they 
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tended to be much more critical of the Angiolini Report, arguing that it failed to take 
into account the successes of the CJA system (See Chapter 5, Section 2 below). The 
Audit Scotland report was less strongly critical of CJAs, and engaged more 
substantively with the structure of community justice delivery.257 This report looked 
at various measures aimed at reducing reoffending among sentenced adults. Aside 
from the unsurprising finding that reoffending in Scotland was still high and costly, 
it made several detailed findings about the CJA system and the extent to which its 
work constituted value for money.  
Audit Scotland found that the CJSW funding system was inflexible and produced 
inconsistencies between local areas. Between local authorities within CJA areas, 
funding allocation tended to follow historic patterns and inequities rather than 
service needs.258 There were also stark differences between areas in the unit costs of 
community justice tasks, and these were at best only partially accounted for by 
offender numbers within areas and differences between urban and rural areas.259 In 
addition, much of the community justice budget was spent on ‘core’ services (legally 
mandatory activities around delivery of sentences and court services), and much of 
the remaining ‘non-core’ funding was also pre-allocated by central government, 
leaving little flexibility for CJAs and their partners to set up projects of their own. 
The level of ‘flexible’ funding differed between CJA areas, producing further 
inconsistency and inequality between local areas in their ability to develop their 
own projects.  Audit Scotland also found that despite ring-fencing, the funding 
available for CJSW fell short, so most local authorities had to subsidise their 
departments from their own budgets, the subsidies totalling £8.6m (a small but not 
inconsequential fraction of the total community justice budget) in 2010/11. This 
report did not recommend restructuring, advising instead that performance 
                                                     
257 Audit Scotland, 2012 
258 Ibid.: 15-16 




measures for CJAs and councils be developed further and that accountability 
mechanisms, partnership working and strategic planning be improved.260  
The two reports agreed that there was a lack of leadership in the field of community 
justice.261 In order to fully realise the potential of CPOs, and to seriously reduce 
reoffending, there would have to be stronger leadership in the community justice 
sector. The concern with leadership is linked to a broader sense, often articulated by 
the participants in this project (Chapter 6), of a need for cultural change in how 
Scotland thinks about crime and justice; such a change would presumably include a 
reorientation in both practice and culture, which would also involve somehow 
addressing the oft-remarked problem with public ignorance and political 
disinterest. The arguments for leadership emphasised the importance of a coherent 
and strategically-oriented direction for community justice, and of promoting 
community sentencing as a penal option on a par with imprisonment. This appears 
to follow McNeill et al.’s argument that leadership is important to bringing about 
the cultural change needed to reorient Scottish criminal justice away from 
imprisonment and towards community sentences.262 The deficit of leadership results 
at least partly from the complexity and blurred boundaries of the community justice 
field in Scotland, in which there was simply no place in the structure for national 
leadership. Implicated in this was the continued position of community justice work 
within ‘generic’ social work departments. As McNeill notes: 
“Hardly anyone can be promoted more than two or three times and stay a 
criminal justice specialist. The effect of this is that criminal justice social 
work since its inception has lacked a cadre of dedicated, expert leaders; 
leaders rooted in an appreciation of the frontline challenges of the job, but 
also with the skills and experience that would enable them to provide 
inspiring professional leadership; to represent the profession publicly; and to 
sit down with, or when necessary stand up to, the Chief Executive of the 
Prison Service, the Chief Constable of Police Scotland, the senior law officers, 
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the Sentencing Commission (if we ever get one) and even the Cabinet 
Secretary.”263 
This leadership seems to be as much a matter of structural features and 
representation as of charismatic individuals – and this interest in developing 
‘leadership’ as a cohesive and strategically-oriented structural feature of the new 
system would be an important part of the discussions about the new system.  
Redesigning Community Justice: The Consultation Years 
The reports set the stage for further changes to the community justice system; 
however, perhaps mindful of the hasty compromises which produced the structural 
flaws of the CJAs, the government has spent several years developing the new 
structure, which will not be fully in place until April 2017. This section provides an 
account of the development of the new model, while Chapter 5, Section 6 considers 
participants’ accounts and experiences of the consultation. The first stage of the 
consultation on the redesign of community justice was launched in December 
2012.264 The consultation document’s foreword, by the then Justice Secretary Kenny 
MacAskill, echoed the language of previous ministerial statements in this area: 
“I strongly believe the status quo is untenable and it is now time to look at 
how we plan, deliver and manage offender services in the community. It is 
critical that we have the right structures in place. Working with people who 
offend and who often have complex and entrenched problems can be very 
demanding. Structural arrangements should support, rather than hinder, 
practitioners, managers and leaders working in the field.”265 
This initial consultation proposed three options for the new system. The first of 
these, the ‘enhanced CJA’ model, would retain CJAs but with an altered 
membership structure. Under this option, each CJA would have a Chair appointed 
by Scottish Ministers, while CJA Boards would also be expanded by the addition of 
members from local NHS Boards. This option would place a duty on all statutory 
partners to cooperate on reducing reoffending in the CJA area. CJAs would have 
more responsibility for strategic commissioning and for promoting community 
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justice, with the further possibility that they could be handed operational 
responsibility for CJSW delivery.266 
The second option was a ‘local authority’ model in which CJAs would be abolished 
and local authorities would take responsibility for planning community justice 
services as well as CJSW delivery. This option would also place statutory duties on 
partners to cooperate in reducing reoffending in local areas, and could also involve 
CPPs as part of the wider community planning framework. The role of the RMA 
would be expanded to include performance management for the 32 local 
authorities, developing practice guidance and promoting community justice to the 
public, media and judiciary (thus it seems likely that, had this model been adopted, 
the promotion of community justice would emphasise public protection). In this 
model, national leadership would be provided by a joint Scottish 
Government/COSLA Leadership group.267  
The third option would follow the Angiolini recommendations by abolishing the 
CJAs and replacing them with “a national social work-led service for community 
justice … with strategic and operational responsibility for the planning, managing 
and delivery of community based offender services.”268 The idea is somewhat 
similar to the Correctional Service for Scotland mooted in 2003, but would not 
involve merging CJSW with SPS; the proposal emphasised that the national service 
would continue to be founded on social work rather than criminal justice values and 
principles. As well as operational and strategic responsibility, the new service 
would provide national leadership and promote community justice, and incorporate 
the RMA. 
When the first stage of the consultation was published there was little support for 
the ‘enhanced CJA’ model, and debate tended to centre on local versus national 
provision. The local authority model was perceived as being more responsive to 
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local needs and as less disruptive both of CJSW’s position within generic social 
work departments (with the historical baggage that entailed) and of local 
partnerships. However, the national model was seen as a way to reduce the 
marginalisation of CJSW within both criminal justice and social work.269 
This first stage of consultation closed at the end of April 2013, after 13 stakeholder 
events and 112 written responses. The result, summarised in a second document 
issued by the Scottish Government in December that year,270 was a split between the 
local authority and national service models (the unpopular ‘enhanced CJA’ option is 
hardly mentioned in this second report). Participants in the consultation were 
overall in favour of the strategic direction, leadership and higher profile that a 
national service could provide, while still favouring the local decision-making, 
delivery and local partnership models that would be served by the local authority 
model. As several of the participants in the project remarked (Chapter 5, Section 6), 
this may partly be attributable to the dominance of local authority CJSW voices at 
consultation events. 
A hybrid option (‘Option D’) was adopted, which would combine elements of local 
and national structures. Its main features would be: 
• “Local strategic planning and delivery of Community Justice services 
through Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs);  
• The creation of a national body to provide assurance and recommendations 
to Scottish Ministers and Local Government elected members as well as 
professional strategic leadership for the sector;  
• A focus on collaboration, including the opportunity to commission, manage 
or deliver services nationally where appropriate;  
• A mechanism, reflecting the national and local democratic responsibilities, to 
afford discussion and agreements as necessary, on aspects of mutual 
concern.”271  
As MacAskill – the former Cabinet Secretary who set the reforms in motion – noted 
recently, the ‘Option D’ model is another local-national compromise with clear 
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echoes of the establishment of CJAs in 2005.272  The consultation mostly showed 
support for ring-fenced funding but there was concern over how it would continue 
to operate. A separate project within the second phase of the Reducing Reoffending 
Programme (RRP2) was established to consider the detail of funding community 
justice; this is unlikely to lead to a major increase in the available funding for 
community justice in Scotland, but could lead to a more flexible model in which 
community justice partners and CJSW departments in particular will be aware of 
their budgets up to three years in advance, allowing for more flexible advance 
planning. 
Further consultation followed in early 2014 – a report in April of that year 
confirmed that ‘Option D’ would be adopted.273 Actual CJSW delivery would 
remain in the same place, while CPPs would gain responsibility for local strategic 
planning and delivery. A new national body, initially to be named Community 
Justice Improvement Scotland but now named Community Justice Scotland (CJS), 
would be responsible for improving practice and, crucially, for ‘leadership’ of the 
sector, promoting the value of community sentences and acting as a public ‘face’ for 
community justice. It was emphasised that the new national body would not be able 
to hold the CPPs to account, but could only provide them with support and 
assistance. 
This stage of consultation ended in June 2014. The Government published The 
Future Model for Community Justice in Scotland in December that year,274 which set out 
the full detail of all aspects of the model and the timescale of implementation. This 
brought an end to the formal consultation period, but not to political conflict over 
the structure of community justice in Scotland. 
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From about the start of 2015 onwards, the Scottish Government began to draw up 
the legislative and strategic policy framework for the new community justice 
system. Primary legislation was required to abolish the CJAs, and this took the form 
of the Community Justice (Scotland) Bill, introduced by Paul Wheelhouse (Minister 
for Community Safety and Legal Affairs) on 7 May 2015. Following Stage 1 debate 
in November and shorter Stage 2 and 3 debates, the Bill was passed unanimously on 
11 February 2016 and received Royal Assent on 21 March. There was cross-party 
agreement as to the Bill’s general principles, but some details were somewhat 
controversial. 
Although CPPs had clearly been envisaged as the local element of community 
justice planning, and are referred to as such in the relevant documents on the 
redesign,275 they cannot have duties imposed on them by law so are not named in 
the Act, which instead refers to a list of ‘community justice partners’ which includes 
the relevant local authority. Perhaps because of the well-known problems with the 
CPP framework (Chapter 6, Section 4), the emphasis of the redesign has subtly 
shifted away from CPPs. Local authorities are instead developing community justice 
partnership structures (‘Community Justice Partners’ or sometimes ‘reducing 
reoffending partnerships’) alongside and/or within CPP structures; there appears to 
be some discretion about how each partnership will be constituted, but an 
expectation that they will work closely with CPPs.276 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
new partnerships will be kept separate from mainstream community planning. 
The first version of the Bill did not include any reference to third-sector 
organisations, either as providers of services or as members of community justice 
partnerships; this drew criticism from MSPs and the third sector.277 The Bill was 
amended to reflect this – requiring the Government, community justice partners and 
CJS to consult relevant third-sector organisations in developing their plans and 
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strategies – but Parliament cannot impose duties on third-sector organisations as it 
can on public bodies, so they are not named as community justice partners. The Act 
as passed requires the local partnerships, CJS and the Government to consult with 
relevant third-sector bodies when planning, but imposes no participation or 
engagement requirement.278 This reflects a further problem to do with the third 
sector– that third-sector organisations often find themselves used as providers 
without being treated as full partners (Chapter 5, Section 4); the Act cannot furnish a 
solution to this. Levels and models of funding were also cited during debate over 
the Bill as a concern for third-sector and public sector organisations.279  
A more conceptual and even theoretical issue was also raised by several MSPs – the 
definition of ‘community justice’. Conservative and Labour representatives on the 
Justice Committee suggested it could be expanded beyond its current remit to 
include early intervention and preventive work, in line with the wider prevention 
agenda in public service reform.280 While acknowledging the potential value of this, 
Wheelhouse and other SNP members argued that primary prevention was best 
managed by other services, and that community justice was concerned only with 
secondary and tertiary prevention (i.e. of further offending). A late attempt by the 
Conservatives to introduce a ‘sunset clause’, which would require the new model to 
be reviewed every five years, was overwhelmingly rejected.281 Other debate around 
the Bill tended to concern the implementation of the legislation rather than its 
content. 
The New Model of Community Justice 
With its legislative underpinnings in place, the detail of the new model is now fairly 
clear, and arrangements have been made to ease the transition to it. In the last year 
or so, local authorities have begun to develop plans for community justice 
partnerships, while CJAs have started to prepare for abolition. The new local 
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partnerships will be required to produce community justice outcomes improvement 
plans alongside,282 rather than within, community plans prepared by CPPs. To 
smooth the transition from CJAs to the new partnerships, the shift to the new model 
is graduated through a ‘shadow year’ (financial year 2016-17) in which both systems 
operate side-by-side.  
Community Justice Scotland (CJS) will be established during this ‘shadow year’, in 
October 2016.283 The new body will contain within it a ‘Learning and Innovation 
Hub’ with responsibility for sharing good practice and research findings. The 
national body will also commission some services on a national basis. The 
Government has emphasised that the local partnerships will not be accountable to 
the new body and that “Community Justice Scotland will have a non-hierarchical 
relationship with CPPs and their partners”;284 the community justice partners will 
instead retain their existing accountability structures, including (through 
councillors) to the local electorate. As well as avoiding the ‘tangled’ lines of 
accountability described by Audit Scotland,285 this aspect of the new model is a 
victory for local authorities, which have avoided having an accountability 
relationship imposed on them.  
In practice, though, there are potentially significant hierarchical elements in the 
constitution of CJS which seem to suggest an effort to introduce accountability by 
the back door. Although not nominally an accountability body, the new 
organisation will have the power to monitor local partnerships’ performance in 
relation to their target outcomes, to report on this monitoring to them and to compel 
community justice partners to publish these reports. Section 29 of the Act allows CJS 
to make “local improvement recommendations”; partnerships will not have to 
comply with these but will have to inform CJS what they intend to do in response. 
In addition, the Act enables the Scottish Government to expand the functions of 
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Community Justice Scotland, including “transfer[ring] functions in relation to 
community justice from another person to Community Justice Scotland”,286 which 
leaves open the possibility of switching to a national service model in future, if the 
partnerships prove unsuccessful.  
The redesign also includes the development and publication of a new National 
Strategy for Community Justice in Scotland. This is intended, among other things, to 
bridge the local and national aspects of community justice through establishing 
intermediate outcomes and aims which link to wider outcomes for Scotland, and to 
the Justice Strategy for Scotland. It may also be a response to the Angiolini and 
Audit Scotland criticisms about a gap in national leadership and a need for a 
nationally coherent policy – no such strategy had accompanied other recent 
community justice policy developments. The Strategy will also be used to inform 
the development of a performance management framework for community justice 
in Scotland,287 which can be read as a response to lack of evaluation of CJAs 
identified by Audit Scotland in 2012.288 
When published, the Strategy will comprise a statement of vision for community 
justice in Scotland and a set of target outcomes linking to the higher-level policy 
outcomes for Scotland.289 COSLA has been involved in drafting the National 
Strategy,290 which gives considerable discretion to local authorities in pursuing 
specifically local outcomes. In addition, the outcomes to which the strategy links use 
a range of metrics that go well beyond simple reoffending rates; this appears partly 
to have emerged from Justice Committee discussions.291 The wider definition of 
community justice advocated by Conservative and Labour politicians during the 
Bill’s debate stage arguably makes a more prominent appearance in the Strategy as 
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a result, although primary prevention is unlikely to be a major part of the Strategy 
when it is published. 
Funding has been a persistent concern in the development of the new community 
justice model, as well as a major issue for many people working within the sector 
(Chapter 5, Section 5). Much of the political discussion around the policy, including 
in the Stage 1 debate,292 touched on the problem of inflexibility in funding, including 
the fact that funding is allocated annually to CJAs, and thence CJSW and potentially 
third-sector providers. This was described as an obstacle to developing more 
flexible services, as social work departments do not know what their future 
allocations will be and thus cannot make long-term plans for service development. 
The short-term focus particularly disadvantages third-sector organisations, who 
commonly have to tender annually for contracts in order to secure the funding to 
continue operating. It is likely that the CJSW funding group within RRP2 will advise 
the Government to move to a model of funding in which CJSW departments are still 
funded annually but made aware of their allocations up to two years in advance, 
allowing them to commission services longer in advance and meaning less time is 
spent renegotiating or retendering contracts.293 However, conflict between local and 
national government has recently flared up again over the CJSW grant allocation, 
after a delay in the UK government’s spending review for 2016-17 delayed the 
allocation of that financial year’s CJSW funding, just as CJAs entered the ‘shadow 
year’.294 
Funding has also been made available by the Scottish Government to support local 
authorities in the transition to the new system – £1.6 million a year, for three years. 
The total is roughly equal to the annual operating budget of the CJAs, and works 
out at £50,000 per local authority. This has also been an area of controversy, with 
local authorities arguing it is insufficient to support them through the transition,295 
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particularly as CJS – a single, small national organisation – will receive significantly 
more (£614,000 in set-up funding and £2.2m per annum in running costs).296  
A number of third-sector organisations have used letters to MSPs and submissions 
to the Justice Committee to highlight a broader concern about funding. At present, 
SPS has around three times the budget of the community justice system, deals with 
fewer offenders and does so less effectively, as measured by reoffending rates 
among other metrics.297 In the context of a felt need for more efficient public services 
in Scotland, and an awareness of the enormous and arguably unnecessary cost of 
imprisonment, the Bill “does not change the funding arrangements for community 
justice services in any significant way”.298 This echoes a wider argument about 
community penalties in Scotland and elsewhere – that unless significant resources 
are moved away from custody and into community justice, it is very difficult to 
reorient the system towards community penalties and away from imprisonment.299  
6. Conclusion: Penal Change in Scotland 
This chapter has described and analysed the wider and specific historical 
background of the redesign of Scotland’s community justice system. Following 
work by Page and others that applies Bourdieusian social theory to criminal justice 
institutions to develop a theoretical model of penal change which emphasises 
struggle and sometimes conflict between actors in the penal field,300 this chapter has 
considered the ways in which community justice administration in Scotland has 
been shaped by struggle and compromise – although there are important 
differences between Scotland and the American examples which inform Page’s 
model (Chapter, 4 Section 3). 
Modern community justice policy tends to be driven less by factors endogenous to 
community justice as by concern about excessive imprisonment, leading to the 
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pursuit of community punishments as alternatives to imprisonment, in both the 
individual-level sentencing sense and the large-scale policy sense. Community 
sentences are generally of demonstrably higher rehabilitative value and lower social 
and economic cost, but, compared to imprisonment in particular, community justice 
enjoys little public or political interest, and suffers from a persistent perceived 
shortfall in judicial legitimacy and confidence. Attempts to rectify this legitimacy 
issue by making community sentences ‘tougher’ can produce the ‘paradox of 
probation’,301 in which community penalties intended as alternatives to 
imprisonment have instead acted to feed the growth of imprisonment; Phelps is one 
of a number of scholars to note that in the international ‘penal turn’, mass 
incarceration has been accompanied by mass supervision.302  
Scotland, however, is often described as having diverged from England and Wales 
and avoided the most dramatic aspects of the ‘penal turn’.303 Instead, Scottish penal 
policy has been characterised in terms of a welfarist and egalitarian ‘Kilbrandon 
philosophy’. This has not been wholly or straightforwardly constitutive of Scottish 
penal policy, which at times has seemed to converge with that of England and 
Wales,304 and recently has seen welfarist rhetoric coexisting with more punitive and 
illiberal policies.305 Nonetheless, the Kilbrandon ethos remains a major influence on 
criminal justice in Scotland, including among practitioners interviewed for this 
project (Chapter 6, Section 5).306 The Kilbrandon Report led directly to the 
constitution in 1968 of a formal and systematised Scottish community justice field in 
which services for offenders were of a piece with other social work, and fell within 
the purview of local authorities.307 These two developments were primary structural 
conditions which shaped the practice and politics of community justice in Scotland.  
All of this took place in a small and geographically diverse country which had 
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always been a separate jurisdiction with its own justice system, but also part of the 
UK – governed from Westminster until 1999, and thereafter by a new national 
government with wide-ranging devolved powers but little political experience.  
Discord between local and national has been crucial in shaping Scotland’s 
community justice field. This includes political conflict and compromise between 
local and national government as political actors, as well as between different 
principles – the need for responsivity to locally-specific concerns set against the 
importance of nationally consistent provision (and see Chapter 6, Section 4). A 
study of the scant material on Scottish community justice history before Kilbrandon 
suggests this tension has always existed in some form, manifested in the often 
informal and unsystematic provision of services in rural areas and in concerns about 
the local governance of community justice by Scotland’s probation committees.  
Although Scotland is often described as distinctive, the period immediately 
following devolution saw some policy convergences with England and Wales’ 
harsher justice policies,308 and the redesign of community justice must be 
understood in the context of the SNP government’s attempt to re-establish 
Scotland’s penal distinctiveness while demonstrating its own fitness to govern and 
adapting to austerity policies enacted by the Westminster government. This last it 
has aimed to do by restructuring rather than cutting public services where 
possible.309 
The Scottish Government was established shortly after the restructuring of 
Scotland’s 12 local government regions into 32 smaller authorities. This change 
produced further local-national disagreement, which combined powerfully with 
concerns about the direction of Scottish penal policy in the 2003 controversy over 
the proposed Correctional Service for Scotland. This ultimately produced a 
compromise system which failed to satisfy either local or national government. 
Doomed by its compromised structure, the CJA system will soon be replaced. The 
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redesign of Scotland’s community justice system forms a relatively unremarked-
upon part of a wider SNP agenda which ostensibly seeks to reorient Scotland’s 
entire penal field away from imprisonment and towards community justice, for 
penal-welfarist and economic reasons. But the new model is the result of another 
compromise between local and national government, over a very long period of 
consultation and development. It is likely that, like the CJA system, this compromise 
approach will have inherent structural problems – although the structural and 
legislative elements in place could mean the hybrid system is simply a short-term 
stepping stone to a national service. 
Much of the criticism of the CJA system has emphasised a need for cultural change 
including leadership and accountability, and this was also a theme in the empirical 
research of this project (Chapter 6), but as Morrison notes, despite “the need for 
cultural change, it is structural change which lies at the centre of the proposals once 
again.”310 The new model is not ambitious, and makes no proposals for changes 
beyond the administration of the community justice system. The actual 
restructuring that will take place will be noticeable but not radical – the delivery 
agencies involved will mostly carry on as before. Reorienting Scotland’s penal field 
would require direct challenges to two very powerful agents – the judiciary and the 
prison system.311 There is little evidence to suggest that the new model will, by itself, 
succeed either in promoting community justice to the public, politicians and 
sentencers or in making significant reductions in reoffending rates or the costs of 
criminal justice in Scotland.  
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Chapter 3: Partnership and Local Governance 
1. Introduction 
Community justice in Scotland is currently organised along regional lines, with 
eight regional Community Justice Authorities (CJAs) responsible for allocating 
funding to the CJSW departments in their regions, holding these departments 
accountable for meeting targets and promoting partnership working to reduce 
reoffending. Under the new model currently being legislated, CJAs will be 
abolished in 2017, and their responsibilities will mostly pass to local partnerships 
led by local authorities. Initially, it was intended that the system of Community 
Planning Partnerships (CPPs), also led by local authorities, would take these 
responsibilities. Recently, the emphasis of the policy shifted to referring to 
‘community justice partners’. CPPs will still have a role in the transition, and to 
some extent in the new system;312 and issues affecting CPPs are likely also to be 
relevant for the new partnerships. The legislation also establishes a new national 
organisation, Community Justice Scotland (CJS), but this will be a small body with a 
mainly advisory role – concerned with promoting community justice and sharing 
innovation and best practice.313 
This chapter considers the restructuring of community justice in Scotland in terms 
of political implications, using insights from sociological and criminological 
literature on subnational variation, deliberative democracy and civic engagement, 
and local governance of crime and crime control. In doing so it also touches on the 
complex question of the meaning of ‘community’ in ‘community justice’, and 
attempts to make links between criminological and local government literatures on 
partnership. It then turns to the logic of prevention, which – although typically 
absent from discussions of community justice – plays a major role in other types of 
crime control partnership and in the rationale for major ongoing public service 
reforms in Scotland.  
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The first section considers some comparative work on variation in imprisonment, 
especially Barker’s explanation of variation between US states with reference to 
different styles of democracy.314 Dzur’s work on deliberative democracy and juries 
is also considered,315 before the chapter tests the applicability of some of these 
concepts to the situation of community justice in Scotland. The second section 
considers partnership arrangements that have been developed with the intention of 
making justice both more democratic and more preventive, and the ways in which 
community justice – traditionally just as much reactive as preventive – has 
attempted to engage with the ‘community’, before considering the specific 
development of partnerships and prevention logics in recent Scottish local 
government reforms. The chapter then discusses some administrative and civic 
concerns common to partnerships in a range of contexts, before finally considering 
legislative developments in community justice and local government in Scotland. 
2. Local Variation and Civic Engagement 
Most western nations have exhibited major change in their criminal justice systems 
since the ‘crisis of penal modernism’ described by Garland and others.316 In Visions 
of Social Control, Cohen describes how challenges to institutionalisation in the 1960s 
– which some predicted would bring about an end to imprisonment – appeared to 
culminate in the opposite effect.317 This included a sharp and well-documented rise 
in imprisonment in the United States, which now has one of the highest rates of 
imprisonment in the world.318 Among other sociological methods, international and 
subnational comparison has been used to determine the causes of this trend.  
Savelsberg and Suhling in Germany 
Savelsberg’s influential work on differences in imprisonment identifies differences 
between the US and Germany in terms of institutional dynamics of knowledge and 
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‘domination’ – in particular the ways in which modes of knowledge production are 
institutionalised in wider society, and the ways in which domination by elites is 
institutionalised (particularly through bureaucracy).319 In general, the 
institutionalisation of German knowledge production is more stable than the US 
whose political climate is marked by sharp changes of direction, often the result of 
changes in ‘public opinion’ as captured by short-term, single-question opinion polls. 
American politics and policy-making tends also to be more ‘personalistic’ (as the 
recent political successes of Donald Trump might attest) while the German polity is 
highly bureaucratised and technocratic. The role of ‘neocorporate organisations’ and 
communities of interest in the German policymaking process is also highlighted by 
Savelsberg as a more communitarian counterpoint to the individualism of opinion 
polling. Particularly relevant for criminal justice is that judges in the US are elected 
officials (often on a ‘tough on crime’ platform) while German judges are unelected 
technocrats who more closely resemble civil servants. 
The position of academics, including criminologists, who may serve as expert 
advisers to governments and policy makers, also differs between the two nations. 
The German tradition is more theoretical and historical, and its academic labour 
market less competitive, while academic experts in the more competitive US sector 
may be under pressure to compromise theoretical rigour and gain state funding for 
more pragmatic solutions to questions of criminal justice policy. Finally, US news 
media is almost wholly privately owned while its German counterpart (as in the 
UK) also includes publicly owned outlets. In Savelsberg’s account, these differences 
contributed to a situation in which the German state responded to rising crime in a 
bureaucratic way, while in the US politicians were both able, and under 
considerable pressure, to make decisions based on public sentiment; when this 
public sentiment is punitive, this leads quickly to rising imprisonment rates.  
Suhling, writing a few years later when German imprisonment rates had risen 
somewhat, examines variation in imprisonment rates between two German Länder 
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(federal states) at the extreme ends of the growth of imprisonment in Germany, and 
finds that the variation is explained by differences in criminal sentencing, permitted 
by the broad discretion on sentencing granted to Länder by the German federal 
criminal code.320 Suhling does not investigate further the possible causes for 
differences in sentencing between the Länder; it is probably safe to assume that it is 
not connected to pressure from local citizens.  
Perhaps envious of technocratic approaches in Europe, some US criminologists have 
called for the depoliticisation of criminal justice policy, perhaps by setting up expert 
boards or (following the German example) by strengthening professionalisation and 
professional identities of criminal justice personnel.321 However, research on 
subnational variation suggests that the opposite direction may in fact be more 
ethical and more effective.322  
Defining Deliberative Democracy 
Deliberative democracy has been a popular idea in political science since at least the 
1980s.323 Its advocates argue that representative liberal democracies limit civic 
participation to voting for elected representatives (regularly but infrequently) and 
that this contributes to voter apathy, political disengagement, a loss of legitimacy for 
governments, and potentially to the deepening of social divisions.324 Such 
democracies, especially in first-past-the-post systems, tend to be characterised by 
conflict rather than constructive dialogue between people and groups, including 
political parties. The atmosphere of the UK House of Commons in particular has 
been described as disrespectful and unconducive to constructive decision making.325 
Deliberative democracy seeks to involve a wider range of people in the political 
process, and to do so in a more constructive way. As Leduc writes, deliberative 
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democracy emphasises voice rather than votes.326 It admits the possibility of people 
changing their minds when exposed to different ideas, rather than assuming 
political preferences are fixed and that the decision-making process should simply 
aggregate these through voting. Compromise and consensus are emphasised over 
conflict and debate. An added bonus of deliberative democracy is that in bringing 
together people from a range of backgrounds and political positions it may also help 
to encourage greater empathy and civic trust. 
Various methods for ‘doing’ deliberative democracy have been developed – they are 
mostly forms of meeting between ordinary members of the public, interested 
stakeholders and organisations, or both, that also involve politicians and/or other 
decision-makers at various levels. Perhaps of particular interest in the British 
context is a ‘deliberative poll’ on crime and punishment conducted in 1994, which 
found that deliberative discussion could produce less punitive attitudes among at 
least some members of the public.327 The idea of deliberative democracy, although 
popular in political science since the 1980s, has only entered criminology relatively 
recently, through the literature on restorative justice.328 Subsequent American 
research has extended the criminological reach of deliberative democracy, 
particularly with reference to imprisonment and the role of the jury.329 Given the 
well-documented lack of public legitimacy and awareness of community justice,330 
such deliberative approaches could be one valuable way of engaging the public 
more closely with the community justice agenda. 
Barker and Subnational Variation in the US 
One limitation in Savelsberg’s research, as with some other accounts of the 
American rise in imprisonment, is that it has not considered the unevenness of this 
trend within the USA; as a partial result of a high degree of autonomy for individual 
US states, the rate of imprisonment varies widely between them. In an article and 
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subsequent book,331 Barker follows Savelsberg’s suggestion that explanations of 
macrosociological phenomena such as imprisonment should pay regard to “nation-
specific institutional structures of knowledge production and domination,” but 
instead follows a state comparative approach. 
Barker analyses this variation through a comparative case study approach, selecting 
three US states – Washington, New York and California – not as extremes of 
imprisonment but as typical of markedly different styles of civic engagement in 
democratic policy. An acknowledged limitation is that the study does not deal with 
the highest-imprisonment states, all of which are in the South, a region Barker 
describes as “underdemocratised”332 which has followed a divergent criminal justice 
path determined to a large extent by the legacy of slavery and racism (Garland 
makes a similar finding with respect to capital punishment).333  
Barker sets out a brief typology of local political engagement, using two key 
dimensions – the extent to which government structures are centralised (at the US 
state level) and the degree of civic engagement and activism – and classifies the 
states by this typology. Barker finds that the high imprisonment rate of California is 
due to a polarising and conflictual populist political culture (high civic engagement, 
centralised government) where public opinion is mobilised around short-term 
single-issue initiatives which citizens are expected either to be for or against – most 
notably Proposition 184, which led to the state’s infamously draconian ‘three strikes’ 
law. Such a system fosters a view of offenders as morally depraved ‘others’, and 
thus support for punitive policies. This can also be considered in light of Page’s 
research on California’s prison officers’ union and how it was able to mobilise 
public opinion in favour of very punitive measures.334 
One can recognise Savelsberg’s description of the US in California, but less so for 
the other states in Barker’s account. Washington’s decentralised government 
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structure has instead traditionally fostered civic participation through deliberative 
formats, including town hall meetings, in which citizens can hear a range of voices 
(including those of offenders), and this has led it instead to limit its use of 
imprisonment in favour of community penalties. New York state, meanwhile, with 
a ‘pragmatic elitist’ government (highly centralised with little opportunity for 
citizen participation), pursued a technocratic and managerialist approach to the use 
of imprisonment as a means of controlling particularly undesirable crimes; its 
imprisonment rate is high for some (drug and violent) offences, and low for others.  
Dzur on Democracy and Juries 
Dzur is broadly in agreement with Barker’s thesis in his defence of the democratic 
value of juries. He refers to “the myth of penal populism”; like Barker, he argues 
that the penal excesses of the last few decades have come not from too much 
democracy but too little – a superficial and conflictual rather than a deep and 
deliberative consideration of issues, and narrow public mobilisation around 
particular ‘hot button’ topics rather than engagement with broader and longer-term 
ideas. Crime and justice are understandably emotive issues, and public participation 
in them should not be feared; a technocratic approach implies that the public cannot 
be trusted. Like Barker, Dzur argues for more deliberative forms of democracy that 
involve more substantive and long-term engagement and deliberation than voting 
in elections or opinion polls.  
Dzur concedes that for citizens who may well be busy and not immediately inclined 
to care very much, “popular sovereignty takes too many evenings”.335 His subject is 
an occasional and (nominally) mandatory mode of participation – juries, whose use 
has declined partly because of efficiency concerns. Jury trials are longer and more 
expensive than plea-bargained summary justice, which has become by far the more 
common form (particularly in the US where plea bargaining is common). However, 
efficiency rationales tend to privilege technocratic expert knowledge and ossify the 
state monopoly on justice. Dzur sees the potential for juries to be a form of ‘rational 
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disorganisation’, which offers a democratic challenge to the state and fosters 
reflexivity about the legal and criminal justice system – even though experts could 
carry out these functions a lot more quickly, non-experts are likely to do so in a way 
that questions the traditions, rules and (perhaps) misconceptions of experts.336 
Dzur positions jury service as a democratic tradition which benefits the jurors by 
showing them how the institutions of criminal justice operate and how difficult it 
can be to make decisions when a range of factors are taken into account, and to 
experience this in a context of sometimes long and heated discussion with fellow 
citizens from a range of backgrounds. The jury is thus a “civic schoolhouse”.337 Dzur 
argues further that institutions may also learn something from the involvement of 
citizens in the jury process.  
Guided by Voices? Deliberative Democracy in Scotland 
Barker and Dzur both go beyond and beneath the ‘penal populism’ hypothesis by 
arguing that punitiveness is in fact the result not of too much democracy but too 
little – although neither of these studies is directly or straightforwardly applicable to 
Scotland. Even the comparatively lenient US states exhibit high rates of 
imprisonment by British standards – Maine is the least imprisoned US state, but its 
rate of imprisonment (350/100,000 population) is more than double that of 
Scotland.338 The UK did not experience the social upheaval engendered by the US 
civil rights movement, which Barker and Savelsberg both identify as a crucial 
explanatory factor in policymaking around criminal justice in the US.339 Despite 
these differences, these works may be relevant in that both connect questions of 
subnational variation directly to those of local and deliberative democracy. 
Scotland, which has always been a separate jurisdiction within the UK, experiences 
subnational (in the sense of ‘within Scotland’, rather than ‘within the UK as a 
whole’) variation in a different way to both the US and Germany, and probably to a 
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lesser extent. Scotland is not divided into states but into 32 local authorities, which 
do not have the power or discretion of American states and German Länder. Unlike 
US states and German Länder (the first of these influential, in the post-World War II 
occupation, on the constitution of the second),340 Scottish local authorities do not 
have separate parliaments, legal or criminal justice systems, functioning only as 
providers of services and as political units of local government, with elected 
councillors responsible for scrutiny and executive decision-making. However, 
particular aspects of the history of Scottish community justice mean that both of 
these functions are implicated in community justice services.  
When the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999, it was described in some 
accounts as the birth of a new form of democracy which would overcome the 
legitimacy problems associated with the Westminster Parliament by taking a 
participatory and deliberative approach to government, through institutions such as 
the committee system and deliberative events with the general public. Electorally, 
the Parliament uses the two-tier Additional Member system, which combines first-
past-the-post constituency elections (which elect the 73 constituency MSPs) with 
proportional representation of parties within the eight Parliamentary regions (which 
each elect seven regional or ‘list’ MSPs). This was intended to avoid the outright 
majorities (and consequent political dominance by single parties) common to the 
Westminster Parliament, to be more representative of the popular vote,341 and also 
to minimise the possibility of nationalists (primarily the SNP) gaining sufficient 
power to bring about an independence referendum.342 The Scottish Parliament was 
seen in its early years as a setting for a ‘new politics’ based on consensus-finding, 
coalition and deliberation.343  
Unlike most Parliaments, it has developed within the context of continuing 
commitments to the UK (whose Parliament retains responsibility for many matters 
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affecting Scotland) and to the European Union.344 Davidson and Stark, in a major 
analysis of deliberative democracy in Scotland, take an optimistic view but one 
tempered with a “health warning” – although there have been many deliberative 
events of various types, these have declined sharply since around 2007.345 This has 
coincided with the period in which the Scottish National Party (SNP) has governed, 
first with a narrow majority of seats and then (from the 2011 election) with a record-
breaking overall majority that the new electoral system was intended to prevent.346 
The Cluttered Landscape: Local Variation in Scotland 
For a small country like Scotland (population around 5 million), 32 is a fairly large 
number of local authorities (England, with around ten times the population, has 
only 57 approximately equivalent such authorities). Scotland’s local authority areas 
range from sparsely populated and remote rural and island areas to compact and 
busy cities, and this heterogeneity can pose particular challenges for local and 
national government. A further challenge is that some local areas in Scotland have 
extremely high concentrations of social problems, including poverty, deprivation, 
ill-health and recorded crime.347 In terms of public service delivery and 
administration, Scotland is a “cluttered landscape” – its public sector organisations 
are subdivided into geographical units, as is common across the world, but with 
remarkably little consistency or co-terminosity across organisations.348 
Politically, Scotland is unusual in being a country whose local authorities predate its 
national Parliament; as such they have considerable political power and experience, 
and are far abler than their counterparts in England and Wales to force concessions 
from national government. Their collective bargaining organisation, the Convention 
of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) has been particularly important in this.349  
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Scottish local authorities are also the traditional holders of key community justice 
responsibilities, following the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act, which abolished 
Scotland’s probation service and placed responsibility for probation supervision 
within generic social work departments in local authorities. Since the 1990s 
community justice supervision and related activities has been referred to as criminal 
justice social work (CJSW), the preserve of specialist social workers within these 
departments. Thus, community justice in Scotland is organised at a subnational 
level, and CJSW provision is the only aspect of criminal justice which is divided 
entirely along local authority lines.   
The exact structural arrangements of which vary between local authorities, and 
supervision workload, as indicated by the number of Community Payback Orders 
(CPOs – which make up the large majority of community sentences, and hence seem 
to be a reasonable indicator of the approximate extent of workload and variation) 
also varies widely; island areas in particular have very few people being supervised 
(around 40 in each island area in 2013-14)350 while urban areas might have over 
1,000. In small rural local authorities there may be only one or two full-time 
equivalent CJSWs,351 while large ones are more likely to have units specialised in 
providing services to offenders. Even after controlling for population differences, 
the rate of community sentences varies widely, being about five times as high in 
Clackmannanshire as in East Renfrewshire.352  
This may partly be accounted for by differences in the crime rate of local authorities, 
which is – unsurprisingly – far higher in populous urban areas such as Glasgow 
(796 recorded crimes per 10,000 people) than in rural or island areas like Orkney 
(145 recorded crimes per 10,000 people),353 but it is likely that a primary factor in the 
workload of CJSW departments is the sentencing decisions made by Scotland’s 
criminal courts. This system has also recently been restructured – the 2014 Courts 
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Reform (Scotland) Act reorganised the courts system along federal lines. The Act 
divided Scotland into six ‘Sheriffdom’ areas, each of which contains one or more 
sheriff courts (a total of 49 such courts across Scotland). It is the practice of criminal 
courts that has the most impact on sentencing variation, particularly in the Sheriff 
Courts which account for the vast majority of CPOs (93.2% in 2013-14).354  
The rate (per population) of CPOs varies by local authority area, but not as widely 
as the differences in recorded crime would suggest, nor in the same places. This 
suggests that variation between the sentencing practices of local courts is an 
important factor which has a knock-on effect on local variations in CJSW workload. 
A brief comparison of sheriff court sentencing practices for common assault – a 
frequent and ordinary offence which can attract a wide range of penalties – shows 
significant variation; in 2013-14, Rothesay Sheriff Court imposed a CPO in only 8% 
of such cases while Portree and Wick Sheriff Courts did so for 46% of common 
assaults.355 
This is not a comprehensive analysis of any aspect of sentencing variation in 
Scotland, and is further limited by the possibility of variation in charging practices 
and/or in seriousness of similarly coded offences being confounding factors, and by 
the minimal caseload of many of the smallest courts (some of which have since been 
closed), which produced significant percentage variation from very small number 
changes; however, even excluding the extreme examples, there remains clear and 
considerable variation between areas (the interquartile range for the rate of CPOs 
for common assault is 22%-33%). These figures also suggest that more detailed 
quantitative research on local variation in sentencing in Scottish courts could be 
fruitful. 
The provision of community justice services also varies between local authorities for 
geographic reasons – group-based interventions are less common in rural and island 
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areas because of the relative difficulty of gathering together enough offenders in one 
place. Additionally, third sector projects, Public Social Partnerships and similar 
initiatives – some highly innovative and successful – tend to be local in scope. 
Funding for local projects of this sort makes up around 20% of the community 
justice budget but this varies widely between and within CJA areas.356 This 
produces a tension between responsiveness to local needs and concerns and the 
requirements of consistency in justice, and can cause conflicts between organisations 
over funding. 
The interface between electoral politics and criminal justice in Scotland is limited; 
judges and sheriffs are not elected, nor has Scotland followed England and Wales in 
adopting locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners. The only elected officials 
involved in Scottish community justice are MSPs (and this only in their role as 
legislators and direction-setters) and the local councillors who sit as elected 
members in some crime control-related local partnerships and as elected members 
of CJAs – regional organisations set up to coordinate the community justice 
activities of local authorities and their partners within their regions. In practice, the 
role of elected members within these partnerships tends to be limited to reading 
reports and approving plans prepared by local authority or CJA staff; although CJA 
members are meant to vote on spending plans for the CJA region, this is almost 
invariably a formality as the plans have been agreed beforehand. Although there 
was concern, particularly during the more penal populist ‘detartanising’ era in 
which the CJAs were first established, about elected members placing political 
expediency above the needs of the CJA, this appears not to have been a serious 
problem – perhaps because public awareness of CJAs, and community justice in 
general, is notoriously low and hence these issues are unlikely to become major 
political concerns for elected members. In this way, CJAs could perhaps be seen as 
deliberative but not particularly democratic. 
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The development of the new community justice system has been marked by an 
unusually long period of consultation and discussion – although it is far from 
certain that this could be called deliberative, since participation was limited mainly 
to experts from interested organisations (particularly local authorities and COSLA) 
and relatively little information reached the general public about it. The placement 
of community justice responsibilities with local partnerships – originally to be CPPs 
– is in some ways an unusual step in a relatively recent tradition of community 
partnership approaches to crime and justice in the UK, and it is to these this chapter 
now turns. 
3. Controlling Crime through Local Partnerships 
This section considers past and future approaches to crime prevention in the 
community in the UK, drawing primarily on the work of Crawford, Hughes and 
Hope and on the wider critical insights of Stanley Cohen.357 After considering briefly 
the macro social context and different definitions of community, the section gives a 
brief account of the development of crime prevention approaches before 
considering specific developments in the field of community crime prevention 
partnerships and CPPs.  
Defining ‘Community’ in the Era of Networked Governance 
‘Community’ is something of a buzzword in British politics and public life,358 to the 
point where it is widely used to refer to any group of people. Hughes differentiates 
between communities of fate (determined by external factors rather than by choice), 
communities of identity and the communities of choice available to successful 
consumers.359 Everyone is concurrently a member of many of these at once, but the 
term’s political usage tends to refer to local areas and the people living and working 
in those local areas as both sites and resources of social action. 
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In Visions of Social Control, Cohen describes a rhetorical ‘quest for community’ at the 
heart of the movement against institutionalisation from the 1960s onwards. In 
Cohen’s account the term (too often presented as unproblematically ‘good’) is 
freighted with nostalgia for pre-modern collective life in rural villages, a reaction 
against the alienation, anonymity and squalor of the city, and the bureaucracy and 
institutional repression of the state. Precedents include the Arts and Crafts 
movement and the work of Durkheim and Tönnies, but Cohen argues the idea 
began to flourish again in the 1960s with the movement against institutionalisation. 
As with restorative justice, this nostalgia could also evoke the simplicity and 
informality of life in tribal societies. As Cohen notes this tends to imply a rose-tinted 
view both of the past and of tribal societies, one which ignores the high potential for 
injustice, discrimination and violence in such informal systems.360  
None of this has stopped ‘community’ being pursued by states as both a means and 
an end in the field of crime control in recent decades. The community rhetoric of the 
late-modern period has been described as developing first from the anti-statist 
politics of the 1980s, which Marilyn Taylor argues produced a hollowing-out of the 
public sphere and a subordination of the concept of ‘community’ to individualist 
notions of self-help, alongside sharp rises in social inequality.361  
This was followed, during the 1990s, by a reborn communitarianism, which carried 
on the distrust of statism while also emphasising that the market alone could not 
provide solutions to social problems, and might even exacerbate them if not 
prevented from doing so. At a time of increasing uncertainty and decreasing 
political legitimacy,  
“’community’ and the ideas that surround it offer resources, social glue, 
alternative ideas and knowledge that are now seen as essential to society.”362 
The role of ‘community’ in political rhetoric was strengthened further by the 
landslide election of a New Labour government in 1997 which pursued a number of 
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community-focused policies including (but not limited to) the Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) discussed below, while making extensive use of 
communitarian ‘Third Way’ rhetoric (although the extent to which this was actually 
informed by communitarian political philosophy is a matter of debate).363 More 
recently, a similar ethos has been discerned in the ‘Big Society’ rhetoric of the 2010-
15 Conservative-led coalition government.364  
Cohen described reforms that ostensibly hand social control power to informal 
community organisations but tend in practice to be organised by the state, and 
hence to involve more, not less, bureaucracy, centralisation and 
professionalisation.365 Crawford has made a similar argument with more specific 
reference to the UK government in the early 21st century - drawing on a nautical 
analogy, he argues that although the state might not always ‘row’ it continues to 
serve both ‘steering’ and ‘anchoring’ functions;366 as Hughes puts it, ours is not an 
era of ‘governance without government’ but a “dirigiste nation-state project”367 
which uses arm’s-length methods to govern communities at a distance. There has 
not generally been close or immediate connection between these ideas and 
‘community justice’; indeed, the ‘community’ in community justice seems often to 
mean simply ‘non-custodial’ (among the connotations of this is that a prison could 
never be considered a community).  
At the time of its beginnings in the work of the police court missionaries and the 
temperance movement, probation work in England included not just the courts and 
the justice system but (in theory) any part of the Victorian city in which inebriates 
and other sinners might be found.368 In more recent times, a popular and contrasting 
narrative within the probation literature has been one of decreasing engagement 
with local communities, as informal home visits to offenders by probation officers 
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have declined.369 Work has moved not just more into the office (with echoes of 
negative reactions to the movement of British policing away from foot patrols and 
into cars) but into fewer, larger offices in urban centres at the expense of smaller 
local probation offices. Meanwhile, the nature of probation work has become 
increasingly bureaucratised and concerned with scripted programmes which 
conform to certain quantitative criteria, to the point where the home visit had all but 
died out by the year 2000.370  
However, as Bottoms points out, the declining visibility of traditional probation in 
the community coincided with an increased visibility for community payback (also 
known as community service or unpaid work), including new requirements for 
visibility by means of high-visibility community payback uniforms, plaques, signs 
and the provision of information to the public, following the recommendations of 
Louise Casey’s report Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime.371 A somewhat 
democratic element was also added to community payback schemes in the form of 
the (central government-mandated) requirement for all community payback 
organisers to develop mechanisms for members of the public to provide their own 
suggestions for work projects for offenders on community payback schemes to carry 
out. Similar schemes are in place in Scotland, but in both jurisdictions the 
community payback organisers choose which schemes get approved, and it’s hard 
to envisage how it could be otherwise. 
The Preventive Turn 
Having already briefly discussed the uneven impact of the ‘punitive turn’ – 
associated in David Garland’s account with ‘criminologies of the other’ – the chapter 
now considers local partnerships with reference to a ‘preventive turn’ more closely 
associated with ‘criminologies of the self’. Hughes locates this preventive turn at the 
heart of community partnership strategies for dealing with crime. Preventive 
measures include Situational Crime Prevention and similar, often technological and 
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consumer-oriented ‘target hardening’ strategies but can also include “social crime 
prevention”, through a range of projects such as youth clubs intended to reach out 
to those thought to be ‘at risk’ of offending.372  
As well as its future orientation, the logic of prevention is notable also for its 
enlistment of wider society beyond specialist crime control agencies. Ordinary 
citizens are made responsible for their own safety and for reducing their risk of 
victimisation, through taking ‘sensible precautions’ but also by becoming 
consumers of security products such as locks, immobilisers, personal attack alarms 
and (less commonly) private security guards, surveillance cameras and weapons.373 
A less individualistic aspect of the crime prevention agenda is that citizens are also 
enlisted as members of communities with responsibility for informal surveillance, 
most notably through Neighbourhood Watch schemes. Prevention also enlists a 
range of organisations and professionals, including those who had never previously 
seen themselves as concerned with crime prevention, such as teachers and 
architects.374 In line with the deinstitutionalisation movement’s distrust of the state, 
these approaches imply that crime prevention and control cannot remain the 
monopoly of specialist institutions.375  
The overlap between crime prevention and community justice is not immediately 
obvious – community justice refers after all to sanctions imposed on offenders after 
they have committed and been convicted of a crime. However, the logic of 
rehabilitation or desistance that informs most community justice practice is fairly 
similar to the logic of crime prevention – both can make use of community-based 
projects and interventions to minimise the risk of (further) offending (sometimes 
referred to as ‘secondary prevention’). This is reflected in the fact that community 
justice organisations are commonly involved with or at least consulted in crime 
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prevention work as well. A further shared concern, although one usually taken 
slightly further in crime prevention, is the emphasis on partnership. 
Another type of prevention logic has developed more recently in the context of local 
government reform in Scotland, in the report of the Christie Commission which 
advocated a more prevention-focused approach to all forms of local government 
spending (see below).376 The political discussions around the Community Justice 
(Scotland) Bill raised the possibility of including primary prevention of crime 
(through early intervention and similar initiatives) in the legislated definition of 
‘community justice’. This was not ultimately passed, with the government taking 
the view that primary prevention was the proper business of other areas of the 
public sector.377 
Mobilising ‘the community’ to prevent crime 
Crime and disorder take place primarily within local communities, and there is a 
long history of attempts to mobilise the resources of these communities to deal with 
crime. In the modern era these attempts have often emphasised the role of inter-
organisational partnerships – a concept Crawford describes as an “extension of the 
concept of ‘community’ to organisations”.378 Some of these partnerships have also 
attempted to involve ordinary citizens, with varying success. 
Formal partnership between different organisations is also an important part of 
community justice in Scotland and elsewhere.379 Pragmatically this is justified by the 
complex and varied criminogenic needs exhibited by many offenders – 
homelessness, addictions, mental health, unemployment – which are the preserve of 
different sectors within public services (Chapter 5, Section 4). There is a long and 
well-documented history in community justice of working in partnership with what 
is now known as the third sector (which until the early 20th century was the only 
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‘provider’ of community justice).380 CJAs were set up partly with the intention of 
encouraging partnership between organisations, and even the most critical reports 
of them acknowledge a degree of success in this aim. A similar logic has applied in 
partnership approaches to crime prevention – an acknowledgment, as Hughes 
describes it, that “people have ‘joined-up’ problems which do not follow the 
bureaucratic demarcations of traditional public services”.381  
Hope’s history of community approaches to crime prevention in the postwar UK 
and US helps to provide some historical background.382 Hope divides the history of 
these approaches into several periods, beginning in the ‘growth city’ of the 1960s 
and 70s, whose community crime prevention approach was heavily influenced by 
the Chicago School concept of delinquency as a property of socially disorganised 
communities. As such, prevention approaches tended to emphasise social 
organisation through schemes including the decentralisation of housing 
management to involve tenants more in the running of their estates, and the 
mobilisation of various types of resources within the community to provide 
legitimate opportunities while also attempting to address structural inequalities. 
From the 1970s onwards, the city (especially the American city) was widely 
perceived as dangerous and disordered, especially in the public housing projects 
that had been constructed in a spirit of optimism not long before. Following the 
urban theory of Jane Jacobs (informal surveillance on streets) and Oscar Newman 
(defensible space),383 crime prevention approaches took a more situational and 
security-focused turn, emphasising the role of informal surveillance 
(Neighbourhood Watch schemes being a particularly successful legacy of this 
period) and various ‘environmental modifications’. Subsequent to this, crime 
prevention policy has tended to emphasise the preservation of social order and the 
‘targeting’ for support of people deemed most vulnerable to criminal victimisation.  
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Hope emphasises that throughout the history of community crime prevention, 
informal social control has remained important, but that social order within 
communities is to a large extent dependent on wider social factors which could 
never be within the control of a community-based partnership.384 The areas most 
affected by crime are also usually those most affected by deprivation and 
underinvestment, and as such it is likely to be especially difficult to build in these 
areas the kind of civic trust required for partnership working to control crime. The 
work of Crawford and Hughes has charted the development of community crime 
prevention approaches in the UK from the 1990s onwards.385 Writing ten years after 
Crawford, Hughes takes a perspective which mixes critical realist criminology and 
‘radical communitarianism’.386 Like Barker, Hughes seeks to challenge criminology’s 
traditional bias towards the nation-state as unit of analysis.  
Modern forms of institutional partnership structures for crime prevention began to 
develop – informally at first – in the 1960s and 1970s and then through the 1980s 
with the establishment of Community Safety departments in an increasing number 
of local councils. Crawford describes the proliferation of partnerships as a “quiet 
revolution” in British governance.387 From 1990 onwards English local authorities 
began to call for statutory responsibility (and thus funding from central 
government) for crime prevention.388 Community partnership approaches to crime 
prevention began to attract interest from the Home Office with the 1991 Morgan 
Report.389 This accelerated from 1997 onwards, under the New Labour government’s 
‘urban renewal’ agenda. Maguire describes the period between 1997 and 2001 as a 
particularly hopeful one for new approaches to crime control, with a falling crime 
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rate and a sense of political optimism about partnerships and evidence-based 
policy.390  
The major legislative step of this period was the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, 
which required local authorities and police forces to work in partnership with 
probation and health boards to produce strategies for the reduction of crime and 
disorder in their areas.391 The Act established partnerships for community-based 
crime control and prevention in each local authority in England and Wales, known 
initially (and still currently in Wales) as Community Safety Partnerships and latterly 
in England as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Although as Hughes 
argues there are important differences in meaning between the two terms,392 this 
chapter refers to Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) throughout, 
for simplicity. CDRPs continue to develop and perhaps to build bridges with the 
community justice machinery; the 2009 Policing and Crime Act promotes probation 
from a cooperating body to a responsible authority of CDRPs, and requires CDRPs 
in turn to adopt a traditional community justice goal, the reduction of 
reoffending.393 
The development of CDRPs was quickly followed by the establishment of the Crime 
Reduction Programme (CRP), in which the Home Office committed to a 
research/partnership/prevention agenda by allocating unprecedented levels of 
funding to a wide range of ‘evidence-based’ crime prevention projects including 
multi-agency partnership. The CRP began in 1999 and was originally intended to 
run for ten years, but ended in 2002.394 As Maguire explains the CRP was largely 
unable to achieve its goals, and was subject to an inherent tension between its role 
as a producer of knowledge about ‘what works’ (or doesn’t) and short-term political 
expediency which pressured the CRP to produce evidence of ‘quick wins’ in 
reducing crime (and tended to have little interest in the publication of negative 
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findings, regardless of their possible research value). There were also a number of 
operational problems, some of which appear to be common in partnership 
approaches to crime and justice (see below).  
The CRP ended prematurely in 2002 and shortly afterwards the New Labour 
government’s approach to crime prevention took a very different turn in the form of 
the antisocial behaviour agenda including the 2003 Anti-social Behaviour Act. The 
Act is perhaps best known for strengthening Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), 
which had been introduced in the 1998 Act but only rarely used in the intervening 
years.395 As well as a sharp increase in the number of ASBOs issued, Hughes 
identifies a shift in local authorities’ crime prevention practices towards more 
repressive and regulatory approaches and somewhat away from the ‘social crime 
prevention’ approach that had characterised their earlier work. This complicates the 
picture of bifurcation between punitive and preventive, suggesting that elements of 
the punitive turn have affected preventive work as well.396 
The New Partnership Professionals 
Although crime rates across the UK have fallen since the 1990s, fear of crime 
remained high, and was increasingly a political concern and object of study in its 
own right.397 A sense that CDRPs have largely failed to address either crime or fear 
of crime led to the wider adoption within local communities of a range of 
community safety professionals who are not police officers (or at least not full 
sworn officers), including: Police Community Support Officers, Community Safety 
Wardens, Community Enforcement Officers, Antisocial Behaviour teams, 
Environmental/Litter Wardens and others. These new professionals may be 
employed by the police or by local authorities, directly or through private security 
companies, and interact in various ways with previously established policing and 
‘human services’-related occupational groups.398 They tend to wear uniforms that 
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may closely resemble those of police officers and may have powers to issue fixed 
penalty notices; in practice, though, their function has more to do with public 
reassurance than with exercising their limited authority.399 
As Cohen wrote in the 1980s, the impulse within the deinstitutionalisation 
movement towards questioning the authority of experts produced the perverse 
outcome of more professionalisation, and more experts. The old experts were able to 
protect their positions, while new experts flourished in new fields of community 
crime control and the role of management expanded in all areas of public life.400 
This trend forms an important aspect of the developments in community crime 
control approaches. Hughes in particular describes the emergence of a new 
professional class of ‘partnership experts’ – civil servants with management 
expertise and particular skills in facilitating partnership working.401 This facilitation 
is non-trivial – partner organisations are not always immediately keen to commit 
scarce resources and time to partnership approaches, particularly where this is not 
legally mandated. Convincing them to do so is as much a matter of interpersonal 
skills as policy requirements, and these are the specific skills of the new partnership 
professionals. Hughes’ insights about these professionals chime closely with the 
experiences of CJA Chief Officers, as indicated by this project’s fieldwork and by 
prior research on CJAs.402  
The Origins of Community Planning in Scotland 
The redesign of community justice in Scotland was originally intended to transfer 
responsibilities away from CJAs to Scotland’s 32 Community Planning Partnerships 
(see Section 4).403 CPPs are local bodies, coterminous with local authorities and 
having responsibility for ‘community planning’. Community planning is a way of, 
and a set of structures for, aligning disparate cultures and fragmented public service 
                                                     
399 Hughes, 2007: 100-101 
400 Cohen, 1985: 169-196 
401 Hughes, 2007: 83 
402 Morrison, 2012: 199-200 




delivery to meet particular social aims within communities, while also serving 
democratic goals by encouraging civic participation in the planning process.404 
Although partnership arrangements for community planning exist in all the 
jurisdictions of the UK, this discussion will focus on the development of CPPs in 
Scotland, whose stated aims combine local democratic engagement with inter-
organisational partnership: 
• “making sure people and communities are genuinely engaged in the 
decisions made on public services which affect them; allied to 
• a commitment from organisations to work together, not apart, in providing 
better public services.”405 
As in the history of community justice in Scotland, the development of CPPs has 
been largely shaped by struggles between local and central government, and much 
of their work involves linking local with national priorities. The devolution of 
Scotland and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive 
(later the Scottish Government) have also been major factors in shaping the 
conditions of CPPs’ development, as well as being in some sense indicative of Third 
Way decentralisation policies. More so than in the other jurisdictions of the UK, 
community planning in Scotland originates in less formal arrangements set up by 
local authorities. Economic renewal in areas impacted by deindustrialisation was a 
primary concern of these partnerships, which tended to fit well with the ‘social 
inclusion’ agenda of the New Labour government of the UK. 
The story is one of continuity as well as change. Initially small and informal 
partnerships could evolve and change - retaining a degree of institutional 
knowledge of local priorities and administrative issues – through successive policies 
which developed the formal structures of what is now called community planning, 
from Priority Partnership Areas and Regeneration Programme Areas, through 
Social Inclusion Partnerships and finally CPPs.406 This development through the 
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1990s and early 2000s reflected a continued concern with developing more joined-
up and consistent approaches to community planning, and moving away from the 
inconsistency of more or less formal partnerships with varying degrees of local and 
subject specificity. The development and formalisation of community planning was 
also seen as a way to reassert the power of local authorities, in the context of the 
development of a new set of central government structures for Scotland.407 The 
Community Planning Working Group, a joint venture between the Scottish Office 
and COSLA, proposed three aims for the system of community planning: “to 
improve local services through coordinated working between local public service 
providers; to establish a process through which public agencies and the voluntary, 
community and private sectors could agree a strategic vision for their area and the 
measures to implement this; and to create a means through which the views of 
communities could be identified and delivered in policy.”408 
This culminated in the development of CPPs, extended (mandatorily) to all of 
Scotland’s 32 local authorities by the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act. This 
required the local authorities to take the lead in setting up CPPs in their areas, and 
mandated the participation of other public sector bodies in CPPs as well. Unlike 
their predecessor partnerships, CPPs would cover entire local authority areas rather 
than targeting specific areas with particular problems. Two other elements were 
important in shaping future arrangements; the first of these, the power to advance 
well-being, allowed local authorities to become involved in any arrangements 
within or outside their areas in order to improve the well-being of their areas and 
people. Perhaps more importantly (particularly in the aforementioned context of 
austerity spending cuts) the Act also imposed a ‘duty to secure best value’, defining 
‘best value’ as “continuous improvement in the performance of the authority’s 
functions”, in terms of maximising the level of service provided for the cost 
involved.  
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In 2007, following the election of a minority SNP administration, the Scottish 
Government entered into a ‘Concordat’ with COSLA. The Concordat allows local 
authorities a great deal of flexibility in how they go about meeting targets and 
dealing with social problems, but in exchange limited the councils’ ability to raise 
funds, instituting a freeze on council tax across Scotland which is now in its eighth 
year.409 The Concordat also instituted a system of Single Outcome Agreements 
(SOAs) – targets that local authorities (and subsequently CPPs) agree on a yearly 
basis with the help of central government. Guidance on SOAs resonates with 
‘evidence-based policy’ approaches, emphasising that outcomes should be tangible 
and progress quantifiable by empirical evidence.410 This system is intended both to 
ensure that the priorities of CPP partners can be aligned towards the CPP’s 
priorities, and to bridge the gap between local priorities and national outcomes and 
indicators. One thing that makes the transfer of community justice responsibilities to 
CPPs somewhat surprising is that CPPs, until the redesign, have had little 
responsibility for justice-related services;411 where community plans and SOAs have 
involved reducing (re)offending, this has mostly referred to the work of the 
coterminous Community Safety Partnerships (the Scottish counterpart of CDRPs), 
which in any case tend to be preventative rather than concerned with punishment 
or rehabilitation. This long-term division is likely to be a factor in the decision to 
keep community justice separate from CPPs. 
In the years following the 2003 Act there was a certain amount of optimism about 
CPPs – they were seen in 2006 as indicative of a “fundamental shift in local 
governance which will unfold over a long period of time, even across 
generations.”412 However, nearly a decade later it is far from clear that CPPs have 
done very much at all – a recent report by Audit Scotland stated that “overall, and 
ten years after community planning was given a statutory basis, CPPs are not able 
to show that they have had a significant impact in delivering improved outcomes 
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across Scotland.”413 Some possible factors in the failure of the CPP model to fulfil its 
initial promise, many apparently common across various types of partnership, are 
discussed below. 
Community Planning in the Age of Austerity 
The economic crisis of 2007-08 and the election of a Conservative-led coalition 
government for the UK in 2010 led to the adoption of major cuts to public spending, 
forming one part of the “scissors of doom” – a fall in the resources available for 
public services, at the same time as an increase in demand for them (mainly due to 
an ageing population).414 
The response of the Scottish Government (from 2011 onwards an SNP-majority 
administration) to this predicament was to attempt to lessen the impact of these cuts 
on services by making efficiency savings wherever possible, rather than by lowering 
the level of service; in the local government context this can be seen as an extension 
of the ‘best value’ duty already in place the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act. 
In November 2010, the Scottish Government established a Commission on Public 
Services, led by Campbell Christie,415 to examine the options for this reform.  
The report of the Christie Commission, which appeared the following year, has 
shaped many of the most recent developments in Scottish local government, 
including upcoming legislation. The four key principles recommended in that 
report were: 
“• Reforms must aim to empower individuals and communities receiving 
public services by involving them in the design and delivery of the services 
they use. 
• Public service providers must be required to work much more closely in 
partnership, to integrate service provision and thus improve the outcomes 
they achieve. 
• We must prioritise expenditure on public services which prevent negative 
outcomes from arising. 
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• And our whole system of public services – public, third and private sectors 
– must become more efficient by reducing duplication and sharing services 
wherever possible.”416 
The third principle, sometimes known as the ‘prevention principle’, has been 
perhaps the most influential and best-known recommendation of the report.417 The 
approach to prevention, as described in Chapter 6 of the report, emphasises the role 
of long-term planning and targeted interventions to deal with inequalities.418 
Referring back to Hughes’ and Crawford’s descriptions of CDRPs in England and 
Wales as having ‘social’ and ‘situational’ crime prevention approaches – attempting 
to deal with long-term social and structural causes, or using architectural and 
technological methods to harden possible targets against opportunistic offenders – 
the Christie approach to prevention clearly chimes more with the former type.  
The Christie report said relatively little about criminal justice or deliberative 
democracy; CPPs are also not mentioned often. However, one finding on CPPs is of 
particular interest here, elucidating a difference between the ‘partnership’ and 
‘community’ dimensions: 
“The Commission heard a consistent view that the potential benefits of a 
local partnership approach are far from being fully realised; that there are 
significant variations in the effectiveness of community planning 
partnerships; and that, for the most part, the process of community planning 
has focussed on the relationships between organisations, rather than with 
communities.”419 
Variations in efficacy of CPPs appear to remain a serious problem, but COSLA and 
the Scottish Government agreed to pursue the Christie Commission’s 
recommendations through the framework of CPPs and SOAs, placing these 
troubled partnerships at the heart of post-austerity public service reform. However, 
as Audit Scotland has found, CPPs would need considerable reform in order to 
meet this rather ambitious goal.420 Another ongoing policy informed by a similar 
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approach is the integration of health and social care provision within local 
authorities under the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014. What the 
effect of the integration will be on community justice or community planning is not 
yet clear, and may also vary between local authorities.  
A number of problems with both the ‘partnership’ and the ‘civic’ or ‘deliberative 
democracy’ elements discussed here appear to be common to both CPPs and the 
local crime control partnerships described by Hope, Hughes and Crawford. These 
issues are discussed in the following section. The Community Empowerment 
(Scotland) Act is the latest attempt to address some of the problems with CPPs, and 
is discussed further in Section 4. 
4. Power and Democracy in Community Partnerships 
A number of common problems and issues appear in the literature on partnership 
work in the community in general. Some of these are linked directly to questions 
about civic participation and deliberative democracy, while others are likely to be 
widespread issues within partnership working in general. Some of these may be of 
particular concern for new Scottish community justice partnerships, so throughout 
this section I attempt to develop and clarify the links between these various issues 
and the redesign of the Scottish community justice system. 
Partnership Dynamics 
Conflicts of culture and aims 
Public service organisations have diverse aims and cultures, and this may be 
especially true of criminal justice which has historically been the site of conflict 
between political views and penal rationales, and legally mandatory obligations. 
Furthermore, partnerships in practice have to be understood not just as collections 
of organisations but as collections of people in working relationships with each 
other. Although ostensibly a straightforward matter of policy, partnership working 
must also be understood in terms of ensuring that cooperative and respectful 




Partnership working in England has often been marked by conflict of aims between 
police forces and traditionally welfarist services such as social work and 
probation.421 This parallels the dichotomy within police culture between ‘crime 
fighting’ and ‘social work’ roles, with the first traditionally being seen as ‘real police 
work’ (masculine, exciting and decisive) and the second as ‘pink and fluffy’, time 
that could be better spent chasing ‘real criminals’.422 Mawby and Worrall have 
described an environment of mutual distrust and suspicion between police and 
probation services, encapsulated in their memorable article title: “They were very 
threatening about ‘do-gooding bastards’”.423 
This problem is more pronounced in the case of services such as social work which 
are not traditionally affiliated with crime control,424 although this may be less of an 
issue in Scotland where probation supervision has for nearly 50 years been a social 
work rather than a criminal justice responsibility. Even without mutual distrust and 
dislike, differences in aims and cultures can have practical effects, for instance the 
bias within health and social services towards patient/client confidentiality (as well 
as specific obligations in this regard) may make them less inclined to share 
information with police forces.425  
As well as specific conflicts between aims or cultures, there are issues with 
partnership working in general that may generate problems. The partnership 
working process requires certain sacrifices – more time has to be spent in meetings 
and organisations may have to give up some control in the interests of the 
partnership. Scarce resources may also have to be given up or shared – a particular 
concern in the current period of public sector austerity. In more abstract terms, 
people may be concerned about the blurring of organisational boundaries as an 
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assault on organisational identity and operational autonomy.426 Organisations that 
are not used to partnership working may find the initial adaptation difficult.  
These issues are to some extent captured in Crawford’s description of two ‘ideal 
types’ of crime prevention partnership – ‘multi-agency’ partnerships are 
collaborative efforts that happen to involve multiple agencies but in ways that do 
not challenge their established cultures and ways of working, while ‘inter-agency’ 
partnerships go beyond this to begin merging functions and disrupting traditional 
methods and tendencies within organisations.427 The latter type may also involve 
secondments and other processes which require professionals from one organisation 
to carry out tasks more traditionally associated with others, such as police officers 
who work closely with probation staff. This may well be beneficial for the person 
involved, who thus experiences the criminal justice system from a different 
perspective and gets a sense of the particular pressures that weigh on other 
professionals, similarly to Dzur’s ‘civic schoolhouse’ thesis about juries. 
It should be noted that the blurring of organisational boundaries is not necessarily 
unproblematic. Teachers and social workers might not be glad to find themselves 
involved in the crime prevention agenda. There is a real danger that due process 
concerns, including the right to confidentiality, could be trampled in the 
convergence of organisations dealing with different needs and concerns. This 
potentially becomes more of a problem when informal relations become cosy, as 
confidential information can be exchanged through back channels without this ever 
becoming a matter of record. The interview data from this project show similar 
concerns in Scottish community justice about conflicts between partners’ aims, and 
about the structural fragility of partnerships in Scotland (Chapter 5, Section 4). 
Power Dynamics in Partnerships 
A further potential problem for relationships within partnerships concerns the 
powers of certain partners over others as constituted in the establishment of 
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partnerships. Typically, a local partnership will place some partners in a position of 
greater power. In the case of both CDRPs in England and Wales and CPPs in 
Scotland, this has been the direct result of the relevant legislation; the 1998 Crime 
and Disorder Act named the police and local authorities as main partners in 
Community Safety Partnerships, while the Local Government in Scotland Act 
names local authorities as key partners in CPPs.428 The necessarily limited 
prescriptiveness of the legislation was intended to engender flexibility, allowing 
partnerships to develop with different partners in different areas – but in practice it 
has often led to dominance by ‘statutory’ partners, particularly since local 
authorities play both a service provision and a local democratic role.429 This has 
been a particular criticism of CPPs in Scotland, as in a recent critical report by Audit 
Scotland: 
“Community planning has tended to be seen as a council-led exercise. This 
reflects both the legal position of councils as the bodies with the statutory 
duty to initiate, facilitate and maintain community planning, and the 
democratic nature of councils which carries with it an important community 
leadership role. The fact that only councils were formally held to account for 
their role in community planning through the Best Value audit also helped 
reinforce the perception that councils were responsible for community 
planning.”430 
The inconsistency of regional subdivisions in Scotland serves to reinforce this, 
because, first, local authorities are one of only a few subdivisions that are wholly 
coterminous with CPPs and second, some organisational areas may have to partner 
with many different CPPs. The Greater Glasgow and Clyde NHS Board is a 
statutory partner of ten CPPs, each with its own time and resource commitments.431 
In England and Wales, police forces have often been particularly powerful within 
CDRPs. In comparison with the other partners, they tend to be well-resourced in 
materials, personnel and information, while as ‘gatekeepers’ to the criminal justice 
system they also have considerable influence on which people become clients of the 
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various partnership projects.432 Although not especially successful at preventing 
crime, police have increasingly been seen as crime prevention experts and consulted 
(both by other organisations and the general public) for advice on target hardening 
and other situational prevention measures. There appear to be affinities between 
this privileged position and the traditional machismo of police culture which likely 
contribute to the perception of police forces as domineering presences within 
community prevention partnerships.433 
This has been a particular problem for third sector organisations, who often provide 
innovative and useful ‘social crime prevention’ and offender projects within 
partnerships, but in recent times have typically done so under contractual 
arrangements which create an asymmetric power relationship between third sector 
and public sector partners (the latter being a commissioner of services as well as a 
direct provider of them).434 Similarly, CPP partners in Scotland tend to view third-
sector organisations as partners with valuable insights and contributions to make, 
but not as equals – third-sector organisations have neither the same level of 
resources, nor the same democratic mandate and accountability.435 
These power dynamics can impact directly on working relationships within 
partnerships. Maguire’s account of the CRP describes the ways in which the 
imperative on researchers to evaluate projects was sometimes overridden by the 
need for the evaluators to maintain good working relationships with the other 
members.436 This has also been a major problem for the CJAs, which were 
established with the conflicting aims of holding local authorities to account and 
fostering partnership between local authorities and other organisations within their 
regions. In ten years of operation the CJAs have never used their accountability 
powers to report local authorities to the Scottish Government for failure to meet 
targets, because to do so would compromise the working relationship between them 
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and make it more difficult to secure cooperation from local authorities; however, the 
presence of the accountability power (although unused) nonetheless led local 
authorities to be highly suspicious of the CJAs in the years immediately following 
their development. Similarly, CPPs were intended to make a wider range of public 
sector organisations more democratically accountable, but in practice this challenge 
to pre-existing lines of accountability generated tensions within the partnerships.437  
Despite these concerns, organisational and individual habitus are not fixed, and 
there is encouraging evidence that these differences can be overcome with time. The 
difficult relationship between probation and police forces gave way in the years 
following the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act to an increasingly cooperative and 
‘federated’ approach which recognised different styles of working while still 
engendering a mutual respect.438 In general there has been a shift in police culture to 
greater recognition of the value of community-based work and interagency 
working. The research in this project suggests there have been improvements in the 
partnership working of CJAs, but that these have appeared too late to save them. 
Civic Concerns 
A further set of issues with community-based partnerships of various types are 
concerned with less with partnership dynamics than with civic participation; they 
have less obvious relevance for community justice, where civic participation is 
limited, but are arguably of considerable concern for deliberative democracy. 
Penal Populism and Electoral Imperatives 
As discussed in Section 1, much of the criminological antipathy to public and 
community involvement in criminal justice policy centres on the punitive responses 
of many members of the public to crime and offenders. Cohen has noted that the 
pre-modern, pre-police forms of community crime control, which have sometimes 
been regarded with nostalgia, were marked by erratic vigilante enforcement and 
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sometimes extreme violence.439 This is a particular concern to community justice, as 
opposed to crime prevention providers, as community justice deals with people 
who have committed and been convicted of a crime. Although there is strong 
evidence that the expression of punitive sentiments does not always or even often 
translate into aggression against offenders, members of the public do sometimes 
behave aggressively towards those identified as offenders. This can include abusive 
behaviour towards the offenders and staff involved in community payback/unpaid 
work schemes,440 or more seriously towards sexual and other serious offenders 
living in the community. ‘Public protection’ is sometimes as much about protecting 
offenders from the community as the other way round. 
The development of a role for local authority members in CDRPs, under the 1999 
and 2000 Local Government Acts, was seen as a positive development for making 
the local partnerships more democratic, and had previously been recommended by 
the Morgan Report as a way of preventing the marginalisation of crime and justice 
issues within local public policy agendas.441 In Scotland, elected members are in fact 
the only ‘official members’ of CJAs (the staff who do the actual work are positioned 
as support personnel). In both the English crime prevention and Scottish 
community justice contexts, there have been concerns that elected members would 
have difficulty reconciling their partnership roles and their electoral needs.442 
However, in general there has been little political interference in CDRPs or in CJAs. 
In both cases this is likely partly attributable to a lack of expertise; unlike the new 
‘partnership professionals’, the partnership role is only a small part of a local 
councillor’s job. The experts involved in CDRPs may intentionally have protected 
themselves against political interference by emphasising the role of empirically 
evaluated ‘evidence-based’ measures; it probably helped that the introduction of 
                                                     
439 Cohen, 1985: 120-2 
440 Bottoms, 2008: 158-9 
441 Crawford, 1997: 36-40 




elected members to CDRPs coincided with the beginnings of the CRP.443 Within 
CJAs the support staff are similarly able to shape the agenda (as discussed briefly 
above), but there does not appear to be the same protectionist impulse in their case. 
It may be that the lack of political interference has in either case more to do with a 
general lack of public or political interest in CJAs and community justice in general. 
In the context of these (real or potential) issues around the involvement of elected 
members, it is noteworthy that during this project’s fieldwork interviews with CJA 
elected members, questions about the extent to which their roles as local politicians 
impinged on their CJA roles were typically answered with descriptions of their 
experiences dealing with constituents’ inquiries about sexual and other high-profile 
offenders moving into their local areas, rather than operational issues about 
community justice in general.  
Civic Disinterest and ‘Community Leaders’ 
A further problem is that citizen participation in partnerships is limited. There has 
tended to be little public awareness – opportunities to participate, whether 
deliberative or not, are not always well-publicised. Participatory events are also 
likely to take place during the day when many citizens will be working. If “popular 
sovereignty takes too many evenings”,444 it’s more likely to be the preserve of those 
with enough time and resources not to have to work long hours. Participation is 
thus commonly limited to “local worthies” who gain disproportionate agenda-
setting power,445 or to those who become involved as part of their professional role 
or through their expertise (as discussed further below), as in the case of local crime 
prevention and Neighbourhood Watch initiatives, which have tended to be 
dominated by better-off homeowners.446 Looking out for crime is also quite boring 
most of the time,447 and it may be that getting involved with community 
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partnerships is not much more interesting – especially in meetings that may be 
dominated by expert-level discussions. 
In some cases the ‘voice’ of the community, or of particular communities within a 
local community (ethnic, religious, etc.) is channelled through ‘community leaders’, 
but as with other leaders, the extent to which these people really represent their 
communities and their interests is unclear. There appears to be little to no 
democratic accountability in choosing who gets to be a ‘community leader’ – as 
opposed to an elected member – in the local partnership context. As Hughes and 
Rowe note, such concerns may be the subject of real tension and disagreement 
within communities.448 A recent example from the press describes just such 
disagreements with reference to Muslim ‘community leaders’: 
“Muslims are mostly under 25, female and from low-income backgrounds, 
but the “leaders” are much older, male and middle class – they don’t speak 
for typical Muslims because they aren’t typical Muslims.”449  
Particular concern arises where the issue of how and by whom ‘the community’ is 
represented interacts with longstanding social divisions and inequalities. A study 
by McAlister of Community Planning Partnerships in Northern Ireland found 
concern that civic participation in these organisations was at risk of becoming 
dominated by sectarian interests.450 Although Scotland is not a ‘post-conflict society’ 
in the same way, it is not inconceivable that such problems could arise in some areas 
of the country. 
Inequality Between Communities and Local Inconsistency 
Acknowledging that different local communities have different needs is a vital part 
of the local partnership approach, but it entails, inescapably, a recognition that not 
all local communities are equal. Attempting to engage the communities most 
severely affected by crime and deprivation is an admirable goal, but complicated by 
the fact that those communities with the most capacity to develop either 
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participatory democratic arrangements, community crime control efforts or 
arrangements that are both of these at once – are likely to be those which already 
possess considerable resources and ‘collective efficacy’.451 The result is inequality 
between areas, especially when combined with the tendency for resource conflicts to 
arise within partnerships, which may be deepened further by the unevenness of 
participation, middle-class professionals and other experts being more likely to 
participate in community planning arrangements.452  
Particular problems exist in this regard for community planning structures in 
Scotland, where the system of Social Inclusion Partnerships that predated CPPs was 
criticised for its failure to provide for the poorest neighbourhoods.453 The fact that 
CPPs in Scotland were developed around or within pre-existing (often informal or 
semi-formal) partnership networks, rather than created from scratch, probably 
helped to smooth the transition and minimise the risk of resistance from local 
authorities and COSLA; however, this also meant that those local authorities 
without such pre-existing partnerships did have to create CPPs ex nihilo. Even some 
years after the development of CPPs, the Christie Commission and Audit Scotland 
emphasised that inconsistency between areas remains a problem, including in levels 
of partnership engagement and accountability arrangements, which is partly a 
result of the wide discretion granted to local authorities in setting up CPP 
structures.454 This is a particular concern for the provision of justice-related services, 
where differences between local areas could conflict directly with the judicial value 
of consistency. 
The Continued Dominance of Experts and Governments 
In his chapter on the system dynamics of community crime control projects, Stanley 
Cohen has argued: 
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“The real, awful secret of community control… the same old experts have 
moved office to the community and are doing the same old things they have 
always done”455 
The probation officers and academics who mourn the passing of home visits and the 
like might disagree, suggesting instead that their offices have in fact moved out of 
the community. The quote above arguably also raises the same questions about the 
meanings of community – surely any office, wherever located, is in some sense part 
of a community. More importantly, Cohen’s argument is that the efforts to challenge 
the dominance of experts within criminal justice (and perhaps other areas of public 
service) ultimately failed and even made them stronger. Although efforts to locate 
crime control in the community, through measures such as CDRPs as well as 
through the Neighbourhood Watch and similar informal surveillance schemes 
described by Hope,456 have sometimes granted a degree of democratic participation 
and even power to ordinary citizens, this has rarely been at the expense of experts. 
As also considered above, the development of CDRPs in the UK, and arguably CJAs 
in Scotland, have in fact created new types of expert professionals, but not at the 
expense of the old ones. 
The continued concentration of power in the hands of experts is likely to be 
compounded by low levels of public participation in the various forms of 
neighbourhood-based partnership, and the aforementioned tendency of these 
partnerships to select (whether deliberately or not) those participants and 
community representatives whose aims already conform to those of the local 
administration.457 In the specific case of neighbourhood community justice work 
through local partnerships, this problem would likely be compounded by a lack of 
public awareness about local government structures and community justice issues. 
There is also a central-local dynamic in play – policies that ostensibly seem to 
devolve power from central government to local communities are in fact typically 
designed, circumscribed and implemented by central government – and sometimes 
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imposed on local authorities and organisations. 458 In the specific case of CDRPs, 
Crawford – writing nearly a decade after his first study of these organisations – has 
since stated that: 
“…the reality is that, in most instances, [CDRPs] have singularly failed to 
meet even the most limited aims of networks. They lack significant 
autonomy from central government, and can hardly be described as ‘self-
organizing’.”459 
Even in Scotland, with its strong tradition of powerful local government, 
requirements for CPPs and similar organisations have typically been imposed from 
above and enforced by central government. The Concordat between the government 
and COSLA made operational flexibility for local authorities conditional on central 
government restriction of a major source of revenue.460 Citizen participation in CPPs 
in Scotland is potentially costly and difficult to put to use in a constructive way. 
There is little incentive in practice for CPPs to develop systems and milieux that 
encourage local deliberative democracy. In these ways, pressures towards efficiency 
seem likely to be factors in the continued failure of CPPs to achieve their democratic 
goal. 
Into the Future: Legislative Developments 
In Scotland, the ongoing redesign of the community justice system, legislatively 
underpinned by the 2016 Community Justice (Scotland) Act and scheduled for 
completion in 2017, was intended for some time to transfer responsibility for 
community justice delivery to CPPs. However, this move was always going to be 
tentative and partial. Unlike other areas of public service funding, including other 
social work, funding for CJSW will remain ring-fenced, limiting the discretion of 
local authorities to spend the money elsewhere (such as in a more prevention-
focused way) as they have been able to do in most areas under the 2007 Concordat. 
The Scottish Government would continue to ‘steer’ local provision of community 
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justice by requiring “community justice outcomes improvement plans” separate 
from mainstream community planning.461  
Although the Government has emphasised that the new national body, Community 
Justice Scotland, will not be in an accountability relationship with local partners,462 it 
will have the power to compel these partners to report on their progress. The 
implication is that local partners cannot entirely be trusted with responsibility for 
community justice. CPPs have not always been able to fulfil an ambitious mandate 
that combines efficiency, partnership working and local democracy. Criticism of the 
CPP system has particularly emphasised their failure as institutions of local 
democratic engagement, and it is this aspect in particular which the 2015 
Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act was intended to address, as seen in the 
Scottish Government’s own description of the justification for the Act which invokes 
the language of deliberative democracy: 
“The Scottish Government is committed to our communities being 
supported to do things for themselves – community empowerment – and to 
people having their voices heard in the planning and delivery of services – 
community engagement and participation.”463 
The participatory element is dealt with in Parts 3 and 10 of the Act, which make 
provision for mechanisms for community participation. Although it is too early for 
there to be much commentary on the Act, there have already been claims that the 
legislation as enacted represents a “watered-down” approach to empowerment 
resulting from compromises with local government.464 Unfortunately for 
deliberative democracy in Scottish local communities, the content of the Act appears 
to support this claim. Part 3 makes no statement about participation beyond 
granting a right to “community participation bodies” (rather than all members of 
the public) to “make a request to a public service authority to permit the body to 
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participate in an outcome improvement process.”465 Local authorities may refuse 
these requests if there are found to be “reasonable grounds for doing so”. Part 10 of 
the Act enables Scottish Ministers to require public authorities to promote 
participation, but does not in itself require anything of local or other authorities. 
There may in any case be an inherent conflict within the mandate of CPPs – between 
efficiency and democracy. As Dzur has remarked in advocating the ‘rational 
disorganisation of juries’, participation by non-experts is comparatively costly in 
time and resources. Expert participation by contrast is likely to be relatively 
straightforward and to feed efficiently into the process of planning or policy 
development.466 In the context of local government service provision, encouraging 
participation by ordinary citizens is likely to require specific outreach events and 
‘community meetings’ which are costly in terms of resources. The ‘best value duty’ 
required by the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act has been reinforced by 
public sector austerity,467 and the Scottish Government response to austerity which 
has emphasised adapting institutional arrangements to maintain the quality of 
service. The ways in which local authorities must make savings are circumscribed – 
many have policies against making mandatory redundancies.468 In short, real civic 
participation is in conflict with the needs of austerity and the duties of local 
authorities to their taxpayers. Strangely, the justification for the transfer of 
community justice responsibilities to CPPs made no mention of deliberative 
democracy and local civic participation, despite its institutional and temporal 
proximity to a community empowerment policy which emphasises these virtues. 
The interface between local democracy and community justice will continue to be 
limited to the presence of local councillors in CPP meetings. 
The Community Empowerment Act widened the range of participation in CPPs, 
extending the range of statutory partners beyond just local authorities (initially the 
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only partners whose involvement was legislatively required)469 to include NHS 
boards, police, transport partnerships and a range of other public service and 
education bodies.470 There may be more justification for optimism here, as this does 
deal directly with one widely-reported problem for partnerships in general – the 
dominance of local authorities. A similar partnership approach is implied in the 
content of the Community Justice (Scotland) Act: 
“The following persons are “community justice partners” for the purposes of 
this Act— 
(a) each local authority, 
(b) each health board, 
(c) the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland, 
(d) the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 
(e) Skills Development Scotland, 
(f) an integration joint board [health and social care] established by virtue of 
section 9 of the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014, 
(g) the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, and 
(h) the Scottish Ministers. [representing the Scottish Prison Service]”471  
Both Acts were the subject of concern around the role of third sector 
organisations,472 which are not mentioned, even in the abstract, in the Community 
Empowerment Act, or in the first version of the Community Justice (Scotland) Bill. 
This arguably protects the third sector’s independence and flexibility, and 
recognises the local nature of many third-sector organisations, but it is also likely to 
reinforce the dominance of the public sector in partnership settings – although the 
Community Justice (Scotland) Act did acknowledge the role of third sector bodies 
and require both local and national elements of the new system to consult them in 
their planning activities.473 
In recent months the redesign of community justice has undergone a subtle shift in 
emphasis. CPPs, initially described as “central to the new arrangements”,474 could 
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not be named as statutory partners. Instead the 2016 Act, and more recent 
documents about the redesign, refer to local community justice partners. Local 
authorities, required to keep community justice planning separate from other 
planning work, are in some cases opting to set up community justice partnerships 
separate from CPPs.  
The partnership structures for community justice are at the discretion of CPPs, who 
thus still have a role in justice planning, but potentially only at this remove.475 
Therefore, whether CPPs become involved with community justice partnerships is 
also somewhat at their discretion, and will probably vary between areas. The set of 
community justice partners includes most statutory members of CPPs, so the 
partnerships will be similar in composition. Community justice planning must 
“have regard to… Local Outcome Improvement Plans produced by the CPP”,476 
locating the justice responsibilities within the wider planning framework. CPPs 
have also been enlisted throughout the redesign process to assist with the transition 
to the new model.477 
The exact reasons for this shift are presently unclear. It may result from concerns 
about CPPs’ suitability for the community justice role, or from resistance by local 
authority interests to CPPs gaining complex additional tasks separate from their 
mainstream work. However, even without knowing how active CPPs will be in the 
new system, the foregoing issues with local government partnership approaches are 
– as argued above – not confined to CPPs, and are likely still to apply to the new 
model of community justice in Scotland. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a range of literature related to subnational variation 
and deliberative democracy in criminal justice, the history of crime control and 
community planning and issues of power dynamics and democracy in both types of 
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local partnership before briefly considering two legislative developments in 
Scotland. In the process it has attempted to bring together a number of different 
strands of work to develop insights on the redesign of community justice in 
Scotland, but this discussion has been marked by awkward gaps as much as by 
helpful convergences. 
Deliberative democracy in Scotland was a promising idea, particularly in the years 
immediately after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, but it has not fully 
developed and may even have regressed. Deliberative democracy has not entered 
community justice in Scotland, even though it might in some ways seem both 
institutionally suitable (given the long-established location of community justice 
responsibilities within local authorities) and potentially fruitful for reducing the 
stigma of offending and making the system more democratic and accountable (as 
Dzur’s and Barker’s work suggests). The current policy on community justice in 
Scotland emphasises the role of partnership working in the system and has a 
considerable amount in common with the history of more prevention-oriented 
crime control partnerships in England and Wales and the US – which also share a 
prevention orientation with the main thrust of Scottish local government reform in 
the last few years. Both the current and future community justice providers in 
Scotland appear to share with these crime control partnerships a range of 
governance problems with implications for administrative efficacy and democracy.  
Recent legislation in Scotland has attempted to make CPPs more democratic. At the 
same time, community justice responsibilities are being transferred to local 
partnerships with structural connections (and conceptual similarities) to CPPs, but 
the redesign does not seek to make community justice more democratic. In fact, the 
policy seems to resist the idea that community justice and local democracy could or 
should converge, despite the democratic rhetoric around CPP reform. The justice 




clear that the two could potentially work entirely apart, despite their common 
interests, as occurred with CPPs and CJAs.478  
The criminological and political literature discussed in the first half of this chapter 
highlights the potential value of democratic and local approaches to community 
justice. However, despite some apparent convergence between community 
empowerment and community justice agendas, the local community justice 
partnerships are likely to be another ‘dirigiste’ approach with little in the way of 





                                                     







Chapter 4: Methods and Project Development 
1. Initial Comparative Intentions 
This project investigates the origins, development and probable consequences of the 
current restructuring of community justice in Scotland. The project began in 
September 2012, at a time when the Scottish restructuring policy was in its very 
earliest stages of development. Over the following four years it has been possible to 
observe the development of the policy through successive consultations and finally 
legislation.479 
The project began with the following research questions:  
1. What historical processes have structured the Scottish community justice 
field? 
2. What are the likely effects of the reforms on the structures of this field? 
3. How will the habitus of people working in different parts of community 
justice adapt to these structural changes? 
The project develops answers to these questions through a combination of empirical 
and secondary research. Secondary research was initially focused on the history and 
development of Scottish community justice, including in relation to England and 
Wales (Chapter 2), and later moved to considering the relationship between the 
current restructuring policy, attempts at community engagement in criminal justice 
and the complex relationship between the current restructuring policy and the 
development of community planning in Scotland (Chapter 3).  
Empirical research for the project was carried out between June 2014 and January 
2015 and comprises semi-structured interviews with 21 practitioners and politicians 
connected to community justice. This strand was intended to complement the 
secondary research by introducing a range of perspectives on the policy, including 
accounts of personal experiences of the formation of the policy and expectations for 
the future (still uncertain at the time).  
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By discussing the theoretical underpinnings of both parts of the project and their 
relationship to each other, as well as the process of analysis conducted on the 
empirical data, this chapter is intended to serve as a ‘bridge’ to the second half of 
the thesis. It will begin by explaining the initial intentions for a project which would 
consider not just the restructuring reforms to the Scottish system of community 
justice, but also the more dramatic and in many ways more radical reforms in 
England and Wales, known as the Transforming Rehabilitation policy.480 The early 
part of this chapter explains the initial intentions to study the two policies 
comparatively, before explaining why this could not happen, and the fairly radical 
change of plans that resulted from this. It then moves to less specific methodological 
questions, considering first the relevance of social theory to the methods used in the 
project, which comprised the literature-based research discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3, and fieldwork interviews which produced the findings detailed in Chapters 5 and 
6. This chapter then details my approach to analysing the data from the interviews, 
explaining the reasoning for choosing a thematic analysis method, and considering 
some of the epistemological and ontological questions and concerns implicit in the 
process, before briefly detailing the choice to use QSR NVivo qualitative analysis 
software and how this software was used.  
The project was developed with a view to direct comparison between policies 
aiming to restructure the community justice systems of England and Wales, and 
Scotland. The original intention of the project was to use a Bourdieusian framework 
– particularly the concepts of field and habitus – to conceive of these policies and 
their effects. This was to be reflected in an essentially dichotomous research plan, 
built around a mix of literature review and interviews conducted on both sides of 
the border. 
Transforming Rehabilitation 
The project began as a comparative study which would compare the redesign of 
community justice in Scotland with ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ (TR), a highly 
                                                     




ambitious set of reforms launched in England and Wales in 2013.481 Under TR, the 
probation service of England and Wales – increasingly, since the 1990s, the focus 
(and arguably the victim) of competitive ‘New Public Management’ logic482 – was 
reorganised in a completely unprecedented way. 
The 35 local probation Trusts which had administered the service under the 
National Probation Service since 2008 were replaced with a two-tier system of 21 
local Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and a new National Probation 
Service (NPS). NPS would remain publicly owned (although as part of the process it 
would also be brought further into the NOMS fold) while the CRCs would be 
contracted out to bidders including private companies, third sector organisations, 
‘public service mutuals’ formed by current public sector probation staff or any 
combination of these bidding as consortia. These organisations would be paid using 
a new ‘Payment by Results’ system, which was intended to ensure that contractors 
would only receive payment where they succeeded in meeting reoffending 
reduction targets.483 
The workload between CRCs and NPS would, unusually, be split largely by risk, 
with CRCs responsible for supervising low- and medium-risk offenders and the 
NPS retaining responsibility for high-risk offenders and court services (including 
pre-sentence reports). A new IT system for offender management, nDelius, would 
be rolled out across England and Wales, intended to replace the mix of three IT 
systems used previously and to facilitate the exchange of information and offender 
records. Before the bidding could take place, the full cohort of probation staff in 
England and Wales were ‘sifted’ into either NPS or CRC roles.  
Most of the CRC contracts were awarded to the private sector, particularly 
Interserve and Sodexo Justice Services.484 It was in general a bad time for criminal 
justice privatisation: the 2012 London Olympics had been marred by the failure of 
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G4S to provide adequate guards, and not long before the tendering process began it 
was revealed that both G4S and Serco had been overcharging the government for 
providing electronic monitoring services, forcing two of the strongest contenders to 
pull out of the TR bidding. Additionally, the Work Programme (also overseen by 
Chris Grayling during his tenure as Minister for Employment) had involved several 
of the same contractors and a similar ‘payment by results’ system, and was widely 
criticised.485 
The policy has been controversial, particularly among probation officers, and has 
led to a series of industrial actions by the National Association of Probation Officers 
(Napo), the trade union representing probation and family court workers in 
England and Wales and some limited but highly critical coverage in the news 
media.486 Major criticisms of the policy itself have included moral issues around 
privatisation, the untested nature of the reforms and the possibility of increased risk 
to the public.487 The implementation of the policy (particularly the CRC-NPS split) has 
also been criticised as hurried, disruptive, bureaucratic and beset by IT problems,488 
and in February 2015 the chief inspector of probation, Paul McDowell, was forced to 
resign over a possible conflict of interest when it emerged his wife was managing 
director of one of the likely bidders (Sodexo Justice Services).489 As Robinson, Burke 
and Millings have noted, the restructuring of probation has also had significant 
effects on probation staff, including a powerful sense of loss and anxiety about the 
forced remaking of their professional identities.490  
Comparison Points 
This project as originally conceived would have considered a number of points of 
similarity and difference between the two policies, including certain contextual 
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aspects. Perhaps the first of these chronologically was the question of divergence in 
the previous nearly-contemporaneous set of community justice reforms, in 2003-05.  
In this period, probation in England and Wales was merged, along with HM Prison 
Service, into the new National Offender Management Service (NOMS). This 
development was generally greeted with concern among probation scholars, who 
argued that the new arrangements would mean more bureaucracy and central 
control for the probation service and domination by the prison service.491 In 
Scotland, a similar development was mooted but rejected – the Scottish Labour 2003 
manifesto On Your Side included a commitment to merge CJSW and SPS into a 
Correctional Service for Scotland – before this had been done in England and 
Wales.492 However, because of the historic political power of Scottish local 
authorities, and the position of probation work within local authority social work, 
representative bodies of both Scottish social workers (ADSW) and local authorities 
(COSLA) could ally and successfully resist the move.493 The argument against a 
national service seemed to be strengthened further when NOMS was implemented 
in England and Wales. This divergence not only suggests comparability between the 
two developments (because similar policies were under consideration in both 
jurisdictions at the same time), but could also offer insight into the ways in which 
developments in one jurisdiction can affect others. 
The comparative aspect of the project would have been focused primarily on the 
current set of policies – TR and the Scottish redesign of community justice. In both 
jurisdictions (and likely in others as well), the main problems faced by community 
justice are similar: community sentences have been repeatedly shown to be more 
effective, more humane and cheaper than prison, but nonetheless tend not to enjoy 
the confidence of sentencers or of the general public (where the general public are 
aware of them at all).  
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However, the two policies themselves are clearly very different, conceptually and 
developmentally. The Scottish redesign has been marked by a very long and 
complex process of consultation involving a wide range of people and organisations 
involved in community justice, while TR appears to have been an ideologically 
motivated imposition by central government. The near-total absence of the private 
sector from community justice in Scotland is another major point of difference. 
A further line of comparison would involve the complex arguments that have 
played out between local and national loci of system control, often at some length. 
Local probation organisations in England and Wales have been subject to 
increasingly directive control and standardisation from central government, 
through the implementation of national standards through the target-driven 
Effective Practice Initiative in 1998,494 the formation of first the National Probation 
Service (in its pre-TR incarnation) in 2000,495 and the foundation of NOMS in 2004. 
As Minkes and Raynor have argued, this has sometimes come at the expense of 
good probation practice developed locally, particularly in rural areas.496 It has 
tended to be accompanied by rhetoric and practice that was both more punitive,497 
and more concerned with risk management; as McNeill notes, Scottish CJSW 
partially adopted aspects of the risk management ethos while remaining essentially 
welfarist.498 
This is likely a partial result of the two key structural factors in Scottish community 
justice (see Chapter 2): the positioning of probation supervision and related 
responsibilities within local authority social work departments, instituted by the 
1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act and largely unchanged ever since; and the power of 
those local authorities in their relations with central government, derived largely 
from their considerably longer political experience. It would become clear that local 
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authorities had been able to exercise considerable influence in the Scottish 
community justice redesign. 
Under the current policies, both jurisdictions will have two-tier systems that 
combine local and national provision, but with different balances between the two 
and different institutional configurations reflecting not just the power relations 
between local and national government, but also the positioning of community 
justice services within the field of public service as a whole. 
It was clear that comparing the two sets of community justice reforms would not be 
entirely straightforward. The points of comparison were clearly shaped by a 
complex mix of long- and short-term factors, and there were clear and essential 
differences between the two jurisdictions (especially perhaps their size relative to 
each other) which could have confounded rigorous comparison. However, it was 
ultimately a less conceptual set of concerns that led to the comparative element 
being abandoned. 
2. Changes of Plan 
Approaching NOMS 
The first plan was finalised near the end of 2013. In the next few months, interview 
schedules were developed and letters of access drafted. Ethical approval – required 
for the fieldwork stage to commence – was sought, and obtained on 13 March 2014. I 
had decided, in early 2014, that the best place to begin was with probation officers 
working for the public sector probation apparatus of England and Wales – then 
comprising 35 Probation Trusts, but (since June 2014) split into the National 
Probation Service (NPS) and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs), 
many of them now owned by large private companies. Public sector probation 
officers were chosen because the impending NPS/CRC split (originally to take place 
in April 2014) meant they were likely to become very hard to access quite soon, and 
hence required quick action to attempt to secure interviews. In addition, I suspected 
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that the highly bureaucratic nature of the National Offender Management Service 
(NOMS) would make the process quite a lengthy one. 
This proved more correct than I was expecting. NOMS guidance on research 
applications499 introduced a new application process in which all applications had to 
use a standardised NOMS form which would then be submitted to the NOMS 
National Research Committee. It took some weeks to complete the lengthy and 
complicated form, and I submitted it on 2 April 2014. The next meeting of the 
National Research Committee was to be held on the 21st of that month, and I was 
told to expect a reply within two weeks of that meeting. When, nearly a month later, 
I had received nothing, I followed up with NOMS and was told on the 29th May that 
my application had been rejected by the Committee.500 
There was the possibility of appealing this decision, but given that this was a PhD 
project with a single researcher and funding that only covered PhD fees, it is 
doubtful that it would have been possible to reconfigure it to an extent that the NRC 
would have approved it. The decision could have been appealed, but this would 
have meant further delays of weeks or even months with no guarantee of success, 
and the project’s limited timescale would render such delays a serious problem. It 
was decided not to appeal the decision. Around this time, NOMS in general seemed 
to become less inclined to grant access to independent researchers. One example of 
this which has recently been reported in the news media was when the Howard 
League for Penal Reform was prevented from interviewing serving prisoners about 
their experiences of coercive sex and rape in prison.501 
Meanwhile, I had also been attempting to make contact with the National 
Association of Probation Officers (Napo), the probation and family courts union in 
England and Wales. Although the Napo staff with whom I corresponded were very 
understanding, the timing was far from propitious: this was at a time when Napo 
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were involved in a series of industrial actions to do with TR, and when their 
members within probation502 were being reallocated (‘sifted’) to the new NPS or to 
CRCs. Hundreds of Napo members appealed their reallocation decisions,503 creating 
further pressures on the union. It was made clear to me that I should not be 
optimistic about my chances of interviewing Napo members.504 Given what 
appeared to be continuing serious administrative problems within probation in 
England and Wales, and a certain amount of internal conflict within Napo, it 
seemed unlikely that I would gain access to Napo within the timeframe of the 
project. These two barriers – particularly the refusal from NOMS, after having put a 
significant amount of time into applying – meant it would be very difficult to gain 
access to public sector probation workers in England and Wales.  
Refocusing on Scotland 
The public sector probation staff of England and Wales have a highly developed 
occupational culture, as well as (often) a strongly academic view of their work.505 
Fundamentally, they are the traditional ‘owners’ of probation work, and are 
definitely those most dramatically affected by TR (as exhibited in the ‘sifting’ 
process, the overhaul of probation IT systems, the further growth of bureaucratic 
processes and a serious fall in morale). While it may still be possible to gain access 
to other provider sectors within that jurisdiction, any fieldwork to do with 
English/Welsh probation structures that didn’t involve this key group would fail to 
engage with the impact of TR in the way that I had initially hoped. A slow start to 
the beginnings of the Scottish fieldwork was not encouraging for the possibility of 
making significant gains in England any time soon.  
Therefore, I decided, on the advice of my supervisors, to shift the focus of the 
project. The fieldwork part of the project would now focus entirely on the 
restructuring of community justice in Scotland. While this did constitute a 
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limitation, it also allows for more depth in investigating the Scottish restructuring: a 
greater range of organisations within Scotland could be approached for interviews, 
including more individual third-sector organisations.  
I had spent some time researching the TR policy, and had gathered (and written) a 
fairly significant amount of material already. I had intended not to let this go to 
waste, with the result that in the period immediately after deciding not to go ahead 
the English fieldwork, the project was intended to be retain the comparative element 
even though fieldwork was only possible in one of the jurisdictions; in essence, to be 
comparative but asymmetrical, structured around the Scottish redesign of 
community justice as a case study but with frequent comparison to TR with 
particular reference to the comparison points detailed above. 
There was a sense that such an approach, by itself, would miss out valuable 
qualitative data about the experiences of English and Welsh probation staff of the 
impact of TR. The use of online sources – mostly blogs and discussion forums – was 
considered as a possible approach to filling this gap, as they seemed to have a 
number of advantages. Much of the information is produced without any kind of 
prompting or request, by ordinary probation officers directly affected by TR – 
despite, or perhaps partly because of, attempts by the Ministry of Justice to regulate 
their dissemination of information online.506 The online material had the further 
advantage of presenting minimal ethical issues – the writers are almost invariably 
pseudonymous, and where they are using their real name this is in an official 
capacity. It should not be necessary to seek the authors’ permission, given the public 
domain status of the work.507 In general, internet research scholars appear to agree 
that it is ethical to use publicly viewable forum posts without getting consent or 
approval.508 
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Another advantage of such media, particularly blogs (which are designed as 
diaries), is that entries are automatically date- or time-stamped, and archived in 
such a way as to make older posts as easily accessible as newer ones and (assuming 
no user intervention) permanently archived in the same way.509 This makes it 
extremely straightforward to look at changes in the qualitative data over time. The 
posts from the forums and blogs could easily and fairly quickly be analysed using 
NVivo or similar software, in the same way as with the interview data. 
The difference in the qualitative data gathering methods could even be a strength – 
while direct comparison is less straightforward, it may have been possible to gain 
information from more different sources within the English/Welsh context. Bearing 
in mind the principle of triangulation, it might have been instructive to make 
comparisons between the data uncovered by interviews in Scotland – in response to 
my questions, in an unusual setting that is at once naturalistic and artificial – and 
data from England and Wales that was spontaneously and freely produced. In an 
article comparing qualitative interviewing and qualitative internet research, Seale et 
al. summarise the advantage of this: 
“Research interviews, by contrast—even ones that, like these, are designed 
to encourage the respondent to tell his or her own story—not only provoke 
narratives involving a positive presentation of self but also involve the 
researcher participating in setting the agenda for talk, framing the terms in 
which the topic is to be conceptualized by the respondent.”510 
This study also found that individuals were more likely to say on the internet what 
they would not say to researchers in interviews, although this is likely to be in large 
part due to the sensitive nature of the health topics under investigation there.511 
Narrowing Further 
However, the use of online research methods to complement more traditional 
fieldwork interviews never progressed beyond this stage. By this point, the 
fieldwork in Scotland was gathering pace, and there was far more detail available 
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about the Scottish community justice redesign than there had been even a few 
months before.512 
These led to two insights which would finally and conclusively set the shape of the 
project. The first of these was that there was more than enough material in the 
Scottish redesign policy for a PhD project. Despite appearing fairly minor 
(particularly by comparison with the dramatic break of TR), the redesign of 
community justice in Scotland played into a number of major questions about 
practice and about politics, and was not entirely uncontroversial.513 The second, 
linked, insight was that there were aspects of political and policy context I had not 
previously considered – particularly the moves towards reforming CPPs and the 
integration of health and social care – which were likely to be relevant in analysis of 
the community justice redesign. Conversely it was also becoming clear that the 
redesign had relatively little to do with the core practice of criminal justice social 
work. 
With this in mind, and after discussion with my supervisors, I decided to remove 
the comparative element from the project entirely. Instead the research would focus 
entirely on the redesign of Scottish community justice. This tightening of focus also 
allowed the fieldwork to be changed in a way that both broadened its range of 
participants and shifted its emphasis in a way that benefited a more policy- and 
politically-oriented approach to inquiry – away from practice and towards 
administration and engagement with policy. The revised scheme for fieldwork 
would still include CJA staff, but not CJSWs and third-sector personnel who worked 
directly with offenders; instead I would interview management-level staff from 
CJSW/social work departments and third-sector organisations, as they would be 
more likely to have knowledge of the policy and engagement with the process of 
consultation. The fieldwork was also expanded to include political actors, a course 
of action already suggested to me by one of my participants and (independently) by 
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my principal supervisor – elected members of CJAs (as the local authority 
politicians with the most involvement in community justice work), MSPs with 
justice-related responsibilities and civil servants involved in community justice 
policy. Incorporating these groups into the fieldwork was intended to help to fill a 
gap in knowledge which started to become apparent after the first couple of CJA 
interviews, to do with higher-level aspects of the policy and its direction, and the 
policy positions taken by the implementation part of the Directorate. Although it 
was not anticipated that this change would raise new ethical issues, ethical 
recertification was sought, and received in early October 2014. Appendix B gives a 
sample letter of approach, while Appendix C is a sample interview guide. 
Despite this change of plans, much of my research on England and Wales remained 
relevant to this project. Scottish penal policy has tended to be defined in relation to 
England and Wales, through a complex dynamic that has combined divergence and 
convergence,514 and Chapter 2 (Sections 2-4) uses literature from both jurisdictions 
to set Scottish community justice in this historical context. 
Pragmatically, the dearth of material on early Scottish community justice history 
necessitates using historical work from England and Wales to gain a sense of the 
shared social origins of community justice. More recent literature from England and 
Wales, alongside some work from the US,515 gives a sense of issues facing 
community justice that go beyond Scotland. Similarly, most of the research on the 
development of community partnership approaches to crime and justice (Chapter 3) 
has focused on England and Wales,516 where crime and disorder-focused 
partnerships developed before appearing in similar form in Scotland,517 where they 
exist alongside a system of community planning influenced to by developments in 
England but also by earlier local precedents.518 Other research focused on England 
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and Wales, particularly on criminal justice privatisation, was not relevant to 
Scotland’s community justice restructuring and is not discussed here. 
3. Theorising Methods 
What did not change during this difficult period was the way in which social theory 
was used to frame the conception of community justice and the methods of the 
project. In particular, the ‘grand theory’ work of Pierre Bourdieu was used to give 
the project an overarching theoretical framework. Bourdieu’s framework, 
increasingly popular in sociological and criminological scholarship, centres on three 
concepts which are seen as constitutive of social settings: 
- Field is “a mesolevel concept denoting the local social world in which actors 
are embedded and toward which they orient their actions”.519  Fields can 
(and do) contain and overlap one another, and are structured partly by the 
agents within them, whose positions and position-takings within the field 
affects that field's structure.  
- Agents' ability to take positions is determined by their possession of capital. 
Capital could be any type of resource that grants power within the field – 
money is a universally known example, but symbolic power - “the most 
effective form of power”520 is what gives agents the power to define the 
principles, structure and terms of engagement within the field. 
- Agents' interactions and positions with the field and each other are 
structured by habitus, a “system of structured, structuring dispositions... 
which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical 
functions.”521 The habitus is always structured by past experience – 
emphasising the importance of history. 
Crucially for a project that is concerned with agents (community justice workers) 
working within structures (formal organisations), the advantage of the 
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Bourdieusian framework is that it transcends a ‘false antinomy’ between 
sociological traditions that overprivilege either agency or structure at the expense of 
the other. For Bourdieu, structuralism tends to overstate the solidity and 
determinacy of relational social structures, while ‘social phenomenology’ 
perspectives make the opposite error by viewing these structures simply as 
constructions of individual actions and perspectives.522 Sallaz and Zavisca state that 
“Bourdieu's theoretical project bridges the deep philosophical divide between the 
structuralism of Lévi-Strauss and the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre.”523  The 
model is one that acknowledges the importance and solidity of exogenous 
structures while also leaving room for individual agency.  
Sketching the Penal Field 
I was particularly attentive to two recent examples of successful application of 
Bourdieu’s framework to the sociology of punishment. The first of these was smaller 
in scale and closer to home – an ethnographic project in which a group of Glasgow-
based criminologists investigated the ways in which CJSWs in Scotland approach 
one part of their work – the writing of social enquiry reports.524 Like Page, they seek 
to use Bourdieu to address the ‘governmentality gap’, “a lacuna in the existing 
penological scholarship which concerns the contingent relationships between 
changing governmental rationalities and technologies on the one hand and the 
construction of penality-in-practice on the other.”525 Their work describes the ways 
in which CJSWs, as multiply marginalised penal agents subject to particular 
pressures, use court reports to stake claims to expertise and influence sentencing 
decisions. However, in the processes of social enquiry reporting and sentencing, the 
CJSW habitus comes into conflict with a (much longer established) judicial habitus, 
producing ironic outcomes for social workers who attempt to influence sentencing 
decisions:  
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“Predictably perhaps, the judges in our study trusted neither the outcomes 
of risk assessment instruments nor the professional judgements of social 
workers, preferring to trust their own skills in judging offenders... Thus 
although policy discourses may lead social workers to hope to find in their 
manipulation of risk-based rationalities and technologies the potential to 
acquire the cultural capital that they need, to the extent that they understand 
or intuit judicial resistance to risk, the ambivalence of their own relationship 
with these rationalities and technologies is exacerbated.”526 
The project makes greater use of a more distant theoretical precedent, however – the 
development of the ‘penal field’ in The Toughest Beat,527 Joshua Page’s sociological 
history of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), a prison 
officers’ union which gained a considerable level of influence on the penal politics of 
California. Page conceives of the penal field as a “the social space in which agents 
struggle to accumulate and employ penal capital—that is, the legitimate authority to 
determine penal policies and priorities”.528 As Page has described, the Californian 
penal field had once been oriented towards rehabilitation of offenders and minimal 
imprisonment. Within prisons, rehabilitation-oriented approaches and the 
development of prisoners’ rights discourses produced resentment among ordinary 
prison guards, leading to the formation of the CCPOA. California experienced a 
very rapid and dramatic change of penal climate from about the 1970s onwards, 
with increasingly politicised and emotive language about law and order (aided, as 
Barker has explained, by a populist approach to democracy),529 and a penal model 
which (in common with, and arguably emblematically of, much of the rest of the 
US) rejected rehabilitation in favour of a penal rationale of ‘ultra-incapacitation’ 
whose primary method was mass incarceration.530 The CCPOA, as a right-wing, 
anti-rehabilitation organisation – which (as Page’s title implies) played up the level 
of danger they faced from the ‘superpredators’ in their charge – was both a 
beneficiary of and a contributor to the shift in penal thinking in California, as well as 
an example to prison officer unions in other states. Page also explains how the 
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forging of strategically valuable alliances, such as with victims’ rights groups, was 
vital to its success. In developing the concept of a penal field to help to explain this 
dramatic political development, both Page and the Scottish CJSW project seem to be 
answering Garland’s call for penologists to go beyond explanations and expositions 
of macro-level policy developments531 – to consider not just what the broad policy 
trends are but also how they are made and enacted by a range of actors, who may 
be in conflict, at different levels. This section now turns to the applicability of this 
approach to Scotland.  
The particular value of the penal field model for discussing justice policy in 
Scotland lies in its emphasis on the construction of penal policy and practice by and 
between various different institutions with different aims, and in the way it 
highlights the role of structural relationships between these institutions. This can 
perhaps be seen most clearly in the long period of compromise between local and 
national government over community justice, and in the way that the development 
of generic social work under the 1968 Act reflects structurally the cultural value of 
the Kilbrandon philosophy that adult offenders should be treated as people with 
unmet social needs. The penal field helps to go beyond the oversimplified discrete 
periods and clean breaks that can sometimes be suggested – although not usually 
actually advanced – by reading broad histories such as McWilliams’ periodization 
of community justice in England and Wales.532 As Garland notes, “there is an 
unavoidable tension between broad generalization and the specification of empirical 
particulars”,533 and the penal field helps to bridge this gap. 
The penal field approach also highlights, and helps to account for, sometimes 
overlooked continuities between apparently different eras as well as seemingly 
contradictory developments within the same era.534 As McAra argues (and see 
Chapter 6 of this thesis), Scottish penal policy has exhibited significant continuities, 
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particularly of penal welfarism and the ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ which have proved 
durable even in the ‘detartanising’ period and despite a growing concern with risk 
in the early 2000s.535 Similarly, current penal policy in Scotland has included both 
welfarist and reductionist developments (such as the presumption against short 
sentences and the development of the CPO – although even this was justified in 
rhetoric which highlighted “the pains of reparative effort”),536 and more punitive 
developments such as the end of automatic early release for some prisoners.537 
However, the penal field model cannot be adapted to Scotland simply or 
completely, and consideration of its limitations serves also to highlight the 
importance of local political structures and systems for the development of criminal 
justice policy (Chapter 3). Goodman et al., building on Page’s earlier work, 
emphasise struggle and conflict in their ‘agonistic’ framework for penal 
development, with particular reference to “the rise and fall of rehabilitation in 
California”, 538 a state notable for emotive and politically charged criminal justice 
policy, including a particularly egregious shift towards mass incarceration.539 The 
agonistic model takes as axioms that penal development results from struggle and 
that contestation is constant, and consensus largely illusory.540  
I suggest that this does not quite hold true for community justice, or criminal justice 
in general, in Scotland. There have been moments of direct and even open conflict 
between institutions, the most recent example in community justice being the 
argument over a single integrated service in 2003-05. In general, though the 
development of community justice structures has been marked not by conflict but 
by consensus-finding and compromise, particularly between local authorities and 
national government, as in the Tough Option groupings, the CJAs and the current 
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restructuring.541 Similarly, the operation of CJAs has sometimes entailed 
disagreements over the allocation of ring-fenced funding, but (as discussed in 
Chapter 6, Section 2) these have tended to be resolved by compromise and 
consensus, with conflict being rare. 
This plays into a different argument that seeks to distinguish Scotland from other 
jurisdictions (particularly England and Wales) – the claim that Scottish 
policymaking is traditionally more consensual in nature. One major feature of this is 
a traditional emphasis on consultation between a range of expert parties before 
making policy,542 which can also be seen in the lengthy consultation process that 
surrounded the restructuring of community justice in Scotland. Notably, Paterson 
highlights the development of generic social work as an example: 
“the legislation that laid the basis of Scottish social work for a third of a 
century was achieved by consensus arising out of thorough consultation and 
by avoiding the partisan strife that is, nowadays, supposed to mar the policy 
process at Westminster.”543 
The consensual quality has been emphasised as a characteristic of Scottish politics 
before devolution, connected to the development of an identity distinct from 
England and Wales,  and after devolution as a symbol of the new Scottish politics.544  
It is also connected to a sense of there being more shared values between services in 
Scotland, producing an approach to policy that was often both cohesive and 
pluralist.545 Even in criminal justice, an area traditionally characterised by 
competing and conflicting values,546 there is still evidence of agreement on some key 
values in current Scottish criminal justice. This includes the development of more 
cohesive approaches to dealing with reoffending, including the Whole System 
Approach for youth offending and the promotion of partnership approaches 
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through the CJA system.547 Nonetheless, there are still differences of values within 
these partnerships (see Chapter 5, Section 4). 
While the penal excess of California is to be avoided, there are disadvantages to 
Scotland’s more consensual approach to policy making – as Keating notes, 
consensus “may also stifle pluralism, dissensus and debate”.548 A number of people 
interviewed for this project, particularly from third-sector organisations, 
highlighted certain antidemocratic aspects of the consultation process, such as the 
ability of local authorities to dominate it (Chapter 5, Section 6). The more consensual 
style of policymaking in Scotland was implicated in the development a pluralist and 
consultative – but also mainly middle-class and somewhat opaque – community of 
policymakers,549 a group credited in some accounts with the development and 
preservation of penal welfarist policy in the period before devolution.550 The 
foregoing discussion also has parallels with the argument made by Barker – also 
with reference to the emotive and populist penal politics of California, in contrast to 
different characteristics in other US states – that the structure of democratic 
institutions within jurisdictions plays a vital role in shaping the development of 
their criminal justice policy.551  
In summary, the penal field is a highly valuable theoretical framework in assessing 
the development of the restructuring of community justice in Scotland, particularly 
the way in which the policy has been constructed by and between institutions with 
different aims, and the interplay between structural characteristics and values held 
by the system. However, the penal field, particularly the ‘agonistic’ approach 
developed around it by Goodman et al.,552 is not entirely directly applicable to 
Scotland. The limitations of that applicability also help to shed further light on the 
nature of criminal justice policy making in Scotland. The specific characteristics of 
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Scotland’s community justice field, and the ways in which the restructuring policy is 
likely to affect it, are addressed in Chapter 7. 
The literature review part of the project has also included sociological studies of 
how different approaches to democracy can affect the development of penal fields 
and how certain common problems seem to recur within the subfields created by 
formal partnership structures, and the relationships between the Scottish 
community justice redesign and other restructuring policies. In the process, a range 
of criminological theory has been considered as well – Garland’s ‘culture of control’ 
thesis,553 McAra’s ‘detartanisation’ hypothesis,554 various theories about the role of 
democracy in justice – but these have been necessarily somewhat more limited in 
scope. 
The methodological structure of this project was initially intended to be 
dichotomous, combining literature research with fieldwork interviews. Initially I 
had intended a theoretical-methodological synthesis: that the literature review 
strand would enable me to sketch the contours of the community justice field(s) and 
the fieldwork interviews would give an insight into community justice habitus 
through the transition(s). I believed that this would produce a degree of 
methodological, data and to some extent theoretical triangulation which would 
improve the validity and plausibility of the findings or at least produce interesting 
further results.555 In practice, though, it soon became clear that this artificial division 
of conceptual labour would be neither successful nor useful; in fact it almost seemed 
to miss the point of a theoretical framework intended to transcend false 
distinctions.556 The interview data often referred to particular aspects of the 
structure of the field, while much of the literature consulted as part of the literature 
review – particularly the Deering and Mawby and Worrall studies of probation 
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habitus in England and Wales,557 and the aforementioned Glasgow study of CJSW – 
gave insights into community justice habitus, which in turn informed the 
development of the interview schedules for this project. The following sections 
explain the development of my methodological intentions and the way in which 
questions of power might play into the process. 
Interviewing in Theory and Practice 
Community justice work is defined by practice; histories of community justice are to 
a large extent histories of practice and how people think about it. Thus, as 
McWilliams writes of England and Wales, the missionary era is defined by practice 
oriented around religious conversion, the clinical era by the diagnostic and 
therapeutic aspects of its practice and the late-modern era by the importance of 
managerial methods and computerised risk assessment.558 In Bourdieu’s work, the 
habitus shapes and is shaped by practice; the importance of formative previous 
conditions in shaping habitus helps to explain the importance of understanding 
historical practices in explaining current ones, particularly perhaps for those 
informants with longer experience in the field. This, for Bourdieu, partly explains 
why practice is not always carefully reasoned or perfectly rational.559 
One aspect of habitus which is particularly relevant in reference to the sociology of 
organisational change is the ways in which it is affected by changes to the field, 
particularly exogenous ones such as government-ordered restructuring. The 
habitus, structured as it is by previous conditions, must undergo a process of 
‘adaptation’ when the field changes. Where the habitus is misadapted to the new 
conditions of the field, the result may be what Bourdieu described as a ‘hysteresis 
effect’, in which the durable dispositions of the habitus, formed under and adjusted 
to a previous set of conditions, are no longer well-adapted to the new conditions.560 
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On the other hand, the historic structuring of habitus can sometimes produce 
surprisingly successful adaptations to new conditions through being put to use 
creatively. Kerr and Robinson made this interesting finding in a study of a British 
corporation operating in post-Soviet Ukraine from 1998 to 2001, following a period 
of long-term economic crisis in the country. Some of the corporation’s Ukrainian 
workers had been dissidents during the period of Communist rule, which in some 
cases was a factor in their seeking employment with the corporation; once there, 
though, they found a number of ‘homologies’ between the ritual domination of their 
role in the corporation and that of Soviet rule – and used similar types of practice to 
deal with them.561 Without necessarily expecting such a finding in Scottish 
community justice practice, this example highlights the potential for the hysteresis 
effect to be an asset instead of, or as well as, a liability. 
I decided to conduct empirical research on habitus using semi-structured qualitative 
interviews. These were intended to gather not just opinions about the policies – 
which might be best measured by surveys – but also the details and stories of 
community justice worker reactions as well. These stories include somewhat 
emotional data, which accompanies stories about practice that are more narrative 
and factual – at least to the teller. This mix also determined the balancing of realist 
and constructivist approaches in the thematic analysis (Section 4). 
A semi-structured approach would allow both types of information to emerge 
without accumulating too much irrelevant data. I aimed to interview one person at 
a time, in order to ensure people feel free to speak their minds without worrying 
about what others will think; this can be a problem in interviews with more than 
one subject, particularly focus groups which often fall prey to problems with false 
consensus.562 Two interviews were conducted with two people at once, as a result of 
arrangements made by the organisations I approached. The remainder of the 
participants were interviewed one at a time. 
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As well as gaining some insight into habitus, the interviews were intended to give 
some sense of a ‘ground-level’ view of the structures of different fields and 
subfields, particularly where these differ from those given in official accounts. In 
reality, the distinction between the field/literature review and habitus/interview 
parts of the project was less marked than I had initially expected. To a large extent 
the participants’ accounts spoke not only to their habitus as community justice 
practitioners or politicians but also to specific and concrete details to do with the 
structure of the Scottish community justice field and its subfields.  
Interviewing, Power and Politics 
The growth of feminist research practice in the 1970s focused attention on the role of 
power relations in sociological research, and emphasised that some quantitative and 
positivist research (including survey interviews) tended to involve the researcher – 
and their interpretations – dominating the subject. In contrast, qualitative interviews 
were viewed as more egalitarian and caring – a process in which other people were 
invited to speak about their lives and what the topics under discussion meant to 
them.563  
Kvale argues that even qualitative interviews are not unproblematic in this regard – 
there are definite imbalances of power in qualitative interviews. Although often 
referred to as ‘dialogues’, qualitative research interviews are inherently 
asymmetrical. The researcher is the one setting the agenda, asking the questions, 
gathering and (perhaps most importantly) interpreting the interview data and then 
disseminating that interpretation.564  But if my role as an interviewer inherently 
privileged me, the interview subjects were also ‘elites’. Many are highly-qualified 
and experienced criminal justice officials or politicians, with extensive experience of 
high-level discussion (and in some cases of interviewing and being interviewed), 
and their jobs may involve power dynamics of their own.  
                                                     





In the previous, comparative version of the project (which was more focused on 
‘frontline’ community justice practice), there were more considerations about power 
as it related to probation supervision and restructuring. The practice of probation 
supervision is somewhat similar to an interview, in which the probation 
officer/CJSW has considerable power over the offender, and expects their questions 
to be answered. Power relations within the penal field more generally are of more 
enduring and general relevance to the project, but this was perhaps even more 
marked in the case of TR, where probation officers – already disadvantaged by the 
dominance of prison within NOMS565 – appeared powerless to resist the enormous 
changes wrought to their careers.  
Mawby and Worrall found that probation officers in England and Wales tended to 
have deep concerns about managerial probation reforms but not to voice these to 
management, preferring instead other adaptations including leaving the service, 
finding ways around regulations and reaffirming their loyalty to the organisation.566 
My intention in approaching English probation officers was partly to give them a 
voice at a time in which their concerns about the reforms were not being adequately 
aired and indeed sometimes actively suppressed (such as by the social media ‘gag’ 
imposed by the Ministry of Justice).567 Although the TR part of the project had to be 
dropped, questions about voices and power relations are still relevant in the Scottish 
penal field during the redesign of the Scottish community justice system. As 
discussed below, there was a sense that some voices, particularly those of local 
authorities and local authority social work departments, predominated in the 
process of the redesign and the consultation around it. 
All interviewees occupied senior positions, and many could be considered ‘elites’ of 
one sort or another; this term is contested, with elite status being defined sometimes 
in terms of policymaking and sometimes in terms of expert knowledge.568 My own 
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role as a researcher, belonging to an elite university, was also a privileged position; 
as Kvale notes, “the interviewer rules the interview” by choosing the questions and 
how to follow up on answers.569  
Nearly a third of the people interviewed were politicians, which might ordinarily 
seem to entail the risk that their answers would follow a ‘party line’ too closely. 
However, as noted in Chapter 6 (Section 6), community justice has a low political 
profile and the political interviewees had only a relatively minor involvement in 
community justice issues. Nationally, there had been little political discussion of 
community justice or the restructuring at the time of the interviews (which ended 
before the legislation was proposed), while at the local level, the consensus-based 
system of the CJA (Chapter 6, Section 2) militated against the development of ‘party 
lines’. While these interviewees, particularly the MSPs, could be considered political 
‘elites’, the limited relevance of community justice to their work suggests that these 
do not really constitute ‘elite interviewing’ as usually understood – it is not what 
they were ‘elites’ about at the time of the interviews. 
One issue that this raises in terms of power dynamics is that I found myself more 
informed on the detail of the restructuring than some of the politicians I 
interviewed. This necessitated a degree of care to ensure that the discussion 
remained open; hence the political interviews go less into specific detail about 
community justice or the restructuring. The civil servant interviewed, as might be 
expected, adhered more closely to the Scottish Government’s position, highlighting 
that their role was to offer clarification on policy, not personal views. As such the 
data from this interview was used mainly for its insight into governmental 
rationales and intentions for the restructuring. 
The more practice-oriented interviewees (CJA staff, social work directors and third-
sector managers) had some access to the policies of their own organisations but 
were not politically powerful. However, these interviewees were highly 
knowledgeable about their field, making it necessary for me to demonstrate 
                                                     




sufficient knowledge about key events and procedures to appear credible, while still 
being receptive to the knowledge and insight they could provide.570 Careful revision 
of key literature, sources and events was necessary in both the preparation and the 
analysis stages. 
In general these interviewees were extremely willing to discuss the details of their 
experiences, opinions and concerns related to their policy. Some interviewees from 
these groups expressed gratification that this policy was coming to academic 
attention and that (through the guarantee of anonymity) they were able to speak 
freely about community justice and the restructuring policy. In general, only fairly 
little prompting on my part was necessary. While I do not doubt the honesty of 
these interviewees, I argue in Chapter 5 that their positions on issues to do with the 
restructuring are closely connected to aspects of their habitus, particularly some key 
aspects of community justice practice as they have described it.  
Ultimately, the differing positions of the interviewees was part of what I sought to 
capture, and hence it was necessary to acknowledge and understand these while 
still remaining sufficiently detached to give an overview and a relational 
perspective on Scotland’s penal field. I continued to hold the researcher’s 
“monopoly of interpretation”,571 and the next section addresses the process of 
interpreting. 
4. Thematic Analysis Development 
In total, the fieldwork comprised interviews with 21 community justice practitioners 
in Scotland:  
- Six CJA staff (four Chief Officers and two part-time analysts) 
- Three CJA elected members 
- Six third-sector managerial staff 
- Two directors of social work 
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- Three MSPs with justice-related responsibilities 
- One civil servant involved in developing the redesign policy 
The CJA staff were drawn from four CJAs across Scotland, of varying sizes and 
covering urban, rural and mixed areas. As noted in Chapter 6, Section 4, this helped 
to develop a sense of how local concerns played into debates about local and 
national organisation. These interviewees came from a range of occupational 
backgrounds, largely in the public sector, and varied levels of CJA experience. 
Because CJAs employ only 24 full-time equivalent staff, this group constitutes 
nearly a quarter of all CJA staff. The social work managers came from large urban 
local authorities, as smaller areas rarely have criminal justice specialism in their 
social work structures and have smaller CJSW workloads. Hence, while not 
necessarily representative of social work as a whole, these interviewees were more 
able to comment on community justice and the restructuring. 
The elected members were drawn from two CJAs and from the two most 
represented parties in Scottish local government, Labour and the SNP.572 All were 
Conveners or Vice Conveners, as these positions entail more responsibility and 
hence more engagement with issues surrounding community justice. The MSPs 
interviewed represented three different parties (Labour, SNP, Liberal Democrat) 
and varying occupational backgrounds, and were selected because of their roles in 
Scottish justice politics, including (but not limited to) the Scottish Parliament’s 
Justice Committee. In the interests of balance, Conservative MSPs were approached 
but declined my requests. I had hoped to interview more than one civil servant, but 
the length of time involved in gaining access to the Justice Directorate made this 
impracticable; nonetheless, the civil servant interviewee was sufficiently senior to 
discuss the restructuring and the rationale behind it in some detail. 
The third sector group included two chief executives and four other managers with 
operational responsibilities, drawn from four different third-sector organisations. 
These organisations included both specifically criminal justice-focused 
                                                     




organisations and more generally social care-oriented bodies. All the organisations 
approached were statutory partners of at least one CJA and hence had experience of 
the CJA system; because statutory partner status is based on funding,573 this 
necessarily excludes smaller organisations. However, most third-sector staff in 
Scotland are employed by a few large organisations.574 
The interviewees’ anonymity is a way of ensuring open discussion, as well as an 
ethical commitment. In order to preserve anonymity (particularly given Scotland’s 
small criminal justice policy community),575 it is not possible to give any further 
information about the interviewees. Interviewees were approached directly by 
email (Appendix B); in some cases, interviewees kindly suggested I contact 
particular colleagues. 
The interviews, which took place between August 2014 and January 2015, were 
digitally recorded and manually transcribed. They varied widely in length and, as I 
had hoped, included a range of different perspectives of the restructuring of Scottish 
community justice and related policy and justice matters. The data comprise the 
words spoken by people working in various parts of Scottish community justice, 
largely in response to questions and prompts from me. They are mostly about the 
current structures by which community justice in Scotland is administered, how the 
participants work with those structures, and the participants’ experiences with and 
views of the restructuring policy. For some participants this policy will constitute a 
major alteration to their working lives – particularly people working for the CJAs, 
which will be abolished in 2017. For others, such as those working in charities that 
are not primarily justice-related, the policy is of less immediate relevance. 
Having conducted these interviews, it was necessary to proceed with analysis of 
this qualitative data. Having conducted a short literature review of qualitative data 
analysis methods, I had decided to use the popular but not always well-understood 
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method of thematic analysis. In the process of developing a thematic analysis 
process I encountered and considered some core epistemological and ontological 
questions, before commencing an analysis using QSR NVivo software. 
Choosing an Analysis Method 
One important issue in selecting an analytical method is that the range of qualitative 
data analysis methods appears less systematic and less uniform than the 
mathematical procedures for analysis of quantitative data. Some qualitative 
methods have capitalised ‘official’ names and clearly prescribed methods, while 
others are less prescriptive and less easily defined.576 As such, any research on 
qualitative data analysis methods may have some gaps, while definitions may also 
vary across different methodological texts. Decisions about how to interpret data are 
more or less closely based on “the ontological and epistemological positions we 
adopt before we start the process of interpretation.”577  
Analysis methods also differ in what ‘level’ of the qualitative data they focus on. 
Conversation Analysis is focused on language in use, and what the verbal and 
nonverbal details can show about the ‘order’ behind conversations.578 Conversation 
Analysis favours the “naturally occurring data” of conversations that take place in 
ordinary settings,579 and as such is probably unsuitable for interview-based studies. 
Discourse Analysis focuses on the meanings of specific words and phrases used in 
qualitative data, and on “a conceptualization of language as constructive and 
performative.”580  
Having considered a range of options, I decided that thematic analysis, probably the 
most popular form of qualitative analysis, would be well suited to this project. 
Thematic analysis can be briefly defined as a process of sifting through qualitative 
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data to find themes within the data. Richard Boyatzis’ definition of a theme is broad 
enough to serve as a starting point: 
“A theme is a pattern found in the information that at the minimum 
describes and organizes possible observations or at the maximum interprets 
aspects of the phenomenon.”581 
Finding themes, then, is a process of pattern recognition, the end product being “a 
description of those patterns and the overarching design that unites them”.582  The 
discovery of themes and patterns within data, and the ability to describe the relation 
of these themes to each other is arguably a fundamental function of the human 
mind. People do some form of thematic analysis all the time, even if only in the 
mental processes of understanding art or literature or making decisions based on 
available information; Winter and McClelland found that the ability to do this well 
was one of the core skills developed in American “liberal arts” university 
programmes.583 Boyatzis refers to another project in which Winter was involved, in 
which the similar concept of ‘pattern recognition’ emerged as a key characteristic of 
the best-performing naval officers.584 Fitting its importance in many parts of social 
life, thematic analysis appears in a wide range of scholarly endeavours, including 
almost all areas of qualitative social science. 585 
Braun and Clarke’s much-cited 2008 article on ‘Using thematic analysis in 
psychology’ characterises thematic analysis as “essentially independent of theory 
and epistemology”,586 in contrast to methods closely associated with particular 
theoretical standpoints. They divide the latter group further, between highly 
prescriptive methods like Conversation Analysis and more flexible (but still 
theoretically anchored) methods including narrative analysis. Its near-ubiquity and 
lack of theoretical or methodological prescription may serve to make thematic 
analysis a process that is more easily grasped than more prescriptively defined 
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methods, but could also create an impression that thematic analysis is simple or 
straightforward. Thematic analysis is sometimes seen as a “default” option in 
qualitative projects, which means it is not always well explained in Methods 
sections of articles and books. Braun and Clarke’s view that, despite its popularity, 
thematic analysis is “poorly demarcated and rarely acknowledged”,587 is a popular 
one in the thematic analysis literature. However, sociological authors have posited a 
range of definitions and more or less prescriptive methods for the thematic analysis 
process, and some would question whether it is a “method” at all.  
Qualitative analysis of any sort is a value-laden process. Recognising themes is not 
always straightforward, and – just as in other methods – what counts as a theme 
depends on the epistemological and analytical approaches taken by the researcher, 
as well as what they are looking for. No analysis can be complete; deciding to use 
one type of analysis could mean closing off the research to insights that could be 
gained by another method, as Roulston discovered when she reanalysed, using 
Conversation Analysis, some interview data that had previously been analysed 
using thematic analysis.588  
Thematic analysis was chosen for this project largely because of its intuitiveness and 
its versatility with regard to theoretical and epistemological standpoints (especially 
when compared with other methods). But this versatility and independence also 
meant that in order to produce a rigorous analysis it was necessary to consider 
questions and develop a set of working assumptions about what the data 
represented, and about this would be developed into an analytical argument, and it 
is to these that I now turn.  
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Epistemological and Ontological Questions 
Dichotomies: Objectivity/Subjectivity, Naturalism/Constructionism 
Several authors begin their discussion of methodology by describing a fundamental 
dichotomy at the epistemological foundations of any research method.589 There are 
differences in the vocabulary used, but the principle is the same: on one side (or at 
one end) is a position that states that social science can empirically uncover 
information about the social world or people’s lived realities, through gathering 
factual accounts. This is clearly associated with a more objective and perhaps a more 
‘scientifically’-minded approach to qualitative research. 
The flip side of this is an approach which treats knowledge as constructed, and 
tends to focus more on the construction than the ‘facts’ – the question of how one can 
know rather than what one knows. This process of constructing knowledge is likely 
to be observed in the accounts of participants; some methodological writers see the 
researcher as involved in the process as well, and knowledge being ‘co-constructed’ 
between researcher and participant. The constructivist approach is more associated 
with subjectivity and a focus on individual experience and ways of seeing and 
doing.  
A related, but subtly different dichotomy concerns the focus of the research: in 
short, whether the qualitative analysis is concerned with studying a social reality 
(but not with how that reality comes into being) or with how that reality is 
produced and constructed. Silverman, following Holstein and Gubrium, 
differentiates between ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructionist’ models of qualitative 
research.590 For Silverman, naturalism (which combines positivist concern with facts 
and romanticist interest in experience) has the advantage of being representationally 
simple, but overlooks the question of how people create meaning and constitute 
reality. Naturalism does not address the above-mentioned issue of whether or not 
that reality exists outside of human action, but does aim to approach the question 
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with a minimum of theoretical preconceptions and to view the meaning that people 
create in the terms in which they create it. Constructionism, which informs methods 
including narrative analysis, is concerned with the production of social reality 
through people’s thoughts and activities. Braun and Clarke take a similar view of 
this dichotomy, substituting the term ‘essentialism’ for ‘naturalism’.591 
Unsurprisingly, nearly all projects (including this one) fall somewhere between 
these two poles – and very often the two facets are not easily distinguished in 
practice, as most people tend not to separate what they know or believe from how 
they know or believe it. My intention with this research was to bring out both 
“factual” information about processes and occurrences that had happened, and 
subjective accounts of people’s reactions and how they had developed their views 
about them, as in the following two examples from an interview with a CJA Chief 
Officer: 
“So we did the survey and then we attended the CPP managers’ network at 
the beginning of October and had a sort of 50-minute workshop with them.” 
Here, the interviewee was describing a fact: an event that occurred. It may be 
evidence about some aspect of the relationship between CPPs and CJAs. During the 
analysis process it could – potentially – have been grouped with other statements 
like this one under themes like ‘Meetings between CJAs and CPPs’, ‘Meetings’, 
‘Dealings with CPPs’, etc. 
“I feel that [the Angiolini Report] was less well-informed, to tell you the 
truth. I think it was particularly informed by the view of certain people in 
the criminal justice system.”  
This seems to suggest a more constructionist interpretation, as it shows something 
about a participant’s view and how they came to that view. The participant says, 
first, that the Angiolini Report was less well-informed than another report (the 
Audit Scotland report mentioned shortly before in the interview).592 Then the 
participant states why they think this is the case: that the report was biased and 
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influenced primarily by particular interests whose beliefs and opinions (it is 
implied) the participant does not share. We start to get a sense of how the 
participant is defining what they think about the Angiolini Report in relation to 
what some of their colleagues in criminal justice think. Potentially, during the 
analysis process, this statement could be grouped alongside and compared with 
other statements about the Angiolini Report, contrasted (as already implied) with 
statements about the Audit Scotland report and set in the context of the participant’s 
statements about policy issues more generally. 
I was also aware that some aspects of the data could be of interest in terms of the 
specific language used – an example that comes to mind is the tendency of the 
politicians interviewed to refer erroneously to “Criminal Justice Authorities”, as 
well as a broader tendency for some of the participants’ remarks to echo 
(consciously or otherwise) official criminal justice policy literature. Although there 
are other methods that would allow in-depth consideration of language as data, the 
advantage of thematic analysis is that it allows such data to be considered alongside 
other data that relate to the same concept – ignorance about what CJAs do, to the 
point of misnaming them – in a more conventionally referential way. Thematic 
analysis is versatile in what it includes as data. In this case external facts, the 
construction of knowledge and opinions, and the particular words and phrases used 
were all potentially valuable and relevant, and a thematic analysis approach would 
be able to encompass all of them. However, the actual process of analysis would 
raise another major question. 
Deductive and Inductive Approaches 
A further important dichotomy/continuum is to do with what the research seeks to 
do in relation to theory, usually divided into deductive and inductive approaches. A 
deductive approach implies a pre-existing theoretical framework which has an 
effect on what the analysis is looking for. The deductive approach is ‘top-down’ and 
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aims primarily to test rather than build theory. It is associated more strongly with 
quantitative social research,593 but can also inform qualitative research. 
There were deductive elements in this research – the interviews are fairly restricted 
in their range of subject matter and the data primarily constitute fairly specific 
answers to questions developed from the earlier research, rather than undirected 
explanations or observations on the social world of the participants. The questions 
in the interviews were derived from literature review of both social theory and 
research on criminal justice policy. In some cases, I was expecting particular 
answers to these questions and my analysis would seek to bring out these ideas. 
In other cases, though, the participants mentioned things I did not expect to find. 
For instance, the Scottish Government’s policy of integrating health and social care 
provision in local authorities was mentioned unprompted in a few cases (before I 
updated my interview instruments to mention it). The thematic analysis was also 
intended to be able to capture themes like this which did not ‘fit’ with pre-existing 
theoretical ideas, otherwise there would be a risk that the end product would 
appear to confirm these pre-existing ideas by removing data which conflicted with 
them. 
Inductive methods aim to approach the data with as little as possible in the way of 
theoretical preconceptions, and to allow the theory to “emerge” as far as possible 
from the data. This ‘bottom-up’ approach is strongly associated with 
anthropological and grounded theory approaches, which Braun and Clarke 
characterise as theoretically anchored although not methodologically prescriptive.594 
This is also an area in which the lack of a widely agreed methodological taxonomy 
is an issue. There are different accounts of the relationship between grounded 
theory and thematic analysis – Chamberlain seems almost to equate the two while 
Braun and Clarke separate them. Methodologically, the two have important aspects 
in common – both concern the development of some sort of framework from 
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patterns within the data, in a way that is to some extent inductive. There is a theory-
building aspect of thematic analysis, particularly in the later stages which focus on 
arranging the themes and patterns drawn from the data into a framework or 
hierarchy (see below). 
Chamberlain characterises traditional grounded theory methods, with their 
assumptions about social realities existing outside of people’s thoughts and actions, 
as taking a “realist epistemological position”,595 while the work of Charmaz from 
the 1990s onwards has emphasised a more constructivist view which sees the 
researcher as a participant in the co-construction of knowledge.596 The ‘grounding’ 
aspect of grounded theory, expressed in terms of “an emphasis on supporting 
claims with data”,597 and more particularly with iterative checking of claims against 
data, is something it shares to some extent with thematic analysis and an approach 
which was likely to be useful in terms of maximising the rigour of this project.  
This ‘groundedness’ also extends to the distinctive ‘theoretical sampling’ approach 
of grounded theory. This is a sampling strategy that is informed by theory as it 
develops, which seeks to fill out conceptual categories and address gaps in 
knowledge; Charmaz describes it as the process that “endows grounded theory 
studies with analytic power”.598 In my project, the participants have been selected 
from a range of organisations with the expectation they will represent different 
views and experiences of the restructuring of community justice in Scotland – as far 
as the scale of the project, the sometimes slow and difficult process of getting access 
and the relatively small numbers of people involved in the relevant parts of the 
justice system will allow. This sampling strategy is neither sufficiently 
comprehensive, nor embedded enough in the research process to be considered 
‘true’ theoretical sampling. Grounded theory texts also tend to recommend that 
coding begins immediately or as soon as possible after the first interview or 
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observation, with a view to improving and refining the subsequent fieldwork.599 
This was not possible in this research; other time commitments meant that even 
transcription had to take place at least a few weeks after the interviews. 
Theoretical sampling and iterative coding both inform the key characteristic of 
grounded theory: the generation of theory (whether realist or constructivist) in an 
inductive way. This research has not proceeded with this idea in mind; the earlier 
literature review stages have helped me to develop a theoretical framework which 
informs (without necessarily containing) the data analysis. A further key distinction 
is that thematic analysis is at its core a way of reducing data to its most important or 
relevant aspects,600 rather than on producing more data based on the original work. 
Corbin and Strauss state that the ideas of grounded theory analysis can still be 
applied to qualitative data analysis while stopping short of the development of 
theory, 601 and this is the approach I decided to take in the thematic analysis process. 
Code Development 
The previous section briefly considered a series of continua that appear in the 
methodological literature on qualitative research. It may not be possible to quantify 
these continua, but it is possible to make statements about the position taken by the 
analysis in relation to them. It may be that thinking about these questions as the 
analysis continues is as important as knowing where the analysis would lie. 
The short and not particularly helpful answer to the latter question is ‘somewhere in 
the middle’. The analysis presupposes the existence of social phenomena outside of 
people’s constructions and knowledge of them. The topic of the research – a 
government policy – exists in artefacts like documents as well as in people’s 
minds,602 and is having (and will continue to have) effects through these. However, 
my interest is largely in the more subjective question of how people are adapting to 
this policy, and in their beliefs and views about it. The analysis was informed by a 
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theoretical framework and was partly concerned with testing certain assumptions, 
but I also intended to be sensitive to themes I had not expected, and to construct a 
thematic framework in a somewhat inductive way. 
The question of inductiveness or deductiveness, in particular, has a close bearing on 
the actual process of thematic analysis. The primary and arguably most 
characteristic feature of thematic analysis is the ‘coding’ of the data – reducing it to 
thematically oriented labels, or putting it into conceptual ‘bins’.603 Charmaz defines 
coding as “a form of shorthand that distils events and meaning without losing their 
essential properties.”604 These can either be (inductively) generated or (deductively) 
discovered, through a process that usually begins with generating themes. This 
section considers that process and how it relates to the questions discussed above. 
The Coding Process I: Inductive and Deductive Coding and Sensitising Concepts 
Some authors have developed taxonomies of coding methods which often rely 
partly on the inductive-deductive distinction. Boyatzis’ influential book 
Transforming Qualitative Information proposes a tripartite classification of code 
development: theory-driven, prior data- or prior research-driven, and data-driven.  
Theory-driven codes will generally be developed outside of the coding process and 
then applied to the data analysis process. These codes could come from the work of 
other researchers. The theoretical framework should also determine choices to do 
with sampling (though this is not quite the same as the “theoretical sampling” of 
grounded theory). Data-driven coding is at the inductive end of the spectrum, and 
aims to draw on the “words and syntax of the raw information” to develop the 
themes. Boyatzis argues this approach is in some ways fundamental to all thematic 
analysis, but not well-understood.605 This distinction also informs the difference 
between “in-vivo coding” (which uses the words in the data itself, sticking closer to 
the ‘voices’ of participants) and “researcher-denoting coding” (based on the 
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researcher’s own interpretations).606 In the middle of the continuum is coding driven 
by prior research or previously gathered data. Exactly where this falls between 
‘pure’ inductive and deductive approaches is largely dependent on what sort of pre-
existing research and data are being used to guide the development of the code. 
Importing a pre-existing set of codes and applying it to one’s own data is at the 
deductive end of the prior-research driven approach to coding; taking a more 
conceptual approach and thinking in terms of broad themes drawn from academic 
literature could be seen as representing the inductive end of this process. 
My analysis was likely to draw broad concepts from pre-existing research and 
literature; as such could be classified as a prior research-driven approach. These 
concepts included relatively abstract ideas that seem to inform a lot of the 
discussion about the policy – for instance, the concept of past and future – which 
could be used, following Charmaz,607 as “sensitising concepts” during the coding 
process.  
Fundamentally, the fieldwork part of this project was intended to complement and 
further the earlier non-empirical stages. It would therefore be surprising and 
perhaps counterproductive if the literature did not influence the code development 
process to some extent. For instance, my research made me aware of the literature 
that Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) had been criticised as ineffective in a 
fairly widely circulated report by Audit Scotland.608 When I was preparing the 
interview guides I was expecting that at least some participants would refer to this 
criticism, and perhaps indicate the extent to which they shared this view; as such I 
asked participants about their views of CPPs (Chapter 6, Section 4). During the 
analysis stage I was aware of the possibility of ‘CPPs are ineffective’ becoming a 
theme during the coding process. However, as Braun and Clarke have warned,609 
there is a danger of becoming over-deductive. If the list of themes becomes 
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indistinguishable from the questions asked in the interview, the analysis becomes a 
set of self-fulfilling prophecies. Wolcott advises that only vigilance and scepticism 
on the part of the researcher can prevent this from occurring,610 and I aimed to keep 
this in mind while coding. 
In approaching my coding process, I used several broad ‘sensitising concepts’ which 
would give my thinking about my analysis some shape (deductively) without 
actually determining its exact thematic content. The first of these was ‘past and 
future’ – a straightforward concept, and one fundamental to all social life. This was 
intended to bring out and emphasise the diachronic themes in the data, particularly 
the ways in which past experience had shaped present practice and expectations 
about the future, and could also be one way to make the data analysis more readily 
relatable to the other work in the project (and outside it). A further benefit is that 
past and future are mutually exclusive – this helps to create a foundation of 
certainty for coding from the very beginning. 
Another broad ‘sensitising concept’ was the long-term tension between ‘localism’ 
and ‘centralism’. As discussed in Chapter 2 above, this tension has animated much 
of the history of community justice administration in Scotland, and it was becoming 
clear from participants’ accounts of the consultation experience that it had been an 
important aspect of this policy as well. The range of the participants produced a 
wide range of views on the tensions between local and central control, the need for 
responsiveness to local differences and the need for consistent delivery of services 
across Scotland (Chapter 6, Section 4). 
The third ‘sensitising concept’ concerned the tension between partnership and 
accountability, which was an important theme in criticisms of the structure of CJAs 
(Chapter 5, Section 2; Chapter 6, Section 3). A number of the reports critical of these 
and other partnership bodies, as well as several of my participants, referred to a 
tension in partnerships between, on the one hand, collaborative approaches that 
seek to secure collaboration and cooperation based on finding common ground and 
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common objectives and, on the other hand, an approach which stresses stronger 
leadership and holding partners to account. Concern about the ‘tangled lines’ of 
accountability in the CJA model was prominent in the fieldwork interviews,611 as 
was a concern that the new model – at the time not fully developed – would impose 
on local authorities an accountability relationship with the new body, Community 
Justice Scotland. 
The Coding Process II: Connecting the Themes 
Whether themes are ‘discovered’, ‘constructed’, or imported from literature review 
(or all three), the richer insights from the analysis are likely to develop from the 
ways in which these themes relate to each other, and particularly the relationships 
between lower-level and higher-level concepts. Even in the everyday thematic 
analysis involved in (for instance) reading a novel, we are able to differentiate 
between less abstract, lower-level concepts and more abstract higher-level ones and 
to appreciate the interplay between them – and literary value is usually seen as 
inhering in the way the novel handles more abstract themes. Corbin and Strauss 
refer to this as a difference between concepts and categories.612  The importance of 
the relationship between themes at various levels applies regardless of whether the 
analysis takes a ‘full’ grounded-theory approach – whether or not the framework of 
themes is an inductively developed theoretical output or a way of understanding 
the topic of study that bridges the gap between the ‘raw’ data and whatever 
theoretical assumptions are being tested or applied. 
Grounded theory provided some interesting insight into the coding process, notably 
in the work of Corbin and Strauss.613 Earlier editions of their book Basics of 
Qualitative Research proposed a three-stage process of open, axial and selective 
coding.614 Open coding is a data-driven/inductive stage which sticks close to the 
data, often reducing it to line-by-line summaries as in Charmaz’ research on people 
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living with long-term illness.615 Axial coding involves making links between themes 
in a way that might (but doesn’t necessarily) imply dimensional measurement. 
Selective coding involves searching for the most common or “revealing” themes. 
Charmaz seems to suggest combining axial and selective coding,616 while the latest 
edition of Corbin and Strauss collapses together open and axial coding; however 
Corbin and Strauss also note that the important thing is not the number or name of 
different stages, but that the process of moving from lower-level themes to higher-
level organising principles takes place, and that the researcher is aware of it.617  
Attride-Stirling’s development of thematic networks suggests a slightly more 
prescriptive system of levels of theme: Basic, Organising and Global Themes.618 
Basic themes make sense only in relation to other basic themes while global themes 
are at the centre of thematic networks and serve to tell stories about particular 
phenomena or explain them in broader terms. Multiple global themes can be 
brought out of the same set of data, allowing for it to be interpreted in terms of 
multiple arguments or sets of ideas. Organising themes serve to group together 
basic themes into broader principles that serve to inform global themes.  
I did not copy any of these processes exactly. My participants often invoked quite 
high-level themes (such as democratic accountability) and (in at least some cases) 
have theoretical frameworks of their own, and my analysis had to be aware of, and 
sensitive to, these frameworks. However, it should not aim to replicate them, and 
the inductivity of a bottom-up analysis could help to maintain a degree of rigour 
and independence. On the other hand, the knowledge and theoretical perspectives 
of the literature review could be used to set the analytical product in context and to 
explain references made by the participants. Agar’s thematic analysis of policy 
arguments in American trucking organisations is one example of the development 
of a thematic framework which uses literature review to set a context. Here, Agar 
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used context and background knowledge about the trucking industry to understand 
the relationships between themes in the analysis: 
“But given that carriers are greedy – by assertion and past example – and 
given that that implies that they can't be trusted, why does it follow that they 
must be regulated? The answer lies in the third NO LEVERAGE theme; 
owner-operators have no bargaining power. To understand this, some more 
background knowledge on trucking is necessary… rates have changed 
rapidly, usually in a downward direction.”619 
As well as explaining the development of a framework of themes, Agar’s article 
exemplifies the maxim “think display”. This appears in Miles and Huberman’s 
Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, where the authors argue that long, 
complex textual explanations of thematic frameworks are not very interesting to 
read or easy to process, and as such researchers using them are likely to “drastically 
overweight vivid information.”620 This view has been endorsed by a number of 
other writers on thematic analysis.621 Miles and Huberman suggest a range of 
displays, mainly comprising matrices (tables) and networks; they are not 
prescriptive about them but make a strong case for the value of visual display as a 
way of showing how information is organised.622 
Using NVivo in Thematic Analysis 
Why Use CAQDAS? 
As Chamberlain remarks, one way in which researchers can develop the “display” 
aspect of their research is through the use of computer software.623 A further 
methodological question, then, was whether or not my research would make use of 
Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), such as QSR 
NVivo (a popular example of such software for which this University had a licence). 
As Seale argues, “the chief contribution of CAQDAS is automation of the retrieval of 
text segments (for instance, sections of an interview) that have been categorized as 
                                                     
619 Agar, 1983: 607 
620 Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10-11 
621 Chamberlain, 2013: 99; Wolcott, 1994: 30 
622 Miles and Huberman, 1994: 90-102 




examples of some analytic concept.”624 The main attraction of using CAQDAS is that 
it allows quick and reliable text searches in a fraction of the time it would take a 
human researcher, and comprehensive organisation by code labels (unlike a human 
being leafing through papers for coloured labels, it will not miss any). Seale 
suggests that “the software's requirement that I code systematically and the tireless 
capacity of the computer to confront the analyst with all coded instances enforced a 
rigor that might otherwise have been daunting to achieve”625 – a statement with 
echoes of Miles and Huberman’s justification for using display rather than extended 
text for displaying qualitative data.626 
There are, however, some potential pitfalls in using software for qualitative 
analysis. Bong describes the dangers of reifying CAQDAS or conflating its use with 
the analysis process in general: 
“I then realised that my initial questions, i.e. to use or not use CAQDAS and 
which software, was short-sighted. The fundamental question I ought to 
have deliberated on instead is how to analyse qualitative data within the 
methodological framework of my research design…”627 
Flick also cautions against over-reliance on CAQDAS, emphasising that it will not 
do the analysis for the researcher and criticising methodological explanations that 
simply refer to software without explaining how it was used,628 while Coffey et al. 
have suggested that the rise of CAQDAS has contributed to a homogenising 
tendency within anthropology and other qualitatively-oriented social science, with 
CAQDAS programs privileging a grounded theory perspective through the 
predominance of coding in the software.629   
I decided that with a sufficiently reflexive and careful approach I could avoid over-
relying on CAQDAS or conflating CAQDAS coding with analysis; in addition, since 
I had decided to use thematic analysis coding well before considering the CAQDAS 
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question, it seemed unlikely that the allure of technology had influenced my choice 
of analytical method. After learning more about how to use NVivo using the NVivo 
Handbook,630 and testing the software with one of my interview transcripts, I decided 
that I would use NVivo for my analysis.  
Developing a Framework with NVivo 
An NVivo project is a computer file which can contain a large variety of project data 
types, including (to begin with) many types of data source, including text, audio, 
video, quantitative data and (using its companion browser extension NCapture) 
Facebook and Twitter posts. NVivo supports the creation of complex classification 
systems for sorting sources and themes, and can potentially be used to produce 
sophisticated quantitative analyses of words and phrases, and is particularly useful 
for multiple researchers collaborating on the same project (particularly as it offers 
easy and quick checking of intercoder agreement). 
However, I saw little need for these advanced features which seemed to be of more 
use to projects with much larger datasets (and arguably to more surface-level 
approaches). In terms of how the software was used, my analysis was 
straightforward and stayed within the core functionality. I imported my 
anonymised interview transcripts into the file (as ‘Internal Sources’), and coded 
them iteratively in the way described above. In the program’s language, themes are 
referred to as ‘nodes’. Opening a node within the program produces a view of all 
the material coded at that node. Nodes can be placed in hierarchical (parent-child) 
relations with each other or sorted into folders. The Findings chapters of this thesis 
(Chapters 5 and 6) are structured around the list of nodes as it stood at the end of 
my analysis. 
Throughout my analysis I maintained an iterative and reflexive approach. One 
feature of the software that was useful in this regard was the possibility of writing 
text memos about the process of analysis, which could be linked to any source or 
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node. After the first ‘pass’ of coding for each interview I wrote a memo which 
summarised the content and key points of that interview. Between coding 
interviews, I also wrote memos, sometimes very long, about the process of coding. 
In each of these coding memos I examined the list of nodes individually and 
considered the analytical usefulness (or not) of each, while also trying to keep the 
number of nodes low enough that I could remain familiar with the full list as I 
coded. This led to many instances of ‘recoding’ as I moved iteratively towards 
nodes that were more analytical and conceptually distinct from each other.  
As Bong warns, the NVivo file is not the same as the analysis.631 The software allows 
the convenient collection of past and current coding schemas and reflexive 
commentary on the coding process in one convenient and searchable format, but the 
interpretation of the data is necessarily my own. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the development of the project in general but with 
particular reference to methodology. As this chapter has explained, my initial 
intentions were to produce a project which would compare the Scottish community 
justice restructuring to TR, a contemporaneous and in many ways much more 
radical restructuring of the community justice system of England and Wales. 
However, protracted access problems made the original plan impossible and, after 
some consideration, it was decided to keep the project focused entirely on Scotland. 
A number of academics have studied and are studying TR,632 but this project is 
believed to be the only empirical study of the Scottish restructuring of community 
justice. 
The theoretical approach taken to community justice was inspired by Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework,633 an increasingly popular one in social science. 
This places my research in a developing tradition of Bourdieusian approaches to the 
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sociology of punishment, applying the concept of the ‘penal field’,634 and (more 
critically) the ‘agonistic’ framework that has been developed from it,635 to the 
Scottish policy under consideration here. In methodological terms, the concepts of 
field and habitus in particular informed the decision to combine literature review 
with qualitative interviewing, although in practice the separation between the two 
was not as sharp as initially expected.  
The analysis of the data collected was a complex process which began with the 
decision to use thematic analysis, a popular and versatile qualitative analysis 
method but not always a well-understood or clearly explained one.636 In developing 
and deciding on a thematic analysis approach it was necessary to take a position 
relative to several epistemological and ontological questions. I was able to clarify in 
my mind and in my writing that my research would combine naturalist approaches 
(emphasising objective extrinsic facts) with constructionist ones (emphasising the 
construction of knowledge and beliefs), because both were relevant to 
understanding the Scottish community justice redesign – and thematic analysis is 
versatile enough to combine these approaches. Turning to the more mechanical 
question of how the coding process would work, it was necessary to consider the 
position of the analysis between inductive and deductive modes of reasoning with 
relation to theory and prior research. The coding would ultimately be informed but 
not prescribed by prior research, proceeding inductively within a schema 
demarcated by several ‘sensitising concepts’. Finally, I decided to use software 
rather than coding by hand, although this was largely for reasons of convenience 
rather than because it seemed to carry any special analytical insight. 
The process of methodological development was both practically difficult and 
intellectually challenging, although only rarely at the same time. However, the end 
result was a project that was far more focused than before and far clearer about 
what it was and what it seeks to do: to produce a rigorous description of how the 
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restructuring of community justice in Scotland has developed, its current and likely 








Chapter 5: Findings I – Community Justice as a 
Professional Discourse 
1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the first of two strands of the findings from fieldwork with 
community justice practitioners in Scotland. It collects findings on a range of themes 
connected to community justice practice, as the system is being restructured, 
focusing on output from the practitioner interviews – CJA staff, directors of social 
work and third sector managers. The next chapter will be concerned with the 
political dimensions of community justice, and will draw more on the interviews 
with local and national politicians.  
The criticisms of two nearly contemporaneous reports sealed the fate of the current 
system (see Chapter 2, Section 5). The report of the Commission on Women 
Offenders (Angiolini Report), which appeared in April 2012, mostly made 
recommendations about women offenders but also obliquely advocated the 
abolition of CJAs and their replacement by a national service.637 This was followed 
in November by an Audit Scotland report which went into more detail about the 
operations of community justice, highlighting several flaws of CJAs but not 
advocating their abolition. 638 The consultation on ‘Redesigning the Community 
Justice System’ began in December 2012, focusing on three possible models – the 
enhanced CJA model, the local authority model and the national service model.639 
The deadline for responses to the first phase was 30 April 2013; in the intervening 
time, the Government held 13 ‘stakeholder events’ and received 112 responses.640 A 
document released in December 2013 explained that neither of the three options in 
the original consultation had proved satisfactory, and that instead ‘Option D’ – a 
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mixed local authority/national service model – would be pursued.641 Another round 
of consultation would decide on the detail – this consultation was launched in April 
2014, with the beginnings of an indicative timeline and an outline of the new 
model’s key features, and ran until 2 July. By the time of the final consultation 
report, which appeared in December, the process had involved 22 stakeholder 
events attended by 900 people, and received over 170 written responses.642 This 
fieldwork was carried out between July 2014 and January 2015, so the discussions 
considered some details of the new system which had not yet been determined. 
The final round of consultation set a long timeline for the transition to the new 
system: CPPs would begin assuming their new responsibilities on 1 April 2016, but 
would be assisted by the CJAs, which would continue to operate for a ‘shadow year’ 
until formal disestablishment on 31 March 2017.643 This gave Parliament time to 
approve the necessary legislation, the Community Justice (Scotland) Act, passed in 
February 2016. Community Justice Scotland (CJS) will be established around 
October 2016.644 When the new model is fully implemented, it will have been very 
nearly five years since the first calls for restructuring. 
This chapter will consider a number of key dimensions of interviewee views of 
community justice practice in relation to the restructuring of the Scottish community 
justice system and with reference to relevant literature and theory. In doing so it 
aims to sketch certain aspects of Scottish community justice habitus as they 
experience and adapt to the restructuring of the community justice field. This 
chapter and the next one make extensive use of direct anonymous quotations from 
the interviewees; italics denote my own questions and remarks. Particular reference 
is made to the report of the Commission of Women Offenders (‘the Angiolini 
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Report’) and the Audit Scotland report Reducing Reoffending in Scotland, the two 
major reports which led to the decision to abolish CJAs.645 
Of the six CJA staff interviewed, four were Chief Officers and the other two were 
part-time policy analysts. Given that CJAs only employ around 24 full-time 
equivalent staff, even this small sample constitutes a fairly large proportion of CJA 
workers – including half of all CJA Chief Officers. The four CJAs in the study 
included urban, rural and mixed areas, and the staff came from a range of 
occupational backgrounds in public service at the management level both within 
and outside social work and Scottish local government. CJA staff occupy an unusual 
position within the community justice system; the constitution of CJAs left Chief 
Officers with little power to direct activities or secure compliance from partners, so 
they must rely on their interpersonal skills to get partners to cooperate (Section 2).646 
This makes Chief Officers similar to the ‘new partnership professionals’ described in 
community crime prevention partnerships in England and Wales.647 
Interviewees also included two directors of social work from large local authorities, 
with responsibility for managing various strands of social work, including criminal 
justice social work (CJSW), in their areas. These included managing social workers 
and attending meetings, including with CJAs and bodies such as Social Work 
Scotland. Both these interviewees were social workers of long experience. I also 
interviewed six management-level staff from four different third-sector 
organisations across Scotland. These were larger national organisations, which were 
chosen as they were statutory partners with one or more CJAs, and had more 
involvement in the redesign consultation and designated management staff with 
responsibilities connected to policy. Their occupational background was fairly 
similar to the other practitioners; their previous jobs had mostly been in public 
sector and third sector social work and health. One third sector interviewee had 
worked for a CJA and could thus provide a valuable double perspective. The actual 
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day-to-day work of these interviewees tended to be dominated by meetings with 
colleagues from their own and other organisations. As managers (or, in some cases, 
practitioner-managers) their role was strategic, largely concerned with developing 
plans and partnerships. A civil servant involved in developing the policy was also 
interviewed. 
More recently in the development of the policy, CPPs have been replaced by sets of 
local ‘community justice partners’, some defined statutorily, which may or may not 
work with or include CPPs.648 Because of the timing of this fieldwork, though, 
interviewees make reference to CPPs throughout. 
2. Community Justice Authorities – A Flawed Design 
Most interviewees, including CJA employees, agreed that CJAs were deeply 
constitutionally flawed in important ways, and had been from their inception; many 
referred to the Angiolini and Audit Scotland findings in discussing these 
problems.649 CJA employees in particular were able to describe the ways in which 
the constitutional flaws in the CJA system had hindered their work – but some 
interviewees, while acknowledging these flaws, defended the CJAs. This section 
will draw on Morrison’s work on the development and constitution of CJAs, a rare 
and valuable study of these organisations which uses CJAs as a case study of penal 
transformation in post-devolution Scotland. 650 Drawing on interviews conducted in 
2009, Morrison explains the development of CJAs before highlighting key aspects of 
their operation and their relationships with other organisations. This fieldwork, 
conducted five years later, confirms some of Morrison’s findings, showing that 
some key structural problems persist. However, there are signs that in their later 
years, CJAs were beginning to find their own institutional identities and had been 
successful in some respects (at least compared to the previous system). 
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“A Schizophrenic Identity” 
“I think the tension has always been that CJAs are a public body that holds 
partners to account, which is essentially what the legislation wants us to be, 
or whether we’re a partnership to reduce reoffending. That schizophrenic 
identity hasn’t really helped to clarify what the role of the CJA was… or is, I 
should say.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
As Morrison has also found,651 and as discussed below, the responsibility of holding 
partners to account is inherently in conflict with the need to promote good working 
relationships and collaboration between partners. Interviewees who elaborated on 
the causes of this ‘schizophrenic identity’ were unanimous in their view that it 
resulted from hasty compromise between the then Scottish Executive and local 
authorities (see Chapter 3). The power of local government, and compromises 
between it and Scotland’s national government, were also raised in discussions of 
the redesign (Chapter 7, Section 4). 
“[W]hen I first got the interview for this job and obviously I went to speak to 
a lot of people as part of my preparations for that, you know, people did say 
to me, “oh, it’s a bit of, CJAs are a bit of an unhappy compromise and a bit of 
a fudge”, I’ve always known that they weren’t really an ideal setup, they 
were a sort of slightly weird creation to keep everybody happy.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
“I don’t think it’s achieved what people had hoped. When it came in it was a 
compromise because at the time, I think about, that was when… there was a 
Labour administration at Holyrood and there was a real push for a national 
service… and there was a lot of concern in local authorities that if you set up 
a national service it would be a takeover by SPS… And to be subsumed into 
that was not where most people wanted to be, so there was a huge campaign 
against going into a national agency, and there was an argument for criminal 
justice social work remaining within local authorities… the eight CJAs was a 
compromise, because the government wanted to move away from 
negotiating with 32 local authorities, but there was resistance to having a 
national organisation, they compromised with the CJAs.” [Director of social 
work] 
This constitutional flaw produced a difficult characteristic of Chief Officers’ work – 
their position of “responsibility without power”.652 Chief Officers have no power to 
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direct delivery, only to allocate ring-fenced funding and agree spending plans. The 
nominal accountability powers granted to CJAs do not even apply to most partners, 
meaning that in practice CJAs exert almost no power, despite being nominally in 
charge of, and accountable for, reducing reoffending.  
 “I think there’s some truth in the accusations that there’s a poor design of 
CJAs, so CJAs have certain accountability, certain responsibilities, but lack 
some of the authority, so there are aspects of what we do which make it very 
challenging to provide leadership in a difficult field.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
The evidence of this project suggests this continues to be a source of frustration and 
disappointment for Chief Officers, and of concern for policymakers. Chief Officers, 
unable and unwilling to use official formal channels to exert influence on partners, 
are reliant instead on their social skills and ability to convince, rather than compel, 
partner organisations to work in particular ways. This is one important facet of the 
ways in which informal interpersonal relationships play a vital role in community 
justice partnerships (Section 4).  
CJA Successes: Development, Partnership and Professionalisation 
Interviewees who had worked with or for CJAs for several years tended to suggest 
that a process of professionalisation had started within CJAs, with the beginnings of 
successful and innovative work, and a distinctive contribution to the success of 
community justice in Scotland, coming only after a tumultuous early period (as 
detailed by Morrison).653 Interviewees sometimes attributed this to staff changes:  
“But the CJAs when they started were – they were set up with a degree of 
optimism but really for the first two years of their life they did absolutely 
nothing, they didn’t get the cooperation from local authorities, no one was 
quite sure what they were doing, and by and large they were chaired – or 
their principal officers were local authority people, almost without 
exception. What happened two or three years ago, I think, was that a 
number of those people stood down and were replaced by effective civil 
servants. People from either a legal background or from a civil service 
background, who – to a man, really, or a woman – were much more effective 
than their predecessors and were much more open. And suddenly the CJAs, 
                                                     




as a result of that the CJAs became a lot more open, they became a lot more 
accessible, they started thinking broader.” [Third sector manager] 
The post-Angiolini period, in which it was clear that the CJAs would be abolished, 
was sometimes described as the third act in this cycle. Other interviewees – like the 
Scottish Government, in documents about the redesign – invariably emphasised that 
they were critical of the system but not of CJA staff, who were described with 
respect.654 Their work tended to be seen as a poisoned chalice – a role rendered 
difficult by the constitution of the CJAs. CJA staff were described as doing the best 
they could, under these circumstances, to take creative approaches to reoffending.  
“my view on CJAs is the people in them work very hard, some of them do a 
lot of remarkable innovative thinking, but they are underpowered and 
under-resourced to do the job that is necessary” [MSP] 
“the CJA Chief Officer doesn’t have the authority to come along and direct 
local authorities to do anything. His authority’s purely by, in [this Chief 
Officer]’s case, using charm and cajoling and all of that, and it’s not a job I 
envy very much...” [Director of social work] 
Reducing reoffending is a primary function of CJAs,655 as well as a wider criminal 
justice priority.656 The problem of reoffending was widely discussed by interviewees 
as both a current and putative future focus of criminal justice efforts, but only 
occasionally in relation to CJAs: 
“[I]f you look at the performance improvement for example, around 
reconviction rates, you would have to say that there has been continuous 
improvement in reconviction rates throughout the period of time that CJAs 
have existed. So from a statistical point of view, certainly for [this CJA area] 
we could say that we have an evidence base that continuous improvement is 
in place. So from that point of view I think that’s a positive.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
“It seems it’s a good system because the partnership and the sharing of the 
information is really good, and it’s a way to address all the issues and use 
one another’s experience. The partnerships that are forged have gone some 
way out to reducing reoffending and in this area, [CJA area], our target was 
to be [a certain amount] below the average by 2017 and we’re already [close 
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to this target] and it’s gone down steadily over the last few years, which 
we’re all really pleased about.” [CJA elected member] 
Scottish Government data shows a clear, but not large, fall in reoffending – as 
measured by reconvictions – over the period CJAs have been active (from 2007 
onwards).657 This has been accompanied by a longer fall in recorded crime in 
Scotland (and some other western jurisdictions).658 There is no evidence to link the 
fall in reoffending to CJAs; Audit Scotland found they had “had little impact in 
reducing reoffending”,659 and that this was largely a result of their constitutional 
flaws – making it unlikely that the CJAs could have done much directly to reduce 
reoffending. The report added further that the efficacy of CJAs in reducing 
reoffending had never been systematically evaluated – so that even if CJAs had 
significantly reduced reoffending, it might not have been possible to evidence a 
causal relationship. CJAs have not been very successful in reducing reoffending, 
and it’s difficult to see how they could have been, given their limited powers. 
However, success was more evident, and more attributable to CJAs, in other areas. 
One of these, Audit Scotland argued, was partnership working.660 Many 
interviewees from within and outside the CJAs agreed, and some took exception to 
the Angiolini Report’s more critical view of partnership in the CJA system.661 
“I think if you look at for example bringing partners – one of the key aspects 
being bringing partners together, making sure that they set a common 
agreed policy for addressing offending within their area, I think they’ve 
been a huge success. Those partnerships across the country are really strong 
between local authorities, SPS, the police, health.” [Third sector manager] 
“I feel that [the Angiolini Report] was less well-informed [than the Audit 
Scotland report], to tell you the truth. I think it was particularly informed by 
the view of certain people in the criminal justice system. I don’t think it was 
accurate in everything that it said. For example, it said “we could find no 
evidence of joint working across boundaries”, well if anyone had asked the 
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CJAs we could have given them a handful – more than a handful – of 
examples of services that were operating across local authority areas and 
across CJA boundaries.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
The interest in partnership is not surprising in light of the emphasis placed by 
interviewees on the value partnership working (Section 4). Innovation and research 
were perceived as other areas of success – a number of interviewees, mainly within 
CJAs, described innovative partnership projects they had been involved in setting 
up or carrying out, and sometimes leading and promoting. Giving specific details of 
the projects could compromise the anonymity of interviewees, but they included 
Public Social Partnerships (PSPs),662 pilots working with offenders and training and 
knowledge exchange events for practitioners: 
“I think we’ve always been quite clear in our CJA – and that predates me 
being in the Chief Officer role – that we can add value, we don’t do that by 
doing what other people are doing, so we’re not trying to micromanage 
social work services or get stuck in to the service delivery end, it’s very 
much about bringing people together, sharing information better, building 
relationships between different agencies so they can work better together, 
supporting the development of new initiatives and new tools and resources 
for people, so for example we commissioned [various outreach projects] – so 
stuff like that, which is just a wee bit different. And we produce guidance, 
and practice guides and all that sort of thing, for practitioners.” 
 “Yeah we were part of the leadership to bring [a new project] about, and we 
were part of the… We have a steering group of professionals and we take the 
responsibility for facilitating that steering group, so there were a lot of 
partners who were really critical to that, but I think the CJAs have been 
critical in putting the case to establish funding, in putting the case to secure 
long-term funding.” 
“So in my CJA we do lots of events and training and awareness raising and 
so on for practitioners, and just bring people together, give them an 
interesting agenda or some sort of particular input around a certain theme, 
and then sort of see what happens, so we do quite a lot of that.” [all CJA 
Chief Officers] 
One third-sector manager and former CJA employee argued that this success 
stemmed from CJAs’ unusual position both within and outside the system of 
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criminal justice social work provision, which allowed CJAs to take more innovative 
approaches. 
“I’d also add on the strengths side as well, that – again this is from 
conversations, it wasn’t in our response – but there was a sense that having 
that, that CJAs were able to take a different perspective to local authorities, 
in that they were able to – and maybe it’s a question of duties and 
responsibilities, in that criminal justice social workers are so under pressure 
in terms of budget, in terms of fulfilling statutory obligations. CJAs were 
able to take that step back and look a bit more broadly, and think a bit more 
creatively, and that’s where some of the answers are found, you know? Our 
concern at the time was if it goes just back to a criminal justice social work-
led response, then it will be very much “you do this and then that and then 
it’s done”, it’s not in the kind of holistic approach and creative approach that 
we have found effective. So yes, that was another strength that came through 
our submission.” [Third sector manager] 
The capacity of CJAs to become involved in such projects demonstrates the 
‘positional advantage’ associated with their being organisations above and outside 
the mainstream system of CJSW delivery, but this is perhaps small compensation 
for structural features which hinder the achievement of their core aims. 
Discussion 
Interviewees were widely critical of the CJA system. CJAs were seen as having a 
‘schizophrenic identity’, caught between promoting partnership working and 
holding partners to account, and this was a serious hindrance to their successful 
operation. This structured the Chief Officers’ ways of working; lacking their own 
resources and symbolic capital, they nonetheless attempt to use their interpersonal 
skills to carry out their role, and even to resist and circumvent the constraints placed 
on them.  
Among the CJA interviewees there was often an implicit disappointment with their 
role – particularly Chief Officers, whose job title suggests a degree of power and 
influence that in fact proved to be absent (largely a result of the political 
compromises around the CJAs).663 On one (non-interview) occasion, the Chief 
Officer of Lothian and Borders CJA remarked, “when I took this job I didn't realise 
                                                     




I'd be spending so much time on the road and driving between meetings”.664 This 
was linked to the sense that there was little awareness of CJAs’ nature and functions 
even among those who worked with them (Chapter 6, Section 6).  
“[W]e’ve got this very highfalutin title – “I’m the Chief Officer of the 
Community Justice Authority!” – and people who don’t know us have this 
idea that we’re this huge organisation with myriads of staff and so on, and I 
think actually we are, as I’ve said, tiny. And actually I’m quite a junior 
officer. I’m in a well-paid local government job but I would be regarded as 
below a head of service in a local government context. So you’re not 
massively powerful, if you know what I mean, in terms of where your 
ranking is compared to some of the other players.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
Despite their well-documented and persistent structural problems, interviewees 
emphasised that CJAs had not been a total failure. There was a sense that CJAs had 
developed over their lives and that, owing to the skilful work of Chief Officers 
pushing against the constraints imposed on them, there had been success in 
developing partnership working and innovative practice. The theme of structural 
deficits hindering the successful operation of the system was at the heart of the 
Angiolini and Audit Scotland criticisms of the CJAs,665 and of practitioner concerns 
about the new system (the detail of which was far less clear at the time of the 
fieldwork). However, as this chapter goes on to argue, it is not certain that the new 
system will eliminate these problems entirely, and it is likely to produce structural 
problems of its own. These structural issues are linked closely to two aspects of 
practice described as particularly important: research and evidence-based 
approaches, and partnership working. 
3. The Role of Research and Evidence 
One of the most common themes was the importance of research and evidence. 
Even politicians – non-practitioners with little direct involvement – invoked this 
concept, although they mainly described their knowledge in terms of their personal 
experience, especially visits to projects (Chapter 6, Section 1). Research was widely 
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seen as vital to community justice practice and policymaking, and an important part 
of CJA work in particular. A number of interviewees, particularly within CJAs and 
TSOs, described specific research-related projects they had been involved with, 
some highly innovative despite the operational constraints on CJAs. The value of 
research was linked to the other most discussed practice value – partnership 
working (Section 4) – through an emphasis on the importance of robust mechanisms 
for sharing information within partnerships. 
Discussions about the redesigned community justice system entailed consideration 
of more academic research approaches, including in particular the development of 
desistance theory. Interviewees expressed hope that the new system would promote 
more of an emphasis on research and on desistance approaches – however, it is not 
certain that this will in fact happen, and there is no necessary relationship between 
community justice structures and desistance principles. 
Information Sharing in Partnerships 
Accurate, timely information was seen as crucial. This included research outputs 
that could guide the development of practice, statistics and day-to-day operational 
information. In the latter case, the need is particularly acute with MAPPA and 
similar arrangements which supervise high-risk offenders, where information 
sharing between partners could mean the difference between life and death. In CJA 
partnerships this is dependent on partners’ actions, and on the development of 
robust systems for ensuring that information can be shared quickly and easily 
between partners; the information sharing process appeared to be considered 
constitutive of partnership working. Crawford describes a similar view in crime 
control partnerships in England and Wales:  
“In place of a rhetorical model of professional ‘expertise’ is one which 
emphasises shared information, stressing the importance of diverse 
knowledgeable organizations and the knowledgeable public. And yet… 
expertise is being recalibrated, restructured and redefined.”666 
                                                     




Hence, structural obstacles to partnership working (Section 4) also hindered 
information sharing, and thus the wider evidence-based practice agenda. As well as 
improving partnership working, robust systems of information sharing were seen as 
potential solutions to problematic aspects of partnerships, particularly the tendency 
for their success to depend on individual people and personal relationships. 
Information sharing from CJAs to CPPs was also described as an important part of 
‘smoothing’ the transition from the current to the future model (see Section 6). 
“So information sharing has to be systematic, resource sharing has to be 
systematic, commissioning has to be shared, the intelligence that you need to 
bring together to arrive at shared priorities needs to be systematically 
shared, analysed, presented in a way that’s going to make sense for 
partners.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
Failures of information sharing were cited as a frustrating aspect of community 
justice partnership work. This was a particular problem for CJA staff, whose role 
involves monitoring the work of other organisations and directing resources to 
them. Partner organisations however sometimes described it as a burdensome 
process.  
“One of the main problems that we have is trying to ensure we have relevant 
and the most up-to-date information. Most of the data that we deal with is… 
could be three or four years out of date by the time we get access to it. 
Right… 
There’s also an issue over accuracy of the data, so it’s… in order to try and 
develop policies and in order to try and direct resources as efficiently and 
effectively as possible, we have to look at other methods, other sources of 
information that will help us to ensure that the funding reaches the people 
that need it the most.” [CJA Staff] 
“The CJA also takes up an enormous amount of time, it’s almost like feeding 
the machine, there’s lots and lots of information required and it’s not 
actually very clear what’s done with all that information.” [Director of Social 
Work] 
The latter quote also supports the assertion by CJA interviewees that there is little 
awareness about what CJAs do and how they work (Chapter 6, Section 6). The 
importance of information sharing as a constitutive aspect of these public sector 
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partnerships links the values of research and evidence-based practice with the 
importance of functioning partnership structures (Section 4). 
Evidence and research in community justice practice 
“I think essentially in the whole justice sphere we have a fairly good 
knowledge of what we’re trying to do, we have an understanding of the 
client group – if I can describe it that way – we seek to affect, but we have a 
paucity of information about what works. And I’m shocked at that, given 
that we’ve had public policy for hundreds of years, you’d have thought one 
of the first things we’d have done is designed an effective tool to measure 
success accurately.” [MSP] 
Evidence has been described as vital to community justice practice,667 within a 
broader context of UK criminal justice reform on ‘evidence-based’ principles,668 
including (within community justice) the shift from ‘nothing works’ to ‘what 
works’.669 Practitioners typically described engaging with or carrying out research as 
a key part of their jobs. In practice, ‘evidence-based policy’ is not a value-neutral 
concept,670 but it was rare for interviewees to discuss specific details and methods, 
as might be expected of academic research. Instead, ‘the evidence’ tended to be 
invoked as an almost monolithic entity which connoted certainty about its meaning 
and how to respond to it. As Sanderson notes, uncritical approaches to ‘evidence-
based policy’ can be misleading,671 and fail to reflect the heterogeneity of forms of 
knowledge involved in making policy.672 As discussed further in Chapter 6 (Section 
1), accounts given by politicians tended to describe their knowledge coming from 
interactions and visits rather than more objective forms of evidence. 
It was argued by public sector interviewees that research should inform the 
allocation of resources, through the commissioning of services that ‘the evidence’ 
showed to be effective. For third-sector providers – whose contribution was seen as 
distinct and valuable, but which were also under unique pressures (Sections 4 and 
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5) – evidence was an important part of legitimacy and survival. As government 
funding for third-sector services has shifted from being mainly unconditional to 
mostly contractual arrangements which resemble investments, funding has become 
contingent on evidenced success.673 
“Our focus at the moment is on gathering that evidence to make that case, 
really, it’s to make sure we’ve got the robust data to support that process 
and to say that it does work.” [third sector manager] 
Some specific research projects were discussed from a practitioner perspective. 
Describing the details of these could compromise the anonymity of interviewees, so 
they are referred to in general terms here. They included independent evaluations of 
third-sector interventions with offenders, small projects carried out by CJAs (using 
their very limited resources) and knowledge exchange events. Additionally, many 
of the interviewees were involved in some way in Public Social Partnerships (PSPs), 
and sometimes cited these as examples of successful innovative practice by CJAs. 
However, pilot projects in Scotland have tended to be locally focused and thus 
limited in scope, playing into the local-national dynamics of community justice: 
“You know you can pilot these things in wee courts all over the shop, but 
they make no difference to national reoffending rates because it’s so small 
and insignificant, and it could be the best practice in the world but it ain’t 
going to make a difference to the national reoffending rates, you have to be 
ambitious and do that on a national scale and that’s what we would have 
wanted to have done… I mean I do understand the need to pilot complicated 
areas of new service development, but it should only be that. You know, it 
should last as short as possible, learn the lessons and then get rolled out. But 
what happens is, you tend to pilot these things and then they stay as 
blooming ongoing pilots for five years because the government hasn’t got 
the money to roll it out, and... I just think we know what works in Scotland, 
you know, we can do it, we’ve got a great third sector that are really vibrant, 
skilled-up, you know, and let’s just bloody get on and do it.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
As discussed above, research and innovative practice was seen as an area in which 
CJAs had succeeded – although the regional structure meant much of this work was 
confined to single CJA areas rather than applied nationwide. 
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“I think one of the things CJAs have been very good at is learning and 
knowledge exchange. I think there’s still more to be done but there’s 
certainly a lot of development of research being undertaken, understanding 
of the issues, and I think it’s important that that isn’t lost.” [CJA Staff] 
Alongside general concerns about the danger of losing the knowledge and expertise 
developed under the CJA system (Section 6), these projects were sometimes invoked 
specifically in discussions of concern about the community justice transition, with a 
sense that without the CJA to guide and promote them, they would lose momentum 
and their work would have to stop. 
Academic Research and Desistance Theories 
Some interviewees discussed the role of criminological research in community 
justice and in developing the new system. This included references to desistance 
scholarship, a relatively recent strand of theory which conceives of the cessation of 
offending as “the maintenance of crime-free behaviour in the face of life’s obstacles 
and frustrations”674 – a process which may be long and complex. In Scotland, 
McNeill’s work has been vital in developing desistance paradigms and applying 
them to community justice practice.675 Desistance shares with earlier concepts of 
non-treatment paradigms in probation practice676 an emphasis on the offender’s 
agency in the change process, and involves challenging practitioners (particularly 
public sector probation/social work)677 to consider themselves not as treatment 
agencies acting on the offender (a tendency arguably prevalent during the 1960s and 
70s)678 but as supporters and helpers to offenders’ self-defined desistance 
experiences – collaborators rather than diagnosticians.679 Other key principles of this 
approach include a holistic and somewhat narrative “individual-level view” of the 
process, justified by the very different desistance experiences of individuals (and, 
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McNeill argues, militating against managerialism and centralisation).680 Some 
interviewees described the effect of desistance theory on their practice: 
“[H]as the work around desistance that’s contributed to all of that, has it 
made us think differently as a local authority provider of statutory services? 
Well yes it has, we’ve put money into different things now. So that’s 
something that might or might not interest you, we’ve put some money into 
a couple of things that we wouldn’t have we were not, kind of – not mindful 
of thinking around desistance… Has the underpinning theoretical approach 
to people who offend made us think differently? Well, yes it has. Both in the 
kind of relationship that exists between social workers and recipients of 
supervision in the community, but also in terms of what is it we invest our 
money in. So we invest less in programmes now, formalised accredited 
programmes, but we’re likely as things progress to invest more in the type of 
social enterprise that we’ve talked about, and more in the kind of 
employment opportunities and volunteering opportunities that are around. 
So there’s, there is a shift I would say in terms of an investment based on 
what is proven to be more effective, but that’s not necessarily about the 
policy of redesign. It’s just – it’s just the growing evidence about what’s 
effective.” [Director of Social Work] 
Documents about the redesign policy refer often to desistance;681 the Policy 
Memorandum for the Community Justice (Scotland) Bill states that “The Scottish 
Government also wishes to embed desistance at a strategic level and therefore is 
prioritising the principle of desistance in the new national strategy and in the new 
national performance framework for community justice.”682 This idea was 
welcomed by interviewees, but there was no evidence that desistance principles had 
informed the substance of the policy itself, which is primarily structural and 
administrative in nature. The civil servant interviewee’s description of the role of 
desistance referred mainly to the funding allocation under the new system, 
suggesting that desistance could inform the allocation of funds to some activities 
but also emphasising that local authorities would retain discretion for their CJSW 
spending. Some interviewees took a more critical view of the role of desistance 
theories in the redesign. 
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“Desistance theory has developed in leaps and bounds over the last kind of 
ten years, and I didn’t see any discussion about “how does desistance theory 
inform how we should structure our service to actually work towards 
reducing reoffending?” We had all the evidence base that was there about 
the kind of things that we could be doing and should be doing – should have 
informed a discussion about “what structure will best allow us to do that, 
and get the best results for the service users?”” [Third sector manager] 
The absence of academic voices in CJA leadership structures was described by one 
Chief Officer as a structural factor that had further inhibited their development as 
distinct institutions with their own identity. A role for academic criminology in the 
Board of Community Justice Scotland could be a step towards embedding 
criminological and desistance perspectives into the new system, but this is not 
guaranteed and the membership is still an open question at the time of writing. 
There is little evidence that the restructuring of the system, per se, will help to embed 
desistance principles in it, but unrelated to the redesign itself, there were signs of 
engagement with desistance principles, including in particular the emphasis by 
many interviewees on the complexity of offenders’ needs (see Section 4) and the 
need to reduce the stigma of offending (Chapter 6, Section 4). 
Discussion 
Research and the use of evidence were perceived by most interviewees, especially 
practitioners, as vital to criminal justice practice – including the development and 
use of particular interventions with offenders – and to policymaking. This perceived 
importance was also bound up with partnership, the other widely emphasised 
element of community justice practice, through an emphasis on the value of 
partnership as a mechanism for sharing information (including research findings). 
In general, ‘evidence-based’ and partnership approaches to criminal justice were 
approximately contemporaneous in their historical development,683 but the 
relationship between the principle of evidence basis and the community justice 
redesign is far from straightforward. Its structural features are shaped mainly by 
evidence from reports and consultations, but this evidence is mainly political rather 
                                                     




than criminological. As Coyle argued in relation to the previous restructuring,684 
there is no evidence that the administrative structure of community justice has any 
effect on its efficacy.  
Much of the research discussed did not have the rigour and reflexivity of academic 
research, but there was discussion of the value of academic criminological research, 
and particularly desistance theories, in developing community justice practice. 
However, nothing about the new structure is certain to ‘embed’ desistance 
principles into this part of criminal justice. One possible area of development in this 
regard is the Learning, Innovation and Development Hub which will form part of 
Community Justice Scotland. The Hub is expected to focus on training and 
development as well as commissioning research and knowledge exchange on a 
national level between partner agencies.685 In this regard the Hub can be seen as the 
extension of the CJAs’ work on research and innovative practice, from a regional to 
a national model – although the extent to which it will succeed is not yet known. 
4. Partnership Dynamics 
Partnership was the most common theme in the fieldwork, discussed (often at some 
length) in every interview. All the practitioner interviewees were involved with 
some form of partnership working. For CJA staff, this was the running of an 
organisation which aimed to promote and coordinate partnership between 
community justice providers (and, as discussed above, this was seen as one area in 
which CJAs had succeeded). Social work directors and third sector managers were 
also involved in partnerships including CJAs and PSPs. CJA elected member 
interviewees were involved in CJA partnerships, although only through their 
attendance and voting at CJA meetings, and usually in other local service 
partnerships including various boards and committees. 
Partnership working was described as essential to community justice, but 
interviewees also described problematic and difficult aspects of it. This section 
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considers the rationale invoked for partnership, before discussing some problematic 
dynamics of community justice partnerships including the uniquely valued but 
difficult position of third-sector partners. It argues that these partnerships are 
essentially fragile, and that the redesign of community justice – as well disrupting of 
existing partnerships – will bring its own structural problems. 
The Value of Partnership Working 
In discussions of the future development of community justice (including most 
importantly the transfer of responsibilities from one type of partnership 
organisation to another), the importance of partnership working and good partner 
relationships was emphasised. Part of the reasoning for transferring justice 
responsibilities to local partnerships (originally to be CPPs, which were also being 
strengthened by the Community Empowerment Act) was to enable better 
partnership working.686 
“So if we see that the objective is around about how we ensure local delivery 
of criminal justice social work – community justice, about how we see that 
being localised, taking account of local needs, with good levels of 
intelligence and information here from central government or from local 
government. Through the auspices of community planning with all of the 
relevant partners, that’s a reasonable objective that we engage partners that 
we’ve, hitherto, not been able to engage in a criminal justice agenda – or 
have struggled, maybe that’s more appropriate, to engage in a criminal 
justice agenda… So I’m hopeful, in terms of going back to the question of 
“how’s it going?”, I think the direction of travel is the right direction of 
travel and it engages a whole host of people through a local delivery model 
that seems appropriate and proportionate, seems the best outcome, seems 
the best structure for a set of outcomes for local people rather than a national 
approach to this particular issue.” [Director of social work] 
As some interviewees explained, this approach was evidenced and justified by the 
complex needs of offenders. Linked to a concern with reducing the stigma around 
offending (Chapter 6, Section 5), interviewees emphasised the complexity of the 
problems experienced by the offenders in the community justice system as a 
rationale for partnership working between specialist agencies. 
                                                     




“the point about reoffending is it requires contributions from a whole range 
of different organisations and sectors, and that’s just the fact of you’re 
dealing with helping people to change their lives, and people’s lives aren’t 
organised by the way in which we structure our public services, so there are 
contributions required from all sorts of people.” [Civil servant] 
A similar argument was used in discussions of another policy development which 
may affect community justice in some areas (at the discretion of individual local 
authorities) – the integration of health and social care provision within local 
authorities. 
“If you take somebody who repeatedly comes to hospital because of their 
intoxication, their alcohol-related difficulties, the lack of joined-up work 
when somebody’s in a hospital – A&E – with community-based alcohol 
rehab, connecting with criminal justice social work, that kind of triangle of 
intervention is still weak. It shouldn’t be as weak as what it currently is. And 
maybe the view that I have is that if we look at health and social care 
integration, and we look at the influence and requirements around health 
and social care integration with a thrust about more community planning, 
that recipe seems to me to be more effective… if you look at the recipe that’s 
now being constructed around community planning and health and social 
care integration, I think you could reasonably argue optimistically that 
you’re going to get a better set of outcomes for people.” [Director of social 
work] 
The variation and multiplicity of criminogenic needs is well-known; a 2005 study in 
England and Wales finds an average of four needs per offender in areas including 
housing, employment, emotional well-being and addictions.687 Although the 
statistics for Scotland in 2016 are probably different, the needs of offenders are 
probably as complex. The emphasis on complex needs links the concern with 
partnership to the ‘needs’ discourse in probation practice which gained traction 
from the 1990s.688 The identification of such a wide range of offender needs thus 
justifies and requires partnership with agencies specialised in dealing with these 
needs, such as the NHS and housing departments. This also includes the third sector 
which was often described as having certain inherent special qualities.  
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The emphasis on complex needs forms a key part of the Kilbrandon approach, and 
was used to justify the development of generic social work in the 1960s.689 However, 
the partnership discourse implies there are limits on the reach of any service, no 
matter how generic; there have also been developments towards specialisation in 
Scottish community justice, including the development of CJSW as a separate sub-
discipline within social work.690 In some ways, the modern Scottish partnership 
approach combines aspects of specialising and genericising tendencies, drawing on 
agencies’ specialist expertise while also developing more and closer links between 
them. Crawford describes inter-organisational partnerships as “an extension of the 
concept of ‘community’ to organisations”,691 and like communities in the context of 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and similar developments, specialist 
organisations were seen as holders of specialist knowledge and skills which could 
be mobilised through partnership mechanisms, including regular meetings and 
clearly maintained lines of communication. 
Misalignment, Conflict and Short-Sightedness 
Partnerships were not always straightforward; practitioners described structural 
problems and power dynamics that could hinder successful partnership working, 
similarly to some discussed in the literature on the development of partnership 
approaches to crime control in England and Wales (Chapter 3). Power imbalances 
between CJSW, SPS and other partners have been highlighted as a particular 
problem for CJAs.692 
“You either believe that you need partnership to address these issues, or that 
you want your profession or your department or your area to be protected 
against the threat, if you like, or the challenge of partnership. The reality is, 
that’s not feasible anymore and that we need to see institutions and 
professions sacrificing a little of their power and expertise for the greater 
good, and I think that’s got to happen.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
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“There is often, there are often different pressures pulling partners in 
different ways, and sometimes they fail to act, quite as, you know, quite with 
one voice, like you might imagine.” [Third sector manager] 
The specialised nature of partner organisations was described as a source of 
potential conflict as well as valuable expertise. Most have cultural tendencies or 
legal obligations which can conflict with those of other partners, or with the higher 
needs of partnerships and the ‘bigger picture’ goals of reducing reoffending. There 
is a persistent tension between organisational goals and the need to maintain good 
partner relationships, while conflicts of aims and values were seen as a particular 
problem for agencies involved in community justice partnerships but not 
traditionally concerned with justice goals. 
“Some areas are doing better than others, but it’s the delivery, it’s getting 
people on board. Some of that is about getting people in the room, some of 
it’s culture, because I notice that a lot of things I do with the police, there’s 
still a view of health “we’re health, we’re bound by a Hippocratic Oath and 
we’re required to keep people, data confidentiality”… So I think some of this 
is about changing attitudes and culture, at the present moment health are 
still a wee bit of a laager693 of “we’re health, we’re different”” [MSP] 
A particularly pointed conflict of aims is implicated in the “schizophrenic identity” 
of CJAs (Section 2) as institutions required both to promote partnership and, where 
necessary, hold some partners (SPS and CJSW) to account. In practice the 
importance of maintaining good relationships has led CJAs invariably to favour the 
former. 
 “Holding accountable, that’s a difficult thing, we have a power… Our only 
teeth, if you like, is that if any partners are not working to the agreed area 
plan, we have a board, and the board should then hold the partner to 
account. And if the board is unable, or the board fails in its duty we have a 
responsibility to report that to the Cabinet Secretary. Never used that power. 
And there’s a good reason for never using it, which is that as soon as you do, 
you kill what you really have, which is influence, partnership, respect, and 
those are the powers – the tools of the trade, if you like, that we have had to 
use, which is to put the reasoned case.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
                                                     




This confirms and updates Morrison’s earlier finding,694 and the redesign is 
intended to rectify this by ‘untangling’ lines of accountability (see Chapter 6, Section 
3).695 Among public service organisations, justice agencies are particularly likely to 
have legally mandatory duties, some with implications for public safety. As several 
interviewees explained, these could conflict intractably with the higher aims of the 
partnership. 
“I think, you’re not going to find any of our partners who disagree that 
reducing reoffending is a noble and appropriate objective. And I don’t think 
you’ll find any of them that won’t use their resources to achieve that. But if 
the courts are sending people to prison, they have the responsibility of care 
for those individuals, and the responsibility of maintaining good order in the 
prisons, and making sure that people stay in the prison to finish their 
sentence! So, they can’t negate those responsibilities, and similarly if we 
have people going through the justice system, and they wind up in court, we 
can’t not write them a court report… you don’t want to close a prison and 
then tomorrow the courts send a whole bunch of people and you don’t have 
the capacity for it, so the prison forecasts continue to go up, if I can pick on 
the Scottish Prison Service… so the prison forecasts continue to go up, and 
the forecast is for growth, so they have to, in all good profession, plan for an 
expansion. And yet what we really want to do would be shutting prisons 
down, pulling that money back and investing somewhere else in the 
system.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
Arguments over financial resources were implicated in disrupting partnerships 
(Section 5), although political conflict was rare (Chapter 6, Section 2). A further 
problem had to do with the difficulty of bridging gaps between national structures 
(including SPS and Police Scotland) and local ones (CJSW departments) involved in 
community justice (Chapter 6, Section 4). 
Some interviewees also suggested that institutional obligations could produce short-
sightedness within the institutions themselves, especially CJSW departments. These 
departments are the primary ‘owners’ of community justice in Scotland and the 
recipients of ring-fenced funding (currently and, as confirmed in 2014,696 in the new 
system). One director of social work described how strictly enforced but easily met 
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obligations combined with budgetary pressures to produce a low level of service 
before the introduction of National Standards: 
“[C]riminal justice really didn’t really get a service – or those subject to 
probation didn’t really get a service – because the money came into the local 
authorities, money was tight, so money was distributed across the social 
work tasks. So what you did is you did what you were publicly accountable 
for, so there were significant people on probation in Scotland who didn’t 
actually, or received a very poor quality of probation service, so we did the 
court report – because that’s really what you were accountable for! – and 
then delivering the Order, the level of service that individuals subject to that, 
which was pre-National Standards, actually received, was very variable and 
on many occasions was actually fairly poor.” [Director of social work] 
Despite what was almost universally described as the immense benefit of ring-
fencing and the National Standards, the problem of short-sightedness remained, 
having developed from CJSW being caught between budget pressures and legal 
obligations – a situation that persists. 
“[I]f they don’t have that statutory obligation to deliver the service, why 
would they invest when times are hard and public sector budgets are 
shrinking?” [Third sector manager] 
Social work interviewees referred to this problem, but tended instead to place the 
blame on inflexible funding mechanisms (Section 5). As discussed in Section 2, the 
position of CJAs was seen as a potential corrective, as was that of third sector 
organisations. The issue of short-sightedness on the part of CJSW, in relation to the 
restructuring,697 is returned to in Chapter 7. 
The “Heineken Effect” and the Third Sector Position 
Interviewees expressed approval for the role of third-sector organisations (TSOs) as 
community justice providers. These organisations are at the historical root of British 
community justice, having pioneered the first probation arrangements in the 
Victorian era,698 although Scotland was notably early to adopt a state-run service.699 
Although TSOs were described as uniquely able and innovative partners, some 
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interviewees – especially from the third sector – described difficulties unique to this 
type of organisation. Both appeared to stem from the position of TSOs as public 
service providers who were not part of the public sector. 
As well as being more able to question ways of working, third sector partners were 
described as being uniquely able to reach certain people at certain times – in 
contrast to the constraints on service availability that affect the public sector. One 
interviewee, echoing an earlier comment on Glasgow’s voluntary sector,700 
described this by referring to the advertising slogan, “Heineken refreshes the parts 
other beers cannot reach”. 
“The public sector doesn’t have the answers to everything. It doesn’t have all 
the expertise, it doesn’t have all the resources, it doesn’t have all the 
solutions, it doesn’t have all the intelligence. You need the third sector to 
help the public sector respond to these big challenges, so as you’re taking 
advantage of the expertise that that sector can bring, in what I call the 
Heineken effect, which is the third sector reaching the parts that the market 
or the state cannot.” 
“They provide services after five o’clock at night and they provide services 
at the weekends. They provide services at the times when a lot of our service 
users need it, not when we plan our services to be available because it suits 
us, between 9 and 5, Monday to Friday.” [both CJA Chief Officers] 
“Putting a third sector hat on, we might challenge and say there would be 
different ways in delivering some of the services, you could be more 
efficient, you could make more use of commissioning rather than having, 
you know, in-house provision and that kind of thing, that might create some 
efficiencies there.” [Third sector manager] 
This was similar to the view expressed by some about the positional value of the 
CJAs (Section 2), although TSOs have more discretion and a higher profile (it is 
estimated that thousands of people work in TSOs in Scotland linked to community 
justice or social work, while CJAs have only 24 full-time equivalent staff).701 
 “It’s really good that the third sector are in the chair for all of them [PSPs], I 
think that’s been really good for the public sector, it’s been an absolute eye-
opener for me I have to say, just about how quickly the third sector can 
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move, you know, their partnership skills, all those things that have really 
been fantastic, and also their ability to connect with service users, you know 
I think that’s been really really good.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
As partnership working was justified in terms of complex criminogenic needs, 
third-sector partners were seen as organisations that combined specialist expertise 
with the positional advantages of being outside the public sector. This is consonant 
with approving descriptions of the sector’s capability and importance as a provider 
of services (particularly in the post-2010 ‘Big Society’ context).702 However, just as 
the perceived positional value of CJAs accompanied structural barriers to their 
functioning, the position of TSOs – as public service providers, but not themselves 
members of the public sector – had significant downsides. As well as particular 
financial pressures (Section 5), there were implications for relationships with other 
partners, as contractual relationships entail power imbalances.703 
“I think the definition of partnership – frankly, I’ll be candid here – I think 
the vast majority of what we call partnership tends to be more of a 
purchaser-provider arrangement. 
I see. Is that something you’ve perhaps experienced particularly with local 
authorities? 
Very much so. Yes, I don’t consider ourselves to be particularly in 
partnership with any commissioning organisation, that’s the wrong 
statement for the arrangement. A commissioning agency, a commissioning 
authority, by its nature, contracts you, so you are a contracted agency, so it’s 
not a partnership arrangement.”  
“I suspect the consensus would be that generally for all the talk of 
partnership the third sector is always an afterthought – that the scrutiny 
that’s sometimes asked to pass around impact and cost of services is not 
applied to statutory services, so it’s not a level playing field.” [Both third 
sector managers] 
CJAs rarely act as commissioners, but do oversee some commissioning of TSOs by 
local authorities. Additionally, some TSOs are statutory CJA partners, guaranteeing 
at least that some TSOs have some voice in CJA discussions. No such guarantees are 
yet in place for the new system at the local level; the Government cannot 
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legislatively require participation by TSOs, or list them as statutory community 
justice partners, although the Act does require “appropriate” third sector bodies to 
be consulted on strategic matters.704  
The contracting process was a focus for some third-sector criticisms of the current 
and future system (Section 5). There was a concern that the redesign, by passing 
planning responsibilities from eight CJAs to 32 local partnerships, would complicate 
the tendering process further and increase the amount of contract negotiation 
required of TSOs – especially larger providers which might work across local 
boundaries. However, the shift to a longer-term funding allocation cycle is likely to 
alleviate some of the difficulty of contracting with CJSW departments.  
One limitation of this research with respect to the third sector is that it only involved 
organisations engaged with the redesign as statutory CJA partners. As a result, the 
four in the study were large organisations providing services across wide areas. 
Other, smaller TSOs might not have the same level of engagement with the 
redesign, but are probably even more financially vulnerable. 
Fragility and the Disruption of Partnerships 
“[T]he problem I have is a lot of these partnership agencies, they make a 
decision because they’ve got budget pressures, but they make that decision, 
it impacts on others. There’s unintended consequences, you know?” [CJA 
elected member] 
Despite the interest in developing structures which could facilitate and ensure 
partnership working, the data suggest that community justice partnerships in 
Scotland are fragile – easily disrupted by structural changes and dependent on 
informal relationships between individuals.  Discussions of the effects of structural 
change set the redesign in the context of structural changes across Scottish public 
services. This included the restructuring of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal 
Service, and of the courts system (including closing some local courts), as well as the 
nationalisation of Scotland’s police. Several interviewees described the ways in 
                                                     




which these types of organisational change could produce disengagement with 
partnership structures, including CJAs. 
 “[W]hat we’ve seen recently is, unfortunately, is a reduction in information 
being made available to Community Justice Authorities and their partners 
from Police Scotland, for instance… The culture change with Police Scotland 
has made a massive impact… I think the police traditionally have done quite 
well at the community level. I think because of the reorganisation those lines 
have been redrawn, and that’s something that they’re aware of and they’re 
working quite hard trying to sort out.” [CJA Staff] 
“[T]his would be more going back a couple of years, really – the PF 
[Procurator Fiscal] links dropped away when the PF moved to the federal 
structure. Again the police structure’s changed significantly, so it’s actually 
hard to know how much is due to the redesign and how much is due to all 
these organisations reconfiguring, and only now thinking “right, how do we 
link into this body?” so, say for example the PF side of things, we used to 
have the area PF who sat on our board, he was super supportive, very 
involved. That post completely disappeared and we didn’t ever manage to 
really get anybody at that level – or anybody – to come to the board 
meetings” [CJA Chief Officer] 
The integration of health and social care – not a justice policy, but a major part of the 
reorientation of public services to prevention – was seen as having the potential to 
have these effects as well, depending on how local authorities pursued the 
integration, which is at their discretion (see Chapter 6, Section 4).  
As well as being affected by changes to other organisations’ structures, CJA 
partnerships were already being affected by the community justice restructuring; 
several interviewees expressed concern that partners were becoming less engaged 
as a direct result of the redesign policy, because they knew the CJAs would be 
abolished.  
 “For example, some people have not attended meetings, because they said 
“oh, the CJAs are going to disappear, so what is the point?”, you know, 
some people. Not all the people.” [CJA Staff] 
The length of the redesign and transition process was seen as particularly 
problematic in this regard, as it produced a long period in which it was clear that 
the CJAs would be abolished, but there was little certainty about what would 
replace them and when (see Section 6). However, accounts of the effect of the police 
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nationalisation (the earliest of the restructurings named above) tended to agree that 
disruption was lessening as the police structure had begun to re-adapt and reforge 
partnership connections. This can be expected of other restructurings, in time. 
Partnerships between organisations entail interpersonal relationships, and this fact 
was a further source of fragility. Despite considerable discussion about the 
development of partnership structures, it was clear from the interviews that the 
success of partnerships depended largely on the personalities involved and the 
informal relationships between them.705 This includes the figure of the Chief Officer, 
who is unable to use the power granted them by legislation and depends instead on 
their ability to convince partners to cooperate with their agenda (Section 2). 
“In Scotland it seems to be much more developmental, evolutionary, small 
steps approach to partnership, and a voluntary approach to it as well! You 
know ‘you can do this if you want’ and I think one of the key weaknesses is 
that partnership in Scotland often relies on personalities and the strength of 
relationships. And that’s true, but the turnover of staff in some big public 
sector organisations is such that as soon as somebody leaves it undermines 
the resilience of those partnership arrangements, so you need a systematic 
approach to partnership, which can meet that resilience challenge of staff 
leaving and having to build up new relationships and all that.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
“[I]f we’ve got wee concerns about things, if we’re kind of hearing things on 
the grapevine and we want to see, you know, is this just a wee rumour, or is 
there something more to this, we can lift the phone to them and say “are you 
hearing anything about this? What do you know about it?” that kind of 
thing. So it’s a very real and a very meaningful relationship that we’ve got. 
To lose that and to have to try and re-establish that with 32 local authorities 
with absolutely no clarity at the minute about what that structure might look 
like and who the people might be … there’s a whole challenge for us in 
terms of trying to identify those people and build up those new 
relationships.” [third sector manager] 
The departure of key individuals can be especially disruptive, and this was a 
particular concern about the transition to the new system. This chimes with a widely 
expressed worry that the transition process could cause the loss of invaluable 
expertise and knowledge, as individuals leave their jobs (see Section 6). The 
                                                     




problem is particularly pronounced in Scottish community justice, which involves 
many fairly small local organisations – including the eight CJAs, which employ an 
average of three full-time equivalent staff each, and the 32 social work departments 
– a quarter of which, as of 2010, employed fewer than 20 full-time equivalent CJSW 
staff.706 This aspect of fragility is unlikely to change, given the new partnerships will 
also be small and numerous.  
Discussion 
This section has considered several important aspects of practitioner accounts of 
partnership, a major theme in the data. Partnership was invariably seen as vital to 
effective community justice work, largely because of the complex and varied 
criminogenic (and other) needs of offenders subject to community sentences – 
similarly to the rationale for the health and social care integration, and with echoes 
of the Kilbrandon ethos of generic social work. As such, partnership-oriented 
activities such as inter-agency communications and meetings were core parts of 
community justice practice. 
It was recognised that community justice and the challenge of reoffending bring 
together agencies who might have different organisational cultures and objectives, 
but successful partnership was seen as dependent on aligning different sets of 
priorities and ensuring people could see the ‘big picture’ rather than focusing too 
closely on more proximate concerns. This was not always straightforward –
partnerships were described as sites where different cultural tendencies and 
obligations could come into conflict, or where organisations’ individual aims could 
distract from or conflict with the partnership’s overall goals. 
Partnership was particularly vital for CJA Chief Officers who, being unable in 
practice to use the powers granted to them by legislation, rely on finely-honed 
interpersonal skills to develop good working relationships. Their powerlessness was 
held largely to be due to an inherent conflict between the elements of CJAs’ 
‘schizophrenic identity’ (Section 2) – accountability and the requirement of 
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maintaining good working relationships. Additionally, the informal and personal 
dimension of partnership was emphasised, with practitioners commonly describing 
relationships with individual members of organisations rather than the 
organisations themselves; good personal relationships were seen as more important 
than the structures intended to facilitate partnership working, particularly given the 
proliferation of very small organisations in Scottish community justice.707 This had 
the consequence that even minor staff changes could be very disruptive to 
partnerships, as could restructuring in partner organisations. 
“So I think we’ve tried to do everything we can to get people working better 
together, but I think sometimes other things still get in the way of that. You 
know, competition for resources and legislative pressures and everyone’s 
different accountabilities. But I’m reasonably happy with partnership 
working as far as we’ve been able to take it.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
Although difficulties in partnership working were widely acknowledged, it was 
described as an area which had seen significant progress in the last few years, and a 
particular area of success for CJAs. There was some optimism about the possibility 
that the new design would build on these gains and improve partnership working 
through the CPP system. However, the redesign has since moved away from the 
CPP framework and made CPPs’ participation optional (although the community 
justice partners include many CPP partners, and it is expected the two will work 
together).708  
“Police were at the last meeting, I think it was the first time police had ever 
been there, so I found that strange. I’m hoping that’ll change when we go 
into the local model, because the police are a big partner in our Community 
Planning Partnership, so I hope that changes… I’m hoping – there is hope 
for improvement there, there’s no doubt about it, and I’m hoping that the 
local model will sort that, as I say.” [CJA elected member] 
“I think theoretically, it could be an ideal model. I think everybody… I think 
there’s a warm welcome to the acknowledgement that what happens on the 
ground happens at a local level – that criminal justice social workers are 
heavily integrated with housing, with other social work, with health staff, 
with other partners – and you wouldn’t want to have nationalised in the 
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way that one of the options was, so I think that’s valued.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
The policy will probably complicate the development of partnerships by 
introducing more bodies – switching from eight CJAs to 32 local partnerships. This 
will probably be a particular problem for third sector agencies, whose position in 
partnerships is an unusual one – seen as uniquely valuable and effective, but 
sidelined from decision-making and lacking the financial security of public sector 
partners. The effect of the new system on partnership working is likely still to vary 
between local areas, and to be contingent on the success of an organisation that 
doesn’t yet exist – Community Justice Scotland. The change to the new system has 
also already proved disruptive in and of itself, partly because of the length of time 
involved in developing it. This has occurred in the context of other major public 
sector restructurings, some of them similarly disruptive – policies which were 
developed largely as a response to public sector austerity. 
5. Budgets and Austerity 
Practitioners were very aware of financial concerns, particularly in a post-recession 
climate dominated by cuts to public spending by the UK government (particularly 
the 2010-15 Conservative-led coalition). Scotland’s SNP government has attempted 
to mitigate the impact of austerity on public services by making efficiency savings, 
restructuring some services and implementing as far as possible the ‘prevention 
logic’ called for by the Christie Report,709 which found that spending on preventive 
services would be repaid many times over by the savings to reactive services. This 
leaves community justice services in an unusual position – reactive (requiring a 
criminal conviction) but also preventive (towards future reoffending). In 
Parliamentary debate about the Community Justice (Scotland) Bill, it was suggested 
that the Bill’s definition of ‘community justice’ be expanded to include primary 
prevention of crime; this was however deemed the responsibility of other services.710 
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CJSW is one of very few services that receives centrally ring-fenced government 
funding (“section 27 funding”); this was seen as vital to its survival and success, but 
not without disadvantages, particularly for partnerships. Funding pressures are still 
keenly felt; the level of funding is inadequate, with local authorities having to top it 
up from their own budgets.711 The funding is also allocated annually, which makes 
longer-term planning difficult and puts significant financial pressures on third-
sector providers. The sense was of a constant search for sustainable, long-term 
funding that would give providers enough flexibility to try new approaches while 
still fulfilling their obligations. Further challenges relate to difficulties of 
quantification – the difficulty of determining costs which vary across Scotland’s 
diverse geography, and – problematically for the wider prevention approach – of 
calculating cost savings from counterfactuals. 
Austerity and the Cost of Offending 
Practitioners emphasised the enormous financial cost of offending, which they 
explicitly connected to other social problems (Section 4) and thus costs to other 
services; the cost of offending and of responding to it was both large and widely 
felt. Practitioners emphasised the value of community justice agencies as preventive 
services which could save public money by preventing reoffending. Imprisonment 
was viewed as a sanction with very poor value for money, especially by contrast 
with community penalties, one of whose perceived advantages is their lower cost;712 
a preventive approach would therefore entail directing money away from prison 
and towards community penalties.  
 “[T]hey’re young people/men that cause significant harm to their 
communities and cause significant impact on the public purse and any 
reduction around their criminal activity is a good thing, both in terms of 
community safety as well as expenditure as well.” [Director of social work] 
Interviewees agreed the community justice budget was already inadequate to deal 
with reoffending, and spending cuts were increasing the pressure. The Scottish 
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Government’s expenditure on justice declined markedly from 2010, and is mostly 
spent on policing; among other spending categories the Scottish Prison Service is the 
most expensive (£382 million of the 2015/16 draft budget) while community justice, 
including national and local government funding, accounted for about £118 
million.713 The impact of austerity on community justice funding was described 
particularly in terms of services’ ability to carry out work beyond their mandatory 
responsibilities. 
“[I]f you look at the changes to the organisations, both in terms of their 
structure, but changes and ongoing changes and future changes to their culture, 
the way they undertake the various services – given that there are budget 
deficits that people have to cover, so if you look at – if you actually look at the 
process of criminal, community justice in Scotland, every organisation, I would 
suggest, within that has had to have some fundamental changes…” [CJA staff] 
“I think again the other change that happened over that kind of lifetime for the 
CJAs was obviously the economic collapse and the impact that had on public 
sector funding. Up until that point, funding for criminal justice services had 
been increasing, and increasing reasonably significantly, so again, it was much 
easier to be creative, to try new things, because your core services weren’t under 
any threat – in fact they were being enhanced anyway – and then there was 
more money on top of that to do new things… but then, you know, once the 
financial crisis hit and the funding started [gestures downward] again…” [Third 
sector manager] 
In these accounts, austerity heightened the importance of allocating resources to 
interventions that were proven to work – contributing to the importance of 
evidence-based practice (Section 3). The emphasis of spending money in the right 
places, thus reducing costs as well as reoffending, has parallels in the justification of 
the prevention ethos more generally. Some interviewees suggested, contrary to the 
Government line, that community justice should become involved with more 
primary prevention. 
“[Y]ou know, the idea of Community Planning is the same as the idea of the 
CJA, which is you know, we do spend the wrong money in wrong place, 
Christie identified that in the report. And Community Planning is meant to 
have been there to say “how do we shift our focus in public spend to achieve 
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for the population in a more effective way, in a more beneficial way?” and I 
think there’s still a long journey to go.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
“And what about the government? You know, I mean the government core 
funds the Scottish Prison Service, why doesn’t it fund more preventative 
work like mentoring, sort of as a core service, not as a wee pilot or 
whatever?” [CJA Chief Officer] 
As well as its other advantages (Section 4), partnership working was seen as key to 
ensuring that the problem of reoffending received sufficient resources. It was also 
described as fairer, by a slightly circular logic – non-justice agencies bore some of 
the cost of offending, so stood to gain if reoffending was reduced, and thus should 
contribute to justice partnerships. However, making this argument was not seen as 
straightforward – partly because of protectiveness on the part of the other services 
(also affected by cuts, and lacking ring-fenced funding) and partly because of the 
difficulty of quantifying the saving from offences not committed (see below). 
“So for example if you look at Shine, who’s actually benefiting from women 
not reoffending? I mean there’s a huge range of partners, but actually are 
any of them… are the police going to come up with some cash? Are the 
courts going to, are the PFs going to come up… you know, these are not 
bodies that are known for putting their hand in their pocket, so then the 
governments keeps putting the focus on local authorities and prison service, 
and you’re like, well, they might be funders, but really co-funders, not the 
only funders. And what about the government? You know, I mean the 
government core funds the Scottish Prison Service, why doesn’t it fund more 
preventative work like mentoring, sort of as a core service, not as a wee pilot 
or whatever? So yeah… hard to see how that will develop in the future – I 
don’t know just now.” 
“That has to be the key priority – it can’t be about reducing reoffending 
within existing section 27 resources for criminal justice social work, because 
you can’t really do that. You can do it up to a point, but you really need to 
use any discretionary funding that’s available within whatever budget to 
encourage other partners to brigade their resources behind community 
justice.” [Both CJA Chief Officers] 
Financial pressure also sometimes caused conflict within CJA partnerships, usually 
between local authorities, over the allocation of resources (Chapter 6, Section 2). The 
question of ring-fenced funding was implicated both in this and in wider 




Views on Ring-Fenced Funding 
CJSW has been comparatively protected from financial pressure, because its funding 
has been ‘ring-fenced’ since 1989.714 Previous to this, local authorities’ discretion 
with ‘generic’ social work budgets meant offenders tended to lose out to more 
‘deserving’ client groups such as children and the elderly.715 Since then, local 
authorities have gained wider discretion over other spending, making CJSW ring-
fencing anomalous: 
“[A]pparently it’s only us and Gaelic that’s ring-fenced these days”  
[Director of social work] 
However, nearly all interviewees argued it was valuable and necessary, particularly 
as it was accompanied by the development of National Objectives and Standards 
which improved the quality of service significantly.716 The consultation on the 
restructuring considered whether or not funding should continue to be ring-fenced; 
most respondents were in favour, and in 2014 it was decided ring-fencing would 
continue.717 Interviewees emphasised the value that ring-fencing had produced for 
CJSW, often (particularly among those of longer experience) with reference to the 
situation that had prevailed before ring-fencing as well as current financial 
pressures: 
“I suppose the idea of protecting it has legitimacy in the sense that we know 
the pressures local government are under, and if that went into the general 
grant allocation, it would be hard when they’re closing schools or services 
for older people, to still justify things that they’re doing with a group that 
doesn’t always elicit the same level of empathy.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
 “So the ring-fence brought a focus and a rigour around about this area of 
activity, and that in itself has to be seen as an absolute good thing, yeah? 
That coupled with National Standards, ring-fenced money I think probably 
gave birth, almost a rebirth to criminal justice social work service in 
Scotland.” [Director of social work] 
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But interviewees also described disadvantages to ring-fenced funding, particularly 
in its effect on partner relationships. Ring-fencing was sometimes seen as creating a 
sense of imbalance and hence a distance between CJSW and other partners, 
particularly TSOs whose funding is less secure. The result was a negative impact on 
working relationships and on partners’ willingness to share resources to deal with 
complex problems – as well as potentially contributing to a degree of short-
sightedness about the real (widely spread) cost of dealing with offending. 
“I have to say that I don’t think ring-fencing in some ways is always a good 
thing, I can understand the argument that, you know, community justice 
was a Cinderella service so they had to ring-fence it, because money was 
getting pauchled [stolen] away for other things, but I think it’s made 
criminal justice social work, because obviously it’s criminal justice social 
work funding, it’s made them quite an isolated service, and they haven’t 
really had to face the same sort of budget pressures as other council services, 
so sometimes I think that’s made them a bit less creative in terms of service 
redesign and the way that other services have had to respond to service 
pressures, because they’ve had this sort of protected budget, and it’s also 
been difficult to attract resources in, because other budget holders are going 
“well, look, you’ve got a ring-fenced budget, so, you can just look after 
yourselves, we don’t feel the need to support what you’re doing”, so I think 
it’s left them quite disconnected in some ways.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
“And that was again one of the challenges that Reducing Reoffending and 
the CJAs and criminal justice social work always faced was, because 
everybody always kind of followed the money, and just looked at that chunk 
of the budget, the kind of nine million or whatever it was that went in to 
section 27... they only ever looked at that, and they didn’t look at the money 
that was going into drug and alcohol services, and you know, huge, huge 
crossover between offending substance misuse, but then they didn’t look at 
the homelessness budgets, they didn’t look at the NHS budgets for 
healthcare. You know, all those kind of things, so there’s a huge amount of 
money actually being spent on offending, but again, a very, very small kind 
of locus of control.” [Third sector manager] 
Ring-fenced CJSW funding forms part of the history of compromise between local 
and national government in Scotland (Chapter 2); financial security was 
accompanied by increased control through National Objectives and Standards. 




successful service, but one other disadvantage is that there is little flexibility in how 
money is spent. 
Budget Flexibility and Temporal Scope 
Financial pressure was described not just in terms of insufficient money but also 
inflexibility in how it could be used. There was a general concern that funding 
(particularly section 27 funding) was allocated in an inflexible, short-sighted way, 
ill-matched to current needs and unresponsive to future ones, which constrained 
community justice practice and particularly innovation. The problem stemmed 
partly from legal obligations on justice services, and partly from time; although 
innovative work was highlighted in discussions of CJAs and TSOs, this was 
described as happening in spite of inflexibility in the funding system. At the 
regional level, CJAs can disburse money, but have very little freedom to do 
anything with it except decide, by consensus, how it will be allocated to local 
authority CJSW: 
“[W]e don’t have any of our own resources, you know, we sort of coordinate 
resources and allocate resources for social work, for local authorities – but 
those aren’t my resources to purchase services that I might choose… the way 
we were set up and kind of resource limitations has sort of left us limited in 
terms of what we can deliver” [CJA Chief Officer] 
As discussed above (Section 2), the CJAs also have no real power to hold local 
authorities accountable, while the mutually consensual nature of funding allocation 
(Chapter 6, Section 2), along with the difficulty of pulling funding away from active 
projects, means patterns of funding within CJA partnerships have changed little, 
reflecting and perpetuating historic inequities between local areas.718 Further 
constraints exist at the local level; Scottish Government statistics show most of the 
£86.5 million spent on section 27 funding pays for legally mandatory activity – 
mainly meeting National Standards requirements for sentences and producing court 
reports – leaving little for innovative or preventive approaches.719 This was linked to 
the sense of inflexibility and short-sightedness on the part of CJSW in particular, in 
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which ring-fencing, despite its importance to maintaining good CJSW service, was 
also implicated. 
“Any partnership funding goes to social work, which reinforces the 
argument that it’s about criminal justice social work. Whereas there should 
be, if you want to incentivise partnership working, you need to – I think, it’s 
a personal opinion – you need to provide resources that will incentivise the 
other partners to bring resources to the table. We won’t be able to do that 
because the resources that come in just go to social work. They can’t be used 
in a sophisticated way… We’ve distinctly failed to bring the resources of 
other partners to the table in a coordinated way, we don’t have an integrated 
resource framework around reducing reoffending. Our focus has been on 
social work and meeting the statutory responsibilities under the legislation, 
around financial management.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
The second source of inflexibility was the temporal scope of funding. Section 27 
funding is allocated annually, without an indication of how much recipients can 
expect the following year. Although funding will continue to be ring-fenced, 
austerity cuts will also continue while obligations on criminal justice remain, 
making annual budgeting increasingly fraught and contributing to a problem 
described by non-CJSW interviewees as short-sightedness on the part of CJSW 
(Section 4). Practitioners argued that advance knowledge about budgets would help 
to mitigate this. 
 “[I]f there’s greater flexibility you can make the budget work more 
effectively for you. So I’m more interested in the discussion that says we 
should have a three-year planning cycle for the budget, yeah? And that we 
should have less restrictions around how the budget is managed, whilst 
retaining for the reasons that I’ve said previously the ring-fenced nature of it. 
That gives, that in my opinion provides both flexibility and longer-term 
planning but a security of tenure as to where the money should actually go.” 
[Director of social work] 
The short-term and inflexible nature of the current funding model has been 
particularly difficult for TSOs which are contracted as service providers. 
Interviewees described a ‘knock-on effect’ in which short-term local authority 
funding produces even shorter-term third-sector funding, often requiring annual 
retendering – a process which drew time and energy away from the ‘real’ work and 




“Here’s a good example – so, domestic violence is a big thing in [this area], 
it’s a real issue for us in terms of providing a very good, top-standard 
criminal justice service. So I buy in what we call partner support for an 
intervention that we have that deals with men’s domestic violence. And 
what that is, is an independent kind of analysis of the effectiveness of the 
group-work intervention through the partner, but I never have any money 
from one year to the next to purchase that, so the organisation that I 
purchase it from come to me as soon as I get my budget and I tell them 
whether or not I can sustain it next year. You know, I could, over three years, 
actually begin to say “right, this is what we’re going to buy from you over 
the next three-year period, because I know how much money I’ve got, I 
know where my fixed staff costs are, and then you then deliver some of the 
priorities for your service”. That’s very difficult to do when you don’t know 
what your budget will be, and the margins between a very small reduction 
and the capacity to invest in a very small resource are very tight as well.” 
[Director of social work]  
“I think that short-term funding has come in and that’s been a huge problem 
to us because we get, we get annualised funding, we can’t invest in staff, we 
can’t invest in staff training, we can’t plan ahead, we’ve no idea whether 
whatever programme we’re running is going to still be running for more 
than a year…” [Third sector manager] 
Since this fieldwork was carried out, the Scottish Government has indicated that the 
new model of community justice is likely to involve a system where local authorities 
are notified of their section 27 allocations on a three-yearly basis.720 This should 
allow local authorities more leeway in allocating resources and potentially to make 
longer-term arrangements with TSOs, but – given that austerity will continue at 
least for the next few years – the financial pressure will remain a major constraint.  
The Unquantifiable in Community Justice Practice 
It is a commonplace in social science that “not everything that counts can be 
counted”,721 and a similar idea was raised here. Although budgetary efficiency 
requires certainty about how much is spent and where, it’s clear that in practice the 
amount of money spent on, or saved by, community justice is not always easily 
determined. The redesign of the system brought renewed effort to clarify its cost, 
including attempting to find a comprehensive unit cost for the Community Payback 
                                                     
720 SP OR FI 1 October 2015: 4 
721 Cameron, 1963: 13 
226 
 
Order (CPO), the main community sentence in Scotland since 2010. The difficulty of 
finding this figure stems partly from the geographical diversity of Scotland and its 
local authorities, and partly from the complexity of CJSW funding; political 
negotiations between local and national government were also implicated in the 
discussion. As such, interviewees were sceptical. 
“Well, there’s a big exercise going on, you probably know this as well, of 
trying to get a unit cost for a Community Payback Order – it’s the Holy 
Grail. People have been trying to do that for years. I think it’s extremely 
difficult because there are different – and I’ve been involved in discussions 
for this local authority, with people that are doing it – staff are paid 
differently across different local authorities. Different local authorities have 
different cost pressures so if you’re working in the Highlands – a part of the 
country that’s the size of Belgium with a population a fraction of it – you 
can’t have the efficiencies that [you would] in a city, because it takes half a 
day sometimes to get into where you need to be going, you can’t run group-
work programmes because you don’t have enough people to run the group-
work programme, if you’re in the Western Isles there are all sorts of 
logistical issues in relation to getting from island to island, and in the 
Northern Isles; if you’re in [this area] there’s a very high cost of property so 
any accommodation that we provide is extremely costly, if you’re in the big 
cities you’ve got the majority of very high-risk offenders who take a lot of 
resources to manage, and in our case with [a particular local programme 
provided to certain offenders], so I’m not confident that anybody’s going to 
come up with a unit cost for a CPO that everybody will agree is fair.” 
[Director of social work] 
“[M]y personal view, and I’m happy to say this on record, is that I think it’s 
an absolute blooming red herring… I mean, what would we use it for? I’ve 
no idea. When we get it, you can be absolutely certain that it’s going to be 
more than the attributed cost, as I’ve just kind of told you, it will be more 
than that, so why government are wanting to have this, because they’ll just 
get beaten about the head by COSLA and the local authorities, once they 
have it, to increase the funding. And it’ll be the same for court social work 
reports and all other areas of activity, because local authorities do subsidise 
these services just now, some to a greater extent than others, but pretty much 
all of them subsidise it. And the unit cost is going to, you know, it will flag 
that up.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
None of the discussion of unit costs considered the possibility that the number of 
CPOs could fall. It also raises the question of why it is worth finding a unit cost for a 




provided, whatever it costs, and local authorities have no power over the number of 
CPOs in their areas. A further quantification problem – perhaps a serious one for the 
prevention agenda as a whole – is the counterfactual nature of prevention savings. 
The cost of a hypothetical offence that didn’t happen is difficult to determine, 
particularly as offending has costs across the public sector; prevention undeniably 
saves money, but savings might not accrue entirely (or at all) to the justice system. 
Even if reduced reoffending reduces criminal justice costs, savings are not fine-
grained – casting further doubt on the reasoning for unit costs. A Chief Officer 
explained this in terms of the interconnectedness of criminal justice, positioning it as 
a further frustrating obstacle to budgetary flexibility and to partners’ committing 
their resources to partnership aims. 
“Well, if we want to change the way we spend on justice, it is really difficult. So 
the PSPs are there to show that if you work with prisoners, and you put this 
resource in supporting them out the gates, that the likelihood of reoffending is 
less. So if they’re less likely to reoffend there are health benefits, so we can make 
the case to health. There are benefits to the police – if you’re not having to arrest 
people that frees up police time. Less people in custody – prison is expensive. 
Court – less people going through court, social workers don’t have to write so 
many court reports, there’s impacts for the family. The difficulty comes when 
you then say, “Well, is that real cash?”, so you know, if fifty less people were 
offending in [CJA area] in a year, so you know, normally they’d have come out 
of prison and they’d have started to offend – and they reduce or stop offending – 
we’re not going to fire a bunch of police officers, take that money, and pay for it. 
And if [Prison] tomorrow reduced its prison population – even if you reduced it 
by five percent, that’s a lot of people – but actually, it’s not real cash because the 
prison’s still open, you still need the staff there, so the only time you start to 
make it cashable, take money out of the system, when it’s big changes, you 
know, when we close a prison… The Scottish Government makes a big 
statement around the fact that there are a thousand more police on the beat and 
they will continue to keep that thousand more when the SNP came to power, 
they’re not going to cut the police force because we’re reducing reoffending. The 
police will do other things, you know, they will use their time to good value in a 
very positive way…” [CJA Chief Officer]  
None of the individual factors that make quantification difficult are unique to 
Scottish community justice, but what is probably close to unique is their confluence 
– in a multi-agency, cross-sector, locally organised and variable, and legally 




Austerity formed the backdrop to much of the discussion; the financial pressure of 
spending cuts was keenly felt in community justice as in other services. This was set 
against the enormous cost of offending, and particularly imprisonment, to the 
public purse; the significantly lower cost of community sentences was often invoked 
as an important advantage of it. Although more secure than most public services 
because of ring-fenced funding, CJSW is still feeling the pressure of budget cuts. 
TSOs are in a more precarious position, often having to spend time securing 
contracts and other funding sources which are now harder to find than before.  
On a larger scale, it was austerity that led the Scottish government to attempt to 
reorient public services towards prevention rather than reaction, an approach with 
clear social and financial advantages.722 Although not a ‘primary’ prevention 
service, community justice performs secondary and tertiary prevention functions. 
As part of local authority social services it has inevitably been affected by the shift in 
thinking towards prevention. In some areas (at individual local authorities’ 
discretion) it will also be affected structurally by the integration of health and social 
care.  
The research has also highlighted epistemological problems to do with budgets and 
prevention. Practitioners described how the Scottish Government’s attempt to find a 
‘unit cost’ for community sentences was seriously hindered by the diverse 
conditions of Scotland’s local authorities. A different quantification problem is 
found in the counterfactual nature of prevention policies, particularly in relation to 
offending, whose cost is not only high but also widely spread because of its 
connection to a wide range of social problems.  
Financial concerns related not only to quantities of money available but also the 
inflexibility of its allocation. At present the use of ring-fenced funding is highly 
circumscribed by legal requirements and by the short-term system of allocation 
(with knock-on effects for third-sector providers, through the contracting system). 
                                                     




Legal requirements on providers will remain, and it is unlikely that budgets will 
increase significantly, but the problem is likely to be partly alleviated by the 
introduction of a longer funding cycle as part of the redesign. 
 
6. Experiences of the Redesign and Transition 
Interviewees described the process of developing the new community justice system 
as unusually long and costly, with implications for the continued operation of the 
current system. Although this was a source of frustration, interviewees (particularly 
those from CJAs) also described their own significant efforts to ensure that the 
transition to the new system would proceed with as little disruption as possible. 
They described an uncertain future, both in terms of the little detail then available 
about the structure of the new system and in some cases the effects on them 
personally. 
The Redesign Consultation – A Drawn-Out and Costly Process 
The redesign has been a long process, and for most of this time, the system has 
operated in awareness that CJAs will be abolished, creating particular pressures and 
concerns. The new system will not fully replace the old one until April 2017, and the 
amount of time spent in consultation was described as a distraction from the ‘core 
business’ of CJAs and community justice in general, as well as a significant 
additional cost at a time of financial pressure. 
“It’s just sort of gone on and on, really. I mean it’s amazing to think that it 
was April 2012, I think, Angiolini first made that recommendation… I think 
it’s just dragged and dragged.” 
“It’s been a long time, it’s been at times a distraction, you know, the process 
is long, that’s in the nature of bureaucracy I suppose… it has taken a lot of 
energy from all the partners to be part of that consultation process, it has 
taken a lot of time, and that sometimes has made that look like the front-end 
business, instead of what is the front-end business…” 
 “The actual redesign project was initially presented to us as a zero-budget 
exercise, well I mean I just think that’s a total joke, because now there’s 
something like eight work streams, all working on the redesign, and the 
230 
 
amount of officer time, you know, if you actually costed all the meetings so 
far, all the consultation papers, all the consultation responses, the meetings, 
attendance at events, you know, if you added that up for government, CJAs, 
all partners, it’d be millions of pounds already – it’s crazy! And I think that’s 
the – so, is it taking up lots of time? Yes. It is taking up time constructively? 
Not really.” [All CJA Chief Officers] 
The length of time involved was described as disruptive as well as wasteful. By 
keeping the CJAs operating in the shadow of abolition for this long, the redesign 
process was putting the expertise built up within them at risk. Innovative 
approaches developed by CJAs were also at risk, as the Chief Officers interviewed 
saw little point in starting new projects and aimed instead to ensure existing ones 
were ended or transferred safely to CPPs. 
“I think we’re having a kind of phoney period. I think it’s unfortunate that 
they’re taking so long to kill off the CJAs, and I think what’s going to happen 
is across the country, is exactly what’s happened with [our Chief Officer] – 
you know, people who are not wanting to be unemployed, who have talents, 
will go off and find other work... I think they’d be much better if it had been 
a shorter period.” [Director of social work] 
The consultation itself was described as well-run, but also as a site of political 
compromise and conflict between local and national government (see Chapter 6, 
Section 4). Engagement with the consultation was sometimes highlighted as 
inconsistent or lacking in some areas – a function of the varying ability of different 
organisations to become involved and make their views known. Responses, 
particularly attendance at consultation events, were dominated by local authority 
social work departments, although the civil servant interviewee emphasised that 
this was less true of the second round of consultation. 
“I don’t think you can blame the civil servants for the consultation process. I 
think the Scottish Government ran the consultation process really well. What 
has been less well done is the response of the public sector more widely.” 
[CJA Chief Officer] 
“[I]f you look at the number of people that attended those consultation 
groups, they were packed by local authority. They had a three-line whip. 
Every community justice social worker was out there. Every social work 
manager, everybody that they could mobilise. I would think on average – I 




people from any other sector than community justice social work in any of 
those consultation meetings. And if you look at the responses you’ll find the 
same sort of thing… absolutely flooded by community justice social work 
[sic] and local authorities saying “what we want is more power to 
community justice social work”! Ha, really? You know? They’re by far the 
biggest group and they can mobilise the greatest, but does that count as… I 
don’t know, does that count as consultation? I’m not sure… I mean 
organisations like ourselves, we can’t send – you know, I mean, I would 
have gone and in my own time effectively, because we can’t afford to send 
people. I haven’t got staff to send to these things.” [Third sector manager] 
As the third-sector manager explained with some indignation, this put TSOs in 
particular at a disadvantage, their marginalisation extending from everyday 
partnership work to matters of policy. 
Through the Transition: Maintaining Service, Retaining Knowledge, 
Handing Over 
Although many details of the redesign were not finalised at the time of the 
fieldwork, most practitioner interviewees had given thought to the transition 
process and some had already carried out preparatory work. Government policy, as 
well as the accounts of the practitioners interviewed for this project, emphasised the 
importance of managing the transition in a way that minimised uncertainty and 
avoided repeating the sort of hasty compromise implicated in the structural flaws of 
the CJAs and their difficult early years. 
“I think people found the CJAs quite difficult to establish in the early period, 
they were set up, as you probably know, as autonomous organisations 
separate from government, separate from local government, but I don’t think 
they really established themselves until probably their second or third year 
in… there were some changes in staff during years 1 and 2, which I don’t 
think helped either, a couple of Chief Officers left quite early with health 
problems. I think they found it quite stressful in the early days just trying to 
establish their organisations.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
Concerns about the transition were informed by the sense that the CJAs had had 
some successes, and that the new system should build on this legacy rather than 
starting from scratch. One key area of concern about the transition itself was the 
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possibility of maintaining levels of service throughout the process; partner 
disengagement (see Section 4) was seen as a particular risk to this. 
“We’ve, during this period we have set up the PSPs, we’ve set up [various 
projects], you know, we’re doing a lot of work, and everybody is coming to 
that work with a sense of “This doesn’t have a start point at 2016, this is 
what we’re doing in [CJA area] and if the hands on the tiller change slightly, 
well, the hands on the tiller change, but this is where we’re going.” 
“And have you found your own work changing, in terms of making preparations? 
We’ve actually been busier! Couple of risks involved here. One risk is that 
people take their eye off the ball and think “it’s OK, CJAs are gone, the 
argument around local social work has been won”, for example, we don’t 
really need to bother with all of that. My experience is that’s not happened. 
People still understand we’ve got to deliver our statutory obligations until 
such times as they change. We’ve got to keep our eye on performance – we 
can’t allow reform to detract from the focus on performance… I think it’s 
going to be more important over the next eighteen months that that 
partnership engagement continues and doesn’t dwindle.”  [both CJA Chief 
Officers] 
The bipartite aspect of CJA planning cycles, which involve a strategic Area Plan 
every three years (the most recent being 2014-17) alongside yearly plans, added to 
the need for a carefully managed transition, particularly before it became clear that 
the new system would not be fully in place until 2017. One of the main new 
responsibilities for local partnerships will be the development of local “reducing 
reoffending outcome improvement plans”, similar to CJA plans but on a smaller 
scale. Therefore, the successful alignment of CJA and new local plans and priorities 
was key – and CJAs are in a good position to support the transition by working with 
partners and instilling awareness and knowledge of community justice issues. The 
2016-17 ‘shadow year’, in which both systems run in parallel, was instituted for this 
purpose. CPPs have been the subject of concerns over their effectiveness and their 
dominance by local authorities (Chapter 6, Section 4),723 and have never held 
community justice responsibilities, remaining similar in approach to CJAs but 
separate from them.724 At the time of the fieldwork, CJA interviewees referred to 
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strengthening their relationship with CPPs – this still largely applies to the new 
local partnerships. 
 “In terms of restructuring we have, at a local level we have, we’ve enhanced 
work – upped our game in terms of a dialogue with Community Planning, 
to make sure that we’re really close, that the CJA area plan and the Single 
Outcome Agreement from the CPP are saying the same thing. That’s the 
critical thing, that actually – you look at one, you’re looking at both.” [CJA 
Chief Officer] 
As well as the shadow year, the Scottish Government has also reallocated the £1.6m 
annual CJA budget to transitional funding, providing £50,000 to each local authority 
– although since the fieldwork was carried out, one CJA Convenor has described 
this as insufficient.725 One aspect of CJAs that was seen as successful was the 
development of innovative practice and specialist knowledge; research and 
evidence-based practice were also viewed as vital to community justice in general 
(Section 3). As well as administrative support, many interviewees emphasised the 
importance of retaining the knowledge and expertise developed within CJAs 
through the transition, rather than allowing them to be lost as staff departed; this 
was particularly keenly felt because of the effect of even minor turnover on such 
small organisations. 
“As a CJA we have three full-time equivalent staff. If somebody goes it’s a 
huge dent, so we have to think about that kind of continuity planning with 
our partners. So if we lost somebody, how would we manage that? Because 
the closer we get to 2016, the harder it would be to recruit somebody… So 
what would you do? And that’s a lot of expertise you lose as well, you 
know, you couldn’t just bring somebody in cold, so it’s about sharing 
resources.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
“The real risk is that you actually lose what you’ve got with CJAs because of 
their insecurity about their jobs, and you lose the intelligence and the 
knowledge. If that’s not retained, that’s a risk to us in terms of the timescale 
from it.” [Director of social work] 
Interviewees generally agreed that the efforts to prepare CPPs for the transition 
were valuable. However, the work of preparing for the transition and attempting to 
make it a smooth process, inevitably distracted to some extent from the main 
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business of the CJAs and their efforts to develop innovative practice, and all this 
was exacerbated further by the length of time involved in the consultation and 
transition. 
Uncertain Futures 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the length of the consultation, interviewees often 
discussed a sense of uncertainty about both the new system and the futures of some 
people working in the current one. CJA staff, particularly Chief Officers, were aware 
they would lose their jobs. They seemed to take a stoical view of this as far as they 
themselves were concerned, but practitioners often expressed concern on other 
people’s behalf, especially Chief Officers on behalf of their staff. The concern with 
making the transition smoother extended to personnel issues – interviewees 
described meetings scheduled between CJAs and the Scottish Government, and 
between CJAs and local authorities, to discuss and clarify the future prospects of 
CJA staff (whose exact employment arrangements vary between CJA areas). Some 
Chief Officers had set up arrangements to incentivise their staff to stay in post until 
the transition was complete, or to make it easier for them to find work after leaving. 
This appeared to be motivated partly by a sense that individual staff members held 
valuable knowledge and expertise as well as being vital links in partnership 
arrangements. 
“I think as I said before the transition has gone from kind of a quiet murmur 
to something more prominent and it’s started to touch people’s lives as well, 
so you have to be alert to the sensitivities of things like people, and jobs, and 
mortgages… You know, there are people who the change is a worrying 
thing. So from that point of view it’s become a bigger chunk and a bigger 
focus and it’s harder to keep that just in a manageable piece somewhere... 
We’re not a big force, across the eight CJAs we’re two dozen people, it’s not 
a huge staff resource, but where will people go? Should we be helping them 
out the door now to other jobs? We’re doing a little bit of that but that has a 
knock-on effect because we still have a job to do until 2016. Is there a place 
for them in the local work that’s going to happen? Is there a place for them in 
the national body? We don’t know. So we’re working with government on 
that” 
“Other CJAs don’t have the same arrangements as us, however, around [this 




their staff begin to leave the closer you get to reform. And as I’ve said, three 
full-time equivalent staff in each CJA, you get one person leaving 
undermines the capacity of the CJA – you got two leaving, you’re in trouble. 
So, would you be able to fulfil your statutory obligations? Well, maybe not. 
So there’s a real resilience challenge there, but each CJA’s responsible for 
taking that forward on their own.” [both CJA Chief Officers] 
The government has aimed to reassure and inform staff members through a series of 
meetings, and forestall a disruptive exodus from CJAs. This seemed to have been 
successful at the time of the fieldwork, but recently evidence has emerged of an 
unexpectedly protracted period of uncertainty about CJA staff employment before 
the confirmation that at least some will be made compulsorily redundant, 
prompting concern over the loss of specialist knowledge that this would entail.726 
Interviewees expressed uncertainty over the detail of the new model, still under 
development at the time. Although all agreed the CJA system was deeply flawed 
and should be replaced, interviewees exhibited mixed feelings on the new system. 
There was qualified optimism about the new model’s emphasis on research, local 
delivery and partnership, and about the potential for combining the best features of 
local and national delivery (Chapter 6, Section 4), but it was recognised that the 
redesign was not a major conceptual step forward, and, in compromising between 
local and national interests, could be repeating the mistakes of the past.  
“We like the relationship between research and practice in there – I think 
that’s important. We like the fact that there is an intention, somewhere, to 
hold local authorities to account. The problem that we see in it is that it’s one 
of these high-minded, idealistic pieces of work where you think “and then 
the miracle starts here”” [Third sector manager] 
“they seem to be making a lot of the same mistakes again, you know, about 
trying to fudge things and keep everybody happy, and have national and 
local and you think, well, I think the government might just want a national 
service but COSLA are going to want a local arrangement, so they’re trying 
to do it all, and I think it’s still very unclear how that’ll actually be better…” 
[CJA Chief Officer] 
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Practitioners emphasised the uncertainty which continued to surround the redesign 
at the time of the fieldwork; that this persisted even after such a long period of 
development was a particular source of frustration. 
“[I]t’s really gone on for like two and a half years already and we’re still 
waiting for a government response, a sort of definitive response, so that 
experience has not been great.” [CJA Chief Officer]  
“I think there’s a long discussion yet to be had. I mean, I think that all that 
we’ve got is a very brief pen picture of that centralised body… the degree of 
influence, and power, and reach, into local delivery mechanisms has yet 
actually to be fully articulated by Scottish Government, frankly.” [Director of 
social work] 
There was qualified optimism but not certainty about the capability of the system to 
make structural and practice improvements. Although certainly possible, these are 
in many cases not certain, and the new system is likely to have structural problems 
of its own – especially the creation of more local partnership bodies which is likely 
to complicate and hinder partnership working.  
Discussion 
The redesign and transition process has been unusually lengthy, involving many 
organisations over several long stages. This was probably intended to avoid the 
rushed decision-making that hindered the development of CJAs, but the length of 
time involved was itself a source of frustration and concern. From 2012, but 
especially from the second stage of the consultation (which confirmed CJAs would 
be abolished, but not until 2017), the CJAs have been in a ‘Phoney War’ – under 
pressure to maintain levels of service, but increasingly hindered by the 
disengagement of partner organisations, and by having to spend time and resources 
on attempting to smooth the transition to the new structures – and as noted in 
Chapter 7 (Section 2), a smooth transition could also have disadvantages. 
There was a deep sense of uncertainty about the redesign process – partly 
concerning personal futures and job prospects after the abolition of the CJAs, but 
tending to focus more on the lack of available detail about the new model at the 




much of this has since become more definite). As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, much of the discussion of the new system instead turned on political 
aspects of it. These included the complex dynamics of local and national delivery 
and governance as well as a sense that there needed to be a major cultural and 
political change in Scottish criminal justice and public policy, which the redesign 
cannot provide. 
7. Conclusion: Structure and Practice 
This chapter has considered a range of aspects of practitioner discourse around 
community justice, drawing mainly on interviews with community justice 
practitioners from the public and third sectors. This part of the research was focused 
on practitioner views of the current system and of particular aspects of community 
justice practice, and how these both relate to the restructuring of the system. 
All interviewees agreed that the CJA system was deeply constitutionally flawed as a 
result of awkward compromise between local and national government, and would 
have to change – although CJAs had had some successes, and appeared in the last 
five years to have made progress towards professionalisation and the development 
of distinctive contributions. The perceived overlooked successes of CJAs tended to 
centre on two practice values which were emphasised throughout the interviews – 
research and innovative practice, and partnership working. Research and evidence-
based policy and practice was highly valued, not just as a valuable tool for 
allocating resources and developing policy, but also – in the case of TSOs – as key to 
securing the contracts necessary to their continued operation. Practitioners were 
keen for research to play a greater role in the new arrangements, particularly 
through the integration of desistance approaches into community justice practices, 
although there is no necessary relationship between desistance approaches and the 
structure of the new system. 
Inter-agency partnership working was seen as vital, due to the wide range of 
criminogenic and other needs exhibited by offenders on community sentences. 
Partnership working seems to be a balance between, and a development from, the 
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generic approach traditional in Scottish social work and an acknowledgment of the 
value of specialist expertise, and as such is not straightforward, with interviewees 
reporting a number of problems which appear to be common to justice partnerships 
across the UK. These include cultural differences between partner agencies as well 
as conflicts of aims – both between the aims of different partners and between short-
term (and often mandatory) goals and the higher aims of the partnership. In this 
context, third-sector providers were seen as having particular value because of their 
position outside the public sector – however, this was balanced by a sense that they 
were not considered ‘full’ partners and were sidelined in partnership discussions. 
Despite efforts to develop formal structures to facilitate and reinforce partnership 
working, this research suggests that community justice partnerships in Scotland are 
fragile – dependent less on good structures than on informal interpersonal 
connections, and prone to major disruption from staff turnover or restructuring in 
other organisations. Although not unique to Scotland, these are intensified by the 
composition of Scotland’s community justice field, which as Angiolini noted 
contains many very small organisations from various spheres of public service and 
local government.727 
A context of public sector spending cuts across the UK formed a major contingent 
factor in community justice practice, which occupies an unusual position in this 
regard because of ring-fenced CJSW funding (which can also have a negative effect 
on partnership working). Despite ring-fencing, budget pressures are keenly felt in 
Scottish community justice, with interviewees describing concerns about quantities 
of money but also about attempts to find funding that was long-term enough to 
allow a degree of flexibility. In the context of a wider effort to reorient public 
services to a prevention approach, the immense, wide-ranging cost of offending 
(and reoffending) was recognised as a problem which the practice of community 
justice could help to mitigate, but also an area in which quantification of costs and 
savings was almost intractably difficult, potentially presenting challenges to the 
                                                     




prevention agenda as a whole. Although the community justice redesign will 
probably introduce some more budgetary flexibility, budgets are unlikely to 
increase significantly. 
The restructuring process was fraught with concern for many interviewees. The 
length of the consultation has created a long interregnum in which the progress of 
CJAs was halted while uncertainty prevailed and partners began to lose interest. 
Despite this, practitioners were working hard to ensure that the transition, when it 
happened, would be as smooth as possible. There was cautious optimism about the 
community justice redesign, and a sense that it would help to resolve some 
structural problems, promote better partnership working and bring more focus to 
research-led practice and policy. However, the extent to which the new system will 
be able to actually fulfil these promises is bound up with political questions to do 
with power dynamics between local and national government and the enduring 












Chapter 5 considered various practical dimensions of community justice, drawing 
mainly on interviews with practitioners to consider dimensions of community 
justice practice in the current system and their relationship to the redesign. These 
included the enormous value placed on research-led practice and on successful 
partnership working. There was also a widely-held view that Community Justice 
Authorities (CJAs) were hampered by intrinsic structural flaws born of hasty 
compromise around the 2005 Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act – although 
practitioners also emphasised that criticism of CJAs sometimes overlooked their 
partial successes. Insufficient and inflexibly allocated funding was seen as a major 
constraint on community justice practice, especially in the context of spending cuts 
imposed by the Westminster government from 2010. Finally, it considered 
practitioners’ experience of the redesign process itself. This was seen as a drawn-
out, disruptive and costly process, and one marked by uncertainty about the new 
system itself and the personal futures of some people working in community justice. 
The practical issues to do with the restructuring of community justice in Scotland 
are only part of the story. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the policy is bound up 
in various ways with political concerns. Like other government policies, it is subject 
to Parliamentary discussions and conflict between political parties, particularly 
during the legislative process. One important political aspect, specific to Scotland’s 
‘generic social work’ structure, is the overlap between community justice and local 
government, which brings local government into Scotland’s penal field. The Scottish 
system of local government is geographically diverse and politically powerful, 
particularly through its representative body COSLA. Like previous restructurings in 
1998 and 2005-07, the current redesign has involved a compromise between local 
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and national government, and many interviewees emphasised the importance of 
ensuring that the new system could balance both local and national needs. In 
addition, there was significant comment, some of it highly critical, on the power 
held by Scotland’s local authorities. 
The politicians interviewed for this study included three Members of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSPs) who all had some involvement or interest in community justice 
policy in Scotland. One important limitation was that it was not possible to discuss 
their views on the legislative process leading up to the 2016 Community Justice 
(Scotland) Act, as this process was not yet underway at the time. There were also 
three local councillors from three different local authorities, who were serving as 
elected members of two different CJAs. Although the CJA role was only a small part 
of their everyday work, they provided complementary perspectives to those of the 
CJA staff who, although not the CJA’s official members, do most of its actual work. 
The politicians who were interviewed came from three different parties, and 
included supporters and opponents of Scottish independence. As in Chapter 5, 
direct quotes are used extensively throughout; my own questions and interjections 
are denoted by italic text. 
One notable difference between the politicians (CJA elected members and MSPs) 
and the practitioner interviewees in the project was an epistemological one. 
Although most interviewees emphasised the value of evidence and research in 
formulating practice and policy (Chapter 5, Section 3), politicians – whose jobs are 
unlikely to leave them time to do their own research or to peruse research findings 
at any length – tended also to describe gaining their awareness and knowledge of 
the issues around community justice largely through “learning by meeting”,728 from 
advice by expert practitioners and sometimes academics and especially from visits 
to projects involved with providing services to offenders. 
“I think sometimes MSPs are so busy running around doing things that they 
don’t really know what’s happening, so if you can say to them, in their 
                                                     




village or their constituency, “Did you know that there was X amount of 
violent reoffenders and X amount of prolific offenders”, and they’re 
horrified and they want to know what we’re doing to address it.” [CJA 
elected member] 
These ‘fact-finding’ visits were described as ways of learning about the difficulties 
faced by offenders, and about ways in which different parts of the criminal justice 
system were succeeding and failing. CJA elected members also described this type 
of activity as a valuable part of their induction to the role. 
“And I visited the women’s centre recently, and it’s just new but they’re 
starting to make inroads, because for many of these women there’s a lot of 
challenges in their life, they lead very chaotic lives, so the system that they 
have there is a good, and they’re starting to get results there, so that’s good. 
So yeah, I agree with the [Angiolini] report.” [CJA elected member] 
“I was in Barlinnie about five months ago, and the officer on the gantry, one 
of the prison officers, he was telling me that a prisoner released at Barlinnie 
is given a coupon, if they don’t have a house to go to, they’re given a coupon 
which guarantees them three nights’ lodgings in a sleeping bag on the floor 
of a homeless persons’ unit. That’s not conducive to making sure they don’t 
reoffend. So very often prisoners just throw that in the bin and on day one, 
they just exist off the fat of the land, and then we’re surprised when they get 
arrested again.” [MSP] 
One third-sector manager expressed cynicism about this tendency: 
“We do lots of mentoring, most of our services are built around mentoring 
but I can’t find anywhere from the Scottish Government that actually points 
from research to that decision. I think that decision is made on the back of 
whatever the Justice Secretary happens to have heard last – says he, being 
slightly injudicious! – or what some group have basically decided is the 
model they wanted to push.” [third sector manager] 
As this quote suggests, this tendency can conflict with the needs of policy being 
informed by empirical evidence and research. However, many politicians 
interviewed also emphasised the importance of some documentary sources – the 
Angiolini and Audit Scotland reports.  




Politicians in the study seemed to describe a process of ‘epistemological bricolage’ – 
combining information from various different sources (documents, advice, 
experiences) based more on availability than epistemological value.729 
Where Chapter 5 considered structural flaws in the CJA system from a practice 
perspective, this chapter draws on other insights from within CJAs to consider their 
operation as political institutions, and the extent to which they have succeeded as 
democratic institutions. There follows some discussion of accountability – 
interviewees generally agreed with Audit Scotland’s assessment that there was an 
accountability problem with the CJA system, 730 and emphasised that the new 
system would have to ‘disentangle’ the lines of accountability. There was also a 
sense that accountability mechanisms were implicated in power relations between 
local and central government, and this was a further area of concern about the 
community justice redesign. 
Another, more abstract aspect of the political discourse around community justice 
had to do with purposes. Interviewees emphasised the value of an effective and 
high-profile community justice system not just in delivering sentences but also in 
preventing crime, dealing with other social problems and generally articulating a 
welfarist, desistance-oriented approach to offending, of the sort sometimes 
described as distinctively Scottish. However, interviewees from all roles emphasised 
the existence of a major obstacle to this agenda – a lack of knowledge about, and 
interest in, community justice and the structures involved in delivering it. This 
included a deficit of public legitimacy as well as a lack of political interest. In places 
there were also instances within interviews in which politicians’ misconceptions 
about the community justice system became clear.  
2. Democracy and Consensus in the CJAs 
Where Chapter 5 (Section 2) considered the well-documented and much-discussed 
structural failings of CJAs as community justice organisations, this section considers 
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their workings as institutions of local democracy. As discussed further in Chapter 2, 
the official membership of a CJA comprises one or more councillors from each of its 
constituent local authorities, who vote on the CJA’s regular spending plans. CJA 
meetings are nominally open to the public, and many CJA documents are published 
online.731 However, CJAs’ appear to have had little actual success as democratic 
institutions, and the discussions with elected members in particular give some 
insight into this. Much of this failure likely stems from the lack of public and 
political interest in community justice in general and CJAs in particular (Section 6), 
but there are also specific structural features of CJAs which undermine their ability 
to function well as democratic institutions.  
Seeking Consensus 
Various mechanisms have developed which serve to generate informal consensus, 
and it is this rather than political discussion and debate which sets the tone for most 
CJA business. 
“Actually at the Board meeting – it’s usually, in all the time I’ve been at the 
board meetings we haven’t really had a vote… It’s always been done by 
consensus and we’ve all more or less agreed with maybe just little 
adjustments to things, we’ve never actually had to come to a vote, which is 
very good.” [CJA elected member] 
Despite the representation of opposing parties on CJA boards, and a febrile political 
atmosphere in the run-up to the independence referendum,732 disagreement and 
conflict on party lines was described as rare, and the relationships between elected 
members as convivial.  
“[A]ctually, the CJA has been very apolitical, I’d say. Including the National 
Convenors’ Group, where all the Convenors meet together, and they’re all 
different political parties, and you’ll get a bit of light-hearted ribbing, in the 
run-up to elections and the run-up to the referendum, obviously, you got 
folk coming in with a big ‘No Thanks’ badge and a big ‘Yes’ badge and so 
on, but actually it’s all quite light-hearted. So we haven’t really had any 
political difficulties, and I don’t know if other CJAs are the same or not, but 
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we’ve had all parties around the table and politics aren’t really something 
that’s mentioned.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
In fact, party loyalties were sometimes described, counterintuitively, as a factor 
militating against, rather than for, political conflict – by producing a situation in 
which small-scale disagreements between individuals would be likely to escalate 
into party disagreements. 
“sometimes if we were not to come to a consensus, if we were to vote, we’d 
have to vote on party lines and that would mean [my party] and the 
Convenor being defeated. So it’s in my interests to have a consensus.” 
“I usually agree a line with [our Chief Officer] that we’re taking, in 
conjunction with the leader of the council here, who’s the same… the 
administration here, and put that input in. So it’s not necessarily my ideas, 
it’s sometimes a hybrid of ideas or a consensus of ideas between what the 
information we get from [our Chief Officer], our criminal justice social work 
person here, what my political party say and what we think as an 
administration.” [both CJA elected members] 
Elected members generally have relatively little knowledge or expertise about 
community justice, so are in practice dependent on CJA staff, who prepare spending 
plans and assist the elected members in working out consensus behind the scenes. 
Resources and Conflict 
Despite the emphasis on consensus-building and the avoidance of open political 
conflict, arguments could still take place; as Goodman et al. noted, “while periods of 
relatively less explosive conflict appear on the surface as consensus… these 
moments are characterized simply by quieter conflicts.”733 Although party loyalties 
did not militate against consensus, members’ loyalties to their areas could be a 
factor in arguments over the allocation of section 27 funding.734 Pressured and 
inflexible budgets (Chapter 5, Section 5) were also implicated in this. 
“[S]ometime before the financial year it has to be agreed, and that sometimes 
causes a conflict between the five members, because the chap in the [rural 
area] always thinks that they’re getting hard done to, because they’re not 
getting enough to cover these time-space elements. And [an urban] Council 
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have got a big volume because they’re a big town and they are the ones with 
the court… So [the urban council] will then argue ‘we need more money to 
address the issues that happen in court etc.’” 
“I mean there was one issue that [one rural member council], they felt they 
weren’t getting allocated enough money, that was the first meeting I went 
then... the colleague from the [rural council], he must have been primed to 
ask why they’re not getting enough money, you know? And he was kind of 
just banging the table, making his point forcibly, and I was sitting there, 
well, what’s fair and what’s not fair, you know? Hadn’t been, hadn’t had any 
background so it’s issues like that can catch you out, so, he never got his 
extra money but… But I think that arguments on that can come to the fore, 
then there’s last year, I think, or earlier this year I should say, or round about 
summertime there were an issue, [urban council] had an issue as well about 
not getting some money, not enough money to do some project or something 
like that. Well, I think that wasn’t quite as bad as the first time, you know, 
but it’s only two times that issues like that have been raised at an open 
meeting, you know. I think, by and by I think we… things are usually 
amicably resolved before people start falling out…” [both CJA elected 
members] 
The difficulty of getting elected members to prioritise CJA interests over those of 
their local areas was criticised at the time CJAs were developed, and it continues to 
be seen as another fundamental structural flaw in the system – and a further source 
of frustration for Chief Officers.735  
“we got new board members, we used to give them induction training, we 
used to do it jointly with local authorities, and we made it clear that 
although they were nominated by local authorities to sit on the board, they 
weren’t there to represent the interest of the local authorities, and that they 
should see themselves as being independent members appointed to hold the 
CJA to account, not to represent the interests of… But that, to be honest with 
you, that message was quite difficult to get through, and I’m not sure, even 
[some] years in, that I’ve been successful with that. In fact, I know I probably 
haven’t been successful!” [CJA Chief Officer] 
However, arguments over funding were described as rare, and the general picture 
was one of political consensus and cooperation between elected members, CJA staff 
and others. One result of this is that although CJAs’ power to reallocate funding was 
intended to reduce historic inequities between areas, the system has largely 
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functioned to preserve them, particularly in the context of ongoing budget 
pressures. 
“And also getting councillors from different local authorities to sit around 
the table and expecting them to then begin to look at an overall picture, and 
some of them to be offering some of their resources to others, was never ever 
going to work, so you were never going to get any redistribution, so I think 
although in theory they have these huge budgets, the headroom for actually 
making change in how those budgets are spent has been absolutely tiny.” 
[Third sector manager] 
“real life is that people don’t act in a fair and rational way, and somebody 
comes along and says “well actually you should be losing that money 
because it’d be fair to the other local authority who did it”, they’re not going 
to say “oh right enough, so it is”, you’re going to make all the arguments to 
retain the money you’ve got because services are stretched anyway, it’s not 
as if anybody’s sitting on a pot of money.” [social work manager] 
One unusual structural aspect of CJAs is their inconsistency in how membership is 
allocated. Some, such as Northern CJA, have one member from each local authority 
while others, including Tayside and Lanarkshire CJAs, have two or three from each. 
Only one (Fife and Forth Valley CJA) uses any type of weighting by population, 
with more populous areas accorded greater representation. Although the equal 
representation of areas was described as helpful in preventing more populous areas 
dominating CJA agendas, it reduces further the capacity of CJAs and their staff to 
make changes in how funding is allocated. 
“one of the things that [this Chief Officer]’s aspired to, and has singularly 
failed – and it’s all our fault – is to shift the thinking around non-core 
funding to current needs rather than historical allocation. But of course we 
as local authorities resist that.” [social work manager] 
One limitation of this insight into the democratic workings of CJAs is that the 
elected members interviewed constitute only a small sample – three out of a total of 
over fifty across Scotland. Furthermore, all three were Convenors or Vice Convenors 
and thus more likely to take a serious interest in community justice and the CJA, as 




meetings with Chief Officers, the CJA Conveners Group and other organisations).736 
Morrison’s findings on elected members suggest that while Convenors and Vice 
Convenors tend to be seen by others sitting on the CJA as proactive and informed, 
other elected members may be less well-informed and more likely to attempt to 
promote ‘penal populist’ agendas.737 However, not only did none of the elected 
member interviewees in this study express such a view, there was no reference to 
any others doing so either.  
As with the discussion of CJAs’ limited effects on community justice practice, the 
accounts of CJAs’ functioning as democratic institutions portrayed them as 
structurally ill-suited to make substantive change. In particular, the conflicting 
loyalties of elected members mean CJAs’ serve to preserve rather than reduce the 
budgetary inequalities between their constituent local areas. As in other ways, 
(Chapter 5, Section 2) the structure of CJAs has prevented them from exerting any 
real power. 
Discussion 
As a venue of democracy, the CJA is an interesting counterpoint to national 
parliaments, where struggles over criminal justice policy have sometimes been 
divisive along party lines (although less so now than in the ‘detartanising’ period 
immediately after devolution).738 The introduction of elected politicians to this part 
of the justice system does not appear to have brought penal populism with it, but 
has created other problems – in particular, elected members’ loyalties to their local 
authorities have tended to produce defensiveness about resource allocation.739 CJAs 
operate as consensus-finding organisations, which partly accords with the 
deliberative democracy scholarship’s advocacy of a policymaking process which 
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sets aside political divisions in favour of finding common ground and working 
towards mutually acceptable solutions.740  
However, this consensus is developed not in the public eye but ‘behind the scenes’ 
through informal communications between elected members, Chief Officers and 
members of partner organisations. Even if citizens did attend CJA meetings –
unlikely given that these meetings are hardly publicised, and there is a widespread 
and longstanding lack of public knowledge of and interest in community justice 
(Section 6) – they would likely find them dully technocratic affairs in which most 
matters of importance had already been agreed. Although structural flaws had 
prevented CJAs succeeding as democratic institutions, a few interviewees raised the 
compelling idea that they were a step towards resolving some complex questions 
about the political structure of community justice: 
“[I]t’s really complicated, the role of politicians in the justice system is not an 
easily answered question. It’s not an easily answered challenge, if you like, 
so I think Community Justice Authorities have at least road-tested what the 
role of local elected members could be in justice and what that interface 
between democracy and the justice system should look like in the future… 
So I think it’s a road test for the future rather than saying they had all the 
answers. The constitutional tensions around democracy and the 
underpinnings of the justice system have not really been fully reconciled 
through the CJA process. We’ve strayed into that territory but still got a wee 
bit to go to make sure the lessons have been learned and responded to in the 
future.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
By implication, the new system is also only another step towards resolving these 
questions, not a conclusive answer. By moving from a regional to a local framework, 
the new system eliminates political conflict and compromise between local areas. 
Low levels of participation and transparency are already well-documented 
problems for other local partnerships and planning bodies, and (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) the new community justice system is being kept completely separate 
from the community empowerment agenda, and hence is unlikely to make 
significant gains in terms of democratic discussion and civic engagement. 
                                                     




3. Accountability Past and Future 
Accountability was another commonly discussed theme among both practitioners 
and interested politicians, as well as being an important characteristic of democratic 
institutions. However, there is relatively little agreement about the meaning of the 
term.741 In developing a “minimal conceptual consensus”,742 Bovens et al. describe 
accountability as a virtue – a property of well-governed public organisations – and 
as a mechanism – a system or systems by which people and/or organisations can be 
required to give an account of their actions, which in turn can (if necessary) be 
called into question, and judgment rendered (if necessary) on the party being held 
to account. This second meaning is required if any organisation can possess the first.  
Much like research-based practice and partnership working (Chapter 5, Sections 3 
and 4), accountability (in both senses) was highly valued. It was also tied into 
structural questions about the development of the new community justice system, 
and hence to potential political conflict and compromise between local and national 
government.  
Barriers to Accountability 
The position of accountability in the CJAs is complex. The presence of local 
councillors was intended to add an element of electoral accountability; in theory, an 
elected member who had failed to fulfil their duties could be held accountable by 
being voted out. In reality, electoral accountability is already a weak form with 
limited scope,743 and there is so little public awareness of or interest in CJAs that it’s 
unlikely that elected members would ever be held to account in this way. CJAs were 
also meant to be accountable to the Scottish Government, but as the 2012 Audit 
Scotland report noted, there has never been systematic assessment of their 
effectiveness.744 
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 “[I]t’s about what performance information you can bring together in a way 
that’s going to facilitate scrutiny – scrutiny of community justice.” [CJA 
Chief Officer] 
The lack of evaluation of CJAs, Audit Scotland argued, made it difficult to 
determine their contribution to reducing reoffending.745 Partly for this reason, a 
national performance framework for community justice is being developed as part 
of the redesign policy.746 However, it was the failure of the CJA as an accountability 
“principal”747 (a body that could hold others to account) that attracted most 
attention. The CJAs have never used their power to hold local authorities or SPS to 
account, and the main reason for this was an institutional design which meant any 
attempt to use this power would always conflict with the need for good working 
relationships. In addition, and as noted by the civil servant interviewee, the 
accountability structure of CJAs is a complex one in which lines of accountability 
diverge and sometimes cross each other; even organisations that are accountable to 
the CJA also have lines of accountability leading elsewhere.748 The occupational 
backgrounds of CJA staff, particularly in their early years of operation, and the 
conflicting loyalties of local councillors (Section 2), may have been a further barrier 
to the CJAs’ ability to hold CJSW to account.  
“when the CJAs were established there was quite a large influence on the 
CJAs – many of the staff employed initially and to this day are former social 
workers. So there was that sort of, while it’s good in terms of internal 
delivery for the social work services, there can perhaps possibly be a conflict 
of interest between the independence of the CJAs from community justice 
social work departments within the local authorities.” [CJA Staff] 
“It could have been better in terms of accountability, I think again that was, 
that was probably a fault in the design of our boards, again with it being 
local authority members.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
CJAs were described in this and other ways as institutions which had begun to 
develop an independent identity, and to make distinct contributions (Chapter 5, 
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Section 2), but the structural obstacles to accountability would not have changed by 
themselves.  
Disentangling Accountability 
Accountability was widely described as something the new system would have to 
‘get right’, and was a priority early in the redesign consultation.749 This was often 
described in terms similar to those of the Audit Scotland recommendations – the 
need to ‘disentangle’ lines of accountability.750 The civil servant interviewee 
emphasised the new system would ensure clear accountability by retaining the pre-
existing accountability relationships of individual partners, rather than trying to 
create new community justice-specific accountabilities.751 The decision that 
Community Justice Scotland (CJS) would not be in an accountability relationship 
with CPPs had been reached as early as April 2014: 
“We do not propose to duplicate or cross over any established lines of 
accountability for CPPs, local authorities and other partners who must come 
together locally in order to effect improved outcomes for community 
justice.”752 
However, there was still significant uncertainty about how accountability would 
work in the new system, much of it implicated in questions about local and national 
control and local-national compromise in the consultation process. Some suggested 
that it would be beneficial for the national body to have more powers to hold CPPs 
to account – in the background of some of this discussion was the possibility of a 
high-profile failure of supervision, which can be highly damaging for community 
justice and social work, and for the people working in these systems.753 If such a 
situation were to arise, a national body was seen by some as a potential source both 
of support for the sector (Section 4) and by others as a way of holding CJSW to 
account and ensuring necessary changes were made. 
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“So those people [in the consultation] who were very adamant that this 
needed to be left locally were wondering “well, what’s this national body 
going to be doing?” Equally those people who I think were nervous about 
leaving this to 32 different local authorities were very keen to ensure that the 
national body would have sufficient teeth to make a difference.” [civil 
servant] 
 “[T]here would have to be some form of board, because you couldn’t have a 
position where in Falkirk you’ve got this, and in Stirling you didn’t get that – 
if somebody says “this has to be done” because it seems to me if there’s a 
FAI [Fatal Accident Inquiry], if there’s a review, as we’ve seen with Alexis 
Jay,754 south of the border, if there’s something like that comes back in 
Scotland… then government’s got to be able to say “take action”, what do 
we do, write to 32 local authorities? Everyone’ll say, you know, “that ain’t 
going to work” so you’ve got to have something that says “this is what 
needs done and you folks have got to do it!” They can do it locally and 
councils will do it, so it’s a political fix of not being a national agency, not 
being the status quo, delivered locally because I think that’s the right thing, 
but with a national advisory board capable of calling some shots when a 
debacle happens…” [MSP] 
Others stated either that accountability arrangements under the new system could 
constitute, or at least be seen as, an imposition on local authorities by central 
government. 
“I think it depends… a lot of it depends on the detail of the national body, 
and to begin with the government said it’s going to have an assurance and 
improvement function, which I think COSLA obviously were like “well 
that’s all right, we can cope with that”, but …there’s a lot of kind of 
muddiness around exactly what the national body will be doing, so I think a 
lot of what happens in reality will depend on the relationship between that 
national body, you know, who is leading it, what kind of ethos and 
philosophy it has, what kind of relationship it builds with the CPPs. Because 
it could be seen as a really supportive, facilitative body that’s really 
encouraging, or it could just be a sort of policing role that’ll just annoy the 
CPPs and wind them up, and put them off…” [CJA Chief Officer] 
This connects the question of structures for accountability back to the centrally 
important issue of the working relationship between local bodies and CJS, and to 
questions of local and national power dynamics (Section 4). 
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The failings of CJAs as democratic institutions extended from a lack of deliberation 
and public awareness to a lack of robust accountability systems; as well as being 
unable in practice to hold agencies to account, CJAs ran up against structural 
barriers to accountability. The question of how accountability would work in the 
new system has been an area of compromise between the Scottish Government and 
local authorities, but also one of continuing ambiguity, which is reflected in the 
structure of the system as legislated.755  
Although policy documents around the redesign have emphasised that the local 
and national parts will not be in an accountability relationship, CJS will have 
powers to scrutinise local partners’ reports on reducing reoffending and to advise 
them on these reports.756 The 2016 Act provides for the national body to gain further 
powers later on, so that as with national administration, there is the possibility for 
accountability to be introduced by the ‘side door’. Questions about how 
accountability would work formed only a part of the complex power dynamics 
between local and national government, and it is to these that the chapter now 
turns.  
4. Local and National: Trying to Find a Balance 
To some extent ‘community justice’ is defined not by what it is, but by where it 
takes place – in ‘the community’. Advocates emphasise the value of community 
justice as a set of sanctions which punish without breaking links between the 
offender and the community where they live.757 Scotland’s local communities are 
highly varied, encompassing cities and sparsely-populated rural and island areas 
(Chapter 3), and this poses particular challenges for local government and 
community justice.  
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Scotland’s distinctive community justice structure has entwined the structure of 
community justice services with the country’s system of local government. As 
discussed further in Chapter 2, there had previously been connection between the 
two through the Probation Committee system;758 however, it was in the 1960s that 
the key structural factors of community justice, as well as other distinctive aspects of 
Scottish criminal justice, were established. The 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act 
abolished Scotland’s probation service, moving its responsibilities into ‘generic’ 
social work departments within local authorities.759 
A History of Compromise 
The current restructuring of Scotland’s community justice system is only the latest 
in a series of compromises between local and national government. These are 
connected to, but distinct from, local- and national-level interests and local and 
national delivery. The compromises began in 1989, in the context of an attempt to 
reduce Scotland’s prison population by making more use of community sentences. 
This required a shortfall in funding for criminal justice social work (CJSW) to be 
addressed, which it was by the introduction of ring-fenced funding from central 
government for CJSW (‘section 27 funding’). This financial security was conditional 
on increased central control and accountability, through the system of National 
Objectives and Standards.  
Other compromises concerned the structure of community justice more directly, 
while having less significant effects on delivery itself. The 1998 Tough Option 
consultation on plans for a national CJSW service produced a compromise of 12 
regional groupings.760 When Scottish Labour proposed a national Correctional 
Service for Scotland in 2003, resistance from local authorities and social work 
produced the current compromise system of eight regional CJAs. 
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The redesign of community justice has produced a further compromise option – 
after initially offering three options (the ‘local authority’, ‘enhanced CJA’ and 
‘national service’ models), the Scottish Government agreed to ‘Option D’ – a hybrid 
between local and national, with CJSW remaining in local authorities and strategic 
responsibilities mostly passing to local partners, with a national service (initially to 
be named Community Justice Improvement Scotland, now Community Justice 
Scotland) acting to facilitate best practice, share research, advise local partners and 
provide national leadership for community justice. In general, there was a sense that 
the new system should as far as possible attempt to balance local and national 
needs, but it was far from clear how and where this balance should be struck; the 
interviews also suggest a more complex and contradictory picture than 
straightforward conflict and compromise between monolithic local and national 
interests.  
The Power of Local Authorities 
As discussed above (Chapter 3), local authorities in Scotland hold an unusual 
amount of power in their relationship with Scotland’s (comparatively new and 
inexperienced) central government. Interviewees from within national government 
tended to see this as problematic, and this included a view that the consultation had 
been dominated by local authority voices (Chapter 5, Section 6) and a general sense 
from MSPs in particular that local authorities were being obstructive. 
“Some of this comes about because of the dysfunctionality of local 
government in Scotland, who basically oppose centralisation even when it’s 
not about centralisation.” [MSP] 
Local authority interviewees – social work managers and elected members – did not 
tend to see the power of local authorities as a problem and this was reflected in 
some of their descriptions of CJAs. The CJA is usually only one of many different 
boards on which an elected member sits, and the work involved in CJAs and local 
authority boards is similar. Both social work managers in the study had worked in 
local authority social work for long enough to remember the systems before CJAs. 
Elected members and social work directors seemed to see CJAs as essentially of a 
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piece with other local authority structures, although CJAs are actually sited at the 
organisational level above local authorities. 
“given it was a new body in local government, it was incumbent on a 
manager to actually understand what it was” [Social work manager] 
“I suppose it’s a bit like within [this local area] we have [arm’s-length 
organisations], so for instance I sit on [one of the boards of these], so their 
minutes would not be on the [local authority] website but they would have 
their [own] site. So I suppose it’s just that connection – although it’s part of 
[the area], there’s this kind of arm’s length as such” [CJA elected member] 
As well as political power, local authorities in Scotland have considerable discretion 
in carrying out reorganisations required of them by central government. 
Interviewees referred to this in reference to the community justice redesign and to 
the ongoing integration of health and social care provision within local 
authorities.761 Although not directly connected to the community justice redesign, 
the integration has the potential to affect community justice services delivery in 
some areas, as local authorities have the option to merge CJSW with other areas of 
social work and social care. 
“The legislation is permissive, so it basically starts with “you’ve got to”, 
“you’ve got to join older people with community health”, and the 
permissive elements of it allows you to put other services and other 
structures in. The council has decided to put all the social work structures in, 
whereas you’ll find across the country the 32 local authorities have done 
different things.” [director of social work] 
At the time the fieldwork was conducted, some local authorities had chosen to 
integrate all social work (including CJSW), while others were only integrating 
elderly social care with health and keeping other social services separate; others had 
not yet chosen exactly what would be included in the integrated structure. Since the 
fieldwork was conducted, a similar situation has developed in community justice as 
local partners start developing community justice partnership structures.762 Some 
areas are setting up specialist community justice partnerships or boards alongside 
or partly within their CPPs. As with the initial development of CPPs, the new 
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community justice partnerships and the health and social care integration exemplify 
‘dirigiste’ approaches to local partnership development, where central government 
sets requirements but local bodies have discretion in some structural details.763  
Community Justice in Local Areas 
The operation of community justice was sometimes described in terms of particular 
local concerns, including about crime. CJA elected members unsurprisingly 
emphasised that the new system should be responsive to specific local needs: 
“in [council area] we have very farming and rural things, so it’s expensive 
things that are getting damaged – tractors, these quadbike things that 
farmers use for going round the hills and stuff – and that’s particularly 
prevalent in the [rural area], and somewhere in [urban area] things like that 
doesn’t happen, it’s maybe like car thefts and drunk and disorderly kind of 
offences and opportunistic stuff...” [CJA elected member] 
“I suppose people will always kind of shout their corner, but [this CJA area] 
has so many unique issues that it’s important that whatever model is 
implemented, it takes cognizance of that, and that we are able to deliver to 
the needs of what is required within the [CJA area].” [CJA elected member] 
The operation of community justice is also contingent on social and geographic 
conditions which vary between local areas, including building rents and the 
remoteness of some areas of Scotland. This was a factor in the difficulty of assessing 
unit costs for community justice services (Chapter 5, Section 5), and thus implicitly 
an argument against centralised control. Centralisation was generally viewed with 
suspicion, particularly by elected members. It was described as a tendency which 
damaged the ability of public services to engage with and respond to particular 
local concerns and locally-specific practices. One elected member referred to the 
controversial centralisation of Scottish policing.  
“[W]e’ve already centralised the police and I think there has been an effect, 
no matter what anyone says, there has been. Centralisation has had an effect 
on the police and the delivery of what the police do. So that I personally feel 
there has been and when I’ve been going to my community council 
meetings, there does seem to be a deterioration in the service… 
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Like armed officers in the Highlands, that kind of thing? 
Yeah, armed officers, the way that they treated the massage parlours in 
Edinburgh, where something worked, seemed to work, and then suddenly 
this policy is – you know, so again I just have concerns about the 
centralisation of it and I think we shouldn’t be centralising. We talk about 
centralisation – I think we’re too central and we’ve had a lot of centralisation 
of the major departments and I am uncomfortable with that.” [CJA elected 
member] 
Police nationalisation had significant political support when it took effect in 2013, 
but the new force has been at the centre of a number of controversies.764 The most 
widely reported of these have concerned specific incidents unrelated to community 
justice, but much of the criticism of centralisation – as articulated in the 2015 
Pearson review of Scottish policing – has argued that the reforms damaged the 
localism and community focus of the police, disconnecting them from local 
communities and damaging local accountability.765 Centralisation also took power 
away from local councillors, and there have recently been calls to return some 
control of policing to local authorities.766 
The Value of Central Provision 
However, centralisation of at least some parts of the system was valued. This partly 
had to do with the value of consistency – a sense that the level of service should 
vary as little as possible between local areas (although some degree of difference is 
probably inevitable, given the effects of local geographic differences). It was also 
connected to financial pressures on local authorities across Scotland,767 which even 
ring-fenced CJSW funding cannot entirely alleviate. Linked to this argument, some 
interviewees highlighted local variation in levels of service as a serious problem in 
various spheres of public service. As small organisations whose success as 
partnership agencies was dependent on the personalities of their Chief Officers, 
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CJAs were described as varying in effectiveness, including in how well they dealt 
with disruption from the redesign. 
“each of the eight CJAs that exist in Scotland are different in terms of scale, 
how many local authority partners they have, what sort of area they cover, 
so that relationship tends to vary from CJA to CJA. That’s mainly down to 
the, if you like, the personalities, the culture, the chief officer or the board 
members made up of local authority council elected members. So that could 
vary and does vary quite dramatically across the piece.” [CJA Staff] 
“some CJAs it seems to me have kind of slightly lost their ambition and their 
forward vision, because they’ve been thinking “you know, well, what’s the 
point?”, this is more just hearsay, it’s not really anything I can really 
evidence, but I just think a couple of CJAs have really thought ‘you know? 
It’s really… we’ll not be here anyway, so what’s the point?’” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
Likewise, CPPs were described as highly variable in their efficacy (as well as a 
source of concern in general – see below), both in general768 and specifically with 
reference to new community justice responsibilities. 
“Actually people are just in varying stages. Some of them have really 
thought it through, they’ve already got lead officers, they’ve thought about 
the governance structure, you know, where they would put the agenda. 
They’ve thought of a lot of the advantages, the disadvantages, the kind of 
opportunities and challenges of it, they’ve really thought it through. Other 
ones are more like “you know what, we don’t have a clue, we’ve not really 
thought about this yet” so there’s a range.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
Discussion of the national part of the new system was necessarily somewhat 
hypothetical, because although its functions had largely been decided by the time of 
the fieldwork, CJS did not yet exist (and will not until October 2016). Interviewees 
agreed that there were advantages in having some functions performed nationally, 
particularly where this could provide for economies of scale and where expertise 
developed within central government could be put to use, and that this would be a 
potential future role for CJS. The view that centralisation can improve efficiency of 
at least some aspects of provision echoes concerns expressed by third-sector 
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managers about the disruption that could result if they went from working with 
eight CJAs to 32 CPPs. 
“I think it’s valued that there’s a recognition that in a country the size of 
Scotland, there are elements of things that you can’t and shouldn’t do thirty-
two times over.” 
“I think there is an issue to be said if we’re not careful about the things that 
need to be done nationally, and we don’t identify the resources to do the 
national work – then there is a real risk, because you will never get 32 local 
authorities to sign up for an approach.” 
“Most of the bodies operate at a national level, so surely it would make sense 
to use their national analytical capacity together, in a coordinated way, to 
develop if you like an offender profile for Scotland that can be then shared 
with CPPs, so you’re not expecting CPPs to use resources that they might 
not have to develop their own analytical products around offenders… And I 
think that’s really where a national body could add value.” [all CJA Chief 
Officers] 
Financial inequities between local authorities formed the background of much of 
this discussion. As well as being geographically diverse, local authorities vary 
widely in their level of income – most of it received from the Scottish government, 
and thus outwith their control – and how much they spend on various types of 
services. The level of annual per capita spending by local authorities on all services 
varies widely, from £1,564 in Aberdeen to £4,202 in Shetland.769 The position of 
many rural communities at the higher end of this scale bears out the point above 
(Chapter 5, Section 5) about the difficulty of quantifying unit costs for community 
justice services – services in rural (especially island) areas being more expensive per 
capita. It is difficult to say how the system of allocation could be fairer – without 
significantly greater resources for all parts of Scottish local government, the 
distribution of resources between local authorities will probably always include 
shortfalls somewhere. 
It is also widely known that section 27 funding is not enough to cover community 
justice services within an area, meaning that most local authorities have to subsidise 
them from other parts of their budgets. Audit Scotland suggests that the extent of 
                                                     




this varies from around £50,000 to £500,000 a year,770 and also notes that the amount 
of funding available to CJAs to spend on their own initiatives varies widely between 
them.771 As considered further in Section 2, CJAs were meant to reduce inequities 
between local authorities by redistributing section 27 funding, but the voting system 
means these inequities have tended to be preserved rather than reduced.772 
Questions about budgets and resources played a significant part in discussions of 
which parts of the system should be administered locally, and which at the national 
level. CJA elected members, particularly from smaller rural areas, emphasised that 
some local authorities were not adequately resourced to supervise high-risk 
offenders subject to Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), 
introduced by the 2005 Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act and implemented 
in 2007. MAPPA cases are expensive to handle and require specialist expertise and 
careful coordination; CJAs have been involved in the regional administration of 
MAPPA in Scotland since 2009.773 For this elected member, the possibility that 
responsibility for MAPPA would now fall to their small local authority was 
troubling: 
“[W]e worried about if there’s a very serious violent offender released into 
the community, and there’s somebody who comes under MAPPA 
restrictions, these people are very expensive when they’re coming back into 
the community, and because we’re a wee local authority, we don’t have a lot 
of resources to look after that kind of person because… we’re just wee... A 
notorious person comes to live [here], everybody knows about it and 
everybody knows their door. So if we had half a dozen people like that at the 
one time, where would this wee authority get all the money to look after 
that? That was a concern for us.” [CJA elected member] 
MAPPA was highlighted in the redesign consultation as “an area [in which] it 
would be necessary to provide clarity as soon as possible on what future 
arrangements, especially funding, will look like.”774 It is also notable that, when 
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asked about whether their constituents ever discussed community justice issues 
with them, the elected members interviewed referred to constituents’ concerns 
about high-risk offenders. These constitute only a tiny minority of people under 
supervision, but a failure in their supervision could have very serious consequences. 
Central government was described as a likely and desired source of financial 
support for local partners as they took on new responsibilities, and the level of 
support provided continued to be a contentious subject as the new model developed 
further.775 
Another common argument in favour of a national element related to leadership 
and the profile of community justice. As discussed below (Section 6), interviewees 
were concerned that community justice enjoyed relatively little legitimacy among 
politicians and the general public, a problem well-documented throughout the 
recent history of community justice in several jurisdictions (see Chapter 2).776 As 
well as potentially inconsistent, the system of local delivery has been described as 
disunited and unable to speak with one voice; a further problem is that the position 
of CJSW within generic social work means no one can rise to a high-level position 
while remaining a criminal justice social worker (the Chief Social Work Officer 
position is a ‘generic’ one).777 The potential for CJS to provide leadership, including 
a well-respected and coherent ‘voice’ for community justice, was welcomed as a 
potential advantage of the new national service: 
“[L]eadership is in the government’s proposed design but I guess it depends 
on how that comes about. Yeah, it’s possible. It’s hopeful.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
“I’m a great believer in decentralisation and localism, so my natural 
inclination would be to say that local authorities are the right place to have 
that responsibility, but I agreed with the analysis that Elish Angiolini had 
that there was not a champion for criminal justice at a national level, and 
that the services tended not to be well-resourced or well-understood at a 
local government level.” [MSP] 
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In this way, CJS was seen as having the potential to contribute to the kind of major 
reorientation of Scotland’s penal culture that tended to be seen as necessary if the 
goals of community justice were to be achieved. 
The Local-National Gap 
A further linked concern had to do less with the specific value of local or national 
delivery as with the interface and relationship between local and national 
organisations. This had proved difficult for CJAs, which were meant to bridge local 
social work departments with national organisations such as SPS. Making functional 
links between local provision and the relevant parts of national organisations was 
described as a particular challenge in the context of partnership dynamics which 
could already be difficult (Chapter 5, Section 4), and one likely to be heightened by 
the fact that justice responsibilities would now pass to entirely local organisations.  
“I think most of the Community Planning Partnerships have really struggled 
to bring on board local National Health Service organisations and because a 
lot of the important bodies for CPPs are national bodies, and trying to work 
with 32 Community Planning Partnerships I think has proved difficult… 
Because it’s very difficult for a large national organisation to work at a local 
level, but I think a number of organisations have tried to address that, one of 
them being the Scottish Prison Service, I think they’re certainly moving in 
the right direction.” [CJA Staff] 
The centralisation of Scottish policing in particular was used to furnish an example – 
in this account, the eight regional forces had had good links to local community 
partnerships before they were merged into Police Scotland. 
“[O]ne of the things that has impacted on Community Planning Partnerships 
is that with the single national police force and the single fire service you 
now no longer have the chiefs sitting at the table. You used to have someone 
who had the authority to make a change sitting at the table, you now have a 
much more junior member of that organisation, and therefore they can’t 
commit the resources of the organisation in the way that the Chief Constable 
used to be able to.” [MSP, former CPP member] 
SPS, Police Scotland and other national organisations are divided up into local 
subunits, but the nature of the power structures within them makes it difficult for 
them to work locally. Where good links are developed, these are often informal and 
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prone to disruption when organisations change or people leave their jobs (Chapter 
5, Section 4). 
Concerns about CPPs 
Although the policy has since changed to refer to local groups of ‘community justice 
partners’ which might optionally include CPPs,778 it was envisaged at the time of the 
fieldwork that CJAs’ responsibilities would pass directly to CPPs. Many 
interviewees expressed concerns about CPPs in general and their ability to handle 
new justice responsibilities, and some of these issues are likely still to apply to the 
new partnerships. 
“CPPs are not working. Haven’t been working for a long time.” [Third sector 
manager] 
“Again one of the problems, I think, I think one of the future issues, and 
everybody’s aware of this certainly from a Community Justice Authority 
perspective and also I think from a Scottish Government perspective, has 
been the ineffectiveness of Community Planning Partnerships, as comments 
made by John Swinney and the reports from Audit Scotland will show.” 
[CJA staff] 
CPPs developed formally at around the same time as CJAs, with legislation in 2003 
and 2005 (although many CPPs existed in some form before this).779 Several 
interviewees highlighted similarities – both were intended to promote local 
partnership approaches to complex problems, and both had been criticised for their 
failure to achieve their initial promise.  
“I think the CPP and the CJA experience is probably the same in as far as we 
can do what we can do [to promote partnership working] but people’s 
resources are still set up separately.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
“[T]he idea of Community Planning is the same as the idea of the CJA, 
which is you know, we do spend the wrong money in wrong place, Christie 
identified that in the report.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
However, some interviewees also emphasised that the ‘prevention focus’ of the 
Scottish Government, which included a renewed focus on community planning (as 
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emphasised in the 2012 Statement of Ambition),780 had significantly improved the 
performance and prominence of CPPs. Audit Scotland similarly described a “strong 
sense of renewed energy nationally and locally to improving community planning” 
following the Statement of Ambition.781 The start of this fieldwork was 
contemporaneous with the introduction in June 2014 of the Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Bill, intended to strengthen CPPs in line with the post-
Christie reorientation,782 but the somewhat delayed development of CPPs had not 
brought them closer to the CJAs or community justice in general. 
“See, Community Planning, ever since I’ve been a councillor I’ve heard 
about community planning and for years, it never really went anywhere and 
it’s only really in the last, I would say since the last election, I think, soon 
after the election the partnership was formed… I think, it’s more organised, 
you have to say that, it seems to be, it’s the way forward really.” [CJA 
elected member] 
 “[T]hat’s been one of the unfortunate effects of the CJA system being set up 
at the point where community planning through the Single Outcome 
Agreements was actually getting a kind of new lease of life, and beginning to 
actually start to deliver more what it was intended to do. Community 
planning had been kind of fairly weak in its early years, and probably from 
about 2007 onwards really started to take off. But you had this kind of 
disconnect that community planning was over here, and anything justice-y 
was over here with the CJAs and it was very difficult to get a dialogue 
between the two…” [Third sector manager, ex-CJA staff] 
The post-Christie period has included extensive and continued evaluation of CPPs, 
particularly by Audit Scotland.783 The overall picture that emerges is one of some 
improvement, but not across Scotland and not in all the most important areas, or to 
the extent hoped for in the Statement of Ambition.784 Participation and leadership of 
CPPs were found to have improved, but Audit Scotland stated that their remained 
room for further improvement in these areas; weaknesses remained in governance 
and accountability and in the absence of a formal performance management 
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system.785 Further evaluation in 2016 found a need for clarity about how the 2015 
Community Empowerment Act would be implemented, and for national 
leadership.786 It seems likely that continued evaluation will be used to develop CPPs 
further as they take on more power including the new community justice 
responsibilities. 
One CJA Chief Officer suggested that CJAs might perhaps have been saved, if the 
Scottish Government had followed the recommendations of the 2012 Audit Scotland 
report more closely and adopted something similar to the ‘Enhanced CJA’ option in 
the community justice consultation, with support for CJAs at a similar level to that 
provided to CPPs: 
“I think at one point we thought we would be working with the government 
to look at how we could enhance CJAs. That seemed to be more the way 
Audit Scotland were going, you know, let’s look at… They didn’t really 
make recommendations, but reading between the lines, I thought they 
thought we could be improved, much as CPPs have had the opportunity 
over their 10 years plus, to get support from the Improvement service and 
the government, from the improvement team… all these people have been 
helping CPPs to function better, recognising it is a difficult thing to do. And I 
think at that point, I thought CJAs would be given the same treatment, we’d 
be given an opportunity to maybe have enhanced resources, enhanced 
powers, a bit more support. But when it became quite clear that the redesign 
was really going to be a local versus national argument…” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
However, the two types of organisation had apparently not connected with each 
other until the community justice redesign; as a result, there was significant concern 
about how able and how prepared CPPs were to take on new community justice 
responsibilities, and the extent of preparation was also described as varying 
between local areas. 
“[T]hey were all telling us how important it was in their field to have 
reoffending kept low, and what they were doing and how it fitted in with 
the CPP. And we’ve had a couple of events like that, and we’re going to 
continue to do it, because there’s a fear that the Community Planning 
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Partnerships won’t really tackle reoffending and so it’s important to have 
them work with us. So we’ve had the people who are in charge of the CPP in 
this authority make sure we’re all on board and we’re all enthusiastic about 
it. 
Have you had that kind of – that kind of buy-in, I suppose, from other CPPs within 
this area? 
No, I don’t think so. Not, when I hear when the other convenors are 
speaking, they don’t seem to be embracing it like this wee authority.” [CJA 
elected member] 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 6, CJAs had already begun working with CPPs to 
help them prepare for these new responsibilities at the time the interviews were 
carried out. Other measures to this end include the ‘shadow year’ which began in 
April 2016, in which CJAs and the local partnerships operate in parallel. 
“So we will be producing a performance framework which makes very clear 
the outcomes we expect the CPP to be delivering in relation to people who 
have offended. There’ll be indicators and measurements around how 
progress is being made around that, so we can see, for example, the use of 
community sentences, the speed with which people find decent housing 
upon leaving prison, continuity of treatment between prison and 
community, that sort of stuff that we’d want to be able to see how that is 
happening and we’d want to be able to see improvements in performance 
around that. So, there’ll be an absolute transparency over what is happening 
in performance that allows us to improve and intervene where necessary. As 
part of that we’ll be requiring each CPP to produce a plan and an annual 
report against that framework, how they’re planning to do it and secondly 
how well they have done against that plan, so again there’ll be that 
transparency over how well this is happening. And then thirdly there will be 
the national body that’s created to look at how well this is all happening, so 
they are all I guess safeguards, if you like, to make sure that this does all 
operate effectively rather than just being left to chance.” [civil servant] 
The measures explained above are intended to minimise the effect on community 
justice of well-documented operational issues with CPPs. This statement also 
positions CJS as a body that will, or could in future, have responsibility for holding 
CPPs to account for failing to meet reoffending targets, in contrast to the assurances 
given to local authorities that no such accountability relationship would be 
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created.787 A further ‘safeguard’ not discussed above was that CPPs’ community 
justice planning would be kept separate from their other community planning work. 
Ultimately, perhaps with a view to safeguarding justice from the problems 
discussed above, the CPP element of the system was changed to legislating sets of 
community justice partners, which could include CPPs at local authorities’ 
discretion. These new partnerships are expected to work closely with CPPs in 
planning, and to share many members with CPPs, while CPPs have a role in 
assisting with planning and with the transition.  
Discussion 
The interviews discussed here took place within a context of a somewhat 
contradictory approach by the Scottish Government to questions of local 
governance, in which the government imposes requirements on local bodies but 
allows them discretion in how they pursue those aims. This somewhat ‘dirigiste’ 
approach is exemplified in the 2007 Concordat with COSLA, and the health and 
social care integration ongoing at the time the fieldwork. 
The consensus was that it was necessary to strike some balance between local and 
national. The new community justice system should be grounded in the 
communities it served and in which it punished, responsive to local needs, concerns 
and conditions and able to work in partnership with other local bodies – but it 
should also be able to provide a consistent level of service across Scotland, to take 
advantage of economies of scale where available, to support local partnerships and 
work well with national organisations. Interviewees tended to describe the working 
relationships between local partners and the new national body as key to the success 
of the new model. 
“Will the divide get it right? Will we get that dynamics where it works in a 
healthy way, rather than a combative way? We could end up with… the risk 
people are alert to, is you could end up with a discord between the national 
focus and the local focus instead of actually bringing them together in 
                                                     




harmony, and I think that’s the greatest anxiety people have.” [CJA Chief 
Officer] 
It is likely, though, that there will be further uncertainty as CJS is established and 
developed in the coming months and years. It is possible that it will provide a 
strong national voice for community justice while also supporting local partners and 
ensuring resources are available to them – but there is no guarantee that it will have 
any significant effect on the success of community justice in Scotland. There is, 
however, a factor which makes this restructuring different to previous local-national 
compromises, as a politician involved in the redesign explained: 
“I actually think there’s good reason for a national agency, it has to be 
delivered locally, that is the reason that we’ve got where we are at the 
present moment, but it’s fair to say that the whole purpose of how it’s been 
planned at the present moment is if it doesn’t deliver then you can switch it, 
with a switch of a button, over to a national agency.” [MSP] 
The 2016 Community Justice (Scotland) Act which establishes CJS grants it very 
limited powers, but allows for those powers to be expanded in future without 
necessarily needing further primary legislation. Unless local partners are 
consistently successful in their community justice work, Scotland could end up 
getting national administration of community justice ‘by stealth’. 
5. The Higher Purposes 
This section considers some questions to do with the purposes of community justice, 
and in particular ideas articulated by politicians and other interviewees to do with 
the intended benefits of the new community justice system for offenders, 
communities and Scottish society in general. These discussions involved articulating 
a position about the offenders dealt with by the community justice system, but also 
a sense that the redesign had to be part of broader cultural and structural 
reorientations of criminal justice in Scotland, and Scotland’s political culture more 
generally, in the wider context of high-profile public debate over the country’s 
future. This section also highlights the extent to which the ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ 
continues to influence discussions of criminal justice policy in Scotland. 
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Reducing Inequality through Equal Access 
As discussed further above (Chapter 5, Section 4), many interviewees emphasised 
the complex and interlinked nature of offenders’ needs (criminogenic and 
otherwise) as a particularly difficult aspect of dealing with offending, and thus a key 
element of the reasoning for partnership working between various agencies, each 
able to make specialist contributions to dealing with these needs. Interviewees also 
sometimes described the community justice redesign in terms of desistance, a strand 
of criminological theory which focuses on the process by which people who have 
offended come to form new ‘non-deviant’ identities.788 Interviewees in this study 
were highly aware of the social stigma that accompanies criminal offending and 
especially involvement with the criminal justice system, and described this as both 
problematic and unjustified. Interviewees tended to emphasise similarity rather 
than difference between offenders and other citizens. 
“rather than hiving off “this is how we deal with people who’ve offended” 
and you know, there’s a separate bit of it, it’s almost mainstreaming them 
throughout all the public sector and recognising that reducing the stigma 
associated and recognising that they are universal services which means 
they are available and must be supplied to every citizen, regardless of what 
they may have done in the past.” [civil servant] 
This approach is supported by the significant proportion of the Scottish population 
who have previously had involvement with the criminal justice system, and for 
whom the stigma of offending – particularly its bureaucratic manifestation, the 
criminal record – pose major obstacles to the successful production of desisting 
identities. Nugent and Schinkel identify the resulting “goal failure” as one of the 
overlooked ‘pains of desistance’.789 The Scottish Government has established a 
consultation on changing the system of disclosure of criminal records to reduce this 
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barrier to employment,790 and other jurisdictions are considering similar steps 
following the success of international ‘ban the box’ campaigns.791  
“[F]ar too many people, nearly a third of the Scottish workforce, male 
Scottish workforce, has a criminal record. That’s huge…  And more than one 
in ten of women of working age have a criminal record. That stops a lot of 
them from getting employment, it’s a huge barrier.” [Third sector manager] 
Ensuring access to public services such as healthcare and housing on equal terms 
with other citizens was often framed as an important way of reducing the stigma of 
offending. While there are no legal barriers to people with convictions accessing 
these services, involvement with the criminal justice system – particularly 
imprisonment – can make this very difficult, disrupting employment, benefits 
claims and especially tenancies (and, by extension, any services which require the 
user to have a fixed address). Offenders already have lower levels of engagement 
with these services before they become involved with the criminal justice system – 
and in many individual cases, particularly in offences to do with homelessness or 
addictions, there are direct causal links between this and their offending.792  
“Making sure offenders have access to the services needed to reduce their 
reoffending” is listed as one of the main actions of Reducing Reoffending 
Programme Phase 2 (RRP2).793 It is not entirely clear how exactly this can be 
achieved – it is likely that it will be a question of incremental improvements to 
various aspects of public sector partnership working, with all the challenges that 
entails, rather than a single clearly defined change in how this work is carried out. 
This particular strand of RRP2 was probably a factor in practitioners’ thinking about 
the redesign of community justice, as well as about public service delivery in 
general. The integration of health and social care was sometimes linked to this as 
well. 
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“I think it’s important that the offender is treated just like an ordinary 
person in the integration of health and social care, the same as I would be. 
Because they’re just, in the [local health and social care] integration board 
there’ll just be a person who needs medical health. We shouldn’t make a 
distinction because there’s lots of people who abuse substances who are not 
criminals and they’re not treated as criminals, so in the health board we 
should just do that…” [CJA elected member] 
Penal populist rhetoric in the news media was sometimes described as an obstacle 
to this approach, part of the “public relations problem” for community sentences 
described by Maruna and King;794 media reporting could perpetuate stigma against 
people with criminal convictions as well as militating against the development of a 
more community-oriented justice policy – including through the low media profile 
of community penalties (see below). 
“I think the challenge you have is we’ve got – I do think the government 
have a good way of looking at it and I think they’re setting out in the right 
direction, but that’s coupled with a very, very stigmatising impression 
created maybe mostly by the media – if you compare it to, I think it’s 
probably comparable to the – all things with welfare reform, it’s this idea of 
these scroungers, these junkies, these people who don’t deserve our hard-
earned money.” [Third sector manager] 
“I think there’s not enough champions for this – people are apologetic about 
it, and they work away quietly and effectively I think, but I think because of 
the media angle that is always taken on it – you know, ‘soft on criminals’ 
and that sort of approach – that people shy away from talking about it… not 
enough of that is said often enough and the strident voices in the 
newspapers tend to make people very cautious of that.” [MSP] 
The argument for using access to services as a way of reducing inequality and 
reoffending echoes the Kilbrandon principles of ‘generic’ social work and ‘children 
in trouble’ – that people with convictions should be treated simply as people with 
various types of unmet social needs. Such an approach is not confined to CJSW, or 
the public sector – none of the third-sector organisations involved in the project 
confined their services exclusively to people with convictions, although all were 
deeply enough involved in community justice to be statutory CJA partners. The 
focus was generally on the offender at an individual level – only one respondent 
                                                     




described the ‘universal service’ aspect of community justice in community-oriented 
terms, but their statement is revealing about their view of the wider social and 
economic context of the project. 
“[T]he biggest single issue with offending – especially in prisons, but 
marked best in the community, is mental health. It’s not people who are, you 
know, seriously bad criminals – career criminals are dealt with by law 
enforcement, nobody else can deal with it – it’s mental health… They’re just, 
not crying out, they need help and support, they need a CPN – no they 
don’t. What they need is somebody that can say “Jamie, how you feeling 
today son?” Ah great, we’ll say “Actually that’s bang out of order, you can’t 
do it.” You know? “Just because it’s two o’clock in the morning, just because 
you’re not feeling great, doesn’t mean you can play your music loud… 
because you got wee kids next door, you got an old buddy and somebody 
around? Somebody’s going to work at five in the morning!” So putting 
resources into that is again the thing to do. And again it falls on the best 
people to do it are Sacro or the Wise Group, not statutory agencies, 
government, local and national… this comes back to, this is about more – 
you know, a ‘fractured society’, not that I like that very turn of phrase, but 
you know – previously these people probably lived with their parents, or 
they lived with their big sister, and somebody kept an eye on them, or their 
brother was round the corner and could look after them. Now they live 
isolated in a council flat, maybe miles away from family, really, and then – 
they’re not bad people. It’s just, when they get stressed they usually self-
medicate – when they self-medicate problems happen, and it’s the 
restoration of communities.” [MSP] 
The description makes an explicit link between two ideological elements of the 
Scottish Government’s approach to community justice, but also sets them in a wider 
social and economic context. It emphasises the importance of using specialist 
agencies and resources to deal with social problems that can cause crime (and other 
types of disruption), and highlights that these problems are connected to offending 
but not its sole cause, and that offenders are not fundamentally different to other 
people with health or social welfare needs – in line with the logic of the Kilbrandon 
Report, Social Work in the Community and the 1968 Act.795 It also sets it in the wider 
context of social and economic shifts in the last 30 years that had weakened 
traditional social bonds and left the most disadvantaged and powerless members of 
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society without support. The argument here seems to be that the community justice 
system is there to provide this support; this has also been part of the justification for 
the development of ‘Third Way’ approaches to community, and of the development 
of community planning in Scotland.796  
The idea that the restructuring of community justice in Scotland could mitigate both 
the stigma associated with offending and the destructive effects on communities of 
recent socioeconomic shifts is an interesting and compelling one. However, and as 
with the discussion of desistance theory (see Chapter 5, Section 3) there is only a 
tangential connection between these ideals and the substance of the community 
justice redesign which is a restructuring of the system of strategic planning of 
services. It also raises the question of why the criminal justice system should be 
expected to act as a welfare state of last resort – or, in more ‘Kilbrandonian’ terms, 
why it should perform functions perhaps better left to ‘generic’ social services. Such 
a ‘criminalisation of social policy’ also risks widening the net of criminal justice 
further,797 and (as noted in Chapter 2, Section 3) even the most supportive 
community sanction is ultimately backed by the threat of imprisonment. 
If the new model can improve partnership working, there is the possibility for more 
‘joined-up’ services in which the partner organisations are more aware of issues to 
do with community justice and can collaborate more to ensure offenders are able to 
access various services, but in general, the new structural arrangements for 
community justice are not likely to have any significant effect by themselves on the 
stigma of involvement in the criminal justice system, or even on reoffending. In the 
view of most interviewees in this study, a broader and less narrowly structural sort 
of change was also necessary. 
The Need for Change 
Many interviewees expressed a sense that there needed to be some type of major 
reorientation of Scotland’s penal field, and its entire public sector and national 
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political culture, if the aims of a fair and humane justice system were to be achieved. 
But it was far from clear exactly what this reorientation would involve, or how it 
would relate to the redesign of community justice. It is noteworthy that the 
fieldwork was largely contemporaneous with the Scottish independence 
referendum, which took place in September 2014. The referendum, whatever its 
result, was not generally seen by the interviewees as likely to have a direct impact 
on community justice, since the legal and criminal justice systems of Scotland have 
always been separate from those of England and Wales.  However, the campaigning 
around this referendum produced an unprecedented level of public debate and 
discussion about Scotland’s future, culminating in a record turnout at the vote 
itself.798 This is likely to have contributed to the emphasis in these discussions on a 
major shift for Scottish politics as a whole, and on Scotland’s distinctiveness in penal 
policy. 
Exactly what this grand penal shift would entail in practice varied significantly, but 
to a large extent tended to involve the wider adoption and internalisation of some of 
the main principles seen as valuable to community justice practice – evidence-based 
practice and policy, clear and functioning accountability and an ethos of partnership 
working and collective responsibility. 
“I think the main one again has got to be the scrutiny. The scrutiny just isn’t 
there… But again that’s not something that’s only community justice social 
work or for the CJAs. I think if one looks at the majority of the public sector 
it’s a fundamental issue. I think much of the scrutiny/accountability 
processes currently in place are – frankly – rather crude instruments.” [CJA 
Staff] 
“I think the key question is how do you incentivise a partnership approach 
to community justice. And delegating community planning might not be 
enough. It’s how do you incentivise a genuine partnership approach to 
reducing reoffending, through the resources that are available across justice 
partners, and I think that’s a big, big challenge, going forward, and 
something that a national body will need to be aware of... We need a 
performance culture in community justice over the next five to ten years. We 
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need that developed and the sort of performance culture that brings partners 
together around shared priorities.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
“The biggest problem that we have in Scotland at the moment is that we 
don’t have strategic commissioning – we don’t link policy, you know, ‘here 
is a policy, the policy’s thought through, this is what we want to achieve, 
and we’ll commission on that basis’ – that should be how it works.” [Third 
sector manager] 
It is not entirely clear how much this sort of dramatic reorientation was genuinely 
seen as possible or even desirable by these interviewees. It is likely that these 
invocations of a major cultural and political reorientation were, to some extent, 
vessels for common and long-held frustrations about the operation of Scottish 
criminal justice and policy. Although local provision of services was seen as 
important, cultural change would have to take place at a national level – what is 
common to all these statements is the felt need for a coherent penal policy in 
Scotland. The goals of partnership working can be hampered by short-sightedness 
on the part of partner organisations and conflict between their lower-level aims and 
obligations and those of the partnership (Chapter 5, Section 4), and a similar process 
can occur at the level of national policy. 
“[W]e have all the tools of justice. You know, we have a robust court system, 
we have a prison service that’s got excellent services in place, we have very 
professional social work services and the list goes on. But we don’t have a 
robust toolbox to keep them all in, to make those decisions about when to 
use what, so the system kind of freewheels on its own will, so why is it that 
when we see levels of crime and particularly violent crime going down 
across Scotland, across [CJA area], we see our use of short-term prison 
sentences going up, when at the same time the evidence is very clear that for 
the vast majority of people the outcome of a short-term prison sentence has a 
higher likelihood of reoffending than using community sentences. So how is 
it that the tools aren’t working very well together?” [CJA Chief Officer] 
This reorientation would likely entail a restructuring of how money is allocated 
within the justice system, requiring – as the Scottish Prisons Commission has argued 
– a major diversion of resources away from the Scottish Prison Service and towards 




criminal justice social work.799 As with the interest in reducing inequality and 
stigma through providing equal access to services, the idea of reorienting spending 
away from imprisonment and towards other services echoes the response to the 
Christie Report and its emphasis on reorienting public services towards prevention 
rather than reaction to adverse outcomes.800 A notable policy development also 
contemporaneous with the fieldwork was the surprising decision in January 2015 by 
Michael Matheson, the new Cabinet Secretary for Justice, not to go ahead with the 
planned new women’s prison at Inverclyde, and instead to follow the Angiolini 
Report’s recommendation of replacing HMP Cornton Vale with smaller community-
based units.801 At the time, Matheson also used the language of radical cultural 
change and Scottish distinctiveness: 
“I’ve decided that the current plans for a prison for women in Inverclyde 
should not go ahead. It does not fit with my vision of how a modern and 
progressive country should be addressing female offending. We need to be 
bolder and take a more radical and ambitious approach in Scotland.”802 
It was not entirely certain what sort of relationship such a cultural change would 
have with the structural redesign of community justice, or what was expected or 
desired by the various interviewees. Some suggested that the redesign was or could 
be part of this cultural change (but only part of it), while others seemed instead to 
see the redesign as a somewhat ineffectual and insufficient feint towards its aims 
that fell well short of making real progress in this area. Although this sense of a 
need for a major cultural change was typically mentioned in conjunction with the 
redesign of the community justice, the actual link between them appears to be 
minimal.  
“I feel that every so often they just rejig the structures just to sort of try and 
do something differently, but there’s never any vision or different 
worldview, it’s just piddling about at the edges, to put it frankly, so, yeah, 
I’m unconvinced it’s going to have a positive impact.” [CJA Chief Officer] 
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For some this major shift would entail CJS playing a strong leadership role, 
including as a promoter of community justice to the judiciary and the wider public. 
As noted above, though, there was scepticism about the capability of the national 
body to do this, given the likely resistance from local authorities. 
None of the interviewees took the view that the redesign would be enough to 
achieve penal reorientation towards community punishments and away from 
imprisonment. The redesign can contribute towards the reorientation of Scotland’s 
penal field only in limited and indirect ways. It has drawn at least some attention to 
community justice, given that there has been coverage in the Scottish news media as 
well as debate in Parliament.803 However, it has not been nearly as widely reported 
as Matheson’s policy U-turn on women’s imprisonment; as in other discussions, so-
called ‘alternatives to imprisonment’ have mainly been discussed from a perspective 
of discussing imprisonment rather than from a positively defined community 
punishment perspective. As the next section will argue, ignorance and lack of 
interest in community justice remain a very significant problem which the new 
national body is very unlikely to solve.  
In improving the flexibility of funding (through a model that allocates funding 
further in advance) and potentially improving partnership structures, there is the 
potential for improving the efficiency of the system and its outcomes, but not for 
achieving the kind of shift discussed here. The potential for better and more 
integrated partnership working is promising, but the Audit Scotland evidence on 
CPPs suggests that this would be unevenly distributed across local authority 
areas.804 Crucially, the redesign’s effects will be limited to the community justice 
system, whereas a reorientation of Scotland’s penal field towards community 
punishments would probably require significant interventions in sentencing, 
including but not limited to the planned extension of the presumption against short 
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prison sentences. Whether the redesign will form part of a genuinely cohesive penal 
policy remains to be seen. 
Discussion 
This section has considered political arguments from the fieldwork data about the 
purposes and value of community justice as an institution and how this relates to 
certain wider contextual elements in Scottish politics. Interviewees often 
emphasised the importance of ensuring equal access to services for people 
regardless of their offending status, and the idea that doing so could reduce not just 
reoffending but also the stigma associated with past offending behaviour. This 
argument both echoes the logic of the Kilbrandon Report and sets the redesign of 
community justice in the context of wider reforms of public services that followed 
the 2011 Christie report.805 The Kilbrandon philosophy lives on to some extent in 
discussions of the purposes of community justice, the links made between it and 
wider social welfare policies and especially in several interviewees’ concern with 
defining offenders as simply adults with unmet social needs. 
The interviewees were also quick to set this and other aspects of the work of 
Scotland’s community justice system in a wider context. They expressed a strong 
desire for a major reorientation of Scottish criminal justice policymaking, and 
sometimes of its public sector and politics more widely. The need for more cohesive 
penal policy in Scotland was emphasised, although Scotland’s policy is arguably 
fairly cohesive already. As well as developing and embedding further the key 
values discussed in the previous chapter – evidence-based policy and integrated 
partnership working – it would entail reorienting patterns of spending in a way 
consonant with the ‘prevention focus’ called for by the Christie Commission. 
Although not by itself sufficient for this reorientation, the redesign of the 
community justice system was sometimes seen as forming part of it. As the next 
section will argue, the development of a cohesive penal policy which could reorient 
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Scottish justice policy towards community sanctions and away from imprisonment 
is seriously hindered by cultural features as well.  
6. Ignorance and Disinterest 
There is a significant obstacle to the kind of reorientation that seemed to be hoped 
for by the interviewees in the project, and a problem for community justice more 
generally – both the general public and politicians are ignorant about community 
justice and often not very interested in it. As discussed in Chapter 2, this has been a 
problem for community justice in other jurisdictions and other time periods as well, 
and a particular obstacle to its wider adoption as a sentence – and thus a factor 
contributing to the continued dominance of imprisonment. This section considers 
the lack of public interest and ignorance about community justice as a concern for 
the interviewees in the study, including in particular a lack of awareness about the 
structure of Scotland’s community justice system. Interviewees also often referred to 
ignorance and disinterest on the part of Scottish politicians (particularly MSPs). It is 
far from clear how the problem can be overcome – and this section argues that the 
community justice redesign addresses it only to the extent of handing difficult and 
poorly-demarcated responsibilities to the new national body.  
Public Ignorance 
Several interviewees referred to a frustrating lack of public knowledge about 
community justice among the general public, sometimes in the context of general 
misperceptions about crime and punishment linked to penal populist rhetoric in the 
media.  
“And do you find you discuss CJA work or community justice with your 
constituents very much? 
Hardly ever. Sometimes when I go to a community council and say 
reoffending’s going down and they’ll be “No it’s not, it’s going through the 
roof because Mrs So-And-So got her pension stolen out of her handbag when 
she was walking home last week and that’s the third time it’s happened in 
the village”, so sometimes people’s perception of crime in the village or the 





Even CJA elected members did not report much interest from their constituents in 
community justice or the work of their CJA; the only aspect of elected members’ 
discussions with constituents that was mentioned in conjunction with CJA activities 
was the concern expressed on the rare occasions when high-profile, high-risk 
offenders moved into the local area.  
“I think we need some kind of national highlight for community justice, 
because I don’t see it being pulled up there, I think everybody’s very aware 
of the prison service and the work that they do, or at least the work that they 
appear to do, I think – I don’t think people really have a detailed 
understanding of what goes on behind the walls, but we know it’s there and 
we know what they’re doing and we have a concept at least of what 
imprisonment looks like or should look like. I don’t think people have any 
concept about what community justice should look like.” [Third sector 
manager, ex-CJA staff]  
There was a strong parallel with Mawby and Worrall’s finding (from England and 
Wales) that community justice is culturally ‘invisible’ in comparison to other 
criminal justice institutions,806 but the sense that there was little cultural awareness 
of what community justice ‘looks like’ is connected to structural questions as well, 
as several interviewees pointed out. This is likely to be a particular problem in 
Scotland, where as well as aiming to address a wide range of needs (and thus 
already involving a wide range of organisations in partnership), community justice 
is not the responsibility of a national service (as it traditionally was and, to some 
extent, still is in England and Wales) – which plays into a wider sense that 
community justice lacks the sort of cohesive national professional identity enjoyed 
by other parts of criminal justice.807 Lack of awareness and knowledge about the 
particular structures and institutions specifically is a particular problem for CJAs, 
connected to the sense that they lacked a cohesive and distinct institutional identity. 
“I would say community justice is quite a difficult beast to get your head 
around unless you deal with it on a regular basis… It’s quite complicated, it 
involves a number of bodies, from my experience you either get very, very 
good local councillors on the board, or you perhaps get those that either 
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don’t understand the issues and the problems concerned or are just possibly 
there to make the numbers up, dare one say.” [CJA Staff] 
 “I mean, there’s a great deal of ignorance about it. If we stopped people and 
said “what’s a CJA?”, 99 out of a hundred people wouldn’t know it. I think if 
you stopped and asked a lot of politicians, they’d struggle to, you know, “Is 
it Criminal Justice Authority? Is it Community Justice Authority? What is 
it?” So there’s a remarkable amount of ignorance – they know the local social 
work department, but they don’t know about the CJA, which is a 
shame…the CJA even when they do good work, they just don’t have the 
profile for people to remember.” [MSP] 
Lack of public awareness need not be a problem for an administrative and strategic 
body with no responsibility for service delivery, but a lack of awareness about how 
these structures worked was highlighted even among people who worked directly 
with CJAs. CJAs were sometimes misunderstood as being essentially similar to the 
informal ‘Tough Option’ groupings that predated them – likely because of the 
geographic similarity between them and the fact that many of the same people 
would have been involved in both. As with the transition from informal community 
planning structures to legally mandated CPPs, the efforts to maintain a smooth 
transition from one institutional form to the other blurred the lines between them 
and hindered the development of distinctive institutional identities. There was also 
uncertainty about the function of CJAs, and several CJA interviewees reported 
misconceptions, playing further into the sense of professional disappointment 
implicit in many of their accounts (Chapter 5, Section 2). One apparently 
particularly frustrating example also described in Morrison’s research was the 
continued misunderstanding of the abbreviation. 808 
“[referring to the first years of operation] Because they’d moved from a 
situation where they had informal groupings of local authorities, and board 
members used to meet with neighbouring authorities, so councillors would 
come together and hear joint reports, and some limited joint work that was 
being done pre-CJAs. But when CJAs came together formally, there was still 
an element of people thinking “well, it’s still like the old joint boards”, and I 
don’t think they really grasped at that early stage that in fact it was 
completely different organisations.” 
                                                     




“[P]eople who don’t know us have this idea that we’re this huge 
organisation with myriads of staff and so on, and I think actually we are, as 
I’ve said, tiny… So I’m quite clear in my role that actually all these massive 
powers that people think we have don’t exist, you know, we have certain 
statutory duties and we try to discharge those in an engaging and creative 
way which gets results, but I have never really felt we’ve had this massive 
authority that some people might think we have.”  
“There’s a historic point which is that we don’t have a professional sense of 
what community justice is, you know, it’s not an unfamiliar situation to be 
somewhere and be introduced as the Criminal Justice Authority, who people 
don’t, don’t quite fully grasp it.” [all CJA Chief Officers] 
Several of the politicians in this research also used this incorrect terminology, which 
has also been reproduced by the Scottish Prison Service.809 In addition, MSPs in 
particular did not always seem at the time of the fieldwork to be clear on the details 
of the redesign policy.  
Political Disinterest 
In general, interviewees described a lack of interest among politicians in community 
justice, and in the community justice redesign. In comparison to higher-profile parts 
of the justice system, which can attract significant political debate, community 
justice is 
“not a sexy or glamorous side of politics, and I don’t see the Justice 
Committee getting worked up into a lather about it.” [MSP] 
Politicians cannot be expected to have the same sort of knowledge of operational 
detail as practitioners who specialise in community justice. Even more than the CJA 
elected members – who do actually have formal responsibilities to do with 
community justice, although these are only a small part of their work – discussions 
of community justice form only a small part of an MSP’s job, and are likely to 
become relevant to them only when there is political or legislative debate in 
Parliament concerning community justice or when they visit community justice 
projects in their constituency (as discussed in Section 1). Structural factors may also 
play a role– the current absence of national organisations which specialise in 
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community justice and can represent community justice, and only community 
justice, in political negotiations means that the field lacks a ‘voice’ that can lobby 
politicians in the same way that SPS or Police Scotland can.810 The process of 
legislation, and the workload placed on MSPs, also means that the implementation 
of that legislation rarely receives the same level of political scrutiny. 
“Thereafter once the legislation was passed, interest from the various groups 
on – my experience – interest in MSPs and their role in this whole thing 
wanes overnight as they become more focused on the civil service who are 
implementing and interpreting what the legislation means, so civil service 
then gain a great deal of power during that twilight period of 
implementation, and that’s where all the various partners are vying for 
position in how they administer the new arrangement.” [MSP] 
A similar process occurred immediately after the 2005 Management of Offenders 
Act; as Morrison has noted, the CJAs were largely shaped by extensive post-
legislative compromise between the Scottish Government, ADSW and COSLA.811 
Even during the Stage 1 debate, the apparently anodyne nature of the community 
justice redesign was acknowledged by the Convenor of the Parliament’s Justice 
Committee, Christine Grahame MSP: 
“The topic might seem to be as dry as dust, but the bill deals with how we 
set up systems and organise support at national and local levels in order to 
prevent reoffending, which costs the public purse an arm and a leg but, in 
the first place, fails society, individuals and their families.”812  
However, the Bill did attract debate – perhaps more than some were expecting. 
Although not as controversial as some other legislation, the Community Justice 
(Scotland) Bill was the subject of quite energetic discussion, particularly in the 
debate stage. As discussed further in Chapter 2, there was disagreement over the 
definition of ‘community justice’ which some MSPs argued was too narrow and 
failed to fully embrace the post-Christie ‘prevention’ focus to the extent found in 
other public services.813 The Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs, Paul 
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Wheelhouse MSP, was called to give evidence a second time, in an unusual 
development that resulted from continued uncertainty among MSPs about how the 
new system would work.814 An attempt during the last stage of the debate by the 
Conservative MSP Margaret Mitchell to ensure post-legislative scrutiny by 
introducing an amendment to add a ‘sunset clause’ to the Bill,815 while never likely 
to succeed, was also an unusual development. Although the Bill ultimately passed 
with relatively little alteration, there has been a greater degree of scrutiny and 
interest from MSPs in the legislative process than might have been expected. 
There was a methodological issue affecting this project’s picture of political 
awareness of community justice in general and the redesign policy in particular. 
Although the timing of this fieldwork was fortuitous in some respects, coinciding 
with much of the consultation and development work on the new community 
justice system as well as with a particularly prominent political debate on Scotland’s 
future, the fieldwork concluded in January 2015, well before the Community Justice 
(Scotland) Bill was introduced in May, after which it was considered by various 
committees. Full Parliamentary debate on the Bill did not take place until November 
that year.816  
As a result, the MSPs in this project had had little opportunity to hear about the 
policy in detail, or in most cases to consider much of the available evidence. Had the 
interviews for this project taken place later, it is likely that the political interviewees 
would have had more awareness about the detail of the policy. This would also 
have meant extending the fieldwork period by many months, which would have 
been impossible within the scope of the project. 
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What can be done? 
Interviewees tended to take the view that the situation of public ignorance and 
political interest was something that should be remedied, if possible, but (as also 
discussed in Chapter 2) this is not an easily solved problem. 
“It’s the value – not just the money spent, it’s what you get in return for it. 
That’s maybe a sort of general point, we need to be better at having that 
conversation with communities, so that’s understood and people come back 
into it.” [Third sector manager] 
While some CJAs had had a degree of success in engaging members of their local 
community in conversations about community justice,817 this success was not easily 
replicated in other areas: 
“We tried [having a community engagement event] in [a town], we had an 
open meeting in [the] Town Hall about five years ago, and it did tend to 
force the… well it did tend to attract the type of person that was more 
interested in kids hanging about street corners and dog fouling and… we 
never really, it wasn’t very good to be honest with you, we never really got 
into that discussion about crime and punishment, so very difficult to do…” 
[CJA Chief Officer] 
The earlier policy documents surrounding the consultation and the subsequent 
redesign, dating from late 2012 to December 2013, show some awareness of the 
importance of cultural change and of raising the public profile of community justice. 
Then-Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill’s foreword to the first of the consultation 
papers emphasises that “cultural change – what people do and how they behave – is 
of fundamental importance”.818 That first consultation included a responsibility for 
promoting community justice culturally and raising its public profile in each of its 
three options; notably, it would be in all cases the responsibility of a national or 
regional agency – the CJA boards under the ‘enhanced CJA’ option, the new single 
service under the ‘single service’ option and the Risk Management Authority under 
the ‘local authority’ model. In none of the options would local authorities or their 
social work departments have responsibility for this task. Even though their new 
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form will ostensibly emphasise democratic engagement with local communities, 
and despite certain indicators that public misconceptions about crime and justice are 
best challenged at a local level,819 the local partners will not be required to do 
anything to raise the cultural and public profile of community justice. 
The result is that this abstract and complex problem will fall to Community Justice 
Scotland (CJS). The initial consultation emphasised the importance of “a strong and 
united voice that represents community justice interests with the judiciary, public 
and media”,820 and similar formulations appear in subsequent consultation 
documents. However, the documents give almost no sense of how the national body 
would bring about this cultural change. The first guidance for the future model, 
which emerged in April 2014, referred to “engagement with key stakeholders” as 
the method by which Community Justice Improvement Scotland (as it was then to 
be called) would “promote the importance of successful community justice and the 
associated values to deliver such”,821  but gives very little sense of how this 
engagement would work or why it could be expected to succeed. In general, the 
documents explaining the redesign become successively less concerned with this 
sort of cultural role; by the time the detail of the new system is decided there are 
only passing references to CJS acting as a “champion”.822 The meaning of “cultural 
change” in the policy documents shifts to being, in fact, about structures – the 
development of an “an improvement culture through the establishment of a 
National Outcomes, Performance and Improvement Framework against which local 
partnerships can plan and report.”823 Cultural change and the raising of a public 
profile are still a legislative requirement under the 2016 Act, which requires CJS to:  
“promote public awareness of benefits arising from— 
(i) persons who are convicted of offences being sentenced to community 
disposals rather than imprisonment or detention in penal institutions, and 
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(ii) managing and supporting persons falling within section 1(3), (6) or (7) 
with a view to them not offending in future or, if that is not realistic, 
reducing future offending by them.”824 
A similar expectation was raised by MSPs during and after the legislative process, 
with Justice Committee member Alison McInnes MSP remarking that “Many of the 
judiciary have, until now, been reluctant to use community sentences properly. It is 
to be hoped that Community Justice Scotland holds the key to unlocking greater 
confidence in community-based services and innovative approaches such as 
restorative justice.”825 Political support, judicial confidence and public awareness 
have been conflated in this single aspect of the responsibilities of the new 
community justice system, and this makes both the functions intended for 
Community Justice Scotland by the Scottish Government, and those functions 
considered and hoped for by interviewees in this study, even more difficult to 
grasp. As considered in Chapter 2, these are actually quite different aspects of the 
same problem. They have different effects on the operation of community justice 
and Scotland’s penal field, and would likely require different approaches to deal 
with them.  
Judicial confidence in community sentencing is necessary to raise its ‘market share’ 
among sentencers, and research by Millie and Jacobson suggests judicial legitimacy 
has to do with how social workers act in relation to the court, and particularly the 
information they provide to sentencers.826 It’s unlikely, therefore, that either the 
restructuring itself or any attempt by CJS to engage either the media or the public 
directly will have any effect on sentencers’ willingness to use community penalties.  
Engagement with politicians and the development of support in Parliament is an 
altogether different matter, and likely only to be necessary at times of particularly 
sensitive or important legislative and policy debates. Given the emphasis placed by 
MSPs on visiting and interacting with individuals as a way of gaining knowledge 
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about particular issues, a parliamentary engagement strategy for CJS could centre 
on encouraging “situated learning” by arranging political visits to community 
justice projects.827  
Maruna and King, as well as much of the scholarship about democratic engagement 
in criminal justice issues, suggest that the best way to engage the public is 
essentially qualitative in nature, and to do with appealing to values and ideas to do 
with rehabilitation and ‘second chances’.828 Much of this work would likely best be 
done at a local level, emphasising the ‘community’ aspect of community justice and 
siting it within local democratic structures. These aspects seem to militate against 
giving this responsibility to a national agency; if the working relationship between 
the new body and a particular local partnership is poor or (more likely) tenuous or 
non-existent, the public engagement in that local area could suffer as a result. 
Engagement with the public through the news media is likely to be a particular 
challenge for CJS, as it will have no control over which stories the news media 
decide to report. There is no reason to expect this small organisation to be able to 
change the tendency in the news media to report community justice mainly, if at all, 
in terms of high-profile failures of supervision.829 
Discussion 
Ignorance and lack of interest were highlighted in these interviews as a problem for 
Scottish community justice, as they have been in other jurisdictions.830 The Scottish 
community justice system is particularly affected by this, partly because unlike in 
many other jurisdictions, community justice work mainly takes place at a local level 
and within generic social work departments. There was also concern that CJAs in 
particular were little understood, although this is less concerning given that they 
don’t work with offenders directly. The lack of cultural profile for community 
justice in Scotland was seen as a major problem which hindered the development of 
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a more cohesive penal policy with community justice closer to its heart; it was also 
linked in many accounts to the lack of national leadership structures for community 
justice. Through the consultation process, this role has fallen to the new national 
body. 
At the time of writing, CJS has not yet been formally established; this is expected to 
happen around October 2016, and it must be in place by 1 April 2017. The role of 
cultural champion is challenging and not easily delineated; the brief discussion 
above is only a tentative sketch of what such a responsibility might entail. It is likely 
that if CJS had been established earlier on in the redesign process, it would have 
been able to partly resist being given this task, or at least push for clarification on 
the detail. Although undeniably important, the cultural champion role is not 
currently well-defined enough to be anything other than unenviable and 
burdensome. As with the crucial working relationship between it and local partners, 
the question of promoting community justice to the public is an aspect of the new 
system which will not be certain until the new body is established and has been 
operating for some time.  
7. Conclusion: Sidelights on Policy 
This chapter has considered the findings of the project as they relate to the political 
dimensions of community justice, and the ways in which particular political 
concerns play into the redesign policy. Two political aspects of community justice 
and the redesign policy dominated these discussions – the conflict and compromise 
between local and national organisations, agendas and political interests, and 
discussions of the ethical ideals of community justice. 
The discussions with CJA elected members in particular gave a sense of the ways in 
which CJAs functioned as institutions of democracy. The way in which they were 
set up helps to reduce the distraction and disruption that can result from direct 
political conflict along party lines and instead to produce a decision-making model 
based on consensus and expert advice. However, this consensus takes place almost 




public; in addition, the emphasis on consensus serves to preserve the status quo 
rather than allowing funding to be allocated more fairly between partners. As well 
as being deeply constitutionally flawed from a practice perspective (Chapter 5, 
Section 2), the CJAs have structural problems that limit their success as democratic 
institutions. 
Connected to this was a common concern with accountability – a term which can 
connote both structural aspects and moral or political virtues of that system, and 
sometimes both at once – was also commonly discussed by interviewees as well as 
being a major theme in the Audit Scotland criticisms of CJAs. Accountability was 
seen as important for the new system, and interviewees agreed the redesign would 
have to resolve the ‘tangled’ lines of accountability identified by the Audit Scotland 
report.831 This played into discussions of power dynamics between local and 
national government, as accountability was a particular source of concern with 
relation to the new national body Community Justice Scotland (the detail of which 
had not been entirely worked out at the time of the interviews). The interview data 
gives a sense that local authorities would view an accountability relationship with 
Community Justice Scotland as an unwelcome imposition by the national 
government. 
The project includes voices from local and national organisations and levels of 
government, and as a result emphases tended to differ although some key principles 
were agreed upon. Local delivery was seen as a key part of community justice, but 
although the redesign policy provides for both delivery and most administration at 
a local level, there were significant concerns relating to local-national dynamics, and 
a desire to make use of national-level resources and coordination where necessary, 
and to ensure that the local focus would not come at the expense of consistency 
across Scotland. This was particularly emphasised by interviewees who argued that 
local authorities had had disproportionate power in the negotiations around the 
redesign. Interviewees also expressed concerns about the mixed record of CPPs and 
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a sense that they might not be well-prepared for their new community justice 
responsibilities – a concern responded to both in the structure of the policy and 
legislation (in which CPPs’ justice planning will be separate from their other 
community planning, and the shadow year) and by the CJA staff themselves, who 
described taking steps on their own to help CPPs prepare for the transition. 
There was agreement on the importance of striking the right balance between local 
and national, and in ensuring that local and national agencies were able to work 
well together in terms of being able to ‘align’ various aspects of the work and 
structure to each other – a particularly germane concern given the perceived 
negative impact of the nationalisation of Scottish policing. The working relationship 
between the local partners and the new national body, Community Justice Scotland, 
was described as vital to the success of this balance. 
Discussions of community justice as a political entity also set it in the context of 
wider political discussions in Scotland. Several interviewees suggested that the 
redesign of community justice would reduce social inequality through ensuring 
equal access to various types of public service, regardless of offending history, and 
in doing so aiming to reduce the stigma associated with offending. This links the 
redesign of community justice to the focus on equal access to services emphasised in 
the Scottish Government’s post-Christie approach to the delivery of public services, 
although the redesign stops short of embracing the prevention principle which is 
arguably the most revolutionary aspect of the Christie approach.832 
Interviewees expressed a wish for some type of major cultural and political change 
relating to community justice in Scotland, going beyond the structure community 
justice to affect potentially the entire orientation of the public sector. This must be 
considered in the context of the debate about Scotland’s identity and future during 
the then-ongoing campaigning around the Scottish independence referendum of 
September 2014, as well as echoing the idea of the cultural shift in Scottish public 
services that the Christie Report aimed to promote (which also has potential 
                                                     




structural implications through the integration of health and social care). Although 
there was relatively little agreement on the exact nature of such a change and 
different interviewees emphasised different ideals and putative characteristics, it 
would entail a much higher public profile for community justice and a more 
enlightened approach to offending. Some took the view that this process was 
already happening and that the redesign of community justice was a part of it; 
others, less optimistically, suggested that the redesign was an unambitious bit of 
structural tinkering that would fail even to contribute towards such a reorientation, 
and that much more radical structural and/or cultural change was necessary. A 
particular problem emphasised by many interviewees and elsewhere in academic 
literature on community justice is the low profile of community justice in the media, 
among politicians and the wider public, as well as a perceived lack of judicial 
legitimacy.833 This was a challenge to the sort of cultural shift discussed above and 
something which that reorientation would have to address. 
The findings from this chapter cast a sidelight on the (yet to be established) new 
body, Community Justice Scotland, and on its position in the power relations 
implicated in the redesign. Without a voice in the consultation process, or at any 
other time, the national body has been left with some very difficult and complex 
tasks which it is unlikely to be able to fulfil – the establishment of a successful and 
productive working relationship with all of Scotland’s 32 CPPs, and the promotion 
of community justice as a viable sanction to sentencers, politicians and the wider 
public. At the same time, the organisation will be small (with six to nine members 
and twenty staff)834 and will have little power; in particular, the emphasis on 
avoiding the ‘tangled’ lines of accountability which characterise the current system 
and hamper the ability of CJAs to carry out their role means that Community Justice 
Scotland will begin with no accountability powers, and any attempt to develop 
them would likely damage the relationship with local authorities. In this, there are 
echoes of the ‘poison chalice’ – the combination of difficult responsibilities and very 
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restricted powers – which was handed to CJAs by the various compromises which 
followed the 2005 Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act. However, the 2016 
Act does enable the Scottish Government to grant further powers to Community 
Justice Scotland later on (albeit only after consultation and Parliamentary 
scrutiny).835 
In discussing the political dimensions of interviewees’ accounts of the community 
justice redesign, this chapter, like Chapters 2 and 3, sets the redesign in the context 
of conflict and compromise between Scotland’s local and national government, 
bringing out the specific relationship between this aspect and other concerns such as 
accountability and the role of Community Justice Scotland, as well as the 
development of approaches to social inequality grounded in the reconfiguration of 
services and the development of local democratic structures. The final chapter 
draws these findings together with the findings about practice from the previous 
chapter, and discusses them in more theoretical terms, to do with Scotland’s penal 
field and the adaptation of community justice habitus, before returning to the 
research questions introduced at the start of the thesis.  
                                                     




Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together some key themes of the 
findings with insights from theory and literature to make critical arguments about 
the redesign, before answering the research questions detailed in Chapter 1 and 
considering the potential implications of this project. As Chapter 4 explained, this 
thesis has used a combination of literature and historical research, and thematic 
analysis of qualitative semi-structured interviews with practitioners and politicians, 
to consider the historical background and political dimensions of the community 
justice redesign and its implications for community justice in Scotland. Chapter 4 
also describes the project’s development as it changed from a comparative study to 
focus solely on Scotland; as was becoming clear, the Scottish community justice 
redesign alone contained more than enough material for a thesis. 
Chapter 2 approached the project’s historical background using the theoretical 
framework of the penal field,836 a concept which emphasises the role of competition 
and conflict between different actors and institutions. That chapter also gave an 
account of the history of community justice in Scotland, with particular reference to 
its role in the development of a distinctive Scottish penal policy identity, and of the 
compromises between local and national government that shaped the structure of 
community justice, before setting out the development of the current redesign. That 
chapter also considered longstanding legitimacy problems with community justice 
in general and in Scotland, drawing parallels to other jurisdictions and highlighting 
the potential harmful effects of the low profile of community justice. 
Chapter 3 turned away from these concerns to consider issues connected to the 
‘community’ aspect of community justice. Beginning with criminological theorising 
about how local democratic structures can affect justice policy, this chapter 
considered the development of local democratic structures for community 
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partnership approaches to crime control, highlighting Scotland’s geographically 
fragmented and diverse public service landscape. It considered the development of 
community partnership approaches to dealing with crime, and of Community 
Planning Partnerships (CPPs), drawing parallels between organisational and 
political issues affecting crime control partnerships elsewhere and those that affect 
Community Justice Authorities (CJAs) and CPPs in Scotland. An important critical 
view of the community partnership approach to punishment was provided by 
Cohen’s Visions of Social Control,837 which argued that apparently benign efforts to 
weaken oppressive institutions, including prisons, produced a subtle outward creep 
of social control into the ‘community’, while still strengthening the old institutions. 
Chapter 3 closed by arguing that despite the significant potential for radical 
developments in bridging the community justice and community empowerment 
agendas, the two were being allowed to converge but not meet (although not 
without justification). 
Chapter 5 drew out the consequences of the redesign for community justice practice, 
beginning with practitioner views of the CJAs. The chapter considers the perceived 
importance of research- and evidence-based practice and partnership working in 
community justice, arguing that the new system is unlikely to make significant 
gains in these areas; it also emphasises the role budget pressures play and will 
continue to play in community justice, before giving an account of practitioners’ 
views and experiences of the redesign consultation. Chapter 5 also considered 
practitioner accounts of difficult or conflictual aspects of partnership working in the 
community justice field.  
Chapter 6 drew mainly on interviews with politicians to consider key political 
aspects of the system and the redesign policy. Beginning with the ways in which 
CJAs have failed to function as democratic institutions, with particular reference to 
problems with accountability and how the redesign aims to rectify this, the chapter 
then considers issues to do with local and national provision, how the redesign aims 
                                                     




to balance them and the connection to ongoing struggles between different levels of 
government. The chapter considers these in light of a widely expressed interest in 
the purposes of community justice, how these related to the wider Scottish 
government public service agenda and to the commonly expressed need for a major 
cultural change in criminal justice and policy more widely. The chapter closed by 
considering a major obstacle to such a development – the lack of knowledge and 
interest in community justice – and how the redesign largely failed to respond to it. 
This final chapter draws together key insights from both the Findings chapters and 
from the research discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, discussing some of the main 
findings of the project in theoretical context. It considers the structure of the 
Scotland’s community justice field, arguing that the penal field is a theoretical 
framework highly applicable to Scotland, and using it to highlight structural 
barriers to the effectiveness of community justice and to argue that the redesign is 
likely to remove some of these but create new ones. It considers the dynamics of 
‘dirigiste’ approaches on the part of central government towards local government, 
before using Bourdieusian theory to argue that attempts to smooth the transition to 
the new system might have disadvantages. The chapter then considers the long-
term problem of the low public profile of community justice, setting this in the 
context of Scotland’s community justice field and arguing that the redesign will do 
little to change it, before setting the redesign in the context of narratives about 
Scotland’s distinctive penal identity and a wider programme of distinctively 
Scottish public service reform. Finally, the chapter returns to the research questions 
posed in Chapter 1, and discusses briefly some implications for policy and research, 
before concluding the thesis. 
2. Sketching the Fields 
The Community Justice Field in Scotland 
Page defines the penal field as “the social space in which agents struggle to 
accumulate and employ penal capital—that is, the legitimate authority to determine 
penal policies and priorities – … [which] intersects the bureaucratic, political, and 
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legal fields, and neighbors the economic, academic, and journalistic fields”.838 To 
this can be added (with some qualification) the “agonistic” approach which 
emphasises the role of conflict and competition in penal change.839 The use of field 
theory also entails consideration of the other parts of Bourdieu’s schema: habitus, 
the system of “the system of structured, structuring dispositions… which is 
constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions”,840 and 
capital, the resources used and developed by actors to take positions within fields, 
which includes money and other resources as well as more abstract forms including 
‘symbolic power’ – “the most effective form of power”, which confers the ability to 
define the field and its principles.841  
As noted above (Chapter 4, Section 3), Scotland’s penal field differs from the 
American (and particularly Californian) example described by Page, being 
characterised by compromise more than by conflict. However, the framework has 
clear value for this project, because Scotland’s community justice field (which lies 
mainly but not entirely within its penal field) is complex for such a small country.842 
Scottish community justice can be considered in terms of competition and conflict 
between actors and institutions, sometimes with very different values and goals, 843 
and this framework highlights the ways in which it has been shaped by its unusual 
structure (whose two key characteristics are the inclusion of probation work within 
‘generic’ social work departments and within local authorities). This has meant 
Scotland’s community justice field includes not only ‘delivery’ agencies, but also 
other social work and local government institutions. The history of this field is 
largely one of compromise between local and national government, a tendency the 
current redesign continues. As discussed further below, the significance of ‘generic’ 
social work is cultural as well as structural, connected to the ‘Kilbrandon 
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philosophy’ and to notions of a distinctively Scottish approach to criminal justice. 
The penal field also highlights the complex ways in which the structure of 
community justice can affect its operation (Chapter 5). The removal of structural 
problems was a main motive for the restructuring of Scotland’s community justice 
field. 
This smaller field is constituted mainly by local authority CJSW departments, 
although in smaller authorities this workload is too small to be entirely separate, so 
CJSWs in rural areas might also do other social work. This falls short of the pre-
Kilbrandon situation in which part-time rural probation officers “might also be… 
inspectors of weights and measures”,844 but is still a problem for the development of 
a distinct CJSW identity. Despite the blurred boundary between CJSW and other 
social work, there is evidence that CJSW staff experience ‘double-marginalisation’ 
from social work and criminal justice.845 However, its location within ‘generic’ social 
work and local authority services brings powerful political organisations into the 
field, enabling the kind of resistance to change seen in the 2003 reform proposals 
and the current restructuring.846  
Third sector organisations (TSOs) are often contracted to provide services to 
offenders that social work departments are unable or unwilling to deliver. TSOs’ 
flexibility, and ability to provide services which complement those offered by CJSW, 
are highly valued – but TSOs are also marginalised (Chapter 5, Section 4). Much of 
their value comes from not being ‘full members’ of the public sector, but this also 
limits their influence. Furthermore, while public sector agencies (especially CJSW) 
enjoy considerable financial security, TSOs do not, and must devote significant time 
and effort to winning funding.  
At the next administrative level up, CJAs are regional organisations which aim to 
bring together CJSW and the more highly-funded TSO providers, as well as SPS and 
                                                     
844 Younghusband, 1978: 254 
845 McNeill et al., 2010: 37-8 
846 Morrison, 2015 
302 
 
other public bodies from inside and outside criminal justice, including the Crown 
Office, Police Scotland and local NHS boards. This brings these organisations to the 
edges of the community justice field. The CJAs’ elected members constitute a second 
interface between community justice and local government. However, CJAs are 
deeply flawed in structural ways.847  
The Structural Barriers 
The setup of CJAs emphasises the importance of partnership, also felt by 
practitioners to be vital to successful community justice practice. Among CJA staff 
in particular, partnership was both valued and a key part of their work. As with the 
development of generic social work,848 the rationale for this emphasis stemmed from 
ontological judgements about offenders, and others with social welfare needs – the 
complexity and diversity of these needs was seen to necessitate partnership with 
specialist agencies. Partnership has also been emphasised in public service reform 
following the Christie Report’s recommendations.849 
It was clear from the interviews that not everyone had successfully adapted to 
partnership working, or to the interposition, nine years previously, of the CJAs into 
the system. CJA interviewees especially emphasised that their colleagues sometimes 
had to be convinced of the merits of partnership working, but despite their 
structural flaws, CJAs were regarded as somewhat successful in promoting a 
partnership-oriented approach to community justice.850 But the emphasis on 
partnership means CJAs have almost no real power over partner agencies, because 
exercising that power would damage the relationships with partners;851 the setup 
also creates ‘tangled’ lines of accountability.852  This limits CJAs’ ability to function 
as accountability principals and, hence, their function as institutions of democracy 
(Chapter 6, Sections 2 and 3). The new system is intended to resolve the 
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accountability issue by leaving lines of accountability up to individual agencies;853 
the new national body will have minimal accountability powers, although the 2016 
Act allows for it to gain these later on.854 
However, the discussion of accountability in the redesign is similar to the policy’s 
approach to partnership. In both cases, the focus has been on structures, but 
structural change can only partly address the problem. This raises the question of 
what use a clear accountability structure is, if no one is actually held to account – 
and, conversely, whether the CJAs’ flawed accountability structure could have been 
used to hold CJSW to account if there had been a particularly serious failure. The 
structure of CJAs drastically limited their ability to hold CJSW to account, but it 
doesn’t necessarily follow that they would have used their powers if these 
impediments hadn’t existed. It is also notable that there have been no recent high-
profile failures of Scottish CJSW supervision of the sort that have drawn calls for 
more accountability in England and Wales.855 
Chapter 5’s discussion of partnership highlights the essential fragility of partnership 
in CJAs and similar organisations. Successful partnership working was seen as 
depending largely on informal relationships between individuals rather than on 
structural measures intended to facilitate it. This seems to be a common problem in 
other jurisdictions as well,856 but Scotland’s community justice field is characterised 
by a large number of very small organisations, meaning the number of interpersonal 
relationships staff need to cultivate could be very high.857 The new system may ease 
this development in some ways, by taking advantage of the connections made by 
CPPs, but will add further complexity by replacing eight CJAs with 32 local 
partnerships, and founding a new body which is expected to cultivate strong 
relationships with all of them.  
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The regular meetings of CJAs can also be understood as spaces in themselves, in 
which various interests – mostly local authorities – compete for power and 
resources, mainly section 27 funding. Accounts given by elected members portray 
CJAs as settings for compromise (and rarely conflict) between local authorities over 
this financial capital, but the CJA structure produces continuity rather than change 
in the distribution of funding, as spending plans must be unanimously approved 
and all but one of the CJAs have equal representation for local authorities regardless 
of population or workload. 
Dirigisme in the Penal Field 
A further aspect of power dynamics in and near the community justice field is the 
‘dirigiste’ character of the Scottish Government’s approach to community bodies.858 
The ‘empowerment’ of communities to deal with social problems has occurred 
mainly by imposing responsibilities on local bodies while giving them discretion as 
to the structural approaches by which to fulfil them; as Crawford put it, the state 
‘steers’ the boat while local bodies ‘row’ it.859 This tendency can be seen in the 2003 
Local Government in Scotland Act, which required local authorities to set up CPPs 
but left the detail at their discretion, allowing informal arrangements that preceded 
CPPs in some areas to continue;860 similarly the 2007 Concordat with COSLA 
widened the discretion available to local authorities but limited their fundraising 
ability.861 Recently, this approach has manifested in the health and social care 
integration – local authorities can decide which services are integrated and how (the 
legislation allows four possible structures), 862 as long as elderly social care and 
health are combined.863 Some local authority interviewees described integration 
plans which would include CJSW, which arguably has just as much potential as the 
community justice redesign to alter partnership structures.  
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The dirigiste approach takes on a particular edge in community justice, as shown in 
the separation of community justice responsibilities from mainstream community 
planning work (Chapter 3). Similarly to the health and social care integration, local 
partners will have some discretion as to structure; many are setting up formal 
‘community justice partnerships’ or ‘reducing reoffending partnerships’ alongside 
their CPPs. This will result in further structural variation between local areas and a 
further challenge for development of relationships between local partnerships and 
the national body.  
The Field in Transition 
Largely because of the fragility of partnerships, the restructuring of Scottish 
community justice has already been disruptive. Interviewees described partner 
organisations becoming less engaged because of the redesign, particularly as the 
length of the process (nearly five years) was producing a prolonged period of 
uncertainty – although this long consultation period was partly necessary to avoid 
the kind of hasty compromise that contributed to the structural flaws in CJAs. The 
interviews show CJA staff trying to ensure the transition to the new system would 
be as smooth as possible. Being similar to the ‘new partnership professionals’ 
described by Hughes,864 their approach involved using their partnership skills – 
building or strengthening relationships with local bodies. Smoothing the transition 
was also the rationale for the ‘shadow year’ in which both systems are operating in 
parallel.  
However, a smooth structural transition could also create problems – particularly if 
it fails to challenge established practices. This is supported by data from interview 
discussions about the early years of CJAs, which suggests CJSW in particular tended 
to see CJAs as essentially similar to the regional ‘Tough Option’ groupings which 
preceded them. This is probably partly because of a strong structural resemblance – 
four CJAs used the exact same groupings of local authorities as before, while the 
others were formed by merging two adjacent groups. As a result, CJAs struggled to 
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develop institutional identities of their own, and their functions – and the crucial 
differences from the previous groupings – were not always well understood. 
Interviewees from ‘merger’ CJAs also suggested divisions persisted within the 
partnerships along the previous lines.865 A similar issue can be found in the 
piecemeal development of CPPs, which can partly be attributed to the fact that the 
2003 Act aimed as far as possible to preserve pre-existing community planning 
structures and local partnerships; the structural continuity of longer-established 
partnerships put them at an advantage.866 
Interviews in this project suggest a degree of short-sightedness on the part of CJSW, 
and others have argued that its “double-marginalisation” has led its staff to “look 
inwards, to identify with their traditions, their teams and their peers, and to hold 
fast to established routines and practices.”867 This may partly account for the 
difficult transition of CJSW to more partnership working and desistance practice.868 
Despite the advantages of a minimally disruptive transition, it is possible that in 
doing so the redesign might miss an opportunity for challenging and developing 
CJSW practice. Nellis recently argued that CJSW is the “weak link in Scotland’s 
[ongoing] penal reimagining”, a process that has already included the decision to 
halt the construction of HMP Inverclyde,869 and – by contrast with the structural 
focus of the community justice redesign – an apparently more paradigmatic shift in 
discourse by the Scottish Prison Service (SPS).  
Traditionally a more punitively-inclined institution, SPS has – particularly since the 
2012 appointment of Colin McConnell as Chief Executive – shifted in its language 
towards more desistance-oriented approaches. McConnell called for “a reworking 
of the ethos of imprisonment around the principles of parsimony and 
rehabilitation”,870 and SPS’ approach to this was crystallised in the 2013 
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organisational review whose title became the SPS motto – Unlocking Potential, 
Transforming Lives.871 The review set out a new vision for SPS with desistance 
research at its heart,872 and recommended more collaboration with other services 
including community justice.873 Perhaps unwilling to overstep its remit, SPS has 
rarely acknowledged the argument advanced in Scotland’s Choice for a major 
reduction in imprisonment,874 referring instead to making efforts to reduce “repeat 
business”.875 Whether the apparent shift towards desistance will produce lasting, 
substantive change is not yet certain. A recent inspection of Polmont Young 
Offenders’ Institution, which found “only just over a third of the population 
engaged constructively in daily activities”, is perhaps a reminder that discourse 
may change more easily than reality.876 Schinkel’s research suggests that 
imprisonment in Scotland does not always support desistance,877 while Nugent and 
Schinkel have highlighted that desistance is not without painful aspects.878 Finally, 
with ‘agonistic’ perspectives in mind,879 it is necessary to consider that punitive 
tendencies may be lying dormant within the organisation, ready to surface if the 
political mood changes. Nonetheless, the change in SPS still appears to approach the 
kind of cultural and imaginative reorientation, with some commitment to a defined 
penal rationale, which so far has been lacking in the restructuring of community 
justice. 880  
Some interviewees also described the consultation process itself as a site in which 
power relations had played out with consequences for the shape of the field. Local 
authorities were seen as able to dominate the consultation, particularly the 
discussion-based events where their representation outweighed that of other 
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organisations community justice organisations. This contributed to the compromise 
between local and national government that has characterised the redesign, 
especially in the two-tier nature of the new system.  This will hand most of the 
responsibilities held by CJAs over to local partnerships, and form a new national 
body, Community Justice Scotland (CJS). 
Many interviewees took the view that this was insufficient, and that what was 
necessary was a cultural reorientation, not a restructuring, of Scotland’s penal field. 
As Coyle remarked of the previous restructuring, there is no evidence that the 
structure of community justice has direct effects on its stated objectives – reducing 
reoffending and imprisonment.881 The imagined reorientation described by many 
interviewees would entail a more humane system in which community penalties 
had far greater prominence, and – perhaps reflecting frustrations with partnership 
structures – there was more agreement and cohesion about goals and methods. It 
would be wider in scope than the current restructuring, and would entail 
embedding welfarist and desistance values into the wider penal field. Some 
versions of this idea were more grandiose than others, and there was often 
vagueness about exactly what it would involve. To some degree it was likely an 
imaginative response to longstanding frustrations with the existing system. 
However, the theme was too widespread, and often expressed in too much detail, to 
be dismissed – the desire for major and more cultural change was genuine and 
deeply felt among the interviewees. This thesis has shown that there is a legitimacy 
problem for community justice in Scotland, as in other jurisdictions, which limits its 
value as a diversionary measure. As Scotland’s Choice and the Angiolini Report have 
argued,882 there needs to be major cultural change in Scotland’s penal field if the 
promise of community penalties is to be realised. Cohen describes a “schizoid split” 
in justice reform efforts, between the potential for radical change and the more 
short-term and tangible promise of minor, more achievable reforms.883 The redesign 
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is clearly the latter type, but it was the former that came often to mind in discussions 
of how the redesign and Scotland’s penal field related to key political questions 
about Scotland and community justice. 
3. The Right Profile 
A common problem for community justice, discussed in both the academic 
literature (see Chapter 2) and in the interviews for this project, was the low profile 
of community justice among politicians, sentencers and the wider public.884 This 
seems to be common across a number of jurisdictions and for much of the history of 
this part of criminal justice; it is ironic that prison – a mode of punishment which 
isolates from the wider public – should enjoy more public awareness. This deficit is 
a complex cultural and political problem, but when it has been acknowledged by 
the Scottish Government, it has been discussed only briefly and in simplistic terms 
(Chapter 6, Section 5 and 6). It is necessary instead to consider it as combining 
several distinct but interlinked issues – a lack of interest or awareness on the part of 
politicians, and a low level of awareness and legitimacy for community sanctions on 
the part of the wider public. There is also an apparent unwillingness on the part of 
some sentencers to impose community sanctions. 
Within the Scottish penal field, community justice occupies a position of little 
prominence, with little cultural and symbolic capital in the penal field or awareness 
in the wider public sphere. It enjoys little public awareness and a minimal presence 
in popular culture and in the news media (where what coverage does appear tends 
to concern high-profile failures of supervision).885 The news media tend also to 
report the most serious (and rare) crimes,886 which almost always receive prison 
sentences, reinforcing the cultural predominance of prison. The lack of cultural 
representations of community punishments compared to other elements of the 
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justice system (as highlighted by Mawby and Worrall in England and Wales)887 
means this area of criminal justice lacks cultural resources through which it can 
represent itself to the wider public in Scotland. 
The deficit may have the effect of weakening public trust in community penalties, 
but this is not certain – research from England and Wales suggests that most 
members of the public believed probation was performing well, but would not be as 
quick to name it as a punishment.888 Its effect is also not immediately clear; while 
there is no reason to suppose that low public awareness would affect the efficacy of 
community punishments, there is a democratic argument in favour of raising their 
profile – that citizens should be more aware of the punishments carried out in their 
name, and that this awareness could be valuable in raising political and civic 
awareness (including of the causes of crime).889 Other research suggests that more 
democratic engagement, particularly deliberatively and at the local level, could help 
build public support for community justice and promote a more empathetic view of 
offenders.890 There may be the potential for Scottish community justice to become 
part of a wider public conversation about criminal justice, as was attempted by at 
least one CJA.891 Where deliberative democracy research has discussed criminal 
justice, this has tended to focus on restorative justice and problem-solving courts, 
arguing for their value in promoting ‘civic accountability’ and public deliberation.892 
The core activity of Scottish community justice – CJSW supervision and writing 
court reports – would perhaps not be as well suited to public engagement (and is 
subject to strict confidentiality rules), although the existing CPP framework offered 
an opportunity for more democratic engagement by the community justice system. 
The potential for such engagement is especially interesting in Scotland, where the 
Kilbrandon philosophy, and hence the structure of the system itself, are geared 
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towards responding to complex social needs – as was emphasised, nearly 50 years 
after the 1968 Act, by interviewees in this project. 
As discussed further in Chapter 2, the low public profile of community justice can 
contribute to the so-called ‘paradox of probation’, wherein community sentences 
intended as diversions from the prison system become feed lines into it;893 one way 
in which this happens, ironically, is through attempts to gain public legitimacy by 
‘toughening’ the system’s approach to people who breach community sentences.894 
Without a strong profile of their own, community sentences become – at policy and 
individual sentencing level – merely ‘alternatives to imprisonment’. There appears 
to be little academic research on public perceptions of community justice in Scotland 
specifically, and this could be a fruitful area of future research. 
Invisibility in the Scottish Penal Field 
Although the problem is common across a number of jurisdictions, the low profile 
of Scottish community justice is exacerbated by its structural characteristics. Because 
it is locally delivered and managed, and part of ‘generic’ social work, community 
justice in Scotland lacks a voice that can represent CJSW (and only CJSW) at the 
level of national government and politics,895 and in the national media. However, 
this structural situation has also afforded connections to powerful social work and 
local government bodies (ADSW and COSLA) which enabled CJSW to resist forced 
integration with SPS and reorganisation along national lines.896 Arguably, the 
involvement of such powerful bodies in the debate about the future of community 
justice counterbalances the lack of everyday awareness among politicians. 
SPS and Police Scotland do have leadership and a political voice at a national level. 
The continued predominance of prison is particularly relevant for community 
justice, and highlights further complexities of Scotland’s penal field. From one 
perspective, SPS is the main ‘rival’ to community justice in the ‘marketplace’ of 
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punishment, and the success of community justice, particularly in the current 
context, is measured in how much it can reduce imprisonment (although as noted 
above the number of custodial sentences has increased at the same time as that of 
community sentences).897  However, SPS under its new leadership has emphasised 
partnership and interdependency with community justice, 898 acknowledging that: 
“It is an uncomfortable truth that providing opportunities in custody to 
build strengths, skills and abilities will be ineffectual if not accompanied 
with the development of positive networks, resources and opportunities in 
the community.”899 
Partnership approaches between SPS and community justice services (sometimes 
involving CJAs) have been developed with this in mind, seeking also to bridge the 
‘gap’ in supervision between custody and community.900 Still, the position of SPS as 
the large and well-funded national organisation, in partnership with smaller and 
less well-resourced agencies, has tended to tip the balance of power.901 SPS has 
arguably begun to encroach on the natural territory of community justice – it is now 
likely, for instance, that the ‘Community Justice Centres’ recommended by the 
Angiolini Report as a replacement for Cornton Vale will be run by SPS rather than 
partnerships of social work and health as originally envisioned.902 SPS has symbolic 
capital in Scotland’s penal field linked to the position of prison in popular culture, 
and to more abstract characteristics – prisons are clearly spatially delineated and in 
some senses understood by the wider public.903 SPS also has more resource capital – 
over three times the budget of the community justice system while dealing with 
fewer people.904 The boundaries between the organisations and systems of 
community justice and prison are complex, and sometimes contain contradictory 
impulses. Both are influenced by extrinsic factors such as sentencing and financial 
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constraints. These aspects of this part of Scotland’s penal field are likely further to 
hinder efforts to promote community justice as an alternative to prison, when the 
two seem (perhaps increasingly) to share some objectives. 
One of the main themes in the interview data was a deeply felt desire for cultural 
change (Chapter 6) which would include a much higher profile for community 
justice and its institutions. This change can be understood as a reorientation of 
Scotland’s penal field towards community justice – a question not just of structures 
but of culture and values. The historically very different values of criminal justice 
institutions are a potential obstacle to this, as they have also been to partnership 
approaches.905 The restructuring of Scotland’s community justice system will abolish 
the CJAs and create a new national agency (CJS), while handing most of the CJAs’ 
former responsibilities to local partnerships. Although ostensibly at the centre of the 
post-Christie reorientation of Scotland’s public services, and intended to work 
closely with the new local partnerships, CPPs also suffer from a lack of public 
awareness.906  
Because of the structure and timing of the redesign consultation, and particularly 
the fact that CPPs already existed at the time – and thus could have some say about 
new responsibilities for local partners – the duty of raising the profile of community 
justice has fallen to CJS. Its position as a national agency could be advantageous in 
engaging with MSPs and the media, but less so in engaging locally with the wider 
public. The new body will be small and likely to have little in the way of resources. 
It will also have very little power over local partnerships, being unable to hold them 
to account or to direct outcomes, meaning that – as several interviewees remarked – 
it will be difficult for CJS to defend community justice or to be seen to hold agencies 
to account in the event of a major failure of supervision. 
The way in which the burdensome and hard to understand ‘champion’ role has 
been dumped on a body that cannot refuse it, and the extremely limited explanation 
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of the role given by the Government, suggest that the ‘champion’ role has not been 
properly worked out through the process of the redesign. There has been a failure to 
imagine what it would entail, and there is no reason to expect CJS to succeed in it. 
Increasing the use of community punishments by sentencers, meanwhile, would 
likely require further intervention in sentencing rather than alterations to 
community justice.  
All of this leaves the prison still in a dominant position in Scotland’s penal field. 
There is currently little sign that the ‘paradox of probation’ is unfolding in 
Scotland,907 although the number of community sentences has increased sharply, 
mostly at the expense of fines.908 The continued emphasis on social work values 
within the system would likely serve as a source of resistance against it becoming a 
feed line into imprisonment, but the lack of public profile and national leadership 
for community justice robs the Scottish penal field of a structural defence against 
such an eventuality.  
4. Penal Distinctiveness and Prevention in Scotland 
A Distinctive History? 
Chapter 2 considered the history of community justice in Scotland with particular 
reference to its connection to Scotland’s distinct criminal justice identity. The current 
redesign policy is set in this context, but also considered in terms of what many 
interviewees described as the need for a major cultural change in Scottish criminal 
justice and policy. This is connected to the wider context of Scotland’s development 
of distinctive approaches to other social policy. 
Much of the historical work on penal policy in Scotland has highlighted its 
difference from that of England and Wales. Particularly since devolution, Scottish 
criminologists have charted policy convergences and divergences with England and 
Wales, with devolution leading counterintuitively to ‘detartanisation’ as the new 
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Labour-led Parliament adopted increasingly punitive policies, followed by a period 
of ‘retartanisation’ from 2007 as the SNP government sought to reaffirm Scotland’s 
distinctiveness in this area.909 Central to this distinctive ‘penal identity’ is the 1964 
Kilbrandon Report and the associated ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’.910 As well as 
producing the Children’s Hearings System, Kilbrandon led to the 1966 report Social 
Work in the Community and thence the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act. The 1966 
report’s development of the Kilbrandon philosophy hinged partly on the idea that 
an approach which minimised the stigma of offending could help to reduce social 
inequality in Scotland.911 There is not a straightforward relationship between 
Scotland’s penal identity and the redesign of community justice in Scotland, but 
both are connected to bigger questions about Scottish policy and national identity. 
One distinctive feature of Scottish penal policy – although one also considered in 
England and Wales around the same time912 – has been the structure of community 
justice. The inclusion of probation in generic social work enacted the Kilbrandon 
ethos in the structure of Scotland’s penal field, making an explicit statement of 
intent – to treat people with convictions as people with unmet social welfare needs. 
Although now over fifty years old, and not without problems of its own, this idea 
continues to shape Scottish practitioners’ perceptions of the function of community 
justice,913 as the interviews in this project also show. As McNeill and colleagues 
found, the CJSW habitus is characterised by welfarist and Kilbrandon-derived 
principles, which produced a ‘hysteresis’ effect of late and mismatched adaptation 
to the increasingly risk-based discourse that began to emerge in the early to mid-
2000s. This fed into the sense of alienation from other parts of the system,914 
although Fenton (more recently) has found this starting to change as younger staff, 
who experience less ethical stress in relation to such ‘neoliberal’ developments in 
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practice, enter the CJSW workforce (as Mawby and Worrall also found with their 
‘offender manager’ ideal type in English/Welsh probation).915 The Scottish 
restructuring is unlikely in itself to affect CJSW practice or habitus, although CJS 
could potentially do so through the development of national staff development 
programmes, for which it will have responsibility.  
The redesign, as a number of interviewees noted, is a structural change and has little 
to do with penal philosophy. Unlike in the previous restructuring, where the 
possibility of a Correctional Service for Scotland raised the alarming spectre of a 
prison-dominated service and a ‘detartanising’ move towards ‘correctionalism’,916 
the current redesign has not been viewed as a danger to the social work values of 
community justice in Scotland, at least not since the decision, early in the process, 
that CJSW will keep its place in the community justice field. In community justice 
restructuring, it is in fact England and Wales that has diverged the most – from 
Europe as well as Scotland – in the part-privatisation of its probation services.917 
As discussed above, interviewees often claimed that there needed to be major 
cultural change in Scotland, which would include the reorientation of Scotland’s 
penal field away from imprisonment and towards community penalties. This 
dramatic shift also had to do with the need for a cohesive penal policy – one in 
which all parts of the system worked together to achieve the same high-level policy 
aims (reducing reoffending and imprisonment), rather than fulfilling their own 
proximate short-term goals and obligations. This perceived need for cohesion also 
had to do with geography; the fragmentation and inconsistency of service provision 
in Scotland, which is partly a function of (without being necessitated by) its 
geographical diversity, was a further hindrance to this.918 However, a major tension 
exists between cohesion at a national level and the perceived need for a system that 
is responsive to the local needs and conditions, and the nationalisation of Scottish 
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policing was seen by many interviewees as a cautionary example of the dangers of 
overcentralisation and disengagement from local communities (Chapter 6, Section 
4).  
Austerity is the Mother of Prevention 
The current redesign of community justice cannot be constitutive of Scotland’s penal 
identity in the way that generic social work has been, but it is implicated in complex 
ways with other distinctive aspects of recent Scottish social policy. Scotland has 
been described as having a distinctive social welfare tradition, with roots in the 
Reformation, continuing through the Kilbrandon Report and appearing in the 
present day in policies such as Getting It Right for Every Child.919 Recently this has 
been expressed in Scotland’s response to public spending cuts imposed by a 
Conservative-led (and, latterly, Conservative) Westminster government that is 
unpopular in Scotland, and in the campaigning for Scottish independence leading 
up to the 2014 referendum.920 As a Scottish nationalist party with comparatively 
little experience in power, the SNP has sought to assure voters of its “managerial 
competence” to run Scotland since its Holyrood election victory in 2007 – including 
but not limited to in criminal justice policy.921 The SNP government – which had an 
overall Parliamentary majority between 2011 and 2016 – has been both empowered 
and required to demonstrate this competence, while also mitigating the impact of 
the cuts in a distinctively Scottish way which also seeks to reduce inequality. This 
has led the Scottish Government to pursue the reorientation of public services 
following the recommendations of the 2011 Christie Report: community 
empowerment, integrated service provision, the prevention of negative outcomes 
and more efficiency through shared resources.922 It is likely that the Christie 
Commission will come to be seen as a distinctive model for Scottish public service 
delivery.923 The reforms entail placing CPPs at the centre of reform efforts and 
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attempting to strengthen them through the 2015 Community Empowerment Act.924 
The integration of health and social care within local authorities under the Public 
Bodies (Joint Working) Act has been a flagship policy for prevention and integrated 
resource-sharing services. The prevention principle is potentially of enormous 
value, morally and financially, and a full shift of Scottish public services towards 
prevention could be a revolutionary – and distinctive – step for Scotland. 
Community justice is an unusual position in relation to prevention, an issue raised 
in the debate leading up to the 2016 Community Justice (Scotland) Act. The 
Government has taken the line that community justice services should be defined, 
fairly traditionally, as secondary or tertiary prevention – concerned with preventing 
further offences after conviction – despite arguments from some MSPs that the 
system should become involved with ‘primary prevention’ of crime.925 By contrast, 
England and Wales has distinguished itself by using the need to reduce costs as a 
rationale for marketising probation services.926 Despite the potential value of 
applying community justice expertise to the primary prevention of crime, this 
would likely entail significant additional costs, without the degree of control over 
outcomes that the National Objectives and Standards have brought; given the 
pressures on social work budgets, money allocated for prevention could easily be 
diverted to core CJSW business. In addition, prevention savings are not easily 
quantified and this is perhaps especially true of crime (Chapter 5, Section 5). Critical 
perspectives on community approaches to crime control, particularly Cohen’s 
Visions of Social Control,927 have highlighted the fact that the movement of criminal 
justice work ‘out’ into the community means the stigmatising effects of contact with 
the justice system are more widely spread. This ‘net-widening’ would be a 
significant potential disadvantage of involving community justice in primary 
prevention. 
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As Chapter 3 has argued, the new justice responsibilities for local partnerships will 
be kept separate ‘mainstream’ community planning, in what is both an 
understandable effort to shield community justice from the failings of CPPs and a 
missed opportunity to bring together the community justice and community 
empowerment agendas. However, the new framework could be an opportunity for 
community justice to develop valuable links to relevant ‘primary prevention’ 
services such as Community Safety Partnerships, from which CJAs were isolated.928 
As McAra notes, “Scotland is a country of many contradictions”,929 and its penal 
policy is not as straightforwardly distinctive or welfarist as the importance accorded 
to the Kilbrandon philosophy might first suggest.930 Its imprisonment rate is close to 
that of England and Wales,931 and the prison population has mostly continued to 
grow during this time.932 Scotland continues – despite its famously enlightened 
approach to youth justice – to have one of the lowest ages of criminal responsibility 
in Europe,933 although this will soon change.934 The apparent ‘retartanisation’ of the 
SNP years has been marked by some illiberal justice policies,935 including the 
proliferation of stop and search of young people on a scale sometimes well beyond 
the better-known excesses of English police.936 In reference to wider questions about 
social welfare and equality, Mooney and Scott argue that “While much is made of 
Enlightenment ideas of progress, universality and rationality, in the context of a 
hugely unequal, polarised and class, gender and ethnically divided Scotland, such 
ideas will remain simply as rhetoric if these social inequalities are not 
challenged.”937 A reorientation of Scotland’s penal field towards community justice 
and away from imprisonment would be a dramatic step for the further development 
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of Scotland’s ‘penal identity’ as a jurisdiction with more welfarist and community-
oriented approaches to crime and punishment than England and Wales. Although 
this was an idea expressed by many interviewees, it is not what the current redesign 
will bring about. This structural reconfiguration represents a failure of imagination 
in Scottish penal policy that is at odds with the idea of a distinctive, welfarist penal 
identity. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the composition of Scotland’s community justice field, 
and how the redesign will alter it, drawing on two overarching concepts from the 
fieldwork interviews: first, the idea that the structure of that field is implicated in 
the effectiveness of community justice, and that the redesign was intended to 
improve it, and second, the idea that a more ambitious and conceptual shift in 
Scottish criminal justice was needed, or at least desirable, and that the current 
restructuring did not provide this. These informed the discussion about a major 
issue for community justice in this and other jurisdictions – its low public profile – 
and how this is connected to the unique structure of Scottish community justice. 
This thesis has argued that, while a higher profile for community justice is both 
necessary and desired by many, the current restructuring has avoided the question 
of how to raise that profile. 
A further key aspect of any discussion of Scottish justice policy is the idea that 
Scotland’s political culture and penal policy are distinct from other countries, 
particularly England and Wales – with the ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ seen as 
emblematic of this distinction. As well as continuing to influence much of the 
content of the discussion about community justice and its purposes, the structural 
legacy of Kilbrandon – generic social work within local authorities – is something 
the redesign both responds to and continues. This chapter has highlighted 
connections and similarities to other elements of Scottish social policy which can be 
described as distinctive, particularly the decision to mitigate the impact of austerity 




This chapter has considered some key findings from both the empirical and the 
literature research parts of this project, connecting themes from the interview 
discussions to the wider literature and setting them in the theoretical framework of 
the penal field. It now returns to the original research questions:  
1. What historical processes have structured the Scottish community justice 
field? 
2. What are the likely effects of the reforms on the structures of this field? 
3. How will the habitus of people working in different parts of community 
justice adapt to these structural changes? 
This final section answers these questions, drawing on the range of research 
detailed in the thesis. 
Historical Processes 
The main historical processes that have structured Scotland’s community justice 
field are the dynamics of local and central control, the development of Scotland’s 
‘distinctive’ penal identity, the growth of community- and partnership-oriented 
approaches to crime and other social problems in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK, 
the imposition of austerity policies from Westminster following the financial crisis 
and the longstanding legitimacy problem of community penalties. 
As Chapter 2 argued, the main structural features of Scottish community justice – 
the position as part of generic social work, within local authorities, rather than part 
of a national criminal justice institution, were laid by the 1968 Social Work 
(Scotland) Act. This is a structural expression of the ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’, and 
thus a major part of Scotland’s distinctive penal identity. The empirical part of this 
project found evidence that the Kilbrandon ethos – the idea that offenders should be 
treated as adults with unmet social needs – continues to inform practitioners’ views 
of their work. 
322 
 
It should be noted that local control had been a distinctive part of the Scottish 
system since its inception,938 and that a similar generic social work system was 
considered in the 1960s in England and Wales.939 In this, as in other areas, Scotland 
was perhaps less distinctive than it might appear, but the idea of forging and 
restating a distinctive penal identity for Scotland – especially a less punitive and 
more communitarian one than that of England and Wales – continued to inform the 
development of community justice in Scotland. 
More recently, Scotland has – like some other jurisdictions – responded to high 
imprisonment rates by trying to increase the use of community penalties. In 1989, 
prison disorder connected to overcrowded conditions led the Scottish Office to ring-
fence funding for social work with offenders.940 Since 2007, the SNP government 
appeared to be attempting to reemphasise Scottish penal distinctiveness by 
reversing the ‘detartanisation’ of the Labour years (although not completely or 
straightforwardly).941 The publication of Scotland’s Choice brought a new impetus to 
reduce the prison population, then at its highest.942 The result was the simplification 
of community sentences, creating the Community Payback Order, shortly followed 
by the community justice redesign. However, evidence from Scotland’s history and 
other jurisdictions suggests that community sentences do not function well as a 
‘lever’ for reducing imprisonment rates, the current restructuring is anyway 
disconnected from sentencing. This is connected to a general, long-term cultural 
problem – a lack of legitimacy for community justice in general, especially 
compared to prison. Although community sentences are more common and in 
many respects preferable, prison enjoys more public awareness and legitimacy. By 
allocating to CJS a difficult ‘champion’ role, without any explanation of how it 
would be fulfilled, the redesign has made it very difficult to address this issue. 
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Although the public profile of community justice probably has little connection to 
its effectiveness or to sentencing practices, it is of democratic value. 
Since ring-fenced CJSW funding was introduced – a period which has seen the 
reorganisation of Scotland’s local authorities, and the creation of its national 
Parliament – conflict and compromise between local and national government has 
been vital in shaping the structure of the field on three occasions: the creation of the 
Tough Option groupings in 1998, CJAs in 2005-7 and now the development of the 
two-tier system. This compromise also affected the length of the recent consultation, 
which was identified in empirical data as contributing to the disengagement of 
partners from the system. 
The imposition of austerity cuts by the Westminster government – both unpopular 
in Scotland – has required the SNP to develop a distinctive approach to public 
service reform. Austerity has also heightened the need to reduce the costs of 
reoffending and imprisonment, and entailed further financial pressures on 
community justice, especially TSOs. The wider reform programmes have also been 
an important contextual factor: culturally, through the emphasis on partnership and 
the idea of community justice as a preventive service, and potentially structurally, 
through the integration of CJSW with health and social care in some areas. As part 
of the reform, CPPs are to take a more prominent role in general, while also 
potentially becoming involved with community justice, although community justice 
is being kept separate from the community planning framework (Chapter 3). 
Consideration of CPPs has also highlighted issues common to community justice 
partnerships and other community partnership approaches. 
The primary structural characteristics of Scotland’s community justice field were 
established in 1968, and continue to exert major structural and cultural influence. 
More recent pressures have produced several restructurings, but all have fallen 
short of the kind of major cultural change hoped for by many practitioners in the 
system – including the most recent redesign.  
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Restructuring the Field 
After lengthy consultation and refinement, the details of the policy are now clear 
and the necessary primary legislation has been passed.943 The CJAs will close at the 
end of March 2017, after just over a decade of operation. Their responsibilities will 
have passed by this point to 32 local partnerships, which include local authorities as 
well as other justice and public sector organisations.944 While the initial intention 
was to pass these responsibilities directly to CPPs (but with separation from their 
main community planning work), it now appears local authorities will instead set 
up justice-specific partnerships which might connect with CPPs – the Government’s 
‘dirigiste’ approach allowing a degree of discretion which will probably increase 
local variation in community justice structures. As part of efforts to smooth the 
transition to the new system, the 2016-17 financial year is a ‘shadow year’ in which 
CJAs operate alongside the new partnerships, building relationships with them to 
familiarise them with key issues and ensure their outcomes are aligned to those in 
CJA plans.  
The restructuring will remove the element of political and electoral accountability 
that the CJA system aimed to inject into community justice through the inclusion of 
elected members.945 This novel aspect was not very successful in increasing political 
accountability or awareness, but can be seen as a step towards resolving a question 
about the role of politics and democracy in the justice system – which the redesign 
will reverse rather than building on. 
One of the Angiolini Report’s criticisms was that Scotland’s community justice field 
was a “cluttered landscape” of many small organisations.946 However, by switching 
from eight CJAs to 32 new partnerships, the redesign will increase the number of 
small organisations and partners in the system. Partnership working will therefore 
require more links between individuals in different agencies and areas, particularly 
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if projects that work across local boundaries are to be continued. It is likely, as one 
interviewee remarked, that at least some of the relationships between local 
authorities that developed under the previous systems will persist, and old 
divisions could also remain. The proliferation of agencies involved is seen by third-
sector providers as a particular source of concern, because it will increase further the 
significant time and effort expended in negotiation with public sector contractors. 
The new national body will be established in October 2016. With a board of 5-8 
members and a staff of approximately 20, it will be about the size of the eight CJAs 
put together.947 The board’s composition is not yet known; there is potential for it to 
promote more desistance-oriented approaches if it includes voices from academic 
criminology and/or former service users as well as the justice sector. CJS will have 
little power over the local partnerships – it was agreed during the consultation that 
there would be no accountability relationship948 – but will be able to report on 
partnerships’ progress against their reducing reoffending plans and provide 
support and advice. The Act enables CJS to compel the partnerships to publish its 
reports on them, and to require partnerships to notify CJS of their responses,949 and 
for CJS to gain further powers in future.950 CJS will be able to commission some 
services at nationally, but it is expected most will be commissioned locally by the 
partnerships. 951 CJS will also be the closest thing this part of the system has to a 
national ‘voice’, although with less power and less connection to ‘frontline’ work 
than the leadership of prisons or police. This and other factors (Chapter 6) are likely 
to hinder its role as a ‘champion’ for community justice. The body will also contain a 
new ‘Hub for Learning, Innovation and Development’, which will have the role of 
sharing best practice, staff development and carrying out some research in 
accordance with the national strategy.952 
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The redesign was meant to rectify some of the structural problems with Scottish 
community justice considered above; it can be expected to eliminate some of these 
problems, but also create some of its own – while failing to address some longer-
term and more important issues. 
Habitus and Adaptation 
Although a national CJSW service was briefly considered,953 it soon became clear 
that CJSW would remain where it was in local authority structures. It is not likely 
that the redesign will dramatically affect the habitus of CJSW practice. There is, 
though, the potential for some change to occur through the national training 
programmes for which CJS will have responsibility. At this stage, it is too soon to 
determine how these programmes will affect frontline practice, and the extent to 
which it will be possible for them to do so; it certainly could not be considered a 
necessary consequence of the redesign per se.  
For all parties involved, the essentially fragile nature of partnerships in Scotland, 
and the multiplicity of small agencies, will mean that adapting to the new system 
will require developing new working relationships. Third sector staff have already 
had to adapt to the shift to more conditional funding, and to additional financial 
pressures resulting from public sector budget cuts; the redesign will require further 
adaptation in this direction as the number of contracting bodies increases (and the 
financial pressures are unlikely to lessen).  
For CJA staff the picture was different – they will no longer have jobs after the CJAs 
close. For some time, they have been using the partnership-oriented practice 
developed through working in CJAs to make links with local partners and prepare 
them for their new responsibilities, in order to minimise the disruption of the 
transition. Local partners will have to take on CJAs’ responsibilities for planning 
community justice in their areas; some will have to build new working relationships 
with justice bodies. However, by keeping justice planning separate from community 
planning, the redesign avoids much change to mainstream CPP practice. For 
                                                     




partners, the process of community justice planning will mostly be similar to the 
types of work they already do with CPPs – meetings between different 
organisations.  
In relation to the redesign, there is less to say about adaptation and practice than 
about historical developments and the structure of the penal field. For the most part 
the new system will entail more of the same work rather than anything qualitatively 
different. As was argued above, the redesign has aimed to minimise disruption and 
in doing so has limited the possibility of changing community justice practice.  
Final Remarks 
When this project began, it was far from clear what the Scottish community justice 
reforms would involve, or where exactly the research would lead. This project, the 
only empirical study of the current redesign of Scotland’s community justice 
system, has set the policy in the context of the system’s history and of power 
dynamics in Scotland’s community justice field, as well as considering the 
relationship between criminal justice, local democratic structures, community 
partnership approaches to crime control, and the redesign policy. Using thematic 
analysis of qualitative interviews with practitioners and politicians, it has 
highlighted structural problems with Scotland’s community justice field, while 
arguing that the redesign will only solve some of these problems, and is likely to 
create its own – it will be at most a step towards a resolution.  
A key argument in the interview data, connected to Scotland’s distinct penal 
identity in the context of debate about Scotland’s future, was that a major cultural 
change is needed in Scottish criminal justice. The thesis has drawn on this and other 
evidence to argue that such a change is necessary to fulfil the potential of 
community justice and reduce Scotland’s reliance on imprisonment. This is 
connected to the project’s most important implication for Scottish community justice 
policy – the importance of imagination. Despite the initial rhetoric of a new vision 
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for community justice,954 the restructuring policy rapidly became mired in structural 
questions.955 Future community justice policy should proceed with the possibility of 
“penal reimagining” in mind;956 consideration should be given to asking questions 
not just about structure but about what the system should do and why. 
The thesis has also highlighted particular aspects of the redesign with more concrete 
lessons for future policy. The length of time involved in the redesign consultation 
process has produced a long period of uncertainty, which has had disruptive effects 
– particularly for CJAs, which will have spent nearly half their operating lives 
dealing with the policy by the time it takes full effect. The slowness of the redesign 
is understandable, given that hasty compromise contributed to the structural 
problems with CJAs;957 however, the current policy has arguably made the opposite 
error, keeping the field in a long, disruptive period of enforced uncertainty. This 
research has also highlighted that despite the emphasis on developing robust 
structures for partnership working, partnerships in Scotland remain essentially 
fragile and contingent, and the restructuring is unlikely to ameliorate this.  
This thesis also has implications, and raises potential areas and questions, for 
academic research on community justice in Scotland and elsewhere. It has 
demonstrated the theoretical value of the ‘penal field’ as a way of thinking about 
penal change in Scotland, a jurisdiction notable for its complex network of 
institutions involved in community justice.958 Future research could make use of the 
penal field in researching other areas of Scottish criminal justice, or community 
justice in other jurisdictions, with particular reference to policies intended to 
restructure these fields. As suggested above, the boundaries and interfaces between 
community justice and SPS could be one fertile area for this work. The thesis has 
also demonstrated the methodological value of gathering data from multiple 
perspectives – by bringing together accounts from practitioners, policymakers and 
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politicians, it has been able to offer views of different parts of Scottish community 
justice, and to consider key points of similarity and difference. This thesis has also 
traced connections between the restructuring of community justice and other 
policies affecting the structure of local public services. Future research could 
consider other interfaces between Scottish local government, prevention and 
criminal justice, particularly in light of recent arguments for giving local authorities 
more control of policing.959 
The thesis considered the structural functioning of CJAs, and the experiences of CJA 
staff. These institutions are still fairly new, and serve as an interesting example of 
new justice institutions which do not work with offenders, but have complex 
administration and planning responsibilities. CJA staff, particularly Chief Officers, 
exemplify in some ways the new partnership professionals described by Hughes,960 
and their accounts chimed with Cohen’s description of technocratic and privileged 
managerial crime control professionals, who nonetheless have somewhat critical 
views of criminal justice and innovative ideas about resolving the problems and 
contradictions within it.961 Future research could take a similar approach, although 
perhaps with a more ethnographic method (similar to Souhami’s work on youth 
justice agencies),962 to the new community justice system. This could include 
studying local partners’ adaptation to new responsibilities, but would perhaps be 
especially fruitful in studying Community Justice Scotland, where it would be 
possible to observe the creation of the organisation from scratch. It could consider 
how the body approaches its challenging work and the process of developing a 
distinct institutional identity (which data from this project suggest was an early 
challenge for CJAs).  
In discussing the problem of legitimacy and awareness, this thesis has highlighted 
the need for further research on public perceptions of community justice in 
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Scotland, beyond the limited work on this by the Scottish Government when 
developing the CPO.963 Such research could be particularly valuable in investigating 
whether and how perceptions about justice are connected to perceptions of national 
identity in post-referendum Scotland. This is connected to another potential area of 
future research – this thesis has shown a need for cultural change that goes beyond 
restructuring community justice to reorient Scotland’s penal field. Some 
jurisdictions have succeeded in reorienting their penal field away from 
imprisonment – in particular, Finland and other Nordic countries have been cited as 
examples of successful penal reorientation in polities similar to Scotland.964 While 
there is significant comparative research on why some countries have experienced 
the ‘penal turn’ more than others,965 and a growing body of comparative community 
justice scholarship,966 there is not presently any academic comparative research 
examining the reasons why Scotland specifically has not had the same success, and 
what specific lessons it could learn from other jurisdictions. 
The above is a non-exhaustive selection of potential implications of the research for 
policy (particularly justice policy) in Scotland, and for future academic research in 
and around this field. Ultimately, this thesis has shown that the circumscription of 
Scotland’s penal field has created missed opportunities to reimagine structurally 
and culturally the potential of community justice, and these are likely to limit its 
future usefulness in reducing reoffending and imprisonment. In doing so, the thesis 
has argued that the redesign is a structural change – its direct significance limited, 
its direct results likely impermanent967 – but that it is closely connected to a range of 
questions about justice, policy, government and national identity in Scotland.  
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Appendix A: Glossary of Abbreviations 
ADSW: Association of Directors of Social Work 
ASBO: Antisocial Behaviour Order 
CAQDAS: Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
CCPOA: California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association 
CDRP(s): Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership(s) 
CETS: Church of England Temperance Society 
CJA: Community Justice Authority 
CJS: Community Justice Scotland 
CJSW: Criminal Justice Social Work(er) 
COPFS: Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
COSLA: Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CPO: Community Payback Order 
CPP: Community Planning Partnership 
CRC: Community Rehabilitation Company 
CRP: Crime Reduction Programme 
CSO: Community Service Order 
CSS: Correctional Service for Scotland 
DTTO: Drug Treatment and Testing Order 
EM: Electronic Monitoring 
ESRC: Economic and Social Research Council 
HMP: Her Majesty’s Prison 
MAPPA: Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
MSP: Member of the Scottish Parliament 
Napo: National Association of Probation Officers 
NHS: National Health Service 
NOMS: National Offender Management Service 
NPS: National Probation Service 
OASys: Offender Assessment System 
PSP: Public Social Partnership 
PSR: Pre-Sentence Report 
RLO: Restriction of Liberty Order 
RMA: Risk Management Authority 
RRP: Reducing Reoffending Programme 
RRP2: Reducing Reoffending Programme, Phase 2 
SAO: Supervised Attendance Order 
SER: Social Enquiry Report (see PSR) 
SNP: Scottish National Party 
SOA: Single Outcome Agreement 
SPS: Scottish Prison Service 
SWSG: Scottish Office Social Work Services Group 
SWSI: Social Work Services Inspectorate 
TR: Transforming Rehabilitation 




Appendix B: Sample Letter of Approach 
This is a skeleton letter which was tailored to specific people and agencies. 
Dear [name], 
 
I'm a PhD student in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Edinburgh, 
supervised by Professor Richard Sparks and Dr Richard Jones. My project is about the 
current restructuring of the community justice system in Scotland. In particular, I'm 
concerned with the historical and political processes that have led to this policy, with the 
ways in which people who work within different parts of the community justice system are 
experiencing them and how their practice is changing and adapting to new structures. 
  
Following an extensive literature review, I recently began the empirical phase of the project. 
This is intended to consist of a series of semi-structured interviews with people working in 
various parts of community justice about their views and experience of these policies. So far 
I've spoken to [some people from particular institutions], and these interviews have been 
really interesting and informative.  
 
However, I'd be keen to speak to [others] to get more of a range of perspectives. [One of my 
previous participants suggested that you might be a good person to contact about this.] I 
would be really interested in speaking to you and/or members of your team, particularly 
given [certain details of particular interest about your organisation]. My interviews 
involve asking participants about their day-to-day work, how they have experienced the 
Scottish Government's consultation process and their experiences of practice and 
partnership working, in relation to the restructuring of community justice and preparing for 
the abolition of CJAs after only a few years in place. 
 
I have full ethical approval from the University, and I would of course make sure that 
nothing that could be used to identify you or any other participants would appear in the 
final thesis. I would also be happy to provide a feedback summary of my research to [your 
organisation], once the empirical stage is complete. I fully understand, of course, that you 
and your staff must be very busy and might not have time for an interview. In either case, 
I would really welcome any advice you might have about [the project]. 
 






Doctoral Research Student, Criminology and Criminal Justice 
[link to University webpage] | j.g.m.buchan@sms.ed.ac.uk 
School of Law, University of Edinburgh 




Appendix C: Sample Interview Guide 
This interview guide was used when conducting my interview with the civil servant in the study. As 
this was the last interview conducted, this is the most well-developed of the guides. 
Interview Guide for Justice Directorate/Civil Service Staff in Scotland 
About the Respondent 
- Name (for purposes of consent form only) 
- Job title and how long held. 
- Previous jobs within and outside organisation, where relevant. Policy/justice 
background? 
- The participant’s job and what it involves on a daily basis. What their time is spent 
doing, what the core responsibilities are. 
The CJA Model 
- Feelings/opinions on CJA system in general – strengths and weaknesses.  
- Success/failure in terms of partnerships and accountability. Angiolini/CWO report 
findings.  
- Particular CJA governance issues (see Morrison, 2012): 
o Divided political/CJA loyalties of councillor members 
o Funding/control discontinuity 
o Power imbalance (between CJSW and SPS) 
o Performance management and assessment (Audit Scotland, 2012) 
- (If relevant) talk about participant’s experiences of implementation of/transition to 
CJA system, and subsequent ‘bedding in’.  
- Transitioning to the Community Payback Order? (if relevant) 
- The decision to redesign community justice –  
o When and how did this come about? How long was it on the agenda? 
o The reasons for this. 
o Participant’s own involvement and input? 
Redesigning Community Justice 
- The Reducing Reoffending Programme – thoughts/opinions on this. 
- Talking about the restructuring process – was the participant involved in the 
consultation and what they were doing. Expected outcomes. 
- Different organisations in the consultation – representation? 
- Discussions with CJA staff? 
- Expectations for the new CPP/national system – advantages and disadvantages. 




- Community Planning Partnerships – the interface between these and RCJ?  
- What kind of preparations are being made for the changeover? 
- Public Social Partnerships. Thoughts/ideas/experience to do with these? What role 
for them in the new system? 
- Ring-fenced funding – opinions about and experience with of. Help or hindrance to 
partnership working? The funding project within RRP2 – progress, reasoning, 
relevance. 
- Decision to maintain the RMA alongside national body – reasoning and process of 
decision. 
Policy and Legislative Context 
- Process of drawing up legislation – relationship to policy cycle? 
- Relation to other policies in justice sector (Police Scotland, CPOs, prisons, court 
reform?) 
- Community Empowerment Bill – CPPs, criticism of them (Audit Scotland) and 
response to this. CJ redesign and the effect on CPPs? 
- Health and social care integration – possible effect on CJSW?  
Adapting Practice 
- Experience of working here – whether and in what way it is like or unlike it used to be. 
- Preparations within workplace for the redesign. 
- How individuals from different partners might be feeling about the restructuring. 
- Has there been much in the way of change in terms of everyday work? 
- Communicating differently? Have official targets/aims changed? 
- Working hours – any changes and possible reasons for this. How much time does 
this project take up, in comparison to other activity? 
Future Plans 
- Future plans – staying/going/changing position within the same organisation? 
- The future of criminal justice social work/community justice? Further reforms? 
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